The 

Diplomatic  History 


of  the 


Southern   Confederacy 


THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES 
ON  DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 


By  the  liberality  of  Albert  Shaw,  Ph.  D.,  of  New 
York  City,  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  has  been 
enabled  to  provide  for  three  years  a  series  of  lectures 
on  Diplomatic  History.  These  courses  are  given  in 
the  Department  of  History,  Politics  and  Economics 
and  are  published  under  the  direction  of  Professor 
Herbert  B.  Adams. 


THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES  ON 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY, 


The  Diplomatic  History  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy 


Q 

By  JAMES  MORTON  CALLAHAN,  Ph.  D. 


BALTIMORE 

THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 
1901 


Copyright,  1901 
THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 


$t  JSorb  (gafttmore 

THE  FRIEDENWALD  COMPANY 

BALTIMORE,   MD.,  U.  S.  A. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

I.     The  Confederate  Diplomatic  Archives n 

II.     Confederate  Government,  Politics  and  Finances  .  25 

III.  The  Confederate  Foreign  Policy 66 

IV.  Mission  of  Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann 108 

V.     Mission  of  Mason  and  Slidell 130 

VI.     Expectations  of  European  Intervention     ....  145, 

VII.     Controversies 169 

\VIII.     The  Crisis  in  England      182 

IX.     Napoleon  and  the  Projected  Confederate  Navy     .  202 

X.  '  Confederate  Operations  from  Canada 220 

XI.     The  Last  Effort — Kenner's  Secret  Mission    .    .    .  239 

Appendix 277 


9 1.3.1 


PREFACE 


This  volume  is  a  study  of  the  efforts  of  the  Confed 
erate  authorities,  in  the  face  of  waning  hope  and 
diminishing  resources,  to  secure  foreign  recognition 
and  support.  It  considers  also  the  forces  which  con 
trolled  the  European  powers  and  defeated  the  attempt 
to  divide  the  American  Union,  which,  if  successful, 
would  have  changed  the  current  of  political  and  eco 
nomic  evolution. 

It  attempts  to  give  a  careful  and  purely  historical 
presentation  of  the  theories,  purposes,  policies,  diplo 
matic  efforts,  and  difficulties  of  the  Secessionists,  as 
reflected  from  their  official  archives  and  other  original 
records.  It  traces  the  inner  working  of  the  diplo 
matic  machine  during  the  many  variations  of  the  mili 
tary  and  political  situation,  closely  observes  the  atti 
tude,  motives,  and  policy  of  the  great  nations  with 
whom  the  Confederate  agents  sought  to  negotiate, 
and  throws  light  upon  international  questions  arising 
between  the  United  States  and  foreign  powers. 

Though  other  materials  have  not  been  neglected, 
the  work  is,  in  a  large  measure,  based  upon  the  Con 
federate  diplomatic  correspondence,  which  is  now  in 
manuscript  in  the  United  States  Treasury  Depart 
ment.  For  permission  to  read  this  correspondence 


8  PREFACE 

and  to  make  extracts,  I  desire  to  acknowledge  the 
courtesies  of  Judge  Lewis  Jordan,  Chief  of  the  Mis 
cellaneous  Division  of  the  Treasury  Department. 
For  permission  to  examine  several  of  the  duplicates 
of  Mr.  Mason's  despatches  and  originals  of  his  in 
structions,  I  am  grateful  to  his  daughter,  Miss  Vir 
ginia  Mason.  For  the  narrative  of  Mr.  Kenner, 
which  has  been  utilized  in  the  preparation  of  part  of 
Chapter  XII,  I  am  under  obligations  to  Brigadier- 
General  J.  L.  Brent,  of  Baltimore,  and  the  late  Hon. 
William  Wirt  Henry,  of  Richmond.  For  sugges 
tions  of  value  in  obtaining  material,  or  for  informa 
tion  upon  particular  points,  my  thanks  are  due  to 
Mrs.  Jefferson  Davis  and  Burton  N.  Harrison,  Esq., 
of  New  York;  Comtesse  Roman,  of  Paris;  Brigadier- 
General  Marcus  J.  Wright,  Brigadier-General  F.  C. 
Ainsworth,  Dr.  J.  L.  M.  Curry,  Hon.  John  Goode, 
and  Theodore  J.  Pickett,  Esq.,  of  Washington,  D.  C.; 
Colonel  William  Preston  Johnston,  Ernest  B.  Krutt- 
schnitt,  and  Miss  Grace  King,  of  New  Orleans;  Rev. 
J.  William  Jones,  of  Richmond,  and  others.  For 
careful  and  valuable  service  in  the  correction  of  the 
typewritten  manuscript  and  proof-sheets,  acknowl 
edgment  is  due  to  Miss  Elizabeth  R.  Daran,  Librarian 
of  the  Historical  Department  of  the  Johns  Hopkins 
University. 

I  am  especially  under  deep  obligations  to  Professor 
Herbert  B.  Adams,  who  has  directed  and  encouraged 
me  in  this  and  other  fields  of  research.  . 


PREFACE  9 

The  materials  upon  which  this  volume  is  based 
were  used  in  the  preparation  of  a  paper  on  Anglo- 
Confederate  Relations,  presented  before  the  Ameri 
can  Historical  Association,  at  the  New  Haven  meet 
ing,  December,  1898.  My  investigations  resulted 
later  in  a  course  of  lectures  which  were  given  upon 
the  Albert  Shaw  foundation  in  the  Johns  Hopkins 
University. 

JAMES  MORTON  CALLAHAN. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  April,  1901. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  CONFEDERATE  DIPLOMATIC  ARCHIVES 

In  a  small  room  on  the  third  floor  of  the  Treasury 
Department,  overlooking  the  Executive  Mansion,  are 
the  manuscript  archives,  sometimes  designated  as  the 
"  Pickett  Papers,"  which  relate  the  story  of  the  un 
successful  diplomatic  efforts  of  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  to  secure  admission  as  an  independent  mem 
ber  in  the  family  of  nations,  to  obtain  the  means 
necessary  to  the  establishment  of  a  navy  and  the 
maintenance  of  an  army,  and  to  bring  about  foreign 
mediation  or  intervention. 

During  the  war  many  valuable  despatches  were 
captured  while  being  carried  through  the  blockade, 
and  were  afterwards  published  by  United  States 
papers,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  Confederate  cor 
respondence,  copies  of  which  were  in  the  offices  at 
Richmond,  were  safely  kept  until  the  close  of  the  war, 
and  the  Confederate  Government  exercised  vigilance 
to  prevent  it  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Fed 
eral  authorities.  For  a  time  in  the  spring  of  1862, 
locomotives  were  kept  in  readiness  to  remove  the 
treasure  and  some  of  the  archives.  There  were  prep 
arations  for  flight  from  Richmond  for  several  weeks 
before  the  evacuation  in  the  spring  of  1865.  Papers  of 
the  Government  were  revised  and  marked  for  destruc 
tion,  abandonment  or  preservation.1  A  month  before 

Bollard:  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  with  a  Secret  History 
of  the  Confederacy,  Chapter  XXX.  J.  B.  Jones:  Diary. 


12         iftk  CONFEDERATE   DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES 


of  the  archives  were  sent  to 
Lynchburg  and  others  were  packed  in  boxes  to  send 
away  later.  Mr.  Benjamin  destroyed  the  secret  ser 
vice  papers  on  April  2,  the  day  the  Confederates  set  fire 
to  Richmond.  In  the  evening  of  that  day  trains 
steamed  from  the  city  with  the  Confederate  treasure 
and  archives,  including  those  of  the  "  State  Depart 
ment."  The  load  dwindled  until,  in  Georgia,  it  was 
carried  in  the  saddle-bags  of  individuals.  Some  of 
Mr.  Davis's  papers  accidentally  fell  into  the  hands  of 
a  young  man  at  Richmond,  who  distributed  them  as 
autographs  to  his  friends.2  Part  of  his  correspond 
ence,  including  letters  from  disloyal  persons  in  the 
North,  was  carried  away  and  was  said  to  be  pre 
served  under  seal  of  personal  confidence  with  Mr. 
Davis.8  Many  other  valuable  papers  were  hidden  in 
the  vicinity  of  Richmond.4 

The  United  States  captured  only  the  refuse  of  the 
archives  at  the  Confederate  capital,5  but  soon  estab 
lished  a  bureau  of  "  Rebel  Archives,"  and  added  other 
manuscripts  from  time  to  time.  On  the  fall  of 
Charleston  the  Federal  army  had  found  a  mass  of 
papers  relating  to  many  subjects;  some  treated  of 
the  causes  and  plans  of  secession,  others  related  to 
Southern  life  before  and  during  the  war,  while  still 
others  were  merely  the  letters  and  diary  of  a  lady 
belonging  to  one  of  the  historic  families  of  South 
Carolina,  whose  trembling  hand  notified  an  ardent 
and  pleading  lover  that  "  men  and  matters  change." 

2  Letter  of  Mrs.  Davis  to  the  author,  Jan.  13,  1899. 
8  The  volumes  of  "  office  copies  "  of  letters  written  by  Mr. 
Davis,   are   preserved,   and  are   now  in  the   control   of  Mrs. 
Varina  J.   Davis. 
4  Pollard:     Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  etc.,  p.  368.         'Ibid. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES          13 

Correspondence  and  records  bearing  upon  the  war 
were  obtained  in  many  other  places.  When  General 
Joseph  Johnston  surrendered  in  1865,  he  notified 
General  Schofield  at  Raleigh  that  he  had  in  his  pos 
session  at  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  certain  records 
and  archives  of  the  Confederacy  which  he  was  ready 
to  deliver.  A  United  States  officer  received  them 
and  they  were  sent  to  Washington.  The  United 
States  afterwards  claimed  all  the  effects  of  the  Con 
federacy  abroad,  including  money  in  the  hands  of 
agents  and  vessels-of-war  in  foreign  ports.  Some  of 
the  Confederate  agents  at  the  close  of  the  war  de 
stroyed  their  papers  for  fear  they  might  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Federal  Government.8  Mr.  Mason,  how 
ever,  carefully  preserved  his  voluminous  correspond 
ence,  and  while  living  in  Canada  guarded  against  any 
possibility  of  its  seizure. 

While  the  important  Confederate  archives  were 
being  removed  from  Richmond,  the  diplomatic  cor 
respondence,  consisting  of  the  "  State  Department " 
archives,  except  the  secret  service  vouchers,  was  taken 
by  a  Southern  man  and  hidden  in  a  barn  in  Virginia. 
After  the  excitement  had  somewhat  subsided,  the 
papers  were  removed  to  Washington  in  'five  separate 
trunks  and,  in  order  to  guard  against  seizure  by  the 
Government,  were  deposited  in  several  places  for 
safe  keeping.  It  appears  that  the  custodian  of  the 
papers  was  in  reduced  circumstances  and  that  sums 
of  money  for  his  current  expenses  were  advanced  by 
Colonel  John  T.  Pickett,  who  was  employed  by  him 
as  an  agent  to  dispose  of  the  papers/ 

8  Baltimore  Sun,  July  30,  1872. 

7  Interview  with  Theodore  J.  Pickett.  It  should  be  stated, 
however,  although  Col.  Pickett  always  claimed  to  be  the 


14         THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES 

Picket!  was  a  well-known  Southern  man,  having 
been  United  States  Consul  at  Turk's  Island  and  also 
at  Vera  Cruz,  Mexico,  for  a  number  of  years.  He 
had  also  been  commissioned  by  Louis  Kossuth  as  a 
general  in  the  Hungarian  service.  Later  he  had  joined 
the  Lopez  expedition  to  Cuba  and  was  in  command 
against  the  Spanish  regulars  at  the  battle  of  Cardenas.8 
He  was  secretary  of  the  Confederate  Peace  Commis 
sion  to  Washington  in  1861,  after  which  he  was  sent 
as  a  commissioner  to  Mexico,  and  later  served  in  the 
Confederate  army  as  chief-of-staff  to  Gen.  John  C. 
Breckinridge. 

Pickett,  stating  that  he  had  found  the  archives 
stored  away  in  Canada  and  had  bought  a  certain  con 
trol  of  them,  wrote,  January  20,  1868,  from  Toronto, 
offering  them  to  Seward,  who  replied  that  they  would 
have  to  be  brought  to  Washington  and  examined  be 
fore  purchase.  The  proposition  was  declined.  When 
Grant  became  President  the  papers  were  offered  to 
him  in  person,  and  he  favored  their  acquisition,  but 
the  consideration  of  the  subject  was  delayed.  Pickett 
also  offered  them  to  Southern  men  of  wealth,  to  pub 
lishers,  and  to  historical  associations,  but  was  unable 
to  dispose  of  them.  Knowing  that  the  archives  ex- 
hibited  the  fact  that  Thompson  was  in  Canada  with 
considerable  money  when  the  Confederacy  fell,  Pickett 
made  a  long  journey  to  Thompson's  home  in  the  sum 
mer  of  1871,  but  the  latter,  feeling  that  his  correspond 
ence  had  been  destroyed  by  Mr.  Benjamin,  showed 

agent  of  a  custodian  whom  he  never  named,   some   of   his 
acquaintances  suggested  that  he,  himself,  was  the  custodian. 
8  Many  interesting  facts  relating  to  Pickett  may  be  found 
among  his  private  papers  now  in  possession  of  his  son. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES          15 

no  disposition  to  buy  the  documents.9  During  the 
same  summer  various  persons  went  to  Pickett  to  in 
vestigate  the  papers,  and  he,  acting  as  attorney  for  the 
custodian,  offered  to  sell  them  to  the  United  States 
officials,  at  the  same  time  representing  that  they  were 
in  Canada.  He  finally  exhibited  a  copy  of  the  in 
ventory,  found  with  the  property,  giving  indices  of 
the  contents  of  the  trunks.  The  President,  in  the 
meantime  having  issued  his  amnesty  proclamation, 
and  the  unknown,  needy  custodian  urging  a  conclu 
sion,  Pickett  entered  into  negotiations  with  Cabinet 
officers  and  the  "  Southern  Claims  "  Commissioners. 
In  April,  1872,  the  United  States  agents  appointed 
to  make  the  purchase  went  with  Pickett  to  Canada 
to  examine  the  contents  of  the  trunks.  Pickett,  with 
out  the  knowledge  of  the  agents,  carried  the  trunks 
to  Canada  on  the  same  train,  and  after  crossing  the 
border  they  were  submitted  to  a  two  weeks'  examina 
tion.10  He  had  hoped  to  obtain  $150,000,  but  accepted 
half  the  sum  rather  than  wait  longer.  The  officers 
reported  in  favor  of  the  purchase,  and  the  custodian 
of  the  papers  agreed  to  deliver  them  to  the  Govern 
ment. 

An  appropriation  to  enable  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  examine  the  Confederate  archives  was  approved 
May  8,  1872,  but  it  seems  that  the  diplomatic  papers 
were  purchased  by  special  act  of  Congress  which  was 
passed  a  month  later.11  Pickett,  having  first  made 
copies  of  the  papers  for  his  own  use,  transferred  them 
to  the  Government.  On  July  3,  1872,  four  yellow 
trunks  were  delivered  at  the  White  House,  where  he 

9  The  Daily  Patriot  (Washington),  July  19,  1872. 

10  Interview  with  T.  J.  Pickett. 

"See  Cong.  Globe,  Part  VI,  Appendix,  42-2,  p.  711. 


l6         THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES 

was  handed  $75,000,  from  which  he  received  stipu 
lated  fees  and  reimbursement  for  his  expenses. 
Through  Mr.  Riggs,  a  Washington  banker,  a  great 
part  of  these  fees  was  distributed  to  needy  widows 
and  orphans  of  Confederate  officers,  without  inform 
ing  them  as  to  the  source  of  the  charity. 

The  news  that  the  "  Pickett  Papers  "  had  been  pur 
chased  soon  became  public.  Among  them  the  report 
of  Jacob  Thompson  concerning  plans  to  burn  North 
ern  cities  and  commit  other  depredations  was  found 
and  soon  afterwards  published  in  the  newspapers.  A 
great  many  articles  appeared  regarding  the  delivery 
of  the  papers  to  the  United  States  Government,  very 
exaggerated  accounts  of  the  character  of  the  papers 
and  the  price  received  were  published,  and  great  in 
justice  was  done  to  Colonel  Pickett,  whose  connec 
tion  with  the  transaction  was  that  of  an  agent  or  attor 
ney  of  the  custodian.  Some  said  that  no  good  could 
result  from  the  exhibit  of  long-buried  documents, 
unless  they  should  be  in  defense  of  persons  maligned; 
others,  including  Sanford  Conover,  said  that  the 
papers  would  prove  to  be  forgeries,  and  that  Secretary 
Boutwell  had  wasted  $75,000  on  four  trunks  of  ^worth 
less  archives.  Some,  speaking  of  them  as  campaign 
documents,  said  that  the  impending  presidential  elec 
tion  seemed  -to  have  whetted  the  appetite  of  the  ad 
ministration  to  purchase  records  which,  when  sifted, 
might  be  found  to  reflect  on  Judge  Davis,  who  had 
just  been  nominated  for  the  presidency.  Several 
prominent  Southern  men  blamed  Pickett  for  deliver 
ing  the  correspondence.  Some  suggested  that  it  was 
forged  and  some  that  it  was  stolen.12 

12  N.  Y.  Herald,  July  24  and  28,  1872.     Daily  Patriot,  July 
22  and  27,  1872. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES          17 

Colonel  Pickett,  in  a  published  statement  of  his 
agency  in  the  sale  of  the  archives,  vindicated  his  ac 
tion.  To  those  who  feared  that  prominent  men  might 
be  injured,  he  stated  that  Mr.  Benjamin  had  burned 
the  secret  service  vouchers,  and  that  under  any  cir 
cumstances  he  would  not  have  delivered  such  papers 
to  the  Government.  Of  those  delivered  he  said  that 
the  Thompson  report  was  the  only  one  that  gave  him 
any  pain,  and  without  the  consideration  of  incapacity 
and  blunders,  that  it  was  the  only  one  "  discreditable 
to  the  three  or  four  men  who  ran  the  Confederate 
machine."  He  admitted  that  Thompson,  Davis  and 
Benjamin  might  feel  uncomfortable  for  awhile,  but 
stated  that  Thompson,  to  whom  he  had  given  an  op 
portunity  to  buy  the  papers,  could  not  now  complain. 
As  to  the  Thompson  report,  Pickett  declared  that  he 
did  not  know  of  its  presence  among  the  papers  until 
his  attention  was  drawn  to  it  while  making  the  exam 
ination  in  Canada,  and  that  it  was  then  too  late  to  with 
draw  it.  He  repudiated  the  policy  of  attempting  to 
burn  the  Northern  cities. 

Pickett  said  that  the  Confederacy  yet  owed  him 
$50,000,  but  that,  in  preserving  the  documents,  he 
acted  only  in  the  interest  of  his  client  and  of  his 
tory.  "  What  right  had  I,"  inquired  he,  "  to  destroy 
the  material  by  which  history  is  written?  The  per 
son  who  spirited  the  papers  away  and  held  them  in 
his  possession  was  getting  impatient  and  swore  that 
he  would  dispose  of  them  himself.  When  the  papers 
were  sold  he  received  the  greater  part  of  the  money 
and  took  the  first  train."  As  to  the  charge  that  the 
documents  were  stolen,  Pickett  said  that  they  were 
rather  restored  to  their  rightful  owner — the  heir-at- 
2 


l8         THE    CONFEDERATE   DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES 

law  and  residuary  legatee  of  the  defunct  Confederacy. 
The  Baltimore  Sun  asked  why  Pickett  had  not  deliv 
ered  them  sooner,  if  they  were  the  rightful  property 
of  the  United  States! 

Pickett  declared  that  the  archives  had  no  present 
political  significance,  and  insisted  that  they  should  be 
respected  as  part  of  American  history.  He  did  not 
see  any  wrong  in  placing  them  in  the  hands  of  the 
Government  so  that  generations  to  come  might  know 
the  truth.  He  did  not  think  that  the  Confederate 
Government  should  be  ashamed  of  its  records,  and 
if  by  chance  their  publications  should  injure  some 
individuals  it  was  simply  the  fate  of  war. 

Aside  from  the  letters  from  Confederate  agents  in 
Canada,  the  archives  did  not  contain  the  material 
which  was  expected  to  make  Thompson,  Davis,  Ben 
jamin  and  others  uncomfortable,  and  as  a  campaign 
weapon  the  collection  was  not  such  a  boomerang  as 
had  been  expected.18  After  the  publication  of  Thomp 
son's  report,  parties  in  the  South  and  elsewhere  offered 
to  sell  other  Confederate  manuscripts.14  iTckett ^riad  a 
list  of  books  used  by  the  Confederacy  and  held  by 
parties  in  Texas  which  he  proposed  to  furnish  for  a 
remuneration.18  They  contained  correspondence  or 
lists  relating  to  subscriptions  to  the  cotton  loan, 
transfers  of  steamers  from  English  firms  to  the  Confed 
eracy,  confiscation  of  property  by  the  Confederate 
Government  and  the  exchange  of  cotton  to  English 

13  Baltimore  Sun,  July  30,  1872.     Also,  the  Memphis  Appeal. 

14  Baltimore  Sun,  July  15,  1873. 

15  Pickett  also  had  in  his  possession  the  official  seal  of  the 
Confederacy,  but  he  did  not  sell  it.     Electrotype  "  medals  " 
of  it  were  for  awhile  on  sale  by  a  Washington  jeweler.     Very 
few  persons  know  who  now  has  the  original  seal. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES         19 

subjects  for  rifles.  Still  other  papers  were  offered  by 
other  persons,  but  the  Government  had  decided  to 
make  no  further  purchases.  Later,  however,  some  of 
those  who  had  first  been  disposed  to  censure  Pickett's 
conduct  sold  important  military  papers  to  the  Govern 
ment,  thus  practically  sanctioning  his  action. 

In  June,  1874,  Congress  passed  an  act  to  enable 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  begin  the  publication  of 
Union  and  Confederate  official  records.  On  July  I, 
General  Marcus  J.  Wright  was  appointed  agent  of  the 
War  Department  for  collecting  Confederate  military 
records.  He  has  obtained  the  originals  or  copies  of 
many  valuable  military  and  executive  papers.  Per 
sons  having  correspondence  have  generally  shown 
a  disposition  to  have  it  published,  though  the  Gov 
ernment  no  longer  makes  purchases.15  The  Naval 
War  Records  Office  has  also  gathered  much  material 
for  publication. 

Time  has  proven  that  Boutwell  did  not  pay  for  waste 
paper.  The  names  in  the  indexes  of  the  Pickett 
papers,  together  with  the  indexes  of  the  correspond 
ence  of  the  Confederate  Treasury  and  other  depart 
ments,  have  proven  of  great  convenience  and  value  to 
the  Government  in  defeating  the  payment  of  fraudu- 
lent  claims  to  the  amount  of  many  millions  of  dollars. 
Hence  the  transaction  has  proven  a  most  profitable 
one  from  a  financial  point  of  view.  The  indexes  are 
not  made  according  to  subjects,  but  are  arranged  ac 
cording  to  the  names  of  persons,  giving  their  post- 
office  addresses  and  the  subjects  of  their  correspond 
ence  opposite.  Thus  the  records  of  persons  making 

18  Marcus  J.  Wright  in  Phila.  Weekly  Times,  April  10,  1880. 


2O         THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC    ARCHIVES 

claims  on  the  Government  can  be  ascertained  in  i. 
short  time  by  referring  to  the  correspondence  itself.  Ii 
the  index  the  subjects  of  letters  are  given  by  such 
short  titles  as  are  indicated  in  the  following  taker 
from  the  index  of  the  "  Miscellaneous "  papers 
"  Suggestions/'  "  salt-petre,"  "  loud  complaints,"  "  ab 
straction  of  State-papers,"  "  vents  his  spleen  on  hie 
captors,"  "  bustling  with  joy  for  the  Confederacy." 

Outside  of  the  great  value  which  the  Pickett  ar 
chives  have  had  in  facilitating  the  investigation  o! 
claims,  they  have  still  greater  importance  as  historical 

&  material.  Embracing  the  larger  part  of  the  diplomatic 
correspondence  of  the  Confederate  Government,  the}' 
have  a  far  greater  value  than  any  of  the  collections 
of  military  papers  or  records.  Pickett  said  that  the; 
archives  consisted  of  all  the  "  State  Department "  cor 
respondence  without  the  abstraction  of  a  single  paper ; 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Benjamin  de-- 

ostroyed  papers  relating  to  secret  missions17  and  that  a 
few  despatches  from  abroad  failed  to  reach  Richmond, 
although  second  and  third  duplicates  were  started 
across  the  Atlantic.  Of  Slidell's  despatches,  numbered 
from  i  to  76  inclusive  (January,  1862,  to  December 
13,  1864),  only  "  No.  21  "  is  missing,  but  several  of 
Mason's  failed  to  reach  Richmond.  No  letters  written 
by  Mason  and  Slidell  to  Mr.  Benjamin,  or  by  Mr. 

17  Mr.  Benjamin  seems  always  to  have  had  a  desire  not  to 
leave  behind  him  any  historical  material.  He  also  seemed  to 
have  an  abhorrence  of  any  ransacking  of  his  private  papers 
and  correspondence,  and  a  very  short  time  before  his  death 
he  destroyed  all  such  manuscripts.  Some  of  his  correspond 
ence  of  the  period  before  1861  may  be  found  passim  in  the 
archives  of  the  State  Department  at  Washington,  but  no 
collection  of  his  private  letters  is  to  be  found  anywhere. 


THE    CONFEDERATE   DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES         21 

Benjamin  to  them,  after  December,  1864,  are  to  be 
found  in  the  papers  purchased  from  Pickett.  It  is 
quite  probable  that  the  strict  blockade  after  January, 
1865,  prevented  Benjamin  from  receiving  European 
correspondence;  and  his  own  letters  after  December 
30,  1864,  were  probably  laid  aside  to  be  copied  in  the 
record  books  later,  and  were  not  packed  with  the  other 
archives  at  the  time  when  preparations  were  made  to 
evacuate  Richmond. 

The  scope  of  the  material  included  in  the  Pickett 
collection  may  be  indicated  by  the  following  list: 

1.  Instructions  and  despatches  of  the  commission  to 
Washington,  1861. 

2.  Papers  relating  to  the  ratification  of  the  ordi 
nances  of  secession. 

3.  Correspondence  relating  to  Fort  Sumter. 

4.  Diplomatic  despatches  of  Yancey,  Rost,  Mann, 
Mason,    Slidell,    Lamar,    Lynch,    Pickett,    Preston, 
Cripps  and  Ricken,  the  Confederate  representatives 
in  England,  Spain,  Belgium,  France,  Russia,  Rome 
and  Mexico." 

5.  Record  books  containing  the  letters  of  Secre 
taries  Toombs,  Hunter  and  Benjamin  to  diplomatic, 
consular  and  special  or  confidential  agents  abroad. 

6.  Consular     correspondence,     including     that     of 
Hotze,    De    Leon,    McRae,    Quintero,    Fitzpatrick, 
La  Sere,  Avegeno,  Bannon,  Capston,  Dowling,  Labor, 
Walker,  Lee,  Helm,  Heyleger,  Thompson,  Clay  and 
Holcombe,  representing  the  Confederacy  in  London, 
Paris,  Mexico,  Ireland,  the  West  Indies  and  Canada. 

18  The  larger  part  of  the   diplomatic  and  consular  corre 
spondence  is  in  "  Trunk  B." 


22        THE   CONFEDERATE  DIPLOMATIC  ARCHIVES 

7.  Record  copies  and  originals  of  domestic  letters 
from  the  State  Department,  and  the  originals  of  mis 
cellaneous  letters  to  the  department. 

8.  Applications  for  appointments  to  positions,  for 
letters  of  marque  and  for  passports,  and  subscription 
lists  for  persons  to  whom  passports  were  issued. 

9.  Index  to  testimony  concerning  property  taken  or 
destroyed,  etc. 

10.  Newspapers  and  clippings. 

11.  Proclamations,    messages,    pardons,    commis 
sions,  appropriations,  constitutions,  and  acts  of  Con 
gress. 

12.  Indexes,  "  Cash  Book,"  ledgers,  etc. 

Some  of  the  Confederate  agents  abroad  kept  copies 
of  their  private  correspondence.  In  some  cases  this 
is  valuable  in  supplementing  the  Richmond  archives 
which  have  been  preserved  to  us  through  the  thought- 
fulness  of  Colonel  Pickett.  J.  M.  Mason's  complete 
public  and  private  correspondence,  including  that 
with  Messrs.  Benjamin,  Slidell,  Mann,  and  other 
Confederate  officials,  is  in  possession  of  his  daughter, 
Miss  Virginia  Mason  of  Charlottesville,  who,  after  pub 
lishing  a  portion  of  it,  contemplates  leaving  it  with 
the  Virginia  Historical  Society.  Among  these  papers 
are  several  official  letters  not  found  in  the  Richmond 
archives.  John  Slidell  unfortunately  destroyed  the 
bulk  of  his  private  correspondence  during  his  resi 
dence  in  Paris." 

Colonel  Ambrose  Dudley  Mann  wrote  from  mem 
ory  an  account  of  his  diplomatic  career,  leaving  the 
task  of  editing  it  to  Miss  Winnie  Davis,  but  owing  to 

"  Letter  of  Comtesse  Roman  to  the  author. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES         23 

his  death  the  manuscript  was  never  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Miss  Davis  and  has  never  been  published.20 

The  prominent  men,  who  could  have  spoken  from 
personal  experience  and  intimate  acquaintance  re 
garding  the  foreign  policy  and  diplomacy  of  the  Con 
federacy,  have  passed  from  the  stage  of  action,  and 
have  left  no  record  of  personal  narratives  which 
might  have  been  drawn  from  their  mines  of  remin 
iscences.  John  H.  Reagan,  of  Austin,  Texas,  the 
only  surviving  member  of  the  Confederate  Cabinet, 
has  been  so  busily  engaged  with  public  and  private 
cares  since  the  war  that  he  has  had  "  substantially  no 
opportunity  to  review  and  perpetuate  the  memory  of 
past  events."  He  is  now  over  eighty  years  of  age 
and  can  no  longer  trust  his  memory  on  important 
points  unless  fortified  by  the  records.  He  probably 
had  no  occasion  to  know  much  regarding  the  depart 
ment  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  who  knew  how  to  keep  his 
own  secrets. 

Mr.  L.  Q.  C.  Washington,  who  was  assistant  sec 
retary  under  Benjamin,  and  now  resides  in  Wash 
ington,  D.  C.,  is  probably  the  only  living  man  who 
had  opportunity  to  know  the  inside  motives  and  plans 
of  Confederate  diplomacy.  In  some  cases,  he  finds 
himself  unable  to  recall  details  unless  he  can  refresh 
his  memory  by  reference  to  documents.  Although 
he  always  knew  more  than  anyone  else,  except  Ben 
jamin,  regarding  the  routine  work  of  the  office,  on 
some  points  he  has  only  a  vague  recollection.  Perhaps 
there  were  some  diplomatic  missions,  the  details  of 
which  were  not  confided  to  him. 

20  Letter  of  Mrs.  Davis  to  the  author. 


24         THE    CONFEDERATE    DIPLOMATIC   ARCHIVES 

Walker  Fearn,  who  was  connected  with  the  mis 
sions  of  Lamar  and  of  Preston  as  secretary,  and  was 
for  some  time  in  close  relation  with  Mason  and  Slidell 
in  Europe,  lived  until  1899,  but  was  not  inclined  to 
write. 

In  a  letter  of  Colonel  Pickett,  under  date  of  July 
26,  1872,  he  alludes  to  a  "  forthcoming  work  "  on  the 
"  diplomacy  of  the  rebellion,"  but  does  not  name  the 
person  who  contemplated  the  preparation  of  such  a 
work.  J.  D.  Bullock,  an  agent  of  the  Confederate 
navy,  in  his  "  Secret  Service  of  the  Confederate  States 
in  Europe,"  has  given  a  graphic  account  of  the  plans 
of  the  Confederacy  to  secure  a  navy  and  of  the  diffi 
culties  which  had  to  be  met.  John  Bigelow,  the 
United  States  Consul  at  Paris  and  also  United  States 
minister  at  the  same  place  during  the  Civil  War,  has 
treated  the  same  subject  in  his  volume  on  "  France 
and  the  Confederate  Navy,"  a  work  based  upon  his 
own  observation  and  upon  Mr.  Slidell's  correspond 
ence. 


CHAPTER  II 

CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT,  POLITICS  AND  FINANCE 

The    Confederacy    had    a    de    facto    Government, 
though  it  was  not  formally  recognized  by  any  power. 
For  over  three  years  it  made  its  home  in  Richmond, 
and  the  vast  armies  of  the  United  States  unsuccess 
fully  beat  against  its  strongholds.     It  adopted  a  flag 
and  a  seal  of  its  own.1     More  important  than  flag  or 
seal,  (t  had  an  army  whose  achievements  won  the  ad-    ' 
miration  of  the  world;  )jut  it  had  no  navy  with  whichV 
to  open  the  blockade  and  give  the  Government  that 
probability  of  permanence  which  was  necessary  to  k** 
secure  European  recognition.2 


1  Davis  loved  the  old  flag,  and  many  favored  keeping  it; 
but  the  Confederate  Congress,  in  February,  1865,  in  the  face 
of  Federal  triumph,  decided  upon  a  temporary  design,  and 
was  debating  the  adoption  of  a  flag  for  future  generations. 
The  seal  was  not  received  at  Richmond  until  near  the  close 
of  the  war.  In  April,  1863,  Congress  passed  a  resolution  for 
the  seal  and  the  next  month  Benjamin  authorized  Mason  to 
have  it  executed  in  England.  In  July,  1864,  after  many  de 
lays,  Mason  sent  it  by  Lieutenant  Chapman  and  shipped  two 
boxes  containing  the  iron  press  necessary  for  making  the 
impression.  [Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  10,  July  6,  1864.] 
The  seal  reached  Richmond  in  September,  but  the  boxes 
were  lost.  [An  article  on  the  seal,  by  J.  T.  Pickett,  appears 
in  the  Am.  Hist.  Record,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  360.]  *' 

*  In  some  respects  the  South  had  the  advantage  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  The  United  States  executive  had 
been  left  unprepared  for  war,  two-thirds  of  the  serviceable 
steam  vessels  were  in  foreign  ports,  and  many  high  officials 
were  Southern  sympathizers.  The  Secessionists,  from  their 
oosition,  required  a  less  number  of  troops  than  the  Union- 


26  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

The  organization  of  a  central  authority  for  the 
seceding  states  began  at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  on 
February  4,  1861.  The  conservative  leaders,  like 
Stephens,  were  opposed  to  secession  as  "  a  remedy 
against  anticipated  aggressions,"  and  many  still  hoped 
for  something  to  occur  to  prevent  permanent  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union  and  at  the  same  time  secure  terms 
favorable  to  the  institution  of  slavery.  Stephens  had 
urged  that  Democratic  failure  at  the  polls  furnished 
the  South  no  reason  for  breaking  the  Constitution,  but 
he  had  not  been  heeded  by  those  of  a  more  impulsive 
temperament.  Cobb,  of  Georgia,  had  advised  the 
state  legislature  to  declare  for  secession  without  wait 
ing  "  to  hear  from  the  cross-roads  and  the  groceries." 
Toombs,  of  Georgia,  had  demanded  that  he  be  given 
the  sword.  In  December  a  South  Carolina  conven 
tion  had  declared  for  secession,  and  asked  the  other 
slaveholding  states  to  cooperate  and  to  send  dele 
gates  to  form  a  provisional  congress.  Other  state 
conventions  had  soon  responded  to  the  invitation. 

The  Montgomery  council  of  delegates,  who  had 
been  hastily  selected  at  a  time  when  it  was  expected 
that  a  war  resulting  from  secession  could  only  last  a 
few  months,  became  a  provisional  congress  for  one 
year.  Cobb,  as  the  temporary  president  of  the 
council  until  the  organization  of  the  provisional  gov 
ernment,  appointed  the  committees  by  which  the 

preservation  party.  The  North,  however,  had  the  advantage 
of  resources  and  factories  and  more  business  men.  These 
count  in  war,  and  made  the  North  firmer  than  the  South  had 
expected.  A  navy  large  enough  to  blockade  the  Southern 
ports  was  soon  created.  The  North  had  a  population  of 
23,000,000,  while  the  South  only  had  9,000,000,  of  which 
3,500,000  were  slaves. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  2J 

organization  was  effected.  The  constitution  for  the 
provisional  government  was  reported  by  a  commit 
tee  including  two  members  from  each  state,  and  on 
February  8  it  was  accepted  by  the  assembled  dele 
gates.  It  was  practically  the  same  as  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  United  States.  Two  new  features  were 
introduced,  however,  by  Mr.  Stephens.8  Congress  v 
was  to  have  no  power  to  appropriate  money  unless  ? 
requested  by  the  executive  or  the  heads  of  the  depart 
ments.  The  clause  excluding  Cabinet  members  from 
Congress  was  omitted.  (Stephens  thought  it  would 
even  be  well  to  choose  the  Cabinet  members  from  '. 
Congress.)  The  provisional  government  was  to  last 
one  year.  Davis  and  Stephens  were  elected  President 
and  Vice-President  respectively,  the  vote  being  taken 
by  states.  Stephens  concurred  in  Toombs's  superior, 
qualification  for  the  presidency,  but  political  ma 
neuvering  placed  it  on  Davis,  who,  it  seems,  did  not 
want  it.  On  February  16,  Davis  arrived,  and  at  once 
appointed  a  Confederate  commission  to  Washington 
in  accordance  with  a  resolution  of  Congress.  He  se 
lected  Forsyth  of  Alabama,  Crawford  of  Georgia,  and 
Roman  of  Louisiana.  He  desired  peace  with  the 
United  States.  Slavery  demanded  it,  and  the  South 
was  not  ready  for  war.  Stephens  was  greatly  bored 
by  the  debates  of  the  new  Congress;  but  it  was  from 
the  people  that  he  expected  trouble,  for  he  saw  that 
it  would  be  necessary  for  them  to  exercise  great  pa 
tience  with  the  inconveniences  of  derangements  of 
mails  and  commerce  and  the  increase  of  taxes. 
The  permanent  constitution  was  completed  March  9. 

Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  Stephens. 


28  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

Rhett  was  chairman  of  the  committee  that  framed 
it.  He,  Toombs  and  Stephens,  proposed  most 
of  the  variations  from  the  Federal  Constitution, 
which  was  followed  as  interpreted  by  Southerners. 
The  central  Government  was  limited  and  its  hands 
tied.  The  constitution  began:  "We,  the  People  of 
the  Confederate  States,  each  State  acting  in  its  sov 
ereign  and  independent  character,  in  order  to  form  a 
Permanent  Federal  Government,"  etc.  The  "  general 
welfare  "  clause  was  omitted.  Several  new  provisions 
and  restrictions  were  added.  Congress  was  author 
ized  to  allow  heads  of  departments  to  appear  in  the 
legislative  chambers  to  explain  their  recommenda 
tions.4  Appropriations  were  proposed  by  the  heads 
of  the  departments,  except  in  case  of  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  both  Houses  to  the  contrary.  The  President, 
who  was  given  power  to  convene  and  adjourn  either 
House  at  his  will,  could  approve  or  disapprove  an 
appropriation  bill  by  sections.  Bills  appropriating 
money  were  to  relate  to  but  one  subject,  and  that  was 
to  be  expressed  in  the  title  (against  the  "rider").  The 
post-office  was  to  be  self-sustaining  after  1863.  Rev 
enue  was  to  be  obtained  by  import  duties  to  pay  the 
debts,  to  provide  for  the  common  defense,  and  for  the 
expenses  of  the  Government,  but  no  bounties  nor  pro- 

4  The  committee  favored  the  clause  in  the  Federal  constitu 
tion  which  prevented  the  Cabinet  from  being  chosen  from 
Congress,  but  this  view  did  not  carry.  The  permission  to  in 
troduce  heads  of  executive  departments  into  Congress  was 
practiced  under  the  provisional  government,  but  after  Feb 
ruary,  1862,  no  steps  were  taken  towards  putting  it  into 
practice,  and  Congress  uttered  stinging  criticisms  against 
Davis  and  his  cabinet  officers,  though  it  yielded  to  executive 
need,  and  its  members  thereby  became  men  of  little  influence 
and  initiative. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  29 

tective  duties  were  to  be  placed  on  imports.  The  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury  was  required  to  publish  an 
itemized  statement  of  the  receipts  and  the  disburse 
ments  of  his  office.  There  were  to  be  no  general  in 
ternal  improvements  to  facilitate  commerce.  Each 
state  was  allowed  to  tax  marine  commerce  in  its  har 
bors.  In  case  a  harbor  was  improved  by  Congress 
it  was  necessary  to  reimburse  the  Confederate  treas 
ury  by  taxes  on  the  commerce  of  that  harbor.  States 
could  unite  to  improve  a  river  dividing  or  flowing 
through  them.  States  were  to  be  admitted  by  a  two- 
thirds  vote  of  each  House,  the  vote  of  the  Senate 
being  by  states.  (Stephens  had  desired  the  new  con 
stitution  to  be  framed  so  as  to  admit  non-slave- 
holding  states  in  case  they  should  apply.)  Congress 
could  pass  no  bankruptcy  act  to  discharge  debts  con 
tracted  before  such  act.  Congress  could  not  inter 
fere  with  the  place  or  the  time  of  electing  senators. 
The  African  slave  trade  was  forever  prohibited,^ 
although  the  Confederate  Government  had  no  au-""^ 
thority  to  make  treaties  upon  the  subject.  Congress 
could  prohibit  the  introduction  of  slaves  from  states 
not  members  of  the  Confederacy.  It  could  take  no 
part  in  amending  the  constitution. 

The  President  and  Vice-President  were  to  serve  for 
six  years  and  the  President  was  not  re-eligible.  Pro 
vision  was  made  against  the  dogma  "  to  the  victors 
belong  the  spoils."  If  the  President  removed  officials 
of  a  lower  grade  than  the  Cabinet  it  was  necessary 
for  him  to  report  the  cause  to  Congress,  and  he  could 
make  no  appointment  if  rejected  by  the  Senate.5 

8  In  the  early  part  of  1865  a  conference  of  the  Virginia  mem 
bers  of  the  Confederate  Congress  advised  Davis  to  reorganize 


30  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

No  supreme  court  was  provided,  though  it  was 
expected  to  establish  one  later.  Citizens  of  one  state 
could  not  bring  suit  against  citizens  of  another  state 
in  trie  Federal  courts.  For  constitutional  offenses 
the  legislature  of  a  state  could  not  impeach  a  Federal 
judge  whose  duties  were  confined  to  that  state.  The 
Department  of  Justice  was  to  be  administered  under 
the  attorney-general.  The  states  were  denied  their 
former  privilege  of  granting  franchises  to  persons  not 
citizens  under  the  general  law  of  naturalization.  Pro 
vision  was  made  to  change  the  constitution.  Three 
states  could  demand  a  convention  of  states  to  alter 
or  amend  it,  but  Congress  could  not  suggest  altera 
tions.  The  constitution  was  ratified  by  state  con 
ventions.8 

Davis  promptly  selected  a  Cabinet  Toombs  of 
Georgia,  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State;  Mem- 
minger  of  South  Carolina,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury; 
Mallory  of  Florida,  Secretary  of  the  Navy;  Reagan 

the  cabinet  by  relieving  all  the  existing  members.  Davis  re 
fused,  but  on  January  18,  Mr.  Seddon  of  Virginia,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  handed  in  his  letter  of  resignation.  On  February 
I,  the  President  finally  acquiesced  in  Seddon's  resignation, 
but  he  did  not  admit  the  power  of  Congress  to  control  such 
a  matter  (as  in  England).  He  stated  that  the  Confederate 
Cabinet  members  were  not  members  of  Congress,  did  not 
originate  legislation,  and  were  not  admitted  to  the  right  of 
debate.  Two  weeks  later  the  Virginia  delegates  stated  that 
their  advice  to  Davis  had  been  confidential  and  had  only  been 
given  to  prevent  a  collision;  that  there  were  many  others  in 
Congress  who  favored  a  change  in  the  Cabinet,  but  that  they 
did  not  assume  the  power  of  Congress  to  compel  a  resigna 
tion  of  the  Cabinet,  and  had  spoken  only  for  public  sentiment 
and  safety.  [Richmond  Dispatch,  Feb.  15,  1865.! 

9  On  the  Confederate  Constitution,  see  articles  in  the  Galaxy 
for  March,  1874,  and  Frazer's  Mag.  for  Oct.,  1862. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  3! 

of  Texas,  Postmaster-General,  while  J.  P.  Benjamin  T 
of  Louisiana  "  full  of  accomplishments  and  sophistry, 
placid  and  smiling,  his  brow  ever  unclouded  "  was, 
strangely,  not  dispatched  to  European  Courts,  but 
made  Attorney-General  of  a  government  "  never  des 
tined  to  have  a  judiciary."  Toombs  was  chosen  Sec 
retary  of  State  only  after  Barnwell  of  South  Carolina, 
had  refused  to  accept  the  place.  Chafing  under  red 
tape  and  complaining  that  too  many  were  seeking 
bomb-proof  positions  under  a  timid  administration, 
he  soon  resigned  and  was  succeeded  by  R.  M.  T. 
Hunter  of  Virginia.8  William  Lowndes  Yancey  was 
offered  the  chief  place  in  the  European  Commission, 

7  Judah  P.  Benjamin  was  born  in  1811  on  the  British  island 
of  St.  Croix  in  the  West  Indies.  His  parents  had  recently 
sailed  from  England  with  the  purpose  of  settling  at  New 
Orleans,  but  at  the  close  of  the  war  of  1812  they  located  at 
Wilmington,  N.  C.  Benjamin  located  at  New  Orleans  in 
1832  to  practice  law,  and  in  1852  and  again  in  1857  he  was 
chosen  to  represent  Louisiana  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
where  his  resolute  face,  piercing  eyes  and  clear  voice  helped 
him  in  gaining  a  reputation  as  an  eloquent  speaker.  He 
had  great  influence  with  the  Buchanan  administration — much 
to  the  discomfort  of  John  Forsyth  who  was  minister  to 
Mexico  in  1856-58.  During  the  civil  war  some  spoke  of  him 
as  "  the  brains  of  the  Confederacy." 

An  English  journalist  said  he  was  the  most  cordial  Con 
federate  he  ever  met,  though  "  too  fond  of  the  card  table 
where  cooler  heads  squeezed  his  sponge  dry." 

He  was  at  his  office  early  and  late  and  first  suggested  many 
of  the  measures  of  the  Davis  administration,  some  of  which 
evoked  severe  criticism  from  the  people  and  Congress.  He 
had  for  years  been  on  intimate  terms  with  Slidell,  who  took 
steps  to  secure  a  Confederate  navy  in  France. 
.  On  the  fall  of  Richmond,  in  1865,  he  escaped  to  England 
after  several  romantic  adventures,  and  soon  began  practice 
at  the  English  bar,  where  he  won  distinction.  In  1883  he 
retired  from  practice,  and  died  in  1884. 

'Stovall:     Robert  Toombs,  Chap.   XXI. 


32  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

and  although  he  did  not  receive  the  instructions  which 
he  considered  necessary  to  his  success,  he  decided  to 
accept.8 

--The  provisional  congress  soon  passed  laws  relat 
ing  to  the  tariff,  navigation,  the  slave  trade,  the  estab 
lishment  of  ports,  and  the  issue  of  money.  An  act 
for  raising  money  authorized  Mr.  Davis  to  borrow 
$15,000,000,  payable  in  ten  years  at  8  per  cent,  and  to 
S  :;  impose  an  export  duty  on  cotton  as  a  means  of  creat 
ing  a  fund  for  paying  the  principal  and  interest  of  the 
loan.  At  a  session  held  by  the  call  of  Mr.  Davis  at 
Montgomery  on  April  29,  1861,  Congress  recognized 
the  existence  of  war,  authorized  letters  of  marque,  and 
passed  a  bill  for  the  issue  of  $50,000,000  in  bonds,  or, 
in  lieu  of  these  bonds,  $20,000,000  of  treasury  notes 
of  small  denomination,  without  interest. 

In  June  the  Government  was  removed  to  Richmond 
for  political  and  military  reasons.  Davis,  expecting 
to  direct  the  armies,  desired  to  be  in  Virginia  near 
the  seat  of  war,  and  Congress  decided  to  follow  the 
executive  departing  -  '•• 10  The  battle  of  Bull  Run  in 
July  gave  the  Conft  .acy  bright  views  of  the  future, 
and  Stephens  expected  a  "  reign  of  terror  to  develop 
in  the  North."  But  there  soon  arose  a  strong  oppo 
sition  party  in  the  South.  Many  opposed  Davis's 
-v  policy  of  endeavoring  to  produce  a  cotton  famine  in 
order  to  force  Europe  to  recognize  his  Government." 
Congress  gradually  became  alienated.  As  the  time 
approached  for  the  inauguration  of  the  "  permanent 

*  Du  Bose:     Life  and  Times  of  Yancey. 

10  Confed.    "  Dip.    Cor.".    Vol.    I.     Instr.   to   Yancey,    Rost 
and  Mann,  No.  6,  May  24,  1861. 

11  Mrs.  Davis:    Jefferson  Davis. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  33 

government,"  Hunter  and  Beauregard  were  men 
tioned  for  the  presidency,  but  Davis  continued  to  hold 
the  reins. 

In  November,  1861,  the  people  at  the  polls  chose 
presidential  electors,  and  elected  members  to  serve 
in  the  new  Congress.  In  the  case  of  states  overrun 
by  the  enemy,  as  Missouri  and  Arkansas,  congress 
men  were  elected  by  a  handful  of  votes  in  the  camps 
of  the  army  of  Virginia.  The  electors  confirmed  the 
provisional  choice  of  Davis  and  Stephens;  and  with 
little  ceremony  Davis  passed  from  a  provisional  chief 
to  a  president  chosen  for  six  years.  The  permanent 
government  had  its  birth  in  a  storm  on  February 
22.  The  skies  poured  incessantly  and  Capitol  Square 
was  black  with  umbrellas,  but  there  was  an  im 
pression  that  the  Confederacy  would  yet  thrive  in 
sunshine.  Davis  retained  his  former  Cabinet,  with 
the  exception  of  Hunter,  who  was  succeeded  by  Ben 
jamin  as  Secretary  of  State.  He  admitted  that  errors 
had  been  made  in  the  war  policy,  but  he  had  abundant 
faith  in  the  administration  for  the,.J[uture. 

After  February,  1862,  Coir;. ..,„...,  was  composed  of 
two  Houses,  the  representatives  being  now  chosen 
by  the  people  instead  of  by  conventions,  as  in  1861." 

12  The  last  session  of  the  provisional  Confederate  Congress 
began  in  Richmond  on  Nov.  18,  1861,  and  ended  Feb.  17,  1862. 
The  first  session  of  the  first  regular  Confederate  Congress 
met  on  Feb.  18.  Hunter,  of  Virginia,  was  chosen  president 
of  the  Senate,  and  Bocock,  of  Virginia,  speaker  of  the  House. 
The  more  prominent  members  were  Wm.  L.  Yancey  of  Ala., 
B.  H.  Hill  of  Ga.,  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  and  Wm.  B.  Preston  of 
Va.,  A.  H.  Garland  of  Ark.,  Julian  Hartridge  of  Ga.,  H.  C. 
Chambers  of  Miss.,  W.  H.  Smith  of  N.  C.,  Wm.  Porcher 
Miles  of  S.  C,  H.  S.  Foote  of  Tenn.,  and  C.  W.  Russell, 
J.  P.  Holcombe  and  John  P.  Baldwin  of  Va.  Though  Foote 
3 


34  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

The  members  were  prevented,  by  law,  from  holding 
military  commissions  in  the  army,  as  many  had  done 
in  the  provisional  Congress.  Some,  like  Pollard,  said 
that  this  was  unfortunate  and  that  it  resulted  in  mak 
ing  Congress  an  inane  and  incompetent  assembly,  the 
best  men  having  a  passion  for  military  service.  Pol 
lard  declared  that  the  Congress  came  at  last  to  be  a 
reflection  of  Mr.  Davis,  and  was  composed  of  un 
known  men  or  broken-down  politicians,  "  who  aban 
doned  the  whole  government  to  Davis  and  a  few  weak 
creatures  around  him,"  though  a  few  distinguished 
politicians  returned  from  the  battle-field  before  the 
close  of  the  war.  Stephens,  on  February  26,  1862, 

urged  aggressive  measures,  a  defensive  policy  of  conducting 
the  war  was  sustained.  The  Senate  recommended  the  de 
struction  of  all  cotton  and  tobacco  that  could  not  safely  be 
removed  beyond  the  reach  of  Federal  forces;  and  the  House 
advised  the  planters  to  devote  their  attention  to  the  produc 
tion  of  provisions  instead  of  cotton  and  tobacco.  Authority 
was  given  to  impress  negroes  to  work  on  fortifications.  At 
the  second  session,  which  began  Aug.  18,  1862,  Congress 
extended  the  conscript  law  to  persons  under  45  years  of 
age,  and  passed  a  bill  to  reduce  the  interest  on  the  funded 
debt  and  to  authorize  the  issue  of  6  per  cent  convertible 
bonds.  At  the  third  session,  which  began  Jan.  12,  1863,  it 
passed  an  act  authorizing  the  impressment  of  produce  neces 
sary  for  the  use  of  the  army,  and  discussed  a  bill  for  the 
organization  of  a  Supreme  Court,  which  passed  the  House 
(March  18)  but  died  in  the  judiciary  committee  of  the  House, 
where  there  was  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  how  much 
power  should  be  conferred  upon  the  court.  At  the  session 
which  began  Dec.  7,  1863,  a  conscript  act  was  passed  making 
persons  between  the  age^  of  18  and  '55  subject  to  military 
duty.  The  gravity  of  the  situation  induced  many  to  favor 
resolutions  for  peace.  At  the  last  session,  which  met  Nov. 
7,  1864,  Congress  talked  more  than  it  worked,  but  finally 
adopted  the  most  important  of  Mr.  Davis's  recommendations 
and  adjourned  sine  die. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  35 

wrote  that  Congress  was  not  such  as  he  could  wish 
it  either  in  the  Senate  or  in  the  House.  In  April,  he 
said:  "  This  is  a  very  poor  Congress.  There  are 
few  men  of  ability  in  the  House — only  two  or  three 
in  the  Senate."  Again,  in  September,  when  fretting 
over  military  orders  and  the  suspension  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  he  said:  "  We  have  not  the  men  in 
Congress  to  act — they  have  not  the  knowledge  of  prin 
ciples.  They  are  children  in  politics  and  statesman 
ship."  ]  There  were,  however,  several  remarkable 
men  in  the  Senate,/Yancey  of  Alabama,  and  Wigfall 
of  Texas,  were  the  fiercely  eloquent  orators.  Orr 
of'  South  Carolina,  and  Hill  of  Georgia,  were  also 
prominent.  Barksdale,  a  friend  of  Davis,  was  the 
leader  in  the  House.14 

The    dispersion   of   the    "  fugacious    Congress "    in 


Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens. 
14  Hon.  John   Goode,  in  response  to   a  query,   has  named 
the  following  persons  as  the  ablest  and  most  active  members 
of  the  Confederate  Congress  from  1862  to  1865: 

1.  Supporters   of  the  policy  of  the  administration — In  the 
House:  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  of  Va.,  Clement  C.  Clay  of  Ala., 
Benj.    H.    Hill    of    Ga.,    Gustavus    Henry   of   Tenn.     In    the 
Senate:  J.  L.  M.  Curry  of  Ala.,  Garland  of  Ark.,   Hartridge 
of  Ga.,  Conrad  of  La.,  Barksdale  of  Miss.,  Miles  of  S.  C. 

2.  Those  holding  views  in  opposition  to  the  policy  of  the 
administration — In    the    House:    Baldwin    of    Va.,    Smith    of 
N.  C.,  Foote  of  Tenn.     In  the  Senate:  Louis  T.  Wigfall  of 
Texas. 

Hon.  J.  L.  M.  Curry  names  as  the  most  prominent  mem 
bers  of  the  second  Congress:  Jemison,  Walker,  Hill,  John 
son,  Semmes,  Graham,  Orr,  Barnwell,  Wigfall  and  Hunter. 

Probably  not  more  than  ten  or  twelve  members  of  that 
Congress  lived  to  see  the  last  year  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Goode,  Curry,  Pugh,  Breckinridge,  Barksdale,  Miles,  Atkins, 
Wright,  Pryor,  Lester,  Bell,  Bruce  and  one  or  two  others 
have  been  mentioned  to  the  author  as  late  survivors. 


36  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

April,  1862,  when  whispered  alarms  said  that  McClel- 
lan  would  take  Richmond,  was  a  source  of  much 
amusement.  Members  were  represented  as  running 
to  their  homes  even  amidst  the  contempt  of  women.  ° 
Shop-windows  were  filled  with  amusing  caricatures 
representing  congressmen,  with  carpetbags,  pursued 
by  insects  magnified  to  represent  gunboats.  News 
papers  stated  that  some  of  the  stampeders  left  in  canal- 
boats  drawn  by  three  sweet-tempered  mules  (for  fear 
of  accidents  on  railroads),  and  that  a  regiment  of 
women  were  detailed  to  march  in  front  of  the  mules 
"  to  clear  the  tow-path  of  piratical  snakes  and  bull- 
frogs."  » 

Congress  had  no  commodious  quarters  in  which  to 
hold  its  sessions.  The  Senate  met  in  a  plain,  dingy, 
third-floor  chamber.  There  were  no  accommoda 
tions  for  ladies.  The  House  had  better  chambers, 
but  the  chairs  were  uncushioned  and  the  benches 
slashed  by  knives.  There  was  no  legislative  decorum. 
Members  were  described  as  sitting  with  their  heels 
in  the  air.  All  important  business  was  conducted  in 
secret  session.  A  synopsis  of  the  ordinary  debates 
appeared  only  in  the  newspapers  and  there  was  no 
stenographic  report.17  •/  In  August,  1862,  Yancey  de 
sired  to  check  the  undemocratic  practice  of  secret  ses 
sions  so  that  the  people  could  see  how  senators  voted 
on  the  war  plans  of  the  Government.  A  short  time 

15  Richmond  Examiner,  April  21,  1862.  Also,  the  Rich 
mond  Whig. 

18  E.  A.  Pollard  in  the  Galaxy,  Dec.,  1868.  For  the  temper 
of  the  women  in  the  war  see  G.  C.  Eggleston's  "  Recollec 
tions  "  (N.  Y.,  1875),  Chap.  III. 

17  Du  Bose:  Yancey;  The  Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg), 
Vol.  I,  Feb.  27,  1864. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  37 

later  a  committee  of  the  Senate  decided  that  a  re 
porter  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer  had  violated  the 
privileges  granted  him  by  the  Senate  and  advised  that 
he  be  excluded  from  the  bar  hereafter.  Yancey  op 
posed  such  action  as  an  infringement  of  the  liberty 
of  the  press.  Several  months  before  this  a  report  of 
the  judiciary  committee  of  the  provisional  Govern 
ment  had  recommended  a  law  to  restrict  or  restrain 
the  press  and  speech  under  certain  circumstances, 
and  Wigfall,  solemnly  rising,  simply  read  the  sedition 
law.  On  April  13,  1863,  Johnson  of  Arkansas,  moved 
in  the  Senate  that  a  committee  of  three  be  appointed 
by  the  chair  with  leave  to  sit  during  vacation,  and  to 
investigate  and  report  to  the  Senate  at  the  next  ses 
sion  upon  the  expediency  of  providing  for  regular 
and  perfect  reports  of  the  debates  of  the  Senate,  and 
of  embracing  secret  as  well  as  open  sessions,  and  to 
report  the  terms  for  which  reporters  could  be  ob 
tained,  and  other  costs  incident  to  publication.  The 
Senate  agreed  to  the  resolution,  but  the  debates  were 
never  reported,  and  were  more  and  more  concealed 
from  the  public  eye.18  Toward  the  end  of  the  war, 
when  the  people  were  growing  more  restless,  nearly 
everything  was  done  in  secret  session.19 

There  were  many  animated  debates  and  exciting 
scenes  at  Richmond  which  did  not  find  their  way  into 
the  newspapers,  but  which  leaked  out  in  whispered 
conversations.  In  January,  1863,  when  the  Senate 
was  considering  the  organization  of  the  judiciary, 
Yancey  and  others  opposed  the  conferring  of  appel- 

18  Richmond  Whig,  April  14,  1863. 

19  N.  Y.  Times,  March  12,  1865. 


38  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

late  jurisdiction  on  the  Confederate  supreme  cour: 
over  the  state  supreme  courts,  as  had  been  proposed 
by  the  judicial  committee  of  the  provisional  Congress 
of  which  Mr.  Hill  had  been  chairman.  On  February 
4,  Hill,  while  speaking  on  the  same  bill,  made  SOUK; 
bitter  references  concerning  Yancey,  who  replied  thar 
the  statements  were  false.  Shortly  afterwards,  during 
a  lull  in  business,  Senator  Hill,  after  some  remark 
by  Yancey,  whizzed  a  tumbler  past  his  head  and 
broke  an  inkstand  over  his  cheek  bone.20  Yancey,  in 
a  long  speech  of  March  14,  was  severe  on  Hill  for 
making  violent  "  assaults  from  the  rear."  In  a  nigh: 
secret  session  of  the  summer  of  1863,  a  row  occurred 
in  the  House  between  Foote  of  Tennessee,  and  Judge 
Dargan  of  Alabama,  throwing  the  whole  House  into 
a  panic.  Dargan  drew  a  bowie-knife  and  advanced 
toward  Foote,  to  resent  some  language  which  Foote 
had  muttered  while  Dargan  was  speaking.  Several 
members  pinned  Dargan  to  the  floor,  and  Foote 
changed  passion  to  laughter  by  striking  a  melodra 
matic  attitude  and  saying:  "  I  defy  the  steel  of  the 
assassin."  The  following  December  a  lady  entered 
the  House  of  Representatives  and  cowhided  Mr.  V. — 
of  Missouri.21  The  Richmond  correspondent  of  the 
London  Times,  in  a  letter  of  March  4,  1865,  when  the 
struggle  seemed  nearing  the  end,  said  that  the  con 
duct  and  language  of  legislative  assemblies  during  the 
war  had  brought  republican  institutions  into  deri 
sion  and  disrepute.22 

Toward  the  end  of  the  war,  Congress  became  very 

20DuBose:     Yancey,  p.  739. 

21  E.  A.  Pollard  in  the  Galaxy.  Dec.,  1868. 

22  London  Times,  March  31,  1865. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  39 

lively  in  its  opposition  to  Davis,  the  disposition  to 
oppose  him  being  spurred  on  by  such  papers  as  the 
Richmond  Examiner  and  the  Charleston  Mercury. 
Wigfall  returned  from  the  army  to  speak  against  him 
with  vehement  passion,  and  the  Richmond  editors 
feared  to  report  his  bitter,  vindictive  speeches.  There 
was,  in  fact,  during  the  last  year  of  the  war,  serious 
thought  in  the  South  of  inaugurating  a  counter-revo 
lution  against  Davis's  administration. 

The  Confederacy  had  all  the  paraphernalia  of  a  con 
stitutional  government,  but  in  reality  the  executive 
department  wielded  powers  far  beyond  those  given  by 
the  constitution.23  Laws  prepared  in  the  executive 
offices  were  sent  to  a  small  room  where  the  provisional 
Congress  sat  to  register  them.  Later  in  the  war, 
even  Senator  Miles  of  South  Carolina,  when  he  pre 
pared  a  bill,  sent  it  to  the  executive  department  for 
approval.  In  the  stupendous  struggle,  inevitable 
exigencies  made  the  executive  will  the  force  of  law, 
and  Congress  bent  to  the  necessity  of  subordinating 
law  to  the  emergencies  of  war. 

An  act  of  the  Confederate  Congress  in  secret  ses 
sion,  March  I,  1862,  proclaimed  martial  law  in  Rich 
mond  and  vicinity  and  declared  the  suspension  of  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus.  A  passport  system  placed  re 
strictions  upon  the  free  movement  of  individuals. 
"  Notorious  Unionists  "  and  those  suspected  of  Fed 
eral  sympathy  were  arbitrarily  arrested.  A  military 
police  was  established  under  General  Winder  of  Bal 
timore,  and  rowdyism,  which  had  recently  shown  it- 

23  Du  Bose:  Yancey;  The  Richmond  Examiner  Q.  M. 
Daniels),  Feb.  24,  1862. 


4O  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

self,  disappeared,  but  the  despotic  espionage  of  the 
Baltimore  detective  system  became  a  source  of  much 
complaint,24  though  it  kept  watch  on  the  people  of 
Richmond  until  May,  1864,  issuing  its  "  reign  of  ter 
ror  passports."  In  April  and  September,  1862,  Con 
gress  passed  conscription  acts  which  gave  much  dis 
satisfaction."  Stephens  declared  that  conscripts  would 
go  into  battle  like  a  horse  starting  from  home,  while 
volunteers  would  go  like  horses  returning  home.  It 
is  said  that  Davis  at  first  opposed  the  conscription 
policy,  preferring  the  voluntary  system,  but  that  he 
yielded  to  the  newspapers  and  necessity.  The  Sep 
tember  law  caused  a  quarrel  in  Georgia  between  the 
Secessionists  and  the  Unionists.  An  exemption  law 
was  passed  about  the  same  time  for  the  benefit  of  the 
overseers  of  slaves.20 

Stephens  feared  that  the  Confederacy  tended  toward 
errors  which  would  lead  to  its  overthrow.  In  1862 
he  was  disappointed  at  the  President's  message  and 
dissatisfied  with  his  appointments.  The  policy  of  the 
Government  was  against  his  judgment,  and  he  stated 
that  there  was  "  no  energy  except  such  as  a  turtle 
with  fire  on  its  back."  Military  orders  and  the  sus 
pension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  were  to  him  the 
source  of  the  greatest  concern.  Though  he  succeeded 
in  inducing  the  President  to  request  some  of  the  gen 
erals  to  revoke  part  of  their  orders,  he  failed  to 
arouse  Congress  to  opposition.  He  still  clung  to  the 

24  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 

25  For  the  acts  of  the  Confederate  Provisional  Government 
and  the  first  and  second  Congress,  see  "  Statutes  at  Large," 
edited  by  J.  M.  Matthews  [one  volume,  1861-64]. 

28  Du  Bose:     Yancey. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 


view  that  government  by  the  people  was  not  a  failure; 
but  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  people,  though  living 
under  a  constitution,  were  indifferent,  and  yielded  to 
usurpations.27 

Mr.  Davis  and  his  administration  have  been  vari 
ously  estimated.  Pollard  has  written  pages  to  give 
his  mistakes,  and  General  Thomas  Jordon  says  of 
him:  "The  longer  he  held  power  the  narrower  grew 
his  conceptions,  the  more  imperious  his  will,  until  to 
differ  from  or  cross  the  orbit  of  his  fancies,  or  even  to 
run  counter  to  the  plans  or  wishes  of  his  favorites, 
became  a  personal  affront.  .  .  .  He  and  his  minis 
terial  clerks  .  .  .  were  always  anticipating  success  in 
a  preposterous  manner,  always  displaying  little  prac 
tical  industry,  and  quite  as  little  judgment  in  prepar 
ing  for  contingencies."  :  Mr.  Alfriend,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  written  a  volume  to  praise  him. 

Mr.  Davis,  like  all  who  accept  offices  in  exciting 
times,  probably  had  to  suffer  from  much  censure  that 
was  unjust.  He  was  as  sensitive  to  disapprobation 
as  Thomas  Jefferson,  the  man  of  peace.  He  grew 
cold  under  the  criticism  of  his  qualities  as  a  military 
organizer,  and  his  appointments  to  civil  and  military 
positions,  but  he  seldom  changed  his  opinion  or  his 
policy.  The  pressure  of  public  opinion  could  not 
induce  him  to  change  his  Cabinet  or  to  dismiss  Dr. 
Northrop  from  the  Commissary  Bureau.  His  dis- 
.position  to  have  his  own  way,  and  his  attitude  toward 
those  who  sought  to  interfere  with  what  seemed  to 
him  was  a  part  of  his  own  prerogative,  swelled  the 

"Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens. 
28  Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.   XXXI,  p.  610.     Oct.,  1865. 


42  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

opposition  and  made  him  very  unpopular.  His  im 
prisonment  at  the  close  of  the  war  drew  to  him  the 
sympathies  of  the  South,  but  during  the  closing 
months  of  the  conflict,  when  the  Confederacy  was 
gasping  for  breath,  he  was  rapidly  losing  the  influ 
ence  which  his  magnetic  personality  had  been  able 
to  command.  Much  of  the  dislike  for  Davis  arose 
from  the  fact  that  he  did  not  meet  the  people  oftener 
in  social  intercourse.  He  was  a  sufferer  from  nervous 
dyspepsia;  and  with  the  arduous  labors  of  his  office 
— examining  as  he  did  into  the  minutest  details — he 
found  it  necessary  to  be  careful  of  his  diet  and  to 
economize  his  time.  Soon  after  going  to  Richmond, 
he  resolved  to  administer  the  Government  instead  of 
giving  entertainments,  and  the  people  soon  said  he 
was  hoarding  his  wealth.29  Tuesday  evening  recep 
tions  were  begun  later  in  the  war,  but  were  discon 
tinued  after  a  month.  Davis  received  a  salary  of 
$25,000  in  Confederate  money.  Richmond  had  offered 
to  make  him  a  present  of  his  house,  but  he  declined 
it.30  Toward  the  close  of  the  struggle  his  salary  was 
insufficient  to  meet  the  household  expenses,  though 
there  were  very  few  receptions  and  levees.  In  April, 
1864,  it  was  reported  that  Davis  intended  to  move 
the  Government  to  Montgomery,  because  of  the 
scarcity  and  high  price  of  supplies.  In  June,  1864, 
Congress  doubled  the  salaries  of  its  own  members 
so  that  they  received  $5500,  and  debated  a  measure 
for  the  increase  of  the  President's  salary,  but  took 
no  action  upon  the  latter. 

29  Mrs.  Davis:    Jefferson  Davis. 

30  J.  W.  Daniel:     Life  and  Reminiscences  of  Jefferson  Davis 
(by  distinguished  men  of  his  time). 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  43 

/~ 

The  Confederate  Government  was  much  embar- 
rassed  by  popular  opinion,  state  opposition,  and  by 
controversies  between  officials.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  war  Union  sentiment  probably  preponderated  in 
several  states  that  seceded.  After  the  Battle  of  Bull 
Run  the  voice  of  the  Unionists  was  silenced  by  the 
shouts  of  victory,  but  it  was  heard  again  in  the  train 
of  disaffection  and  defeat.  "  Secession  from 
Secessia "  was  also  threatened.  In  November  and 
December,  1862,  when  state  authorities  complained  of 
military  usurpations,  some  of  the  clerks  at  Richmond 
said  that  patriotism  was  mainly  in  the  army  and 
among  the  women,  and  that  the  President  should 
change  his  Cabinet  and  policy,  and  cultivate  the  sup 
port  of  the  people,  else  the  Confederacy  might  split 
into  states.  It  was  feared  that  Lincoln's  message 
for  gradual  emancipation  would  find  advocates  in  the 
South.  A  letter  to  Davis  said  that  Louisiana  and  a 
large  part  of  Mississippi,  if  overrun  by  Federal  troops, 
would  submit  to  the  United  States.  Davis  went  to 
Mississippi  a  few  days  later  to  encourage  fighting. 
In  June,  1863,  while  the  Federals  thundered  at  the 
gates,  jealousy  was  growing  between  the  Confederacy 
and  the  state  authorities  and  Davis  feared  conspiracy. 
In  September,  defection  was  spreading  in  North  Caro 
lina  and  the  United  States  flag  was  raised.  Davis 
made  a  month's  tour  in  the  South  and  it  was  suspected 
that  he  was  preparing  to  take  measures  for  fuller 
control.  In  December,  collision  between  the  Con 
federate  and  Georgia  authorities  was  imminent  on 
the  question  of  "  just  compensation  "  for  sugar  seized 
by  the  agents  of  the  commissary.  Northrop  said 
that  it  was  necessary  to  impress  food  for  the  soldiers. 


44  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

Foote  was  denouncing  both  Davis  and  Northrop,  and 
Senator  Orr  and  others  asked  for  the  removal  of 
Northrop,  but  Davis  refused,  stating  that  the  Com 
missary-General  was  one  of  the  greatest  geniuses  of 
the  South. 

In  January,  1864,  the  breach  was  widening  between 
Congress  and  Davis,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  country, 
Congress,  in  February,  obediently  passed  the  new 
conscript  act  and  other  laws,  greatly  increasing  the 
power  of  the  executive.31  It  also  passed  a  bill  sus 
pending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for  six  months, 
though  it  refused  to  pass  Judge  Campbell's  supreme 
court  bill.  A  revival  of  the  murmurs  against  Davis 
followed.  Colonel  Brown  ordered  an  armed  guard 
to  protect  him,  and  it  soon  became  a  fixture  in  front 
of  Mr.  Davis's  residence.32  Judge  Pearson  of  North 
Carolina  continued  to  grant  the  writ  of  habeas  cor 
pus.  In  March  Stephens  said  the  purpose  of  the  bill 
to  suppress  the  writ  was  to  muzzle  the  North  Caro 
lina  press.  In  April,  in  a  speech  against  the  sus 
pension  of  the  writ,  Stephens  said  that  indepen 
dence  without  liberty  was  of  no  value  to  him,  and 
that  he  would  as  soon  have  a  Northern  as  a  Southern 
master.  In  June,  while  the  Federal  guns  thundered 
down  the  river,  there  were  intermittent  "  rows  "  in 
the  Bureau  of  Conscription,  and  they  continued  in 

31  An  act  approved  Feb.  6,  1864,  prohibited  all  exports  of 
cotton,  tobacco,  etc.,  except  by  specific  regulations  issued 
by  the  President,  who  was  thus  practically  given  full  power 
as  to  the  regulation  of  foreign  commerce.  In  carrying  this 
act  into  effect,  Mr.  Davis  required  that  one-half  the  tonnage 
of  all  vessels  should  be  reserved  for  the  use  of  the  Confed 
erate  authorities. 

82  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  45 

September,  November  and  December.  The  Govern 
ment  was  almost  in  a  state  of  paralysis.  In  July  the 
murmurs  against  Davis  grew  louder.33 

The  feeling  against  speculators  and  class  exemp 
tions  increased  the  disaffection  against  the  Gov 
ernment  in  the  autumn  of  1864,  and  there  were 
signs  that  the  curtain  would  soon  rise  on  the 
last  act  of  the  drama,  and  that  the  disturbed 
and  divided  nation  would  "  cease  to  float  upon  a 
sea  of  blood."  Both  Seward  and  McClellan,  in  the 
North,  were  making  promises,  and  in  the  hour  of 
dulness  many  reflected  on  the  repose  once  enjoyed  in 
the  Union.  Many  favored  a  revolution  in  the  South. 
Governor  Vance  of  North  Carolina  showed  his  teeth, 
and  said  that  he  would  not  allow  the  Confederate 
Government  to  interfere  with  his  furnishing  clothes  to 
his  troops.  From  the  attitude  of  Governors  Brown, 
Toombs,  Stephens  and  others  it  appeared  that  Georgia 
was  in  danger  of  making  peace  with  the  United  States. 
Davis  went  South'  to  make  speeches.  Governor 
Brown  refused  to  respond  to  his  call  for  the  Georgia 
militia.  He  held  to  states  rights  and  said  that  Davis 
must  send  reinforcements  if  he  demanded  the  return 
of  the  Georgia  troops.  Notwithstanding  Davis's 
speeches  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  to  reanimate  the 
people,  the  states  seemed  determined  to  control  their 
own  men  not  in  the  regular  army,  and  the  Union  party 
was  increasing.  There  was  danger  of  losing  North 
Carolina.  In  November  J.  T.  Leach  of  that  state 
offered  submission  resolutions  in  the  Confederate  Con 
gress,  and  two  of  his  colleagues  voted  for  them.  A 

33  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  June  I,  Sept.  6,  Nov.  9  and  Dec.  4. 


46  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

few  days  later  peace  resolutions  were  offered  in  tlit 
North  Carolina  legislature.  General  Lee's  corre 
spondence  indicated  that  the  conscription  officers  were 
not  doing  their  duty — that  the  rich,  the  slaveholders 
and  the  speculators,  were  buying  their  way  out  of  ser 
vice.  He  complained  that  rich  young  men  were 
elected  magistrates  in  order  to  escape  field  service. 
The  law  exempting  large  slaveholders  was  creating 
an  anti-slavery  party.  In  September,  a  clerk  in  the 
War  Department  said  that  over  100,000  landed  pro 
prietors,  and  the  majority  of  the  slave-owners,  were 
out  of  the  ranks — and  that  some  wanted  to  keep  the 
horses  that  had  been  lent  them  by  the  Government, 
while  the  poor  were  thrust  into  the  trenches.  Mili 
tary  officers  were  impressing  men  into  the  army,  while 
state  governors  were  granting  exemptions.  In  Oc 
tober  many  men  with  exemptions  were  being  forced 
into  the  army — some  while  getting  medicine  for  their 
sick  wives,  and  many  became  indifferent  as  to  which 
side  should  prevail.34  New  and  strong  farmer  soldiers 
murmured,  and  many  hoped  that  the  soldiers  in  both 
armies  would  desert  and  go  home,  and  that  the  guns 
would  "  cease  to  shoot  sine  die."  Some  who  once  held 
the  idea  that  "  beauty  and  booty  "  were  the  aim  of 
the  Northern  troops,  said  that  "  Beast  "  Butler  was 
proving  himself  very  generous  before  Richmond,  and 
they  declared  that  the  press  had  "  long  misrepre 
sented  the  conduct  of  the  enemy  and  tried  to  keep 
animosity  alive."  They  complained  that  they  were 
put  in  the  trenches  as  "  volunteers  "  under  threat  of 
dismission,  while  able-bodied  men  escaped  the  army 

84  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  47 

and  rode  through  the  streets  on  sleek  horses.  Clerks 
supposed  that  they  were  exempted  from  military  ser 
vice  by  the  constitution,  but  in  November,  Attorney- 
General  George  Davis  said  that  though  the  constitu 
tion  exempted  certain  civil  officers,  the  recent  im 
pressment  act  of  Congress  must  be  executed.  A  few 
weeks  later  the  clerks  favored  revolution. 

As  the  year  1864  drew  to  a  close,  Congress  was  sit 
ting  most  of  the  time  in  secret  session,  and  while  Mr. 
Davis  was  suffering  from  neuralgia  or  busy  with  ap 
pointments,  promotions  or  the  details  of  the  adminis 
tration,  a  strong  party  was  preparing  to  transfer 
the  military  powers  of  the  executive  to  General  Lee, 
in  order  to  prevent  Georgia  from  reentering  the 
Union,  and  to  strengthen  the  confidence  of  the  peo 
ple.  The  Federal  cannon  kept  up  their  monotonous 
noise,  Lee's  army  was  being  depleted  by  desertions, 
incessant  rains  made  gloom  gloomier,  and  the  hungry 
people  complained  that  they  were  at  the  mercy  of  the 
quartermasters,  commissaries,  railroads  and  the 
Southern  Express  Company.  Foote,  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  on  December  17,  announced  his  in 
tention  to  withdraw  from  the  Confederate  Congress 
rather  than  to  legislate  under  a  despotism,  and  said 
that  there  was  a  land  of  freedom  yet  left  that  would 
receive  to  its  bosom  a  poor  refugee.35  At  the  begin 
ning  of  the  new  year  the  Government,  in  a  volumin 
ous  correspondence,  was  planning  for  the  arrest  of 
men  who  should  attempt  to  cross  the  Potomac.  To 
the  south  "  mountains  were  looming  up  everywhere." 
States  were  evading  the  Confederate  law  and  ignoring 

85  Richmond  Examiner,  Dec.  19,  1864. 


48  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

Confederate  authorities,  while  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  was  preparing  the  way  for  negro  enlistment 
and  emancipation.  North  Carolina  was  swarming 
with  deserters  and  Georgia  was  favorable  to  the 
Union.  The  people  desired  peace.  Mr.  Collier,  ir 
the  Virginia  legislature,  on  February  25,  said  that  the 
chief  characteristic  of  the  Confederate  administration 
was  that  it  had  separated  the  Government  from  the 
people.3"  Future  events  were  casting  their  shadows 
before. 

The  breach  between  Davis  and  Congress  grew 
wider  as  the  alarm  tocsin  sounded  and  the  end  drev\ 
nearer.  While  the  Federal  artillery  thundered  at  the 
gates,  the  politicians  quarrelled.  Congressional  com 
mittees  of  five  or  six  would  visit  Davis  in  a  private 
way  to  remonstrate  or  to  ask  the  removal  of  Commis 
sary  Northrop,  "  the  pepper-corn  doctor  from  North 
Carolina,"  but  it  was  breath  wasted.  Members  of 
Congress  asked  the  dismissal  of  members  of  the  Cabi 
net.  On  some  questions  Vice-President  Stephens 
used  all  his  influence  against  the  administration.87  In 
March,  1864,  he  had  objected  to  the  act  of  Congress 
to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  which  he  heard 
had  for  one  of  its  objects  the  control  of  the  elections 
and  the  assemblages  in  North  Carolina  and  to  muzzle 
certain  presses  in  that  state.  He  declared  that  the  act 
was  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  denial  of  constitu 
tional  liberty  could  only  hasten  the  departure  of  states. 
"  I  want  to  see  no  Maryland  this  side  of  the  Potomac," 
said  he.38  In  January,  1865,  there  was  a  tie  vote  in 

30  Richmond  Sentinel. 

87  Cleveland:     A.  H.  Stephens,  p.  761. 

88  H.  S.  Foote  made  a  speech  in  favor  of  repealing  the  act 
for  suspending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.     He  was  not  afraid 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  49 

the  Senate  on  a  bill  to  re-suspend  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  and  Stephens  was  on  the  point  of  giving  his 
deciding  vote  in  opposition  to  the  bill  when  he  was 
prevented  by  a  senator  who  changed  his  vote  to  the 
affirmative.  Stephens  declared  that  the  senator  had 
no  right  to  change  his  vote  after  the  result  had  been 
announced.  But  the  Senate  overruled  him.  Stephens, 
considering  this  as  an  indignity,  told  Senator  Hunter 
that  he  would  resign.  Hunter  urged  him  not  to  do 
so.  The  next  day  the  Senate  succeeded  in  conciliat 
ing  him  by  unanimously  passing  a  resolution  request 
ing  him  to  address  them  in  secret  session  upon  the 
situation  of  public  affairs.  The  bill  to  suspend  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  ultimately  failed  to  pass. 

After  long  secret  debates,  in  which  policy  oscillated 
between  "  not  yet "  and  "  too  late,"  Congress  finally 
passed  the  bill  for  negro  enlistments  and  decided  to 
adjourn  March  10,  1865.  But  Mr.  Davis  requested 
its  members  to  remain  a  short  time,  as  further  legis 
lation  would  be  required.  There  was  much  anxiety 
as  to  the  kind  of  communication  that  he  was  prepar 
ing  to  lay  before  Congress.  Some  supposed  that  it 
related  to  foreign  complications.  Rumor  said  that  a 
treaty  with  France  for  alliance  was  about  to  be  con 
summated.  On  Sunday,  March  12,  Davis  was  clos 
eted  with  Benjamin  and  the  Secretary  of  War  nearly 
all  day.3"  The  next  day  he  sent  a  message  to  Con 
gress  stating  that  he  considered  the  measures  already 
passed  to  be  insufficient,  and  that  only  by  the  prompt 

of  newspaper  criticism  of  the  Government.     "  Paper  bullets 
are  harmless  "  said  he.     [The  Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg), 
May  28,  1864.] 
39 J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 
4 


5°  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

devotion  of  the  entire  resources  of  men  and  money 
in  the  Confederacy  could  independence  be  achieved. 
He  said  that  Congress  had  so  long  debated  and  de 
layed  his  recommendation  of  the  preceding  Novem 
ber  as  to  the  enlistment  of  negroes,  etc.,  that  much 
of  their  value  was  now  lost.  He  asked  that  restric 
tions  on  the  power  to  impress  supplies  be  removed 
on  account  of  the  condition  of  the  Confederate 
finances;  he  again  recommended  a  diminution  of  ex 
empts  and  the  abolition  of  class  exemptions;  and  he 
said  that  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
was  indispensable.40  Davis  and  Benjamin  were  said 
to  be  already  rejoicing  over  their  triumph  over  Con 
gress.  But  on  March  16,  the  Senate  committee  01 
Congress  presented  their  reply  which  stated  that 
if  the  President  had  urged  the  necessity  of  the  negro 
bill  legislation  might  have  been  quickened — but  that 
he  had  seemed  to  dissent  from  the  general  policy  of 
arming  them  as  soldiers  and  had  not  even  responded 
to  calls  for  information  by  the  Senate.  The  commit 
tee  defiantly  declared  that  all  measures  recommended 
by  Mr.  Davis  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  army 
had  been  adopted  "  except  the  entire  repeal  of  class 
exemptions."  (Exemption  of  overseers  between  18 
and  45  had  been  repealed.)  Mr.  Davis  was  informed 
that  on  account  of  executive  abuse  of  the  power  of 
detail  Congress  had  revoked  details  and  limited  their 
power.  When  the  members  of  the  committee  waited 
upon  Mr.  Davis  he  fired  a  parting  broadside  into 
them.  Congress  adjourned  sine  die,  March  18,  with 
out  passing  Davis's  last  recommendations,  but  also 

40  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  15,  1865. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  51 

without  succeeding  in  ousting  Mr.  Benjamin  from  the 
cabinet.41 

The  Confederacy  while  embarrassed  by  political 
conditions  was  also  handicapped  by  lack  of  resources 
and  of  communication  with  the  world.  The  want  of 
skilled  labor  was  a  source  of  weakness.  In  April, 
1863,  Mallory  asked  Captain  Bullock  to  send  out 
English  mechanics  capable  of  manufacturing  Besse 
mer  steel  but  he  met  with  difficulties  in  obtaining  and 
sending  them.  In  the  South  there  were  no  great 
iron  manufacturing  establishments  for  furnishing  ma 
terials  for  ships  and  railways.  Mason,  in  1863,  sent 
a  model  of  a  wooden  railway  which  was  supposed  to 
have  some  advantages  over  the  iron  roads  but  the 
Government  appears  to  have  had  less  confidence  in 
it  than  did  Mr.  Mason.42  Frequently  the  Government 
was  unable  to  obtain  even  reference  books  in  the 
library  at  Richmond.43  Benjamin,  anxious  to  keep 
posted  on  the  British  debates  on  the  blockade,  etc., 
had  to  wait  months  for  a  copy  of  "  Hansard." 

There  was  no  direct  communication  with  Europe, 
though  several  plans  were  proposed  before  the  close 
of  1862.  There  were  Government  vessels  most  of  the 
time  from  Nassau  and  Bermuda  to  Charleston  and 
Wilmington,  but  supplies  and  dispatches  were  often 
sent  by  private  blockade  runners  which  charged  enor 
mous  freight.  Agents  carrying  despatches  were  in- 

41  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  20,  1865.     J.  B.  Jones:  Diary. 
C.  A.  Evans  (Ed.):     Confederate  Military  History  (Atlanta, 
1899),  Vol.  I,  Chap.  24,  p.  538,  ct  seq. 

42  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  35,  April  30,  1863.     Ibid.,  No. 
13,  Paris,  Sept.  29,  1864. 

**  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  27,  June  22,  1863. 


52  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

structed  to  destroy  them  in  case  they  were  in  danger 
of  capture,  but  in  several  instances  United  States 
cruisers  apprehended  correspondence  containing  im 
portant  plans  or  damaging  statements. 

On  July  19,  1862,  Mr.  Benjamin  had  for  weeks  had 
no  opportunity  to  send  Mason  instructions  with  any 
reasonable  hope  of  his  getting  them.  Mr.  Ward,  re 
cently  United  States  minister  to  China,  had  just 
brought  Mason's  despatches  of  May  6  and  15,  which 
were  the  first  received  since  his  despatch  of  February 
7.  Wetler  and  Ficklin  had  been  entrusted  with 
despatches  of  a  later  date  than  February  7,  and 
they  had  arrived  safely,  but  found  it  necessary  to 
throw  their  despatches  overboard."  In  November, 
1862,  Mason  had  heard  nothing  from  Benjamin  since 
his  letter  of  the  preceding  April.  In  January,  1863, 
after  the  capture  of  Reid  Sanders,  the  Northern 
papers  were  full  of  "  intercepted  correspondence  " 
of  Benjamin  and  others,  berating  Russell  and  charg 
ing  Napoleon's  consuls  with  occult  designs  to  seize 
Mexico  as  a  colony,  detach  Texas  and  recognize  it 
separately.  The  correspondence  also  revealed  the 
Confederate  plans  to  obtain  money  and  vessels  in 
Europe. 

The  Northern  papers  were  often  the  only  means 
of  obtaining  news  from  Europe.  They  also  seem  to 
have  been  correctly  advised  of  what  happened  at 

**  Instr.  to  Mason  No.  6,  July  19,  1862.  Also,  see  Instr.  to 
Mason  No.  20,  April  14,  1863. 

45  Richmond  Examiner,  Jan.  24,  1863.  J.  B.  Jones:  Diary, 
Jan.  23,  1863.  Benjamin  advised  that  no  more  despatches 
should  be  entrusted  to  Mr.  Sanders.  Instr.  to  Mason,  No. 
15,  Feb.  7,  1863. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  53 

Richmond.  Perhaps  in  some  cases  persons  with 
regular  passports  carried  information,  but  there  were 
other  means.*5  Dr.  McClure,  an  embalmer,  was  de 
tected  taking  live  men  through  the  lines  in  his  cof 
fins.  In  December,  1864,  a  "  Yankee  "  mail  line  was 
discovered  between  Federal  gunboats  and  the  city 
with  a  lady  at  one  end  of  the  line. 

The  Confederate  Government  resorted  to  all  pos 
sible  expedients  in  financial  measures,  and  its  hands 
sometimes  largely  controlled  Southern  resources. 
By  an  act  of  May  16,  1861,  and  by  subsequent  laws, 
Confederate  treasury  notes,  payable  six  months  after 
the  war,  were  provided.  In  June,  1861,  a  bureau  of 
printing  and  engraving  was  established  and  soon  be 
gan  "  to  make  money."  A  loan  was  provided  in 
April,  1861,  and  was  met  by  a  double  subscription. 
Another  of  $100,000,000  was  provided  in  August,  and 
still  others  followed.  The  Government  received 
loans  of  cotton  from  planters  who  promised  to  ac 
cept  8  per  cent  bonds  for  a  portion  of  it  when  sold. 
This  "  produce  loan "  was  conceived  with  the  idea 
that  cotton  could  be  made  a  basis  for  security. 
Within  a  short  time  the  whole  amount  of  the  loan 
was  taken.  By  an  order  of  the  Treasury  Department 
no  vessel  was  granted  a  clearance  unless  one-half  her 
cargo  was  shipped  on  Government  account  from  the 
accumulated  Government  stores.  The  Confederacy 
also  paid  for  direct  purchases  from  planters  "  in  8  per 

46  Secret  service  agents  often  furnished  the  U.   S.  Govern 
ment  with  valuable  information  as  to  the  plans  of  the  Con 
federates.     See   an   interesting  article,   by  Allan   Forman   of 
Baltimore,  on  "  A  Bit  of  Secret  History,"  in  the  Magazine  of 
American  History,  Vol.  XII,  Oct.,  1884. 

47  H.  D.   Capers:     Life  and  Times   of  C    G.  Memminger, 
Richmond,  1893. 


54  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

cent  bonds.  When  it  was  seen  that  the  blockade  and 
war  would  continue,  arrangements  were  made  to  use 
cotton  as  a  basis  of  a  foreign  loan  negotiated  by  Er- 
langer,  of  Paris.  The  states  in  undertaking  to  sup 
port  their  quotas  issued  paper  money  and,  in  some 
cases,  seized  supplies  for  the  army,  paying  for  them 
state  certificates  of  indebtedness.  The  property  oi 
all  alien  enemies  was  sequestered. 

Supplies  were  impressed  by  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  where  the  depreciated  currency  failed  tc 
command  them.  In  order  to  secure  cotton  as  a  basis 
on  the  foreign  loan  it  was  sometimes  found  necessary 
to  enforce  a  tax  in  kind.  In  the  early  part  of  1863 
there  was  a  bill  before  the  Confederate  Senate  to 
regulate  the  impressment  of  private  property.  It 
was  strongly  opposed,  especially  by  Yancey  who  had 
for  several  months  been  making  long  speeches  in 
Congress  protesting  against  the  usurpations  of  the 
Government  and  insisting  that  the  war  power  was  not 
superior  to  the  civil  power.  The  administrative  offi 
cials  called  Yancey  a  professional  alarmist,  but  the 
Richmond  Whig  declared  that  he  was  the  guardian 
of  public  liberty.  Yancey  favored  the  exercise  of 
stern  war  powers  by  Congress  and  claimed  to  oppose 
only  extra-constitutional  measures.  At  the  close  of 
1863,  Commissary  Northrop  found  it  necessary  to 
impress  food  for  the  army.  At  the  close  of  1864  and 
the  beginning  of  1865  Mr.  Benjamin  favored  the  seiz 
ure  of  cotton  for  the  purchase  of  ships  in  Europe, 
and,  in  a  speech  of  February  9,  he  said  that  all  per 
sons  having  tobacco,  corn,  meat,  and  other  supplies 
must  give  them  to  the  Government.  Mr.  Collier  of 
the  Virginia  legislature  a  few  days  later  protested 


CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  55 

against  Benjamin's  declaration  that  everything  the 
people  had  belonged  to  the  Government  in  the  hour 
of  its  adversity. 

The  treasury  notes,  simple  in  appearance,  uncertain 
in  promise,  resting  only  on  the  scriptural  faith, 
"  the  substance  of  things  hoped  for,  the  evidence  of 
things  unseen,"  nevertheless  fell  but  little  below  par 
until  after  the  summer  of  1861.  When  the  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports  shut  off  all  communication 
with  Europe  they  depreciated  more  and  more,  and 
prices  in  the  Confederacy  became  higher  and  higher 
after  1862.  Many  suffered  for  the  want  of  food. 
Davis,  speaking  from  a  dray,  quelled  the  threatened 
bread  riot  at  Richmond,  and  later  advised  the 
people  to  raise  food  instead  of  cotton.  Farmers 
losing  confidence  in  the  currency  refused  to  sell  grain, 
stating  they  had  all  the  currency  that  they  desired. 
Many  suffered  in  the  midst  of  plenty  because  they 
had  not  the  means  to  purchase.  A  Richmond  lady 
being  told  by  a  merchant  the  price  of  flour  said:  "I 
have  seven  children,  what  shall  I  do?"  "I  don't 
know,  madam,"  replied  he,  "  unless  you  eat  your 
children."  From  October,  1863,  to  March,  1865, 
flour  rose  from  $70  to  $1500  per  barrel.  In  Septem 
ber,  1863,  quinine  was  $100  per  ounce,  and  calico  $10 
a  yard.  In  July,  1864,  a  saucer  of  ice-cream  cost  $6, 
a  pound  of  sugar  $10,  and  coffee  $i  per  cup.  In 
August,  $33  in  Confederate  money  were  worth  only 
$i  in  gold.  In  March,  1865,  the  Government  was 
paying  $i  in  gold  for  $60  of  its  currency.  In  Octo 
ber,  1864,  the  physicians  charged  $30  per  visit.  The 
Richmond  Dispdtch  cost  $.50  per  copy  or  $100  per 
year.  Some  believed  that  prices  could  be  regulated 


5  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

and  that  jugglery  could  save  the  Confederate  cur 
rency.  It  was  as  possible  for  one  to  lift  himself  by 
his  boot  straps.  The  Government  could  not  live  al 
ways  on  credit.  Some  believed  that  a  new  issue  of 
currency  would  defeat  the  schemes  of  the  speculators, 
but  the  prices  of  food  would  not  diminish.  The  ma 
jority  of  the  people  lived  on  limited  rations.  Rats 
ceased  to  appear;  cats  staggered  and  died.  It  cost 
$200  a  year  to  keep  a  cat.  Wives  made  their  petti 
coats  into  undershirts  for  their  husbands.  Legisla 
tures  threatened  to  suppress  theatrical'  amusements 
during  the  war.  In  some  cases  the  Government  lent 
horses  to  the  plantation  owners. 

The  scarcity  of  food  and  the  depreciation  of  the 
currency  were  not  the  only  causes  of  the  high  prices.48 
They  were  often  due  to  the  lack  of  transportation. 
Crops  were  abundant  but  the  means  of  transportation 
were  poor.  Railroads  were  not  kept  in  repair,  and, 
in  some  cases,  there  were  complaints  that  the  Gov 
ernment  monopolized  the  roads  for  military  pur 
poses.  In  January,  1863,  the  Governor  transmitted 
to  the  Virginia  legislature  a  copy  of  a  joint  resolu 
tion  of  the  Alabama  legislature  protesting  against 
the  continued  exclusive  military  control  of  the  rail 
roads  and  favoring  their  being  kept  open  for  private 
business  and  transportation.  Later  complaints  in 
Virginia  stated  that  the  speculators  occupied  too 
much  space  in  the  cars.  Sometimes  there  was  not 
sufficient  transportation  for  food  for  the  troops  in  the 
field.  In  February,  1865,  Lee's  armies  suffered  for 

48  An  article  on  the  "  History  of  Prices  in  the  Confederacy," 
by  J.  C.  Schwab,  appears  in  the  Report  of  the  Am.  Hist. 
Ass'n  for  1898. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  57 

want  of  soap,  though  there  was  plenty  at  Charlotte, 
North  Carolina. 

Government  regulation  of  prices  and  transporta 
tion  was  several  times  the  subject  of  consideration. 
In  1863  Congress  authorized  the  seizure  of  food  sup 
ply  at  rates  of  payment  fixed  by  state  commissioners 
who  were  to  assess  prices  every  sixty  days.49  In  Oc 
tober  of  the  same  year  some  favored  the  Government 
control  of  prices  and  transportation  in  order  to  break 
up  the  speculators  and  to  get  the  food  to  places 
where  it  was  most  needed.  Some  favored  martial 
law  as  a  step  toward  the  equal  distribution  of  food. 
In  May,  1864,  the  Government  was  selling  meal  to 
private  individuals.  The  following  July,  it  caused  an 
increase  in  the  price  of  food  by  fixing  a  high  price 
upon  the  goods  which  it  seized.  In  November  follow 
ing,  Senator  Sparrows,  of  Louisiana,  offered  a  reso 
lution  providing  that  no  prices  should  be  higher  than 
those  assessed  by  the  army.  In  January,  1865,  Mr. 
Seddon,  the  Secretary  of  War,  was  requested  to  im 
press  and  distribute  the  coffee  and  sugar  which  was 
"  cornered  "  when  Wilmington  was  threatened.  In 
some  cases  there  was  a  state  distribution  of  cloth. 

The  depreciation  of  the  currency  and  the  lack  of 
transportation  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  Confeder 
ate  armies  to  get  living  rations  during  the  last  few 
months  of  the  war.     Trenholm,  the  Secretary  of  the  €? 
Treasury,  tried  to  mend  the  currency  by  purchasing 

49  In  September,  1864,  the  commissioners  of  prices  for 
N.  C.,  Ga.,  Ala.,  Fla.,  Miss.,  and  Tenn.,  met  at  Montgomery, 
Ala.,  with  a  view  to  securing  uniformity  of  prices  (under  the 
impressment  law).  [Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg),  Oct.  22, 
1864,  pp.  248-50.] 


5  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

all  the  cotton  and  tobacco,  selling  it  to  foreign  mer 
chants  and  buying  treasury  notes  with  the  proceeds. 
In  February  the  preachers  offered  to  take  the  stump 
to  raise  subscriptions.  President  Davis,  marking 
their  proposal  "special,"  sent  it  to  the  War  Depart 
ment.  "  Humbugged  to  the  end,"  said  Jones,  a 
clerk  in  the  department.  In  that  hour  the  ministers 
could  not  stem  the  ebbing  tide  of  Confederate  for 
tune.  On  March  22,  Congress  deemed  it  hopeless 
to  adopt  any  plan  to  reduce  the  currency.  Deprecia 
tion  continued,  and  the  operations  of  the  Federals 
made  it  impossible  to  collect  the  taxes. 

Until  1863,  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Company  were 
the  only  European  bankers  or  "  depositories  "  of  the 
Confederate  Treasury.  They  paid  the  drafts  of  the 
Confederate  purchasing  agents  in  Europe  and  the 
bills  drawn  by  the  heads  of  departments  at  Richmond. 
Thus,  when  Congress  made  appropriations  for  build 
ing  naval  vessels  in  Europe,  the  navy  made  a  requisi 
tion  on  the  treasury  for  the  amount  and  received 
treasury  notes  which  could  be  converted  only  by  buy 
ing  cotton  and  shipping  through  the  blockade  to 
Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Company,  who  placed  the 
proceeds  to  the  Confederate  navy.50  In  this  way, 
Mallory,  in  1862,  placed  $1,000,000  to  the  credit  of 
Captain  Bullock,  the  naval  agent  in  Europe.  Soon 
after  that  date  the  Confederate  finances  were  much 
depressed.  On  July  4,  Bullock  stated  that  the  credit 
of  the  Navy  Department  was  thus  far  sound,  but  he 
hoped  for  more  money  to  settle  the  outstanding  con- 

00  Bullock:  Secret  Service  of  the  Confederate  States  in 
Europe,  Vol.  II,  p.  416. 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  59 

tracts  which  amounted  to  £390,000.  Congress  ap 
propriated  very  much  larger  sums  for  the  navy,  but 
Mallory  wrote  in  September  that  the  exchange  of 
the  country  was  nearly  exhausted  and  that  cotton 
went  out  in  very  small  lots.51  It  was  found  neces 
sary  to  resort  to  other  means  of  finance  for  it  was 
seen  that  the  blockade  and  the  war  would  continue. 
Mallory  stated  that  if  the  agent  of  the  treasury  could 
dispose  of  the  Confederate  bonds  even  at  fifty  cents 
he  would  do  so  in  order  to  pay  the  requisitions 
in  Europe,  and  he  suggested  that  Bullock  himself 
might  possibly  be  able  to  get  advances  by  an  agree 
ment  to  repay  with  8  per  cent  interest  in  cotton,  and 
that  he  might  agree  to  have  the  amount  expended 
at  Richmond  by  the  Treasury  Department  for  cot 
ton,  which  could  be  stored  and  transported  to  the 
sea-ports  by  the  treasury — regarding  it  as  the  prop 
erty  of  British  creditors. 

In  May,  Mason  had  enclosed  a  letter  of  Mr.  Spence, 
a  Liverpool  banker,  whom  he  considered  sagacious 
and  friendly,  suggesting  the  importance  of  a  Confed 
erate  financial  agency  in  Europe.  Benjamin  replied 
that  the  subject  was  considered  premature.  "  It  is 
by  no  means  certain  that  we  shall  require  a  loan  in 
Europe/'"  In  September,  Mason  suggested  that 
money  might  be  commanded  in  England  by  the  use 
of  cotton  bonds  or  obligations  for  the  delivery  of 
cotton  at  any  Confederate  port  upon  the  thirty  days' 
demand  of  the  holder  of  the  bond,  or  within  three 
months  after  peace.58  In  November  he  wrote  again 

61  H.  D.  Capers:     C.  G.  Memminger. 

82  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  6,  July  19,  1862. 

K  Despatches  of  Mason  to  Benjamin,  No.  16,  Sept.  18,  1862. 


60  CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT 

enclosing  views  upon  a  "cotton  bond"  mode  of  fi 
nance.5*  Bonds  for  the  delivery  to  the  amount  of 
£60,000  had  been  negotiated  through  the  house  of 
Lindsay.  Erlanger,  whose  son  was  engaged  to  Mr. 
Slidell's  daughter,  made  a  proposal  to  float  a  Con 
federate  loan  of  £5,000,000.  Mason  said  that  the  cot 
ton  bond  plan  seemed  to  offer  the  best  scheme  of 
finance,  but  that  political  advantages  might  follow  the 
Paris  (Erlanger)  plan. 

When  Mason  wrote,  the  subject  of  a  loan  based  on 
cotton  certificates  had  already  been  considered. 
Benjamin  wrote  Mason,  October  28,  that  the  Gov 
ernment  had  confided  the  matter  to  Mr.  Spence  as 
Mason  had  suggested.  Memminger's  cotton  certifi 
cates  represented  cotton  stored  on  the  plantation  and 
accepted  by  the  Government.  These  certificates 
gave  the  European  purchaser  an  absolute  right  to 
the  particular  lot  of  cotton  with  the  privilege  of  ship 
ping  the  same.  Spence  was  also  appointed  as  agent 
for  the  sale  of  $5,000,000  of  8  per  cent  bonds  if  he 
could  realize  50  per  cent  on  them  and  he  was  direct 
ed  to  negotiate  for  the  application  of  $2,500,000  of 
coin  in  the  Confederate  treasury  for  supplies — by 
transfer  to  British  owners  who  could  transport  it 
from  a  Confederate  port  as  British  property. 

Mr.  Spence  received  the  cotton  certificates  but  it 
was  thought  best  to  withhold  them  from  the  market 
until  the  result  of  Erlanger's  proposals  for  a  direct 
loan  were  known.  Later  they  were  withheld  for  fear 
they  would  prejudice  the  proposed  loan  which  was 
considered  of  great  political  importance.  The  cer- 

64  Ibid.,  No.  19,  Nov.  4- 


CONFEDERATE   GOVERNMENT  6l 

tificate  money  bonds  were  also  received  by  Spence; 
but  they  could  not  be  used  at  better  rates  than  50  cents 
on  the  dollar,  and  they  too  were  withheld  until  after 
the  floating  of  the  Erlanger  loan. 

In  January,  1863,  Benjamin,  in  informing  Mason 
that  the  cotton  bonds  had  been  forwarded  to  Spence, 
said  that  there  was  no  desire  to  effect  a  loan  in 
Europe  during  the  war,  and  that  the  Confederacy  only 
wanted  moderate  sums  for  the  purpose  of  supplies.55 
The  Confederate  loan  based  on  cotton  and  nego 
tiated  by  Erlanger  had,  however,  been  decided  on. 
The  cotton  was  to  be  delivered  at  certain  ports  with 
in  six  months  after  the  close  of  the  war — or  before 
the  end  of  the  war  if  possible.  The  agents  of  Er 
langer  had  recently  gone  to  Richmond  to  offer  to 
float  a  loan  of  $25,000,000,  but  Memminger  would 
agree  to  make  it  only  $15,000,000.  Erlanger  took 
the  7  per  cent  bonds  at  77  per  cent,  and  said  that 
Davis  privately  favored  increasing  the  loan.  Mem 
minger  also  seems  to  have  contemplated  an  exten 
sion  of  the  amount  in  case  Congress  would  amend 
the  loan  act  so  as  to  relieve  all  doubt  as  to  his  au 
thority  to  do  so;  and  in  January,  1863,  he  recom 
mended  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representa 
tives  that  the  act  be  so  amended  that  the  bonds  pro 
vided  for  might  be  used  for  largely  increasing  the 
Confederate  specie  credit  in  Europe.56 

The  Confederate  loan  was  placed  upon  the  Euro 
pean  market  March  18,  1863,  and,  Mason  rejoicing 
that  it  wras  a  brilliant  success,  wrote  Benjamin  the 

55  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  12,  Jan.  15.  1863. 

56  Capers:     Memminger. 


62  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

next  day  that  over  £5,000,000  were  subscribed  at 
once  and  that  it  reached  a  premium  of  4^  per  cent 
before  night.  "  Mr.  Erlanger  worked  it  with  great 
diligence,"  said  he,  "  and  has  conferred  with  me  freely 
and  frankly."  In  two  days  and  a  half  the  subscrip 
tion  to  the  loan  reached  £16,000,000.  The  premiun 
fluctuated,  being  1^4  to  2  per  cent  by  March  30.  Er 
langer  did  not  expect  it  to  touch  par.  "  I  congratu 
late  you,"  wrote  Mason  "  on  the  triumphant  success 
of  our  infant  credit;  it  shows  malgre  all  detraction 
and  calumny  that  cotton  is  king  at  last."51  On  April 
9,  however,  Mason  wrote  that  the  loan  had  shown  a 
tendency  to  fall  below  par  more  and  more.  Erlanger 
told  him  that  the  agents  of  the  United  States  were 
trying  to  discredit  the  loan  by  large  purchases  at  low 
'  rates  and  that  they  might  cause  the  subscribers  to 

forfeit  the  instalment  of  15  per  cent  already  paid  and 
abandon  future  subscriptions.  To  prevent  a  panic 
Erlanger  desired  the  Confederacy  to  give  authority 
for  the  purchase  of  £1,000,000  to  bring  it  back  to 
par.08  The  bears  were  bringing  down  the  stock  and 
it  was  necessary  to  bull  the  market  to  keep  it  up  till 
April  24,  when  the  second  intalment  on  subscriptions 
was  to  be  paid. 

Mason,  by  the  advice  of  Slidell  and  others  took  the 
responsibility  of  authorizing  Erlanger  and  Company 
to  sustain  the  loan  by  secret  purchases  on  Confeder 
ate  account — and  from  April  9,  to  April  24,  £1,388,500 
worth  were  bought,  carrying  the  price  from  4^  per 
cent  discount  gradually  to  about  il/2  per  cent  pre- 

67  Despatches  of  Mason  to  Benjamin,  No.  32. 
58  Despatches   of  Mason  to   Benjamin,   Unofficial,   April  9, 
1863. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  63 

mium.  Mason  acted  under  the  advice  and  guidance 
of  Mr.  Spence,  who  was  attending  to  the  operations 
in  London.5"  A  second  effort  was  made  to  bull  the 
market  till  May  i.  After  that,  they  hoped  that  with 
the  mass  of  stock  "  in  certain  hands,"  and  with  favor 
able  news  from  the  South,  the  stock  would  keep  at 
par  and  enable  the  government  to  sell  what  it  had 
bought.  "  Our  purchase  of  the  stock  may  yet  turn 
out  to  be  a  money-making  affair,"  wrote  Mason. 

The  loan  dropped  somewhat  when  the  news  arrived 
that  United  States  ships  had  run  the  batteries  at 
Vicksburg.  Mason  found  that  the  conditions  were 
far  different  from  what  he  had  expected,  but  he  said 
that  the  press  was  confident  of  news  from  Fredericks- 
burg  that  would  "  make  our  loan  buoyant."  On 
June  12,  he  wrote  that  the  loan  seemed  solidly  placed 
at  last.  After  the  news  from  Gettysburg  and  Vicks 
burg,  however,  it  soon  fell  to  30  per  cent  discount 
and  Mason  saw  that  the  Confederacy  could  not  ex 
pect  another  loan,  and  that  the  Government  should 
arrange  to  ship  cotton  to  Nassau  and  Bermuda  by 
fast  steamers  running  the  blockade  and  under  Gov 
ernment  control. 

In  May  all  the  Confederate  disbursing  officers  in 
Europe  were  in  arrears  and  there  was  no  authority 
to  make  the  proceeds  of  the  loan  available  to  them. 
C.  J.  McRae,  who  was  sent  to  Europe  as  special  agent 
of  the  Treasury  Department  to  regulate  the  disburse 
ment  of  the  Erlanger  loan  and  to  negotiate  the  sale 
of  treasury  bonds  arrived  about  June  i.°°  At  first 

59  Ibid.,  Unofficial,  and  No.  34,  of  April  27,  1863. 
80  Bullock:  Vol.  II. 


64  CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT 

he  had  no  orders  to  supply  Confederate  agents  in 
Europe,  but  later  the  heads  of  departments  sent 
drafts  on  him  to  meet  the  wants  of  purchasing  agents 
and  he  was  authorized  to  keep  the  bankers  in  funds. 
At  the  beginning  of  August  he  found  only  £700,000 
on  hand  while  the  Government  engagements  for  the 
army  and  navy  required  much  more. 

A  short  time  later,  the  financial  programme  in 
Europe  was  changed.  Both  the  Navy  and  Treasury 
Departments  had  sent  out  large  amounts  of  Confed 
erate  bonds  to  different  persons  who  practically  be 
came  competitors  of  each  other  in  negotiating  for 
their  sale.  This  was  unsatisfactory  and  in  Septem 
ber,  1863,  Benjamin  drew  up  a  scheme  which  pro 
vided  for  a  special  fiscal  agent  with  power  to  deal 
exclusively  with  all  bonds.  All  who  had  been  en 
trusted  with  the  sale  of  bonds  were  asked  to  sur 
render  them  to  McRae  who  was  to  negotiate  them 
and  distribute  the  proceeds  among  the  purchasing 
agents.01  Mr.  Spence  was  thus  superseded.  He  had 
been  dissatisfied  when  Erlanger  was  selected  to  effect 
the  Confederate  loan.  His  retention  was  strongly 
opposed  by  the  Richmond  Examiner.  He  was  well 
paid  for  his  services  but  while  speaking  and  writing 
in  favor  of  the  Confederacy  he  had  also  promised  that 
it  would  abolish  slavery  as  soon  as  it  became  inde 
pendent.  For  this  reason  Mr.  Benjamin  afterwards 
wrote  him  that  he  could  not  officially  recognize  him 
as  an  agent. 

Before  the  end  of  1864,  the  net  proceeds  of  the 
Erlanger  loan  were  exhausted,  and  after  the  fall  of 

61 J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  Sept.  16,  1863. 


CONFEDERATE    GOVERNMENT  65 

Fort  Fisher  the  small  supply  of  funds  from  the  sale 
of  bonds  ceased,  the  intercourse  with  the  Confeder 
acy  being  cut  off  by  one  or  two  shoal  bays  on  the 
coast  of  Texas.  The  financial  agents  of  the  Con 
federacy  saw  that  transmission  of  supplies  must  cease 
and  stopped  their  purchases  and  shipment.  To  get 
money  for  urgent  wants,  McRae  sold  several  ships  and 
transferred  the  funds  to  the  Treasury  Department. 
When  the  war  closed,  the  Confederate  agents  abroad 
had  no  large  sums  of  money  to  turn  over  to  the 
United  States. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

James  L.  Orr,  chairman  of  the  Confederate  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  once  said  that  the 
Confederacy  never  had  a  foreign  policy,  and  never 
attempted  any  high  diplomacy.  Whatever  may  be 
thought  of  this  statement,  the  failure  of  the  Confed 
eracy  was  certainly  not  due  to  any  deficiency  in  the 
number  of  its  agents  abroad.  Jefferson  Davis  com 
missioned  many  diplomatic  consular  and  secret  agents 
to  watch  every  opportunity  to  negotiate  treaties  or  to 
press  Confederate  interests.1 

An  attempt  to  open  diplomatic  negotiations  with 
the  United  States  Government  in  February,  i86i,'was 
made  with  the  hope  of  securing  a  peaceful  disruption 
of  the  Union.  The  leaders  of  secession  were,  no 
doubt,  influenced  by  the  belief  that  there  would  be  a 
strong  Northern  sentiment  opposed  to  coercive 
measures  and  in  favor  of  the  early  establishment  of 
trade  and  diplomatic  relations  with  the  South.  They 
favored  peaceful  secession,  and  some  desired  alliance. 
They  proposed  to  win  the  good-will  of  the  West  by 
maintaining  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.2 
In  March,  while  some  thought  it  impracticable  to  go 
on  without  further  accession  of  territory,  many  ex- 

1  Confed.  Dip.  and  Consular  Commissions.     Pickett  Papers, 
"  Trunk  C." 

2  Proceedings  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  Feb.  25,  1861. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       67 

pected  the  size  and  strength  of  the  Confederacy  to 
increase  rapidly.  Stephens  hoped  and  expected  that 
the  border  states  would  join,  though  the  South  could 
get  along  without  them  until  they  should  decide  lo 
follow.3  Looking  at  the  distant  future,  he  said  that 
even  the  states  of  the  Northwest  might  gravitate  to 
ward  the  Southern  door,  which  he  considered  was 
wide  enough  to  receive  them  "  if  they  assimilate  with 
us  in  principle." 

It  has  been  said  that  if  Andrew  Jackson  had  been 
President  during  the  term  before  Lincoln's  inaugu 
ration  he  would  have  discouraged  secession  in  its  in- 
cipiency  and  thus  prevented  the  civil  war.  Buchanan 
sympathized  with  the  South  on  the  slavery  question 
and  took  no  decided  position  to  prevent  preparations 
for  the  dissolution  of  the  Union.  He  did  not  believe 
that  the  states  had  a  constitutional  right  to  secede, 
but  neither  did  he  think  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  could  constitutionally  prevent  them. 

The  seceding  states  made  several  unsuccessful  at 
tempts  to  obtain  recognition  at  Washington,  and  to 
arrange  for  a  peaceful  secession.  South  Carolina* 
after  its  resolution  to  secede  sent  three  commission 
ers  to  state  its  reasons  to  Buchanan,  and  to  arrange 
terms  of  separation,  but  they  were  not  received. 
They  then  prepared  a  memorial  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  but  no  answer  was  received.  In  February, 
1861,  South  Carolina  sent  its  Attorney-General  to 
Washington,  but  he  received  no  official  recognition. 
When  the  Confederate  Provisional  Government  was 
established  it  sent  three  commissioners 4  to  Wash- 

3  Cleveland:     A.  H.  Stephens,  p.  723. 

4  Commission     to     Washington     Record     Book.      (Pickett 
Papers,  "  Trunk  B,"   Ncs.  28  and  29.)     The  three  commis- 


68       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ington  to  arrange  a  peaceable  settlement.  The  lat 
ter  were  instructed  to  consult  upon  "  matters  of  in 
terest  to  both  nations,"  and  were  authorized  to  con 
clude  treaties.  They  arrived  March  5,  and  one  week 
later,  through  Judge  Campbell,  they  communicated 
their  mission  to  Seward,  who,  after  delaying  his 
reply  until  April  8,  refused  to  receive  them.  The 
commissioners  believed  that  the  United  States  would 
evacuate  Fort  Sumter.  Seward  and  others  in  Lin 
coln's  Cabinet  seem  to  have  thought  that  Sumter 
amounted  to  little  as  a  strategetical  point,  and  were 
waiting  for  an  expression  of  public  opinion  on  the 
subject.6  Davis  believed  that  Seward's  views  would 
prevail  at  Washington.  But  as  the  war  party  at  the 
North  grew,  public  opinion  opposed  the  evacuation 
of  Government  property,  and  the  hope  of  peaceable 
secession  was  lost.  Seward  was  hoping  that  by  wait 
ing  and  making  no  attempt  to  precipitate  war,  the 
Union  element  at  the  South  would  assert  itself.8  But 
in  this  he  was  mistaken. 

In  the  history  of  the  mission,  which  Davis  pub 
lished  on  April  29,  he  stated  that  Seward  had  induced 
the  commissioners  to  forbear  pressing  for  an  answer 
and  had  said  that  Fort  Sumter  would  be  evacuated/ 
but  that  in  the  meanwhile  preparations  were  being 
made  for  its  defense.  Lincoln,  however,  had  ex- 

sioners  were  M.  G.  Crawford,  John  Forsyth  and  A.  B. 
Roman.  Their  credentials  were  dated  Feb.  27,  1861.  J.  T. 
Pickett  was  secretary  of  the  commission. 

5  Stovall:     Toombs,  p.  222,  et  seq. 

6  Some  favored  a  foreign  war  as  a  means  of  "  reunion," 
but  this  project  was  smothered  by  Lincoln  and  Sumner. 

T  Correspondence    relating    to    Fort    Sumter.     Confederate 
Archives  (Pickett  Papers),  "  Trunk  A,"  Package  No.  35. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       69 

pressed  his  views  in  no  uncertain  tone.  In  a  speech 
to  the  Indiana  legislature  February  12,  referring  to 
some  of  the  "  lovers  of  the  Union  "  who  resisted  co 
ercion  and  seemed  to  "  think  the  Union  no  regular 
marriage,  but  rather  a  free-love  sort  of  arrangement 
to  be  maintained  only  on  passionate  attraction,"  he 
said  it  was  no  coercion  or  invasion  to  hold  United 
States  forts  and  collect  duties,  or  even  to  withhold 
mails.  Abraham  of  old  said  to  Lot,  "  Is  not  the 
whole  land  before  thee.  Separate  thyself,  I  pray 
thee  from  me;  let  there  be  no  strife  between  me  and 
thee,  for  we  are  brethren."  But  Abraham  Lincoln 
said  no  such  thing  to  Jefferson  Davis.  To,  settle 
questions  by  avoiding  them  was  not  so  easy  as  in  the 
days  of  the  patriarchs. 

President  Lincoln  remained  firm  in  his  purpose  to 
defend  Sumter,  Davis  (in  opposition  to  Toombs  in  a 
Cabinet  meeting)  resolved  to  attack  it,  and  soon  "  the 
hornet's  nest "  was  opened  by  a  bloodless  conflict  in 
which  no  one  was  hurt.  On  April  12,  the  newsboys 
ran  through  the  streets  of  Richmond  shouting  "  The 
storming  of  Fort  Sumter." 8  The  coup  d'etat,  which 
some  said  should  have  been  struck  before  the  inaug 
uration  of  Lincoln,  had  started  the  dogs  of  war,  and 
it  was  too  late  to  dream  of  peaceable  separation.  On 
April  15,  there  was  a  strong  secession  demonstration 
at  Richmond.  Fiery  speeches  were  made  by  Tyler, 
Wise  and  others.  On  April  23,  Alexander  H.  Steph 
ens  met  the  state  convention  in  a  closed  door  session 
to  arrange  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Confederate 
states."  For  two  days  he  waited  in  suspense  while 

8J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 

"Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens. 


70       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Virginians  debated,  but  on  April  25,  the  treaty 
was  ratified.  The  Virginia  convention  which  had 
>  strongly  declared  against  secession  at  last  resolved 
to  secede  and  join  the  Confederacy.  North  Carolina 
and  Tennessee  followed,  and,  for  the  succeeding  four 
years,  the  Confederate  de  facto  Government  was  in 
dependent  of  Washington  and  a  civil  war  disturbed 
the  repose  of  Europe,  as  well  as  of  America,  until  the 
instruments  of  battle  proved,  notwithstanding  the 
prophecies  of  great  statesmen,  that  secession  was  in 
admissible.  The  devotion  and  constancy  of  the 
South  for  its  principles  of  government  and  econom 
ics  in  the  face  of  a  waning  hope  and  diminishing  re 
sources  have,  perhaps,  no  parallel  in  history,  but  at 
the  end  of  the  war  it  accepted  the  historical  situation, 
and  the  constitutional  interpretation  of  the  majority. 

A  commission  appointed  by  Davis  in  January,  1865, 
when  many  were  anxious  to  take  some  step  to  end 
the  fraternal  contest,  was  directed  to  proceed  to 
Washington  for  an  informal  conference  as  to  the  is 
sues  of  the  war  and  terms  of  peace.  Its  members  10 
met  Lincoln  and  Seward  at  Hampton  Roads  where  a 
friendly  interview  occurred,  but  they  failed  to  agree 
upon  the  subject  of  reunion.  Compelled  by  force  of 
circumstances,  however  the  Confederate  authorities 
finally  ceased  the  contest. 

No  agents  were  sent  to  Canada  until  1864,  when 
it  appeared  that  the  British  Government,  unless  in 
duced  by  new  circumstances  or  complications,  would 
continue  to  refuse  to  favor  either  recognition,  media 
tion  or  intervention.  Agents  were  then  sent  to  that 

10  J.  A.  Campbell,  A.  H.  Stephens,  and  R.  M.  T.  Hunter. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       7! 

country  to  encourage  the  peace  party  in  the  North 
and  disaffection  in  the  Northwest,  and  to  make  the 
Canadian  border  a  base  for  hostile  expeditions  into 
United  States  territory." 

Mexico  was  a  near  neighbor  whose  territory,  ever 
since  the  purchase  of  the  Mesilla  valley  in  1853,  had 
been  looked  upon  by  many  as  a  field  for  the  future 
extension  of  the  institution  of  slavery  and  its  accom 
panying  agricultural  system,  and  very  early  in  1861 
the  Confederates  desired  to  open  friendly  relations 
with  the  people  of  that  country  and  take  steps  to 
prevent  the  United  States  from  securing  any  treaty 
advantages  in  that  direction.  On  May  17,  Toombs 
instructed  J.  T.  Pickett  as  a  special  agent  to  sound 
the  Mexican  Government  on  the  subject  of  alliance, 
to  feel  the  pulse  of  merchants  and  ship  owners  on  the 
subject  of  privateering,  and  authorized  him  to  grant 
commissions  of  marque  and  reprisal  or  to  employ 
agents  in  Mexico  for  the  same  purpose.12  Looking 
for  arguments  which  might  induce  Mexico  to  form  an 
alliance  with  the  Confederacy,  Toombs  said:  "The 
institution  of  domestic  slavery  in  one  country,  and 
that  of  peonage  in  the  other,  establishes  between 
them  such  a  similarity  of  labor  as  to  prevent  any  ten 
dency  on  either  side  to  disregard  feelings  and  inter 
ests  of  the  other."  Mexico  was  to  be  informed  that 
in  case  the  Confederate  States  were  to  guarantee  her 
against  foreign  invasion  "  they  could  do  so  more 
promptly  and  effectually  than  any  other  nation." ' 

u  Jacob  Thompson  and  C.  C.  Clay  were  appointed  Special 
Agents  to  Canada,  on  April  27,  1864,  to  carry  out  instruc 
tions  received  orally. 

12  Confed.  Dip.  Cor.,  Vol.  I,  Instr.  i. 

13  Confed.  Dip.  Cor.,  Vol.  I. 


72       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Picket!  remained  in  Mexico  until  December,  writing 
many  letters,  most  of  which  Toombs  failed  to  receive. 
On  his  arrival  at  Vera  Cruz,  which  he  called  "  the 
SoutE  Carolina  of  Mexico,"  he  sent  to  Mata  (who 
had  recently  been  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs)  an  unofficial  note,  looking  toward  recognition. 
He  also  took  steps  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
Governor  of  the  province,  which  he  suggested  might 
again  resolve  to  resume  its  sovereignty  as  it  had  done 
in  the  past.  While  awaiting  the  arrival  of  a  "  friend," 
he  wrote:  "  Let  the  United  States  Minister  [Corwin] 
fire  at  random  and  waste  his  ammunition,  and  then  I 
will  go  to  Mexico  City."  Learning  that  the  United 
States  had  probably  made  overtures  for  the  passage 
of  her  troops  through  Mexico,  in  order  to  reach 
Arizona,  he  caused  the  insinuation  to  be  made  (to 
various  persons  connected  with  the  Government)  that 
the  granting  of  such  a  privilege  would  be  "  a  breach 
of  neutrality,  attaining  the  gravity  of  a  casus  belli — 
that  it  would  be  a  step  not  only  hostile  to  the  Confed 
eracy,  but  also  suicidal  to  Mexico."  At  the  city  of 
Mexico,  he  found  that  the  Government  was  not  dis 
posed  to  give  attention  to  his  communications.  Ne 
gotiations  with  the  United  States,  however,  were  "  dili 
gently  pressed."  Corwin  wrote  Seward,  on  July  29, 
that  well-informed  Mexicans  seemed  to  be  aware  that 
the  independence  of  the  Confederacy  would  be  a  signal 
for  a  war  of  conquest  to  establish  slavery  in  each  of 
the  states  of  Mexico. 

Pickett,  on  learning  that  the  Mexican  Congress  had 
acceded  to  the  American  request  for  the  privilege  to 
pass  troops  through  Mexican  territory,  said  privately: 
"  If  this  decree  is  not  annulled,  Mexico  will  lose  the 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       73 

state  of  Tamaulipas  in  60  days."  He  unofficially  in 
formed  the  Mexican  Government  that  invasion  of  the 
northern  states  of  Mexico  by  Confederate  forces  would 
probably  result.  In  October,  while  threatening  re 
taliation,  he  proposed  to  re-cede  California  and  New 
Mexico  in  order  to  secure  a  treaty  of  free  trade  be 
tween  the  Confederate  States  and  Mexico.  He  also 
gave  notification  that  the  Confederacy  could  not  con 
sent  to  the  sale  or  hypothecation  of  the  Mexican  pub 
lic  lands  to  any  government  not  in  amity  with  the 
Confederate  Government.  On  October  29,  in  a  de 
spatch  (No.  12)  to  Toombs,  suggesting  that  the  pro 
posed  treaty  of  the  United  States  with  Mexico  prob 
ably  had  for  its  basis  the  hypothecation  of  Mexican 
lands  and  the  establishment  of  a  line  of  United  States 
military  posts  through  Mexican  territory,  he  said: 
"  Under  these  circumstances  does  it  not  become  the 
policy  of  the  Confederate  States  to  take  military  pos 
session  of  Monterey  and  declare  their  purpose  of  hold 
ing  all  of  that  region  until  all  questions  with  the 
United  States  be  brought  to  an  amicable  adjustment? 
Such  an  occupation,  under  the  direction  of  wise  mili 
tary  and  civil  chiefs  would  ensure  to  us  the  permanent 
possession  of  that  beautiful  country."  Mentioning 
the  information  that  the  privilege  granted  by  Mexico 
as  to  the  passage  of  troops  would  probably  not  be  used 
by  the  United  States,  he  said:  "  I  have  entered  no 
formal  protest  against  that  extremely  offensive  per 
mission;  for  it  affords  a  golden  opportunity  to  the 
people  of  the  Confederate  States  of  fulfilling  speedily 
a  portion  of  that  inevitable  destiny  which  impels  them 
southward." 

On   October  30,  Pickett  received   a  telegram  an- 


74       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

nouncing  Confederate  victories  and  the  safe  arrival 
of  Mason  and  Slidell  at  Havana,  and  proceeded  to 
celebrate  the  occasion  by  jollification  with  his  friends. 
Learning  that  an  American  "  pill  vendor,"  named 
Bennett,  had  doubted  the  authenticity  of  the  news, 
and  had  intimated  it  to  be  an  invention,  he  went  to  his 
place  of  business,  called  him  a  "  liar/'  slapped  him, 
and  inflicted  "  severe  punishment."  with  his  hands  and 
feet.  On  the  following  night  he  was  arrested,  but  was 
allowed  to  remain  at  his  hotel.  He  pleaded  his  diplo 
matic  character,  which  the  Government  refused  to 
recognize.  On  November  14,  he  was  "  thrust  into  a 
filthy  guard  room,"  to  await  trial  or  the  payment  of  an 
indemnity  to  Bennett.  After  his  release  he  wrote: 
"  To  preserve  my  liberty,  and  perhaps  my  life,  I  have 
had  no  alternative  but  to  resort  to  bribery."  He  was 
convinced  that  the  Confederacy  had  few  friends  in 
Mexico — "  at  least  among  the  Mexicans  themselves 
of  the  dominant  party." 

In  a  despatch  [from  "near  Mexico"],  on  Novem 
ber  29,  Pickett  informed  Toombs  that,  having  no  reply 
from  Mexico,  and  no  further  instructions  from  the 
Confederacy,  he  considered  his  mission  virtually 
ended.  As  early  as  the  middle  of  October  he  had  so 
notified  the  Mexican  Government,  stating  that  the 
chief  reason  was  the  persistent  violation  of  neutrality 
by  Mexico.  Commenting  upon  the  internal  condition 
of  Mexico,  the  desire  of  Conservatives  for  the  restora 
tion  of  Spanish  rule,  and  the  effects  of  his  own  mis 
sion,  he  said:  "My  enterprise  has  afforded  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  Confederate  States  an  opportunity 
which  may  never  present  itself  again.  .  .  .  My  ap 
proaches  to  the  Conservatives  was  with  the  double 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       75 

hope  of  making  them  our  friends,  and  of  having  my 
self  sent  out  of  the  country  as  a  pernicious  intriguer, 
and  when  first  arrested  I  really  supposed  that  to  have 
been  the  cause.  .  .  .  Mexico  has  placed  herself  in  the 
wrong  in  the  eyes  of  all  civilized  nations  .  .  .  and  thus 
have  I  cut  the  Gordian  knot  of  our  infant  diplomacy 
in  this  quarter.  If  the  Confederate  States  improve  the 
golden  opportunity,  I  will  not  have  suffered  in  vain. 
....  Our  people  must  have  an  outlet  on  the  Pa 
cific.  .  .  . 

"  The  part  for  the  Confederate  States  to  play  in  this 
crisis  is  clear  to  my  mind.  Our  revolution  has  emas 
culated  the  Monroe  doctrine  in  so  far  as  we  are  con 
cerned.  The  Spaniards  are  now  become  our  natural 
allies,  and  jointly  with  them  we  may  own  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  effect  a  partition  of  this  magnificent  coun 
try.  I  little  thought  a  few  years  ago  ever  to  counsel 
a  Spanish  alliance,  but  revolutions  bring  us  into 
strange  company,  and  I  am  now  prepared  to  advocate 
an  alliance  which  may  tend  to  check  the  expansion  of 
the  North." 

Pickett  reached  Vera  Cruz  in  December,  in  time  to 
witness  its  occupation  by  Spanish  forces.  He  soon 
returned  to  the  Confederacy  by  request  from  Rich 
mond.14  After  September,  1863,  some  hoped  for  rec 
ognition  by  Mexico,  and  Preston/5  being  appointed 
envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary,  on 

14  Confed.    Dip.    Cor.,    Mexico.     (Pickett    Papers,    "  Trunk 
B,"  Record  5;  Pickett's  Despatches,  June   15  (No.    i),  June 
17  (No.  2),  Oct.  29  (No.  12),  Nov.  29  (No.  13)  and  Dec.  24 
(No.    14),    1861;   also  Corwin's   Despatches  to   Seward,   July 
29  (No.  3),  Aug.  28  (No.  4),  Sept.  7  (No.  5)  and  Oct.  29  (No. 
7),  1861. 

15  Walker  Fearn  was  also  appointed  as  secretary. 


76       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

January  7,  1864,  soon  left  the  Confederacy  for  Cuba 
with  "  secret  service  "  money,  but  receiving  no  intima 
tion  that  he  would  be  received  by  Maximilian  he  never 
reached  the  Mexican  capital.10 

At  the  opening  of  the  civil  war  the  northern  prov 
inces  of  Mexico  were  in  a  state  of  revolution,  and 
on  May  22,  Toombs  sent  J.  A.  Quintero  on  a  mission 
to  New  Leon  to  inform  Governor  Vidaurri  that  the  ^ 
Confederacy  wished  to  maintain  friendly  relations 
and  to  prevent  border  raids  between  Mexico  ard 
Texas,  but  that  if  the  Governor  failed  to  stop  tr.e 
raids  the  Confederacy  would  be  compelled  to  punish 
the  invaders  and  to  guard  against  the  recurrence  of 
such  disturbing  inconveniences.17  Vidaurri  impress 
ed  Quintero  with  his  friendliness,  and  confidentially 
proposed  a  political  union  of  the  northern  provinces 
of  Mexico  with  the  Confederacy.  Quintero,  after 
returning  to  report  the  success  of  his  mission  was 
again  sent  as  confidential  agent  to  northeast  Mexico 
(September  3,  1861)  to  reside  at  Monterey,  with  in 
structions  to  declare  his  official  character  only  to  the 
Governor  and  such  others  as  he  might  deem  prudent. 
He  was  authorized  to  say  that  Mr.  Davis  reciprocated 
Vidaurri's  expressions  of  friendship  and  good-will 
for  himself  and  his  people,  and  that  he  desired  to 
serve  mutual  interests  by  intimate  social  and  com 
mercial  relations ;  but,  although  the  Confederates  felt 
sympathy  for  the  revolutionists,  he  believed  "  it 
would  be  imprudent  and  impolitic  in  the  interests  of 
both  parties  to  take  any  steps  at  present  in  regard 
to  the  proposition  made  by  Governor  Vidaurri  in  his 

10  Confed.  Dip.  Cor.,  Mexico.     Ibid.,  Package  15. 
17  Confed.  Dip.  Cor.,  Vol.  I. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

confidential  communication  ...  in  reference  to  the 
future  political  relations  of  the  Confederate  States 
and  the  northern  provinces  of  Mexico."  Quintero 
was  instructed  to  send  statistics  concerning  that 
country,  to  report  on  the  prospects  of  getting  powder, 
lead  and  other  war  supplies  through  Matamoras,  and, 
in  case  Mexico  had  given  the  United  States  permis 
sion  to  transport  troops  across  her  territory  for  war 
against  the  Confederacy,  to  induce  Vidaurri  to  use 
his  influence  to  prevent  it.  On  November  4,  Quin 
tero  reported  that  Vidaurri  would  oppose  the  pas 
sage  of  the  United  States  troops  through  New 
Leon." 

Naturally  the  Confederacy  early  sent  a  special 
agent  to  the  West  Indies,  where  it  was  desired  to 
obtain  a  point  of  vantage  for  communication  with 
Europe.  On  July  22,  1861,  Toombs  instructed  C.  J. 
Helm  to  perform  this  office,  giving  him  a  letter  of 
introduction  to  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba  to  whom 
it  was  desired  that  he  should  present  reasons  for 
friendly  relations  between  Cuba  and  the  Confederacy, 
leaving  no  efforts  untried  to  remove  appfehensions 
as  to  Confederate  designs  to  acquire  that  island.19  The 
Confederate  authorities,  by  sparing  no  pains  to  in- 

18  Consular    Corres.,    New    Leon    and    Coahuila — Quintero 
(Pickett  Papers,  "  Trunk  B,"  Package  17).     Also,  Dip.  Mex. 
8  and  g — J.  L.  Cripps  and  Charles  Ricken;  Misc.  Cor.  and 
Records,   Mexico;    Consular,   Matamoras — Fitzpatrick;    Con 
sular;  Vera  Cruz — Matamoras,  La  Sere  and  Avegno. 

Richard  Fitzpatrick  was  appointed  commercial  agent  at 
Matamoras  on  Nov.  15.  1862.  Bernard  Avegno  was  ap 
pointed  on  Dec.  18,  1862,  to  act  in  the  same  capacity  at 
Vera  Cruz.  Emile  La  Sere  received  credentials  on  May  30, 
1864.  to  perform  the  same  functions  at  Vera  Cruz. 

19  Confed.  Dip.  Cor.,  Vol.  I. 


78       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

form  Spain  that  the  South  no  longer  desired  Cuba, 
by  urging  mutual  interests  in  the  institution  of  slav 
ery,  by  suggesting  probable  aggressive  expansive  de 
signs  of  the  United  States,  and  by  proposing  a  de 
fensive  alliance,  made  strong  efforts  to  secure  the 
friendship  of  that  once  powerful  people;  but  Spai:i 
remained  neutral.  In  Cuba  there  was  considerable 
local  sympathy  with  the  Confederates;  and,  during 
the  blockade,  the  Richmond  authorities  hoped  to 
make  the  island  an  entrepot  from  which  to  obtain 
European  supplies,  and  a  base  for  forwarding  des 
patches  between  the  Confederacy  and  Europe.  Sew- 
ard,  while  denying  any  desire  for  conquest,  in 
formed  Spain  that  the  United  States  could  not  look 
with  favor  upon  any  policy  that  would  make  that 
island  the  fulcrum  of  the  lever  for  overthrowing  the 
Union/0  The  Confederacy  several  times  tried  to  se 
cure  recognition  by  Spain,  but  was  always  disap 
pointed,  though  it  took  fresh  hope  from  complica 
tions.  The  Confederate  steamer,  General  Rusk,  had 
been  used  to  get  Confederate  supplies  at  Havana, 
and  while  there,  it  was  supplied  with  British  papers 
and  had  its  name  changed  to  Blanche.  After  one  suc 
cessful  voyage  the  vessel  sailed  for  Havana  with  a 
cargo  of  cotton,  in  the  latter  part  of  1862,  but,  while 
off  the  coast  of  Cuba  in  the  neutral  jurisdiction  of 
Spain,  was  destroyed  by  a  United  States  steamer. 
For  this  act  the  United  States  paid  Spain  $200,000, 

m  James  Morton  Callahan:  Cuba  and  International  Rela 
tions,  Chap,  n,  passim;  15  Instr.  Sp.,  p.  263,  Sevvard  to 
Schurz,  No.  2,  April  27,  1862.  [Also,  October  28,  1861]; 
Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.",  Hunter  to  Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann, 
Aug.  24,  1861,  and  Benjamin  to  Slidell  (No.  16),  May  9,  1863. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       /9 

and  Benjamin  instructed  Slidell  (March  22,  1863)  to 
urge  Spain  to  pay  all  of  the  amount  over  to  the 
Confederacy,  instead  of  to  the  individuals  who  tem 
porarily  had  the  loan  of  the  vessel,  but  the  Confed 
eracy  did  not  press  its  claim. 

Agents  in  Nassau  and  the  Bermudas,  in  addition 
to  Helm  in  Cuba,  performed  valuable  service  for 
the  Confederacy  during  the  whole  period  of  the  war.21 

It  was  to  Europe  that  the  Confederate  leaders 
principally  looked  for  sympathy  and  assistance. 
Their  policy  of  secession  had  been  greatly  influenced 
by  the  expectation  of  foreign  aid.  Naturally,  in  pre 
senting  their  case  to  Europe  they  urged  the  advan 
tages  of  free  trade  and  avoided  a  discussion  of  the 
slavery  question.  They  desired  especially  to  enlist 
English  sympathy.  Benjamin,  in  a  letter  to  the  Eng-  I  s 
lish  consul  in  New  York  said  that  conditions  might 
arise  which  would  even  induce  Southern  states  to 
resume  their  former  allegiance  to  England.22  \There  ! 
was  a  strong  belief  that  in  case  of  war  England  would 
not  permit  the  United  States  to  interfere  with  Eng 
lish  trade  through  the  Southern  ports.  On  January 
28,  Mr.  Iverson,  of  Georgia,  in  his  farewell  speech  • 
to  the  United  States  Senate,  referring  to  the  possi 
bility  of  a  blockade,  said :  "  We  can  live,  if  need  be, 
without  commerce.  But  when  you  shut  out  our  cot- 

21  The  name  of   Heyleger,   who  acted  as  agent  at  Nassau, 
and    obtained    concessions    favorable    to    blockade    running, 
does  not  appear  among  those  whose  credentials  (from   Mr. 
Davis)  are  recorded  in  the  "  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Com 
missions  "  book  of  the  Confederate  State  Department.     Nor 
man  S.  Walker  was  appointed  commercial  agent  at  Bermuda 
on  July  7,  1864. 

22  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  Vol.  II,  pp.  313-14. 


8O       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ton  from  the  looms  of  Europe  we  shall  see  whether 
other  nations  will  not  have  something  to  do  on  that 
subject.  Cotton  is  king  and  it  will  find  means  1.0 
raise  your  blockade  and  disperse  your  ships." 

The  new  American  tariff  gave  the  Confederare 
leaders  further  hope  of  English  sympathy,  and  an 
opportunity  to  urge  their  opposition  to  the  tariff 
with  greater  effect.23  Buchanan,  in  his  message  of 
December,  1858,  had  recommended  a  revision  of  tl  e 
tariff  in  order  to  increase  the  revenue,  but  the  admin 
istration  leader  in  the  House  could  not  get  the  neces 
sary  two-thirds  vote  for  the  proposition.  In  April, 
1860,  Morrill  introduced  his  tariff  bill  in  the  House. 
Its  principal  object  was  stated  to  be  revenue.  It 
passed  the  House  by  105  to  64,  but  its  consideration 
by  the  Senate  was  postponed.  On  February  20,  i86c, 
however,  it  passed  the  Senate  with  some  amendments 
by  a  vote  of  25  to  14 — after  the  senators  from  seven 
seceding  states  had  withdrawn.  Some  felt  that  its 
passage  made  England  much  more  liable  to  recognize 
the  Confederacy,  and  Clingman  said  that  it  contributed 
to  the  secession  of  Virginia,  North  Carolina  and  Ten 
nessee. 

On  general  principles  the  Democrats  of  both 
North  and  South  since  1825  had  leaned  towards  a 
tariff  for  revenue  only,  but  since  1832  there  had 
been  no  signs  that  the  integrity  of  the  Union  was 
endangered  by  tariff  legislation.  In  the  farewell 
speeches  of  Southern  leaders  in  Congress  there  had 
been  scarcely  an  allusion  to  the  tariff.  The  burden 
of  the  grievances  expressed  were  concerning  South- 

23  See  Hunter's  remarks  in  the  Cong.  Globe,  Feb.  27,  1861. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       8l 

ern  rights  as  to  slavery.  Many  in  the  Alabama  se 
cession  convention  desired  to  induce  the  United 
States  to  treat  with  the  South  as  an  independent 
power  and  as  an  ally,  and  they  were  willing  to  agree 
to  a  tariff  equal  to  that  of  the  United  States  but  al 
lowing  free  trade  with  the  United  States  in  order  to 
dispense  with  frontier  custom  houses,  border 
troubles  and  war  debts.** 

The  Confederate  constitution  declared  in  favor  of 
a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  and  the  commissioners  who 
were  sent  to  England  with  instructions  (of  March  16) 
to  make  a  treaty  °  practically  providing  for  free  trade 
were  told  to  inform  the  English  Government  that 
dissolution  was  the  result  of  long  and  mature  delib 
eration  to  escape  the  persistent  efforts  to  compel  the 
South  to  pay  bounties  to  the  North  in  the  shape  of 
high  protective  tariffs.  It  was  soon  discovered  that 
Seward  had  taken  prompt  steps  to  meet  their  argu 
ments  abroad.  The  nature  of  Seward's  arguments 
may  be  seen  in  his  instructions  to  Carl  Schurz  April 
27,  in  which  he  said :  "  The  interest  which  now 
raises  the  flag  of  disunion  has  directed  the  Govern 
ment  since  the  first  murmur  of  discontent  was  heard. 
The  United  States  .  .  .  for  forty  years  has  especially 
accommodated  that  interest  (slavery)  and  construct 
ed  all  defenses  required  for  that  section." 

"  Rost  to  Yancey,  April  7,  1862. 

*  The  Confederacy  offered  to  continue  all  the  United  States 
treaties  except  the  clause  providing  for  the  maintenance  of 
a  naval  squadron  on  the  coast  of  Africa.  The  Confederate 
constitution  had  a  clause  against  the  slave  trade,  but  if  Eng 
land  had  asked  for  a  treaty  clause  against  it.  she  would  have 
been  informed  that  the  constitution  gave  the  Government  no 
power  relating  to  that  subject.  "  It  is  not  wise  to  impose 
restraints  on  the  future "  said  Benjamin  in  January,  1863. 
[Instr.  to  Mason,  Nos.  13  and  14,  Jan.  15,  1863.] 
6 


82       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  instructions  of  the  Confederate  commission 
ers  did  not  mention  any  of  the  expressed  grievances 
relating  to  slavery.  But  later,  the  agents  in  Eng 
land  endeavored  through  the  press  and  otherwise  to 
leave  the  impression  that  the  North  desired  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  institution  of  slavery.  This  policy 
was  based  upon  the  fact  that  England  and  France 
were  opposed  to  slavery  but  desired  commercial 
intercourse  with  the  South.  Palmerston,  in  July, 
1861,  said  to  August  Belmont  of  New  York,  "  We  do 
not  like  slavery  but  we  want  cotton  and  we  dislike 
very  much  your  Morrill  tariff." 

There  was  a  strong  party  in  England  led  by 
Bright,  Cobden  and  Forster,  who  had  pronounced 
sympathies  with  the  United  States  and  would  have 
been  glad  if  they  could  have  informed  their  constitu 
encies  that  the  Lincoln  administration  was  fighting 
for  emancipation  as  well  as  for  the  integrity  of  the 
Union.  But,  notwithstanding  the  fears  which  had 
been  expressed  in  the  speeches  of  the  Southern  lead 
ers,  the  Lincoln  party  proposed  only  to  restrict  slav 
ery  in  the  territories  and  had  no  emancipation  policy 
until  it  came  as  a  military  exigency  during  the  war. 
Lincoln  in  his  inaugural  address  said:  vJ  have  no 
purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere  with  the 
institution  of  slavery  in  the  states  where  it  exists." 
The  Confederate  agents  in  Europe  quoted  this  as  a: 
means  of  decreasing  sympathy  with  the  North.  The' 
Confederate  arguments  were  presented  to  the  Brit 
ish  Parliament  by  Lindsay,  Gregory,  Roebuck  and 
other  members  who  sympathized  with  the  South. 
Lindsay,  in  explaining  these  positions  in  July,  1862, 
said  that  the  cry  against  slavery  in  the  North  was 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 


1 


only  a  political  cry — else  England  could  sympathize 
with  the  North.  He  declared  that  taxation  without 
representation  was  the  real  cause  of  the  war,  stating 
that  the  North  and  West  had  increased  their  repre 
sentation  in  Congress  while  the  South  had  fallen  be 
hind  and  had  to  pay  the  protective  tariffs.28  Forster, 
in  reply,  stated  that  slavery  was  the  real  cause  of 
the  war,  and  that  the  tariff  had  scarcely  been  men 
tioned  in  the  elections  and  during  the  period  of  se 
cession."7 

Mr.  Davis  and  his  followers  at  first  expected  to 
produce  a  cotton  famine  which  \vould  induce  Eng 
land  and  France  to  break  the  blockade  and  recognize 
the  Confederacy.  ,  Later,  they  were  willing  to  offer 
special  commercial  advantages  to  secure  the  same 
end,  and  proposed  to  give  Napoleon,a  large  amount 
of  cotton  for  the  loan  of  a  squadronA  They  also  fav 
ored  French  and  Spanish  designs  in  America  and,  in 
order  to  obtain  a  treaty  of  alliance,  intimated  their 
readiness  to  guarantee  the  possessions  of  those  pow 
ers.  (They  made  England  and  France  a  base  for  secret 
attempts  to  fit  out  vessels.  They  endeavored  to  dis 
turb  internal  affairs  and  create  complications  which 
Iwould  serve  the  interests  of  the  Confederacy.  Finally, 
jin  a  paroxysm  of  desperation,  they  proposed  to  secure 

emancipation  for  recognition,  and  in  negotiations  with 
>ndon   syndicates   agreed   to   guarantee   cotton   for 

noney  to  secure  ships  to  break  the  blockade.  / 

i6»  rarnaTDebates,  p   511  et  seq.    July  18,  1862. 

See  "Appendix."  Also,  see  F.  W.  Sargent:  England, 
the  United  States,  and  the  Confederate  States,  London,  1864. 
Also,  an  article  on  the  changes  in  tariff  legislation  since 
1789,  by  W.  G.  Cutler,  in  Mag.  Am.  Hist.,  Vol.  XII  (1884), 
P-  519. 


84       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

|  R.  B.  Rhett,  who  had  made  some  study  of  com 
merce  and  revenues,  had  discussed  in  the  secession 
convention  of  South  Carolina  a  policy  of  commercia1 
agreements  with  the  important  states  of  Europe 
At  Montgomery,  he  was  chosen  chairman  of  the 
committee  of  foreign  relations,  and  before  the  inaug 
uration  of  Davis  had  brought  in  a  report  author 
izing  the  latter  to  send  a  commission  to  Europe  to 
secure  recognition  and  make  treaties,  offensive  and 
defensive.  As  a  plan  of  diplomacy  he  proposed, 

•(i)  A  treaty  of  commercial  alliance  involving  recipro 
cal  obligations  offensive  and  defensive  for  twenty 
years  or  more,  during  which  the  Confederacy  would 
impose  no  import  duty  higher  than  20  per  cent  ad 
valorem,  no  tonnage  except  for  maintaining  harbors 
and  rivers,  and  would  permit  European  parties  to  the 
treaty  to  enjoy  the  privileges  of  the  coasting  trade 
free,  subject  only  to  the  police  regulations  of  the 
states.  (2)  A  discriminating  duty  of  10  per  cent  on 
all  goods  of  all  nations  refusing  to  accept  the  treaty. 
(3)  The  commissioners  to  have  power  (as  Franklin 
in  1778)  to  form  alliances  with  European  powers  and 
guarantee  their  North  American  possessions.28  This 
policy  was  discussed  in  Congress  in  the  presence  of 
Toombs,  who,  as  Secretary  of  State,  hoped  to  be  al 
lowed  to  give  the  commissioners  instructions  based 
upon  this  policy  of  overcoming  European  feeling 
against  slavery  by  offering  liberal  commercial  ad 
vantages,  but  Davis  did  not  embrace  these  points 
in  his  later  conversation  with  Toombs.  The  com 
mission  had  already  been  appointed  to  go  to  Wash- 

28  Du  Bose:     Life  and  Times  of  Yancey. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY      85 

ington;  but  Toombs,  Rhett,  and  Yancey,  expecting 
nothing  from  that  source  to  justify  a  delay  in  foreign 
diplomacy,  said  that  the  friendship  of  Europe  should; 
first  be  secured,  and  that  the  policy  toward  the<l 
United  States  should  depend  upon  circumstances. 
There  was  a  strong  feeling,  however,  in  the  Confed 
erate  Congress,  and  especially  in  Alabama,  in  favor 
of  giving  the  first  advantages  of  diplomacy  to  the 
United  States.  Some  expected  that  the  desire  for 
cotton  would  induce  the  Government  at  Washing 
ton  to  favor  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Confederacy. 
Yancey,  the  champion  leader  in  "  firing  the  South 
ern  heart "  at  the  beginning  of  the  secession  move 
ment,  who  had  been  spoken  of  for  the  presidency, 
was  asked  by  Davis  to  head  the  commission  to  Eu 
rope,  and  P.  A.  Rost  and  Dudley  Mann  were  named 
as  his  colleagues.  Yancey  was  born  in  1814  and 
elected  to  Congress  in  1844.  He  had  opposed  the 
Clay  compromise  of  1850,  anticipated  the  coming 
conflict,  and  prepared  schemes  for  secession  as  early 
as  1858.  In  January,  1860,  he  advocated  the  seces 
sion  of  the  Southern  members  from  the  Charleston 
convention,  if  their  demands  were  denied,  and  he  be 
came  the  chief  manager  in  that  convention  and  in 
laying  the  program  for  secession  from  the  Union. 
P.  A.  Rost,  born  in  France,  1797,  had  gone  to  Louis 
iana  in  1816,  served  in  the  Mississippi  legislature  in 
1826,  and  a  few  years  later  removed  to  Louisiana 
where  he  became  judge  in  the  Supreme  Court. 
Mann,  born  in  1801,  had  been  sent  as  United  States 
consul  to  Bremen  in  1842,  commissioner  to  Hun 
gary  in  1849,  and  minister  to  Switzerland  in  1850, 
after  which  he  was  appointed  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  (March  23,  1853). 


86      THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Yancey  found  that  Davis  did  not  favor  the  policy 
of  negotiating  commercial  treaties,  but  expected  to 
base  his  diplomacy  on  the  importance  of  the  cotton 
crop  (much  of  the  previous  year's  crop  being  still 
on  hand)  and  the  legality  of  secession.  When 
Yancey  informed  Rhett  of  Davis's  instructions, 
Rhett,  feeling  that  the  United  States  had  already 
warned  Europe,  and  that  it  would  be  necessary  to 
compensate  the  latter  for  the  risk  of  recognition, 
said:  "You  have  no  business  in  Europe,  you  carry 
no  argument  that  Europe  cares  to  hear.  My  coun 
sel  is  ...  to  stay  at  home,  or  to  go  prepared  to 
conciliate  Europe  by  irresistible  proffers  of  trade.' 
B.  C.  Yancey,  who  had  recently  been  in  England,  anc 
had  "  studiously  sought  information  touching  the 
feeling  of  the  Government  there  toward  a  probable 
Southern  Confederacy,  and,  also  had  applied  himself 
to  ascertain  the  feeling  of  the  laboring  classes  and 
their  leaders,  Cobden  and  Bright,"  whom  he  found 
would  oppose  the  recognition  of  a  slaveholders' 
Confederacy,  advised  his  brother  not  to  undertake  the 
mission,  stating  that  the  English  Government,  how 
ever  well  disposed,  could  not  run  counter  to  the  Ex 
eter  Hall  anti-slavery  influence.29 

Before  the  commission  sailed,  Congress  and  the 
executive  were  urged  to  adopt  a  foreign  policy  simi 
lar  to  that  by  which  Franklin,  Deane  and  Lee  se 
cured  money  and  supplies  during  the  American  Rev 
olution,  but  the  commissioners  only  received  power 
to  encourage  practical  reciprocity  to  aid  them  over 
a  crisis.  The  opposition  afterwards  complained  that 

-u  Du  Bose:     Life  and  Times  of  Yancey,  pp.  588-89. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY      87 

though  the  ports  ,w~ere  open  for  a  year,  cotton  was 
left  on  the  plantations  "  while  waiting  for  the  United 
States  to  fall  into  bankruptcy."3 

Yancey,  though  he  failed  to  receive  the  instruc 
tions  which  he  considered  necessary  to  success,  ac 
cepted  the  mission.  The  instructions  to  the  commis 
sion  directed  them  to  Inform  Europe  that  secession 
violated  no  allegiance,  that  opposition  by  the  United 
States  was  not  expected,  and  that  the  South,  with 
abundant  resources^was  able  to  win,  and  was  willing 
to  accept  the  treaties  between  the  United  States  and 
foreign  powers  and  to  make  a  treaty  practically  pro 
viding  for  free  .trade.  The  commissioners  were  later 
authorized  to  issue  commissions  to  privateers.  They 
sailed  March  31,  and  were  in  mid-ocean  when  news 
arrived  from  Washington  that  an  armed  fleet  had 
been  sent  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter.  A  call  for  troops 
by  Lincoln  followed,  and  Virginia  seceded. 

Rhett  soon  appealed  to  the  Confederate  Congress 
to  direct  Mr.  Davis  to  instruct  the  commissioners  in 
favor  of  a  more  liberal  treaty,  granting  commercial 
privileges  for  a  period  of  twenty  years.  Perkins, 
fearing  that  so  long  a  period  would  extinguish  the 
infant  manufactures  of  the  South,  proposed  to  make 
it  six  years,  stating  that  England  was  compelled  to 
have  cotton  anyhow.  Rhett  replied  that  Europe,  for 
a  treaty  securing  vital  relief  for  the  Confederacy, 
would  require  a  twenty  years'  guarantee,  and  that 

30  It  is  said  that  six  iron  ships  built  for  the  East  India 
trade  were,  early  in  the  war,  offered  to  the  Confederacy  by  a 
Liverpool  firm  for  ten  million  dollars,  but  that  Mallory, 
knowing  the  inefficiency  of  Memminger's  department,  omitted 
to  communicate  this  offer  to  President  Davis.  [Du  Bose: 
Life  and  Times  of  Yancey.] 


88       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

during  this  period  the  Confederacy  would  have  time 
to  recuperate  from  the  sacrifices  of  the  war,  which 
might  not  end  for  six  years.  To  those  who  sug 
gested  that  goods  could  be  smuggled  into  the 
United  States,  he  said  that  in  case  of  such  an  event 
the  manufactures  of  the  United  States  would  be  in 
jured  more  than  those  of  the  Confederacy.  He  did 
not  think  that  a  currency  based  on  the  cotton  de 
posited  in  the  South  as  good  as  a  treaty  that  would 
make  a  cotton  deposit  in  Europe  the  basis  of  a  cur 
rency;  and  he  declared  that  if  the  cotton  ports  be 
closed,  England  would  engage  in  attempts  to  culti 
vate  cotton  in  India  and  her  other  possessions,  and 
would  thus  be  led  to  discourage  trade  with  the  Con 
federacy.  The  Perkins  amendment  carried,  but  on 
the  motion  of  Rhett  the  whole  subject  was  laid  on  the 
table. 

Davis  expected  to  get  Europe  to  recognize  his 
Government  and  receive  its  ambassadors  on  grounds 
of  international  duty.  Memminger,  also,  feared  to 
sell  the  cotton  on  account  of  possible  political  ef 
fects  at  home,  stating  that  the  United  States  would 
make  the  blockade  more  effective  if  an  attempt 
should  be  made  to  take  cotton  out  of  Confederate 
ports  and  that  there  was  little  probability  that 
Europe  would  send  vessels  to  get  the  product  even 
if  it  should  be  stored  in  seaports.  He  said,  that  cot 
ton  stored  by  the  Government  on  the  plantations  was 
the  best  basis  for  currency  and  European  diplomacy. 
Soon  after  this  many  began  to  say  that  it  should  all 
be  destroyed  by  the  Government,81  and  that  notice 

81 J.  M.  Daniels:  Writings  in  the  Richmond  Examiner 
during  the  Civil  War  (N.  Y.,  1868),  Feb.  26,  1862. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY      89 

should  be  given  to  England  that  no  more  would  be 
raised  until  that  power  was  willing  to  grant  recogni 
tion.  The  Confederate  Government  soon  placed  a 
tax  on  cotton  production. 

Stephens  had  been  strongly  in  favor  of  shipping 
the  cotton  to  Europe  to  pay  for  vessels  to  injure  the 
United  States  commerce  and  to  hold  at  least  one 
Confederate  port  open  while  other  Confederate  ves 
sels  convoyed  cotton  to  Europe  where  it  could  be 
stored  more  safely  than  in  the  United  States.  He 
was  strongly  opposed  to  the  policy  of  Mr.  Davis. 
Many  others  preferred  the  exportation  policy,  and 
strongly  tried  to  convince  Davis  that  his  "  cotton 
famine  policy "  was  wrong.82  Some  urged  him  to 
sell  to  persons  in  the  United  States.  Toombs,  who 
had  desired  the  Confederate  Government  to  take  the 
responsibility  of  rapidly  exporting  all  the  cotton  to 
Europe,  chafed  under  red  tape,  and  resigned  because 
he  thought  the  administration  was  too  timid.  He 
said  that  if  he  had  been  president  he  would  have 
mortgaged  every  pound  of  cotton  to  France  and 
England  at  a  price  sufficient  to  remunerate  the  plant 
ers  as  well  as  to  get  the  aid  of  the  navies  of  England 
and  France.33  It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  shipment 
of  200,000  bales  of  cotton  to  Liverpool  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war  would  have  strengthened  the  \ 
Confederate  chances  of  securing  a  navy,  but  there1 
were,  probably,  insurmountable  obstacles  to  this 
policy.  The  Government  was  new  and  untried,  and 
the  sudden  blockade  of  Southern  ports  had  not  been 
expected.  Many  merchant  vessels  made  haste  to 
load  and  get  away  in  March,  1861,  but  Bullock  says 

82  Mrs.  Davis:    Jefferson  Davis.  "Bullock. 


QO       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

there  were  not  enough  vessels  to  carry  out  the  cot 
ton  even  if  it  had  been  bought.  General  J.  E.  Johns 
ton  stating  that  the  blockade  was  not  effective  unti 
the  end  of  the  winter  of  1862,  declared  that  the  Con 
federate  Government  could  easily  have  shipped 
4,000,000  bales  to  England  and  received  the  mone> 
for  it.  Memminger  pronounced  Johnston's  views 
impracticable  and  visionary,  stating  that  the  block 
ade  was  instituted  in  May,  1861,  and  that  it  would 
have  required  4000  ships  to  get  the  cotton  out  be 
fore  that  time.  He  said  that  private  enterprise  ship 
ped  as  much  as  the  Government  could  have  shipped; 
that  the  Government  had  no  funds  with  which  to 
make  purchases;  that,  even  if  there  had  been  enough 
treasury  notes  and  bonds  for  that  purpose,  it  would 
have  been  a  bad  policy  to  use  them  to  meet  the  ne 
cessities  of  the  planters;  that  the  Government  could 
not  have  secured  donations  of  cotton  and  did  not  de 
sire  to  seize  it;  and,  with  the  expectation  that  the 
blockade  would  last  for  less  than  a  year,  the  Govern 
ment  had  no  motive  to  store  cotton  as  a  basis  of 
credit.8* 

Stephens,  who  was  never  very  confident  of  recog 
nition  by  European  powers,  always  said  that  it  was 
a  serious  mistake  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  to 
consider  cotton  as  a  political  instead  of  a  commercial 
power.35  He  strongly  opposed  the  recommendations 
which  some  made  to  cease  cotton  culture  so  and  de 
stroy  the  stock  on  hand  in  order  to  compel  England 

84  H.  D.  Capers:     Memminger. 

85  Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens. 

80  The  Confederate  House,  on  March  3,  1862,  passed  a 
resolution  advising  all  growers  of  cotton  and  tobacco  to 
stop  the  cultivation  of  those  products.  [C.  E.  Evans  (Ed.): 
Confederate  Military  History,  Vol.  I,  p.  436.] 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 


9! 


to  raise  the  blockade.  He  had  been  in  favor  of  the 
Government  paying  ten  cents  a  pound  for  all  the 
cotton  that  persons  were  willing  to  subscribe  for 
eight  per  cent  bonds,  and  after  the  harbor  system  of 
the  South  had  been  closed,  Memminger  adopted  his 
views  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  Government 
purchasing  cotton,  but  Stephens  said  it  was  then 
too  late. 

Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann,  on  reaching  Europe, 
soon  saw  that  the  action  of  France  and  other  powers 
depended  upon  the  policy  of  England  who,  though 
opposed  to  slavery,  desired  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  South.  They  were  encouraged  by  the  Brit 
ish  neutrality  act,  recognizing  the  Confederacy  as  a 
neutral,  and  later  by  the  victory  of  Bull  Run,  and 
hoped  that  the  British  Government  would  take  of 
fense  at  the  harsh  protests  of  Seward  (who  at  that 
time  would  have  been  willing  to  unite  the  North 
and  South  in  a  war  against  England),  but  independ 
ence  was  different  from  belligerency,  and  Adams, 
anxiously  keeping  his  hand  on  the  British  pulse 
and  watching  every  indication  of  variation,  presented 
all  of  Seward's  protests  in  courteous  language  and 
thus  avoided  an  Anglo-American  rupture.  By  their 
active  operations,  the  Confederates  gave  rise  to  im 
portant  legal  and  diplomatic  questions,  and  to  acrimo 
nious  correspondence  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  and,  at  the  time  of  the  Trent  affair 
they  anticipated  complications  which  would  induce 
the  British  Government  to  take  a  stand  favorable  to 
the  Confederacy,  but  their  hopes  were  disappointed.87 

37  On  Aug.  24,  1861,  Messrs.  Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann  were 
also  appointed  special  commissioners  to  Spain  with  full 
powers. 


92    — $H£jCON|.EDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Yancey's  commission  was  embarrassed  by  lack 
of  funds 38  and  secret  agents,  by  Seward's  vigorous 
diplomacy,  and  by  the  fact  that  Europe  read  the  news 
from  Northern  papers,  but  soon  after  sending  Mason 
and  Slidell  to  Europe  the  Confederacy  decided  to 
spend  more  money  abroad.  Agents  with  secret  ser 
vice  money  were  sent  to  influence  public  sympathy. 
[The  Index,  a  Confederate  organ,  was  established  at 
London,  editorials  and  other  articles  were  prepared 
for  insertion  in  the  prominent  English  and  French 
newspapers.  About  the  latter  part  of  1862  Benja 
min,  in  writing  to  De  Leon,  expressed  a  desire  for 
him  to  extend  his  operations  to  the  press  of  Austria, 
Prussia  and  other  parts  of  central  Europe.  Henry 
Hotze,  the  confidential  agent  at  London,30  in  addi 
tion  to  his  press  duties,  also  kept  Mr.  Benjamin  in 
formed  on  European  public  opinion,  forwarding  him 
the  London  papers  and  the  principal  quarterly  re 
views.40  Mason  and  Slidell  each  received  a  salary  of 
$12,000  with  an  allowance  of  $3000  for  contingent 
expenditures  for  limited  objects.  In  January,  1864, 
Mason  wrote  Benjamin  that  Slidell  and  himself  both 

88When  Yancey  left  London  on  the  arrival  of  Mason  he 
borrowed  money  for  his  expenses.  His  salary  had  not  been 
remitted.  ^&t~Z.£, 

w  Hotze  was  born  in  Zurich,  Switzerland  in  1834.  In  1858 
he  was  provisionally  appointed  secretary  of  the  U.  S.  Le 
gation  at  Brussels.  In  1859  he  became  associated  with  John 
Forsyth  in  editing  the  Mobile  Register.  In  April,  1861,  he 
enlisted  in  the  Confederate  army.  On  Aug.  31,  he  was  ap 
pointed,  by  the  Confederate  war  department,  to  proceed  to 
Europe  to  purchase  supplies  of  war.  On  Nov.  14,  he  was 
appointed  commercial  agent  at  London,  where  he  founded 
the  Index.  [The  Mobile  Register,  May  u,  1887.] 

40  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  35,  April  18,  1864. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       93 

agreed  that  there  "  are  objects  of  expenditure  for 
political  ends,  occasionally  presenting  themselves, 
when  it  would  be  well  that  the  commissioners  in 
Europe  could  have  larger  discretion." '  "  This  char 
acter  o/  expenditure  might  not  generally  admit  of  a 
regular  voucher  but  must  be  submitted  to  the  integ 
rity  of  the  commissioners."  On  April  18,  Benjamin 
sent  him  £500  as  a  secret  service  fund. 

When  Mason  and  Slidell  reached  Europe  the  first 
of  February,  1862,  Davis  and  Hunter  were  contem 
plating  the  possibility  that  France  and  England,  act 
ing  both  from  commercial  and  political  motives, 
would  end  the  blockade  by  intervention,  and,  on  Feb 
ruary  8,  prepared  instructions  urging  that  to  prevent 
the  danger  of  future  war  or  reunion,  the  area  of  the 
Confederacy  should  be  enlarged  so  as  to  include  the 
Chesapeake  bay,  the  border  states,  and  New  Mexico 
and  Arizona.*2  _Mason,  while  unsuccessfully  urging 
the  British  Government  to  adopt  the  policy  of  recog 
nizing  the  Confederacy  and  breaking  the  blockade 
to  secure  cotton,  also  directed  his  efforts  to  mould 
public  opinion  through  the  press  and  social  channels, 
and  took  an  active  part  in  arranging  for  the  con 
struction  of  Confederate  vessels  in  British  ports. 
Though  he  always  exaggerated  the  chances  of  suc 
cess,  public  opinion  in  favor  of  recognizing  the  Con 
federacy  was  increasing  in  1862.  The  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg  seemed  to  silence  Southern  opposition  to 
the  Confederate  Government,  and  Gladstone  said 

41  Despatches  of  Mason  to  Benjamin,  No.  I,  Paris,  Jan.  25, 
1864. 

42  Confed.    "  Dip.    Cor.,    Great    Brit."     Hunter    to    Mason, 
No.  4,  Feb.  8,  1862. 


• 


94       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

that  Davis  had  "  created  a  nation."  When  the  Brit 
ish  Government  awaited  future  developments  and  re 
fused  to  join  France  in  a  policy  of  mediation,  the 
Confederate  leaders  were  disappointed,  and  pro 
nounced  English  neutrality  a  farce  and  an  irony  man 
aged  to  the  advantage  of  the  United  States.43  The 
Richmond  Enquirer  said  that  the  English  policy  was 
to  let  the  war  continue  long  enough  to  destroy  the 
strength  of  both  North  and  South. 

In  November,  1862,  Mason  having  been  able  "  to 
see  and  hear  nothing  from  the  British  Government 
officially  or  unofficially,"  suggested  that  a  termina 
tion  of  his  mission  might  preserve  the  dignity  of  the 
Confederate  Government;  but,  in  the  same  letter  he 
stated  that  his  presence  in  London  was  really  import 
ant."  As  early  as  July,  seeing  that  Russell  would 
neither  receive  him  nor  recognize  the  Confederacy 
he  had  given  a  similar  intimation,  and,  on  September 
26,  Benjamin  wrote  him  that  Mr.  Davis,  though  de 
siring  him  to  avoid  being  placed  in  the  attitude  of  a 
\suppliant,  thought  that  he  should  await  contingen 
cies.  In  the  last  week  of  October,  expecting  San- 
jiers  to  secure  the  construction  of  vessels  in  England, 

"Alfriend:     Jefferson  Davis,  Chap.  14. 

**  Commander  Sinclair  arrived  at  London  with  an  order  of 
the  Confederate  Navy  for  money  to  pay  for  building  a  ship; 
but  Bullock's  funds  were  needed  to  meet  contracts  already 
made,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  delay,  Mason,  as  an  agent  of  the 
Confederacy,  agreed  to  an  arrangement  with  Lindsay  arid  Co. 
[Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  16,  Sept.  18,  1862.]  In  October, 
after  a  murder  had  occurred  on  the  Swntcr  at  Gibraltar, 
Mason  authorized  Bullock  to  sell  the  vessel  and  endeavored 
to  induce  the  English  authorities  to  deliver  the  murderer  at 
some  Confederate  port.  The  government  at  Richmond  after 
wards  approved  his  action  in  these  matters. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       95 

Davis,  notwithstanding  Russell's  scant  courtesy,  "  of 
fensive  arrogance  and  rude  incivility,"  decided  that 
Mason  had  better  remain  waiting  for  public  opinion 
to  force  the  British  Government  to  change  its  policy. 
But,  in  a  speech  to  the  Mississippi  legislature  in 
December,  after  referring  to  former  expectations  ofj 
recognition  and  intervention  by  foreign  nations,  he 
said  "  put  not  your  trust  in  princes  .  .  .  this  war  is 
ours;  we  must  fight  it  out  ourselves."4  The  proba 
bility  that  Russia,  like  England  and  France,  would 
postpone  the  question  of  recognition  until  the  ques 
tion  of  might  was  made  clear,  caused  Benjamin  to 
hesitate  in  approaching  Alexander  II.,  but  on  No 
vember  19  he  instructed  L.  Q.  C.  Lamar  to  go  to 
St.  Petersburgh  and  assure  the  Czar  of  the  Confed 
erate  desire  for  friendly  and  commercial  intercourse.46 
Russia  was  friendly  toward  the  United  States  and  re 
fused  to  receive  the  Confederate  commissioner.47 

Stephens,  considering  that  France  and  England 
while  jealous  of  the  growth  of  the  United  States  were 
also  opposed  to  slavery,  had  "  never  looked  to  forr 
eign  intervention  or  recognition,"  and  on  September 
I,  1862,  in  a  letter  to  R.  M.  Johnston  he  said  that 
Davis  should  recall  all  commissioners.48  Others  held 
the  same  views  by  the  close  of  the  year.  In  Jan 
uary,  1863,  Foote  in  the  House  urged  this  measure. 
On  January  15,  the  Richmond  Examiner,  commenting 

I 

"Alfriend:    Jefferson  Davis. 

48  Walker  Fearn  was  appointed  as  secretary. 

47  Despatches  from  U.  S.  Legation,  Russia:  Bayard  Taylor 
to  Seward,  No.  30,  March  3,  1863  (encloses  intercepted  com 
munication  of  Benjamin  to  L.  Q.  C.  Lamar).  Also,  14  Instr. 
Russia,  Seward  to  C.  M.  Clay,  No.  2,  March  31,  1863. 

**  Cleveland:     A.  H.  Stephens,  p.  761. 


96       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

upon  Davis's  policy  to  avoid  a  conclusion  upon  this 
subject,  also  favored  a  withdrawal,  and  said  that  th<; 
European  powers  as  soon  as  they  saw  the  end  of 
the  struggle  approaching  would  then  have  to  send 
ambassadors  to  Richmond  instead  of  calling  up 
Southern  commissioners  "  now  waiting  in  servants' 
halls  and  on  the  back  stairs."  New  York  papers  ot 
March  30  published  the  Mason-Russell  correspond 
ence  which  had  been  brought  before  the  public  by  a 
resolution  of  Parliament,  and  the  Richmond  Whig  of 
April  6,  republishing  part  of  it,  berated  Russell  for 
his  terror  of  Seward  and  his  "  perversion "  of  the 
provisions  of  1856  to  which  the  Confederacy  had 
been  induced  to  agree.  In  the  Confederate  House- 
on  April  6,  1863,  Mr.  Swan  of  Tennessee,  moved  z. 
suspension  of  the  rules  to  enable  him  to  introduce 
a  joint  resolution  suggesting  that  Congress  would 
approve  the  removal  of  Mason  from  London.48  The 
vote  stood  39  yeas  to  39  nays,  but  as  a  two-thirds 
vote  was  necessary  Swan's  motion  failed.  On  April 
13,  the  Sentinel  abused  Congress  for  differing  with 
the  President  as  to  the  retention  of  the  diplomatic 
agents.80  De  Leon  wrote  Benjamin  from  Paris  on 

48  Richmond  Dispatch,  April  7,  1863. 

60  On  March  16,  Mr.  Davis  sent  to  the  Senate  the  name  of 
L.  Q.  C.  Lamar  as  commissioner  to  Russia.  The  Senate 
referred  the  nomination  to  the  committee  of  foreign  affairs. 
The  committee  and  the  Senate  did  not  think  it  expedient  to 
send  a  commissioner  to  Russia,  and  on  April  13,  in  secret 
session,  requested  Mr.  Davis  to  state  his  reasons  for  making 
such  an  appointment.  Davis  replied  on  April  20,  but  the 
Senate  adjourned  May  I  without  confirming  the  nomination, 
and  Lamar's  commission  thereby  expired.  Davis,  while  re 
gretting  the  action  of  the  Senate,  deemed  it  his  duty  to  yield. 
[Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,  Russia,"  Instr.  to  Lamar,  June  u, 
1863,  with  enclosure  of  Burton  N.  Harrison  to  Benjamin.] 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       97 

June  19,  that  by  reason  of  the  prejudice  against 
slavery  no  further  attempts  to  get  recognition  should 
be  made,  and  renewed  suggestions  which  he  had 
previously  made  that  the  commissioners  should  be 
recalled  from  Europe.  Slidell,  considering  De  Leon 
as  a  spy  on  his  actions  and  his  despatches,  soon  com 
plained  to  Benjamin,51  and,  after  some  annoyance 
caused  by  the  interception  and  publication  of  objec 
tionable  correspondence,  De  Leon's  agency  was  s 
ended. 

The  Confederacy  had  felt  inconvenienced  and  han 
dicapped  by  the  slowness  of  communication  with 
Europe,  and  was  anxious  to  secure  a  sure  and  swift 
transportation  of  despatches  and  news.  George  X. 
Sanders  had  early  tried  to  get  the  privilege  to  estab 
lish  a  line  of  communication.52  Benjamin  would  not 
engage  him  in  that  capacity,  but  agreed  to  give  him 
a  certain  sum  for  the  delivery  of  despatches  from 
abroad.83  In  October,  1862,  Benjamin  wrote  Mason 
that  Mr.  Fearn  had  arranged  a  plan  for  facilitating 
intercourse,  but  Sanders  continued  to  act  as  des 
patch  bearer  until  the  beginning  of  1863  when  his 
son  Reid  Sanders,  while  attempting  to  run  the  block 
ade  from  Charleston,  allowed  important  despatches 
to  be  seized  on  his  person,  and  caused  Benjamin  to 
advise  Mason  to  risk  no  more  letters  through  that 
agency.  Despatches  and  supplies  were  afterwards 
sent  through  L.  Heyleger,  at  Nassau  or  via  Bermuda. 
In  November,  1862,  Mr.  Lindsay  proposed  a  plan  for 
establishing  a  direct  line  of  French  steamers,  with  a 

51  Despatches  of  Slidell  to  Benjamin,  No.  50. 

52  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  8,  Oct.  28,  1862. 

53  Instr.  to  Mason,  Feb.  7,  1863. 

7 


98       THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

view  of  diverting  the  trade  of  the  West,  and  as  far 
as  possible  that  of  the  North,  through  Norfolk  and 
other  Confederate  ports,  but  this  line  was  not  ex 
pected  to  operate  before  the  close  of  the  war.54  Dav  s. 
and  Benjamin  replied  that  the  Confederate  constitu 
tion  did  not  allow  a  grant  of  postal  subsidies  as  pro 
posed  by  Lindsay's  plan,  but  suggested  that  Vi;*- 
ginia  as  a  state  might  grant  such  a  subsidy.55  About 
the  same  time  George  McHenry  made  a  proposition 
for  the  establishment  of  an  Atlantic  mail  line  by  Con 
federate  aid,  but  Davis,  on  the  grounds  that  the  Post 
Office  Department  must  sustain  itself,  and  that  tie 
terms  of  transportation  might  be  cheaper  later,  re 
fused  to  accept  the  proposition.58  Despatches  con 
tinued  to  be  sent  by  British  vessels  via  Halifax  ard 
through  the  Confederate  agents  at  Bermuda  ard 
Nassau. 

In  the  early  part  of  1863,  Benjamin  seeing  little 
hope   of  action   by   England   and   suspecting   Napo 
leon's  designs  in  Texas,  Louisiana  and  Florida,  asked 
Slidell  to  open  communication  with   Spain  by   sug 
gesting  the  advantage  of  alliance  and  offering  to  join 
in  a  disclaimer  as  to  designs  on  Cuba."     President 
Davis   refused   to   recognize   any   longer   the   British  * 
consuls    unless    they    obtained    exequaturs    from    the 
Confederate  Government. 
lln  the  middle  of  1863  Napoleon  with  the  United 

M  Despatches  of  Mason,  Nov.  4,  1862,  and  March  19,  1863. 

55  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  12,  Jan.  15,  1863.  Despatches  of 
Mason,  Jan.  16,  1863. 

M  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  19,  March  31,  1863. 

87  An  attempt  was  also  made  to  influence  public  opinion  in 
Ireland.  On  March  7,  1863,  Robert  Dowling  was  appointed 
as  commercial  agent  at  Cork. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY       99 

States  map  before  him  said  he  was  only  waiting  for 
England  to  act,  and  the  Confederates  believed  they 
had  two  advocates  in  the  British  cabinet  and  ex 
pected  to  get  others  to  support  a  resolution  for  rec 
ognition,  but  it  was  in  vain  that  they  hoped  to  over 
come  the  influence  of  the  British  Liberals  and  of 
Seward,  who  with  an  eye  to  the  future,  wras  watch 
fully  making  record  of  every  case  where  he  thought 
the  British  Government  had  favored  the  Confeder 
ates.  When  they  turned  secretly  to  secure  the  con 
struction  of  vessels  in  British  ports  they  found  Se- 
ward's  consular  agents  watching  the  dockyards,  and 
securing  evidence  by  which  to  emphasize  protests 
to  the  British  Government.58  In  the  autumn  of  1863 
Mason  withdrew  from  London  to  Paris,  and  soon 
received  duplicate  full  powers  addressed  in  blank  so 
he  could  fill  them  out  himself  and  go  to  any  English 
capital,5"  but  contingencies  not  arising  to  call  for  his 
services  on  the  continent  he  alternated  between  Paris 
and  London  until  the  close  of  the  wrar,  drawing  his  sal 
ary  as  a  commissioner  but  having  no  diplomatic  du 
ties  to  perform.80  At  London,  however,  he  aided 
certain  members  of  Parliament  in  attempts  to  em 
barrass  the  Government  and  force  it  to  recognize  the 
Confederacy. 

58  Bullock,  Vol.  I. 

69  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  34,  Jan.  25,  1864. 

60  On  September  24,  1863,  Mann  was  instructed,  by  Benja 
min,  to  go  to  the  Pope,  who  had  expressed  sorrow  as  to  the 
ruin  and  devastation  of  the  war,  and  to  assure  him  £hat  the 
Southern  people  were  desirous  that  the  war  should  cease. 
[Record  i,  Instr.,  p.  21.]  On  April  4,  1864,  Rt.  Rev.  P.  A. 
Lynch,  Bishop  of  Charleston,  was  appointed  Special  Com 
missioner  to  the  States  of  the  Church,  with  full  powers. 


IOO      THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY 

On  October  26,  1864,  Benjamin  published  a  copy 
of  a  despatch,61  which  he  prepared  for  publication  in 
Europe,  with  the  purpose  of  showing  that  if  the 
United  States  continued  the  war  she  would  be  unable 
to  pay  her  debts  abroad,  and  that  the  foreigners,  in 
order  to  escape  ruin,  ought  not  to  lend  her  'more 
money.6"  He  also  tried  to  impress  Spain,  England 
and  France  with  the  statement  that  their  American 

\ possessions  would  be  in  danger  from  the  desire  of 
he  United  States  for  empire. 

There  was  considerable  English  sympathy  for  the 
I  secession  movement,  but  the  condition  of  parties,  the 
f  sentiment  against  slavery,  the  active  efforts  of  Eng 
lish   friends  of  the  Union,  together  with  the  diplo 
macy  of  Seward  and  Adams,  prevented  the  success 
of  Confederate  efforts  to  secure  recognition  or  inter 
vention. 

Earl    Russell    in    his    "  Recollections    and   Sugges 
tions  "  says  that  the  only  grave  error  of  his  official 
acts   toward  America  was  his  neglect  to   detain  the 
Alabama.     The   British  cabinet,  while  Napoleon  was 
intriguing     and     Anglo-American     relations     were 
strained,  was,  as  a  rule,  discreet  and  fair  in  its  policy 
,of  neutrality.     Benjamin,  Mason  and  Slidell  all  con- 
jsidered  that  Earl  Russell  was  cold,  distant  and  un- 
i  friendly  to  their  cause,  and  after  1862  their  only  hope 
[was   for  a   change  of   cabinet  or  complications,   but 
many  members  of  the  Lords  and  Commons  were  in 
(frequent  conference  with  Mason  and  openly  express- 
*ed  the  desire  to  embarrass  the  government  and  force 

61  Instr.  to  Mann  (circular),  Oct.  10,  1864. 
02  Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg),  Dec.  24,  1864.  J-  B.  Jones: 
Diary,  Oct.  26,  1864.     The  Index,  Jan.  5,  1865. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY  IOI 

it   to   recognize   the   Confederacy.     It  has   been   said  y 
that  the  dress  suit  and  digestive  apparatus  of  Eng 
land  were  hostile  to  the  United  States,  but  that  the 
cerebro-centres,  heart  and  muscle  were  friendly. 

Napoleon  was  held  back  by  England  and  the 
people.  He  held  many  conversations  with  Slidell  and 
was  eagerly  planning  in  the  Tuileries  to  recognize 
the  South  and  break  the  blockade,  but  the  capture 
of  New  Orleans  prevented  any  step  he  'i^av;-  have 
contemplated  without  the  cooperation  of  England. 
He  afterwards  seemed  to  favor  the  constructicji '  x*f 
Confederate  vessels  in  French  ports  ancTit'wa's  prin 
cipally  the  vigilance  of  Mr.  Dayton,  the  American 
minister,  which  prevented  these  vessels  from  reaching 
the  sea,  but  the  Confederate  agents  asserted  that  the 
Emperor  had  wilfully  tricked  them. 

The  Confederacy  was  disappointed  in  the  power  of 
cotton  to  secure  foreign  influence.  A  report  to  the 
Richmond  congress  in  December,  i864,63  said  tha 
England,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  possessed  larg 
stocks  of  cotton  and  cotton  goods  which  the  owner 
sold  for  exorbitant  prices,  doing  a  smaller  busines 
in  quantity  but  a  larger  one  in  value  and  leaving 
their  unemployed  operators  to  be  supported  by  oth 
ers.  Besides,  from  1862  there  was  a  steady  flow  of 
cotton  to  both  Europe  and  the  Northern  states.  The 
report  to  Congress  stated  that  England  had  received 
indirectly  from  the  Confederacy  since  September, 
1863,  4000  bales  per  week;  that  United  States  mer 
chants  also  had  the  benefit  of  exports  in  Confederate 
cotton  through  the  trade  with  Mexico  and  the  West 

63Geo.  McHenry:     Cotton  Crisis,  Dec.  18,  1864. 


IO2  THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY 

Indies,  and  had  not  drawn  from  Europe;  that  King 
Cotton  had  been  captured  by  United  States  vessels 
while  running  the  blockade,  and  had  thus  assisted  the 
finances  of  the  United  States.  In  February,  1862, 
the  Richmond  Examiner  proposed  that  the  Govern 
ment  should  burn  the  cotton  to  prevent  it  falling  into 
the  hands  of  citizens  of  the  North.04  In  October, 
1862,  Benjamin,  desiring  to  secure  army  stores,  gave 
Mr.  Dunnock  permission  to  sell  cotton  on  the  coast. 
Randolph,,  the  Secretary  of  War,  urged  the  accept 
ance  -of  offers  by  others  to  trade  it  for  meat  and 
<  a  •> 

bread  imports  held  by  the  United  States.  Davis  hesi 
tated,  but  on  November  8,  he  consented  to  allow  Gov 
ernor  Pettus  of  Mississippi  to  trade  it  for  salt  at  New 
Orleans  which  was  under  the  jurisdiction  of  Butler. 
In  1863,  there  were  complaints  that  while  the  Con 
federates  could  not  place  enough  money  in  Europe 
to  pay  for  needed  supplies,  the  United  States  was  re 
ceiving  both  cotton  and  information  through  the 
blockade  runners  and  the  Southern  Express  Com 
pany  was  monopolizing  the  railroads  to  deliver  cot 
ton  to  speculators  who  sent  it  into  the  North.  In 
April,  1863,  it  was  said  that  importation  by  British 
adventurers  was  contrived  by  Northern  merchants 
with  the  sanction  of  the  United  States  Government 
and  that  war  supplies  were  therefore  usually  cap 
tured.  In  March,  1864,  J.  B.  Lamar  of  Savannah, 
who  had  command  of  five  steamers,  wrote  that  he 
could  easily  arrange  with  the  Federal  commanders 

M  Bunch,  the  British  consul  at  Charleston,  wrote  Lord 
Russell  on  August  15,  1862,  that  1,000,000  bales  of  cotton  had 
been  destroyed  by  the  South.  By  the  end  of  the  year  very 
little  was  taken  to  the  coast. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY  103 

to  permit  them  to  pass  out  with  cotton  by  paying 
one-half  for  freight.53  On  April  2,  General  Lee  made 
regulations  to  prevent  cotton  from  passing  to  the 
North  unless  allowed  by  the  Richmond  Government. 
A  month  later  Memminger  favored  a  proposition  of 
Mr.  Bond  for  the  Government  to  give  him  a  bill  of 
sale  of  ten  thousand  bales  of  cotton  in  exposed  places 
in  the  West  "  to  be  shipped  via  New  Orleans  to 
Antwerp."  In  June,  one  of  the  commissary  officers 
in  the  West  proposed  to  the  Government  to  sell  cot 
ton  on  the  Mississippi  river  for  London  exchange  and 
indicated  that  he  had  large  sums  to  his  credit  by  such 
•transactions. 

George  McHenry,  in  a  pamphlet  on  the  approach 
ing  "  Cotton  Crisis  "  published  at  Richmond,  in  De 
cember,  1864,  said  that  under  the  acts  of  the  United 
States  Congress  of  July  2,  by  which  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  was  directed  to  authorize  purchases  of 
products  of  the  Confederate  States,  the  North  had 
been  getting  cheap  cotton,  and  the  South  receiving 
dear  bacon;  that  the  trade  had  been  winked  at  on  the 
part  of  some  of  the  Confederate  authorities;  that 
frauds  had  been  practiced  to  a  shameful  degree;  and 
that  there  had  been  a  constant  drain  of  cotton  from 
Arkansas,  Louisiana  and  Texas.  On  September  27, 
1864,  the  Confederate  cotton  agent  in  Mississippi  was 
authorized  by  the  Government  at  Richmond  to  sell 
cotton  in  exposed  situations  to  United  States  agents 
for  specie.  In  October,  Beverly  Tucker  who  was  in 
Canada  made  a  contract  by  authority  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  exchange  cotton  for  bacon  pound  for 

65  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary. 


IO4  THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY 

pound.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  not 
pleased  with  the  arrangement. 

In  January,  1865,  Trenholm,  Secretary  of  ihe 
Treasury,  authorized  an  agent  to  go  to  Augusta  to 
buy  all  the  cotton  for  the  Government,  and  then  sell 
it  for  the  London  exchange  to  parties  who  were  to 
be  allowed  to  remove  it  within  the  Federal  lines  or 
abroad.  A  month  later  speculators  at  Wilmington 
seemed  to  want  their  cotton  to  fall  into  United  States 
hands. 

There  had  been  a  considerable  loss  on  the  cotton 
exchanged  in  Europe  for  supplies.  The  rate  for 
blockade  running  was  extravagant  and  the  cotton  was 
usually  sold  at  less  than  the  market  price.  Some 
said  it  would  have  been  far  better  to  pay  gold  for 
supplies  and  retain  the  cotton;  others  that  the  Gov 
ernment  should  have  assumed  complete  control  of  all 
cotton  and  the  regulation  of  the  price.  When  the 
Richmond  Government  saw  that  the  war  and  the 
blockade  would  continue,  it  arranged  to  use  cotton  as 
the  basis  of  a  loan  negotiated  in  Europe  by  Erlanger,"8 
but  its  power  to  control  the  cotton  was  restricted  by 
a  large  amount  in  the  hands  of  those  who  would  not 
sell,  and  it  did  not  desire  to  seize  the  crops  of  those 
who  refused  to  receive  a  depreciated  currency  in  pay 
ment.  The  first  efforts  to  ship  cotton  on  Govern 
ment  account  met  with  difficulty  and  delay.  Ships 
engaged  in  the  blockade  trade  were  owned  by  private 
firms  who  wanted  all  their  space  and  the  ships  owned 
by  the  Government  were  wanted  for  other  purposes. 
On  December  29,  1863,  Mallory  wrote  Bullock  that 

98  Capers:     Memminger. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FOREIGN  POLICY      IO5 

3100  bales  had  been  shipped  from  Charleston  and 
Wilmington  via  Bermuda  and  Nassau  to  go  to  Fraser, 
Trenholm  &  Co.  Later  he  said  that  1200  bales  had 
been  purchased  by  the  State  Department  and  would 
go  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible.67  At  the  beginning 
of  1863,  Bullock  had  suggested  that  the  Government 
should  own  its  packets  in  order  to  avoid  heavy 
freights.  In  September,  when  Mason  saw  no  pros 
pect  of  another  European  loan,  he  wrote  Benjamin 
that  the  Confederacy  in  order  to  cheapen  goods, 
strengthen  the  Confederate  credit  and  prevent  the 
United  States  from  sharing  in  the  profits  of  running 
the  blockade  should  take  entire  control  of  exporta 
tion  of  cotton  and  the  importation  of  supplies.68  Bul 
lock  suggested  the  same  to  Mallory  in  October,  stat 
ing  that  the  Confederacy  should  accumulate  in  Eu 
rope  a  large  supply  of  cotton  by  which  to  rule  the 
market  and  perhaps  exert  political  influence.  Again, 
in  November,  he  urged  the  building  of  special  ves 
sels  for  shipments  by  the  Government.  In  December 
Benjamin  prepared  a  project  for  a  "  Bureau  of  Ex 
port  and  Import,"  and  early  in  1864  he  recommended 
a  Government  monopoly  in  the  export  of  cotton  and 
the  import  of  necessary  supplies.  Congress  adopted 
the  measure;  and  McRae,  who  had  written  from  Paris 
urging  this  plan,  during  the  following  summer  con 
tracted  with  Fraser,  Trenholm  &  Co.  for  eight  steel- 
clad  steamers,  six  of  which  reached  the  Confederate 
coasts  and  made  one  or  more  trips  before  the  close  of 
the  war.  Other  vessels  were  begun  but  not  com- 

61  Bullock,  Vol.  II.  ' 

88  Despatches  of  Mason  to  Benjamin,  No.  45,  Sept.  5,  1863. 


IO6  THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY 

jpleted.  Notwithstanding  the  tone  of  unofficial 
speeches  in  England,  the  British  Government  refused 
to  allow  unarmed  ships  to  escape  when  they  were 
clearly  intended  for  use  by  the  Confederates. 

One  of  the  principal  factors  in  forcing  the  Confed 
eracy  to  end  the  war  was  the  lack  of  supplies  which 
cotton  could  have  purchased   if  it  could  have  been 
shipped  to  Europe.     The  blockade  by  sea  and  by  lane 
was  the  principal   cause  of   the   Confederate   failure 
If  the  vessels  at  Liverpool  and  Bordeaux  had  beet 
allowed  to  go  to  sea  in   1864  the  South  might  hav< 
opened  some  of  her  ports./  George  McHenry  in  hi 
report  on  "  the  approaching1  cotton  crisis  "  in  Decem 
ber,   1864,   said  that  if  the  Confederates   could  hav< 
withheld  their  cotton  from  the  outer  world  the  pow 
ers  by  that  time  would  have  been  forced  into  a  polic) 
of  recognition,  but  that  a  large  share  of  it  had  abso 
lutely  been  dissipated  away;  that   most  of  the  Con 
federate  legislation  had  operated  to  favor  a  few  spec 
ulators  who  had  neither  social  nor  political  influence 
across  the  Atlantic,  and  who,  so  long  as  they  had  con 
tracts  giving  them  the  monopoly  of  the  trade  at  700 
per    cent   profit   did   not   care   to   see   peace   brought 
about,""/    Mr.  McHenry  said  that  the  cotton  operators 
in  England  who  were  over  employed  before  the  war 
had  invested   money  in   the  savings   banks   and   had 
been    using   it   during   the   period    of   tinder-employ 
ment  since  the  war  began,  but  that  they  had  now  ex 
pended  all  their  former  earnings,  and  sold  their  fur 
niture,  and  must  soon  have  work.     He  held  that  Eng 
land  was  in  error  in  expecting  an  increased   supply 

09  Geo.    McHenry:     Approaching    Cotton    Crisis,    Dec.    31, 
1864. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    FOREIGN    POLICY  IO7 

of  cotton  from  countries  which  had  hitherto  produced; 
little,  and  stated  that  the  stoppage  of  the  Confederate! 
cotton  leak  would  certainly  produce  a  cotton  crisis 
in  England  some  time  during  the  year  1865  and  cause 
Manchester  to  force  the  ministry  to  recognize  the 
Confederacy. 

frt  the  beginning  of  1865*  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr.  Ben 
jamin  had  resolved  not  only  to  offer  emancipation 
f&r  recognition  or  intervention  by  England  and 
Rrance,  but  to  contract  with  syndicates  at  London  and 
Paris  ^agreeing  to  seize  cotton  and  furnish  it  to  them 
in  payment  for  funds  necessary  to  procure  a  navy.  At 
tliat  time,  however,  no  policy  could  have  secured  the 
success  of  secession. 


CHAPTER  IV 

MISSION  OF  YANCEY,   ROST  AND   MANN 

In  1860  the  Prince  of  Wales  visited  the  northern 
portion  of  the  United  States,  going  as  far  south  as 
Virginia.  He  slept  at  the  White  House,  planted  .1 
tree  at  the  tomb  of  Washington,  and  was  given  a  re 
ception  indicating  that  Anglo-American  relations 
were  more  cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years. 
When  the  storm  of  the  "irrepressible  conflict"  burst 
forth  in  torrents  of  fury  the  next  year,  the  sympathy 
of  Queen  Victoria,  Prince  Albert,  the  Prince  of 
Wales  and  the  majority  of  the  people  of  England  was 
with  the  Union  cause.  Slavery  in  the  South ,  had 
been  a  source  of  much  annoyance  to  England,  and  the 
Northern  people  hoped  that  the  secession  movement 
would  receive  no  support,  but  in  this  they  were  disap 
pointed.  Many  of  the  aristocracy  of  England  stood 
for  the  South.  London  club  life  was  Southern  in  its 
sympathies  and  prominent  English  papers  endeavored 
to  mould  England  in  favor  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy.  Prominent  statesmen  considered  that  the 
Union  was  "  shooting  the  Niagara  Falls."  Lord 
Russell  spoke  of  the  "  late  United  States."  The  Earl 
of  Shrewsbury  spoke  of  the  trial  and  failure  of  democ 
racy  and  prophesied  the  establishment  of  an  aristo 
cracy  in  America.  In  October,  1862,  Gladstone  said 
that  Jefferson  Davis  had  made  an  army,  a  navy  and 
a  nation. 


MISSION    OF    YAXCEY,    ROST    AND    MANN        (IOC) 

On   the   day   of   Mr.    Lincoln's    inauguration    Mr. 
Gregory,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  gave  notice  of 
motion  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Confed^ 
erate  States;  and,  soon  after,  by  a  public  letter,  urged 
this  policy  as  a  means  of  breaking  up  the  slave  trade, 
and    as    a    retaliation    against    the    American    tariff. 
Many  of  the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  already  had 
strong  expectations  of  securing  early  recognition  by 
both  England  and  France,  especially  for  commercial 
reasons.JOn  March  16,  1861,  while  Confederate  com 
mission  eTs""were  at  Washington  trying  to  open  peace 
negotiations    with    Secretary    Seward,    Mr.    Toombs- 
directed  Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann  to  go  to  London 
"  as  soon  as  possible  "  (and  then  to  other  European 
capitals)   to   press   claims   for   recognition.1  /The   in 
structions   recite   that   dissolution   was    tfie   result   of 
long  and  mature  deliberation  to  escape  the  persistent 
efforts  to  compel  the  agricultural  South  to  pay  bourp*j 
ties  to  the  North  in  the  shape  of  high  protective  tar-' 
iff_S4_that  secession  violated  no  allegiance  or  rights;1 
that  the  Washington  Government  was  not  in  a  condi 
tion  to  offer  opposition;  that  a  large  party  of  Northern 
people  would  not  favor  resistance  to  secession;  that 
there  was  no  unusual  reason  to  fear  war;  and  that 
the   South  had   abundant   means   and  determination, 
jvpuld  be  joined  by  the  border  states,  and  would  winM 
|  Power  was  given  the  commissioners  to  make  a  treaty 
^"practically   providing   for   free   trade.     A   willingness 
was  expressed  to  continue  all  the  United  States  trea 
ties  except  the  clause  providing  for  the  maintenance 
of  a  naval  squadron  on  the  coast  of  AfricaTi  Though 

1  Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,"  Vol.  I. 


IIO/          MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 
/ 

the  Confederacy  had  prohibited  the  slave  trade,  she 
could  not  help  the  rest  of  the  world  to  end  it.  With  the 
South  controlling  the  Gulf  coast,  and  one-half  of  the 
Atlantic  coast,  and  with  her  large  exports  of  cotton 
and  her  laisscz  faire  policy  in  commerce,  it  was  ex 
pected  that  England  would  be  ready  to  oppose  any 
measure  by  the  United  States  Government  that  would 
interfere  with  trade.2  £After  Sumter  fell,  Toombs 
wrote  (April  24)  to  the  commissioners  stating  that 
war  was  unavoidable  but  that  unrestricted  intercourse 
with  friendly  nations  was  desired,3  and  he  soon  au 
thorized  them  (May  18)  to  issue  commissions  for 
privateers!"!  In  1856  the  powers  of  Europe  had  en - 
deavorecPto  persuade  all  nations  to  abandon  priva 
teering,  but  the  United  States  having  no  large  navy 
had  refused  to  join  such  an  arrangement.  Toombs 
now  stated  that  the  large  navy  of  the  United  States 
made  it  necessary  for  the  Confederacy  to  adopt  this 

2  W.  H.  Russell,  an  English  journalist,  who  spent  May  of 
1861  in  the  South,  and  had  a  seat  on  the  floor  of  the  legisla 
tive    assembly    at    Montgomery    when    it    was    not    in    secret 
session,  says  in  his  diary  (May  6th)  that  the  press  was  fan 
ning   the   flames,    and   that    Browne,    Assistant    Secretary    of 
State,  had  informed  him  that  400  letters  applying  for  letters 
of  marque  and  reprisal  had  been  received  by  the  Confederate 
government.     Russell  visited  the  plain  office   of  Mr.    Davis, 
and  also  that   of  the   cordial   Mr.   Benjamin,   whom   he   said 
was     "  not    afraid    of    anything."     Benjamin     stated    that    if 
England   declared   privateers   to   be   pirates   the   Confederacy 
would  consider  it  as  a  declaration  of  war,  and  meet  it.     He 
was  certain  that  if  the  United  States  claimed  the  Confederate 
ports  as   United   States   ports,   that   the    British   law   officers 
would  advise  the   British  government  not   to   recognize   the 
blockades.     W.  H.   Russell:     Diary,  North  and  South. 

3  Confed.   "  Dip.   Cor.",    Vol.    I,   Instr.   to   Y.,    R.   and   M., 
No.  2.     Ibid.,  No.  5. 


MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN  III 

method  of  warfare.  He  had  made  no  allusion  to 
slavery  in  the  first  instructions,  but  he  now  stated  that 
it  was  evidently  the  intention  of  Lincoln  to  overthrow 
domestic  instituticns  and  to  sweep  away  the  rights 
of  the  minority.  The  right  of  each  state  to  judge  what 
are  infractions  of  the  constitution,  and  the  remedy  for 
such  infractions,  was  declared.  Assurance  of  the  en 
thusiasm  and  unanimity  of  the  South  was  given,  and 
the  commissioners  were  instructed  to  present  to 
England  the  prejudicial  results  of  the  blockade.  At 
the  same  time  Captain  Bullock  was  sent  to  secure  war 
vessels  in  Europe. 

Before  the  last  instructions  had  been  received  the 
three  commissioners  had  reached  London,  and,  on 
May  3,  through  the-.good  .offices  of  Mr.  Gregory  of  /  A/VV"~' 
the  House  of  Commons,  had  obtained  J^ormal  inter-  u  *JL** 
view  with  Lord  Russell.  They  stated  that  a  new  - 
government  in  America  had  been  formed  without 
shedding  a  drop  of  blood  and  was  prepared  to  main 
tain  its  independence — and  they  emphasized  especially 
the  unrestricted  commercial  advantages  which  Eng 
land  would  obtain  by  recognition.4  They  said  that 
the  tariff  was  the  principal  cause  of  secession,  and 
pointed  to  the  new  Morrill  tariff  as  a  means  of  nearly 
excluding  English  manufactures  from  the  North. 
Earl  Russell  informed  the  commissioners  that  the 
whole  matter  would  be  a  subject  of  Cabinet  consider 
ation,  but  he  expressed  no  opinion.  Mr.  Rost  re 
ceived  more  encouragement  in  Paris,  where  he  had  an 
interview  with  Count  De  Morny,  a  confidential  friend 
of  the  Emperor  Napoleon.  The  Count  said  that 

4  Russell  to  Lord  Lyons,  May  n,  1861. 


112  MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST    AND    MANN 

France  and  England  had  agreed  to  pursue  the  same 
course,  and  that  recognition  was  a  mere  matter  of 
time,  but  that  it  would  be  a  fatal  mistake  to  urge  im- 
^mediate  action.  He  stated-  that  France  ;  would  be 
ready  to  receive  suggestions  from  the  Confederates 
unofficially  and  secretly,  and  that  so  long  as  cotton 
was  for  sale  both  France  and  England  would  see  that 
their  vessels  reached  the  Confederate  ports.  In  a 
despatch  to  Secretary  Toombs,  the  commissioners 
expressed  confidence  that  neither  England  nor 
France  were  averse  to  the  -disintegration  of  the 
United  States,  but  they  feared  that  public  opinion 
against  the  Confederacy  on  the  question  of  slavery 
would  embarrass  the  governments  in  dealing  with  the 
question  of  recognition.5 

In  April  the  British  Government  had  concluded  not 
to  intrude  its  counsels  unsolicited  to  avert  war.6 '  On 
May  2,  Russell  referred  to  the  war  as  a  bad  one  and 
,  said:  "For  God's  sake,  let  us,  if  possible,  keep  out 
of  it." '  Though  war  had  been  declared  by  neither 
party,  Russell,  in  reply  to  Gregory,  on  May  6,  an 
nounced  the  decision  of  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown 
that  the  Southern  Confederacy  must  be  treated  as  a 
belligerent  as  Greece  had  been  in  1825,  but  he  antici 
pated  no  disagreement  with  the  United  States  as  to 
the  blockade.  On  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  the 
British  ambassador  at  Paris  inviting  the  Emperor  to 
cooperate  in  a  joint  endeavor  to  obtain  from  each  of 
the  belligerents  certain  concessions  in  favor  of  neu- 

5Confed.    "Dip.    Cor.,"    Vol.    I,    p.    105.     Despatches    of 
Yancey  and  Mann,  No.  I,  London,  May  21,  1861. 
8  162  Parl.  Debates,  Lords,  April  29,  1861. 
7  Sen.  Rp.  1160,  54-2. 


MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST  AND    MANN 

trals.  The  French  minister  concurred.8  British 
statesmen  saw  the  necessity  of  warning  British  sea 
men  that  privateering  was  against  the  foreign  enlist 
ment  act,  and  on  May  13  the  government  issued  a 
proclamation  of  neutrality  between  the  United  States 
and  "  certain  states  styling  themselves  the  Confeder 
ate  States  of  America."  Earl  Russell  based  his  ac 
tion  on  the  "  si?e  and  population  of  the  seceding 
states."  He  soon  gave  orders  to  interdict  the  en 
trance  of  all  ships  of  war  or  privateers  with  prizes, 
into  any  of  the  British  ports.9  Some  believed  that 
Russell  felt  that  recognition  of  the  independence  of 
the  Confederacy  was  only  a  question  of  time,  and 
thought  that  he  hurried  his  proclamation  in  order 
to  avoid  the  remonstrance  of  C.  F.  Adams,  the  new 
American  minister  who  was  on  his  way  to  London. 
W.  H.  Russell,  the  English  journalist  who  was  trav 
elling  in  the  United  States,  found  people  in  the  North 
very  indignant  against  England  on  account  of  the 
British  policy.10  They  pointed  out  that  the  United 
States  had  taken  no  such  unfriendly  course  during  the 
Canadian  rebellion. 

The  British  proclamation  of  neutrality,  practically 
recognizing  the  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent,  was 
given  at  a  time  when  the  United  States  claimed  that 
no  state  of  war  existed,  and  that  this  action  would 

8  In  March,   1861,   Mercier  at  Washington   seems  to  have 
advised   France  to  recognize   the    Confederacy.     In    May  he 
advised  his  government  to  intervene  by  raising  the  blockade. 
About  May  21  he  was  at  Richmond  and  held  prolonged  in 
terviews  with  Benjamin — probably  for  the  purpose  of  rescuing 
tobacco  which  had  been  purchased  by  French  citizens. 

9  163  Parl.  Debates,  June  7,  1861. 

10  W.  H.  Russell:     Diary,  p.  133. 

8 


MISSION   OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 


be  a  means  of  aiding  the  secessionists  in  the  estab 
lishment  of  their  power.     Complaints  were  made  tha 
the    British    Government    had    not    given    the    nev\ 
American  administration  time  to  develop  its  policy  o 
ending  the  "  demoralization  "  which  had  been  grow 
ing  since  the  November  election.     The  United  State: 
did  not  recognize  the   Confederacy  as   a   belligeren 
until  President  Lincoln  under  the  act  of  Congress  o 
July  13,  issued  his  proclamation  of  August  16,  1861.   I 
was  stated  that  England  knew  the  Confederacy  ha<' 
no  navy,  and  was  aware  that  the  United  States  consid 
ered    secession    unconstitutional.     Secretary    Fish    in 
1869,  in  referring  to  the  matter,  said  "  the  assumed 
belligerency  of  the  insurgents  was  a  fiction  .  .  .  tho 
anticipation   of   supposed   belligerency    to   come,   but 
which  might  never  have  come  if  not  thus  anticipated 
and    encouraged."     English    writers,    on    the    other 
hand,  said  that  President  Lincoln's  proclamation  of 
a  blockade  to  suppress  local  insurrection  practically 
recognized  belligerency,  and  that  it  had  become  nec 
essary  for   Great'  Britain  to  protect  the   interests  of 
Her  citizens  which  would  be  affected  by  the  war. 

A  few  hours  after  the  British  Government  issued 
its  proclamation  Charles  Francis  Adams  arrived  in 
London  to  replace  Dallas  as  United  States  minister, 
and  to  oppose  decidedly  any  wavering  policy  of  the 
British  Government  which  might  give  the  Confeder 
ates  hope  of  recognition.  "  You  alone  will  represent 
your  country  at  London  "  said  Seward  in  his  instruc 
tions  to  Adams,  "  and  you  will  represent  the  whole  of 
it  there.  When  you  are  asked  to  divide  that  duty 
with  others,  diplomatic  relations  between  the  Gov 
ernment  of  Great  Britain  and  this  Government  will 


MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN  1  15 


be  suspended."  Before  Adams  arrived,  Dallas 
informed  Seward  of  Russell's  unofficial  interview  witr 
the  Confederate  agents  on  May  3.  Seward  had  also 
learned  that  England  and  France  had  decided  to  act 
together.  He  had  not  expected  such  an  alliance,  and 
resolved  to  take  no  notice  of  it,  but  he  was  determined! 
to  take  a  decided  stand  against  European  interference; 
in  the  war.  On  May  21,  in  a  letter  bristling  with  ref 
erences  to  the  danger  of  a  war  with  European  na 
tions,  and  stating  that  the  United  States  was  ready 
to  meet  such  a  war  with  confidence  and  success,  he 
wrote  Adams  that  the  United  States  after  long  for 
bearance  had  a  right  to  adopt  a  blockade  as  a  means 
of  suppressing  insurrection,  and  that  the  treatment 
to  be  administered  to  Confederate  privateers  was  a 
matter  for  the  United  States  alone  to  decide.11  He 
also  stated  that  even  unofficial  intercourse  with  the 
Confederates  was  hurtful  to  the  United  States  and  he 

11  This  letter  had  several  of  its  teeth  drawn  by  Lincoln 
before  it  was  sent.  In  the  original  draft  Seward  said,  "  We 
intend  to  have  a  clear  and  simple  record  of  whatever  issue 
may  arise  between  us  and  Great  Britain,"  but  Lincoln  struck 
out  this  phrase,  as  well  as  others.  W.  H.  Russell,  in  his 
diary  said  that  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Eng 
land  probably  were  considerably  affected  by  Seward's  failure 
in  his  prophecies  as  to  the  early  suppression  of  secession. 
He  said  that  Seward,  becoming  more  exacting  and  defiant, 
and  assuming  higher  ground  as  the  Confederacy  gained 
'power,  had  been  "  fretful,  irritable  and  acrimonious,"  but 
that  Sumner  was  useful  in  allaying  irritation.  On  July  4, 
Seward  told  Mr.  Russell  that  if  any  European  power  pro 
voked  a  war  the  United  States  would  not  shrink  from  it,  and 
had  nothing  to  fear  from  a  foreign  war,  though  it  should 
wrap  the  world  in  fire.  Russell  could  not  but  admire  his 
confidence  and  coolness.  It  appeared  that  he,  like  Benjamin, 
was  "  not  afraid  of  anything.'' 


Il6  MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST    AND    MANN 

added  "  You  will  ....  desist  from  all  intercourse 
whatever,  official  or  unofficial,  with  the  British  Gov 
ernment  so  long  as  it  shall  continue  intercourse  of 
either  kind  with  the  domestic  enemies  of  this 
country."  On  June  14,  Adams  replied  that  Russell 
declared  he  had  "  no  intention  of  seeing  them  again." 
Seward,  by  his  constant  vigilance,  embarrassed  the 
Confederate  commissioners  at  every  corner.  After 
the  passage  of  the  Morrill  tariff  he  expected  that  the 
Confederates  would  ask  for  recognition  as  a  retalia 
tion  and  gave  Adams  his  instructions  to  thwart  the 
arguments  of  the  Confederates.  He  said  that  to  seek 
to  destroy  the  Union  as  a  retaliatory  measure  would 
be  far  more  injurious  to  the  United  States  than  the 
temporary  disadvantage  of  a  revenue  law  could  be  to 
England;  he  intimated  that  England  should  not  as 
sume  that  the  Confederacy  would  offer  more  liberal 
terms  of  trade  than  the  North  could  offer;  he  stated 
that  the  Confederates  might  in  case  of  war  find  them 
selves  tempted  to  levy  import  duties,  or  be  forced  to 
discontinue  their  offer  of  practically  free  trade;  he 
urged  that  most  of  the  imports  from  Europe  to  the 
United  States  were  consumed  in  the  North,  and  that 
the  Morrill  tariff  probably  would  not  decrease  the 
amount;  he  declared  that  recognition  would  mean  in 
tervention  and  war,  and  that  permanent  disunion 
would  mean  perpetual  civil  war  and  Confederate  ag 
gression  for  expansion,  which  might  be  fraught  with 
grave  consequences  to  other  nations  and  to  the  peace 
of  the  world;  he  reminded  England  that  recognition 
would  be  a  dangerous  precedent  to  be  set  by  a  nation 
whose  bonds  to  her  colonies  might  be  put  to  a  se 
vere  test  by  future  insurrections. 


MISSION   OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND   MANN  1 1/ 

By  June  the  Confederate  commissioners  found  that 
the  general  opinion  at  London  was  that  the  North  U/f 
was  too  strong  for  the  South.12     Seeing  no  immediate 
hope  of  recognition  by  England  and  France  they  sug 
gested  that   communication   should   be   opened   with 
Spain.     Gregory  had  proposed  to  make  a  move  in 
the  Commons  on  June  7,  looking  toward  recognition, 
but  he  postponed  his  motion  at  the  request  of  Earl 
Russell,  who  said  it  was  opposed  to  public  interests 
to  raise  such  a  question.     The  commissioners  were 
hopeful,  however,   that   the   Confederacy  would   win 
favor  by  the  failure  of  Seward's  pledges  to  restore 
the  Union  in  ninety  days.     In  a  recent  interview  with 
the    Confederate    commissioners,    Earl    Russell    had 
seemed  to  be  interested  in  their  narrative  of  the  con 
duct  of  the   United  States   toward  the   Confederate    I 
Peace  Commissioners  at  Washington,  but  he  only  said    \ 
that. Great  Britain  desired  to  communicate  with  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Confederate  States  as  to     1 
the  Declaration  of  Paris  and  the  rights  of  neutrals,     \ 
and  that  the  cabinet  would  consider  all  the  questions 
that  arose — but  he  could  give  no  promise  in  regard 
to  recognition.18 

12  Despatches  of  Yancey,   Rost  and  Mann,  No.  2.,  June  I, 
1861. 

13  On  June   15   Lord   Lyons   and   Mercier  in   an   interview 
with  Seward  proposed  to  read  their  instructions  as  to  the 
neutral  attitude  of  their  respective  governments,  and  ascer 
tain  the  position  of  the  United  States  as  to  the  Declaration 
of   Paris,  but   Seward  already  having  been   informed   of  the 
substance  of  the  instructions,  and  feeling  that  foreign  powers 
had  no  right  (by  assuming  the  attitude  of  a  neutral)  to  decide 
that  the  United  States  was  divided  into  two  belligerent  par 
ties,   declined  to  hear  them  read,  and  a  few  days  later  in 
structed  Dayton  at   Paris  and  Adams  at   London,  that  the 
insurrection  in  the  South  did  not  constitute  a  war. 


Il8  MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 

In  1856  representatives  from  the  different  Euro 
pean  governments  met  at  Paris  and  agreed  upon  the 
following  declarations: 

"(i)  Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished. 

"(2)  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemies'  goods  with 
the  exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

"(3)  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contra 
band  of  war  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  the  ene 
mies'  flag. 

"(4)  Blockades  in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  ef 
fective,  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient 
really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy." 

At  that  time  the  United  States,  having  a  small 
navy  as  compared  to  the  nations  of  Europe  with 
whom  there  was  a  possibility  of  a  contest  in  the  fu 
ture,  felt  that  it  was  inexpedient  to  agree  to  a  declara 
tion  against  privateering  unless  private  property 
should  be  exempted  from  capture  by  sea.14 

Having  practically  recognized  the  Confederacy  as 
a  belligerent,  Lord  Russell,  on  May  18,  instructed 
Lord  Lyons  at  Washington  to  take  steps  to  secure 
the  assent  of  the  officials  of  the  Confederacy  to  the 
rules  of  1856  in  regard  to  a  neutral  flag,  neutral  goods 
and  blockades,  and  authorized  him  to  confide  the  ne 
gotiation  to  Robert  Bunch,  the  British  Consul  at 
Charleston.  On  July  5,  Lord  Lyons  directed  Bunch 
,  ^  to  proceed  in  the  negotiations  with  the  Richmond  au 

thorities,  using  caution  so  as  to  avoid  raising  the 
question  of  recognition.  Mr.  Bunch  secured  Mr,J\V^ 
H.  Trescot  as  an  agent  to  lay  the  matter  before  Mr. 
^\  Davls7"and  the  latter,  after  a  cabinet  meeting,  obtained 

14  Exec.  Docs.,  24-3,  Vol.  I,  p.  33- 


MISSION   OF  YANCEY,   ROST   AND   MANN  1 19 

the  passage  by  the  Confederate  Congress  of  a  resolu 
tion  maintaining  the  right  of  privateering,  but  ac 
ceding  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris  on  all  other  sub 
jects.  This  resolution  was  approved  August  13,  and 
England  practically  agreed  not  to  interfere  with  pri 
vateering  by  the  Confederacy. 

As  soon  as  Seward  heard  of  the  negotiations  with 
the  Confederacy  he  asked  the  removal  of  Bunch,  but 
Lord  RusselJ  accepted  the  responsibility  of  his  acts 
and  refused  to  remove  him,  whereupon  his  exequatur 
was  revoked  by  President  Lincoln  on  the  ground  that 
his  communication  invited  the  insurgents'  to  exercise 
power  belonging  to  a  sovereign  state — to  become  a 
party  to  an  international  agreement  which  was  simi 
lar  to  a  treaty.  The  United  States  was  willing  to 
accept  the  entire  declaration  of  Paris,  but  England 
did  not  desire  her  to  accept  the  article  against  pri 
vateering.15 

The  Confederate  commissioners  abroad  were  still 
watching  the  popular  pulse.  By  July  15,  Rost  had 
held  an  informal  interview  with  M.  Thouvenel  the 
French  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  He  found  that 
while  France  was  ready  to  join  the  other  powers  in 
an  effort  for  peace  it  was  necessary  for  her  to  look 
[first  to  her  interests  in  Europe.  Yancey  had  joined 
Lost  in  Paris,  and  he  reported  that  the  Emperor  had 

10  feeling  hostile  to  the  Confederacy  but  only  waited   \ 
[or  England.    The  commissioners  were  of  the  opinion 
lat  Spain,  Belgium  and  Denmark  were  friendly  and 

feady  to  extend  recognition  as  soon  as  England  and 
France  should  do  so.     In  a  letter  complaining  of  the 

13 J.  B.  Moore:  International  Arbitrations,  Vol.  I,  pp. 
V>4-65. 


120  MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 

neglect  of  the  Confederacy  to  keep  the  commissioners 
well  informed  as  to  vessels  entering  and  clearing  Con 
federate  ports,  and  urging  the  establishment  of  a  se 
cret  line  of  communication  by  way  of  Canada,  he  said 
that  opinion  was  becoming  reconciled  to  secession  as 
a  fact  though  it  had  been  opposed  to  it  as  a  theory. 
In  a  letter  to  Toombs  (July  15)  the  commissioners 
stated  that  relations  between  Mr.  Adams  and  the 
British  Cabinet  were  neither  amicable  nor  satisfac 
tory.  It  was  seen  that  complications  might  arise  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Confederacy.  But  Adams  was 
successful  in  breaking  off  the  personal  interviews  be 
tween  Russell  and  the  commissioners,  and  this  caused 
a  difference  of  opinion  in  the  commission.  Yancey 
thought  that  Russell's  concession  to  Adams's  de 
mand  was  a  violation  of  British  neutrality.  He  said 
that  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  could  not  be  ade 
quately  explained  in  writing,  nor  the  temper  of  the 
British  Government  be  discovered,  and  urged  that  a 
firm  but  moderate  protest  should  be  made,  but  Rost 
and  Mann  objected  to  the  protest  and  the  subject  was 
referred  to  Richmond.10 

After  the  Confederate  victory  at  Manassas  (Bull 
Run),  in  July,  the  commissioners  were  encouraged  to 
renew  their  efforts  and  to  furnish  Russell  with  a  long 
communication  giving  reasons  for  immediate  recogni 
tion.  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  who  had  replaced  Toombs, 
informed  the  commissioners  that  Union  sentiment  in 
the  South  had  been  silenced,  and  that  Maryland  and 
Missouri  were  kept  in  the  Union  only  by  Federal 
troops.17  Even  in  the  United  States  some  said  that 

16  Du  Bose:     Yancey. 

L!  Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,"  Vol.  I.  Instr.  to  Y.,  R.  and  M., 
No.  7,  July  29,  1861. 


}Y*-t^v 

MISSION   OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN        1^12* 

the  Union  was  as  dead  as  the  Achean  League.18  Earl 
Russell  in  a  note  of  August  7  intimated  a  desire  to  -^ 
have  a  written  explanation  of  the  alleged  right  of  the 
Confederate  States  to  recognition  by  England. 
Yancey  and  Mann  replied  on  August  8,  promising  to 
prepare  the  document.  Rost  came  from  Paris,  the 
document  was  prepared  the  next  week,  and  on  August 
14  it  was  presented,  j  It  reviewed  the  two  previous  in 
terviews,  and  the  instructions  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  and  urged  that  the  secession  violated 
no  principles  of  allegiance,  but  was  sustained  by  the 
principles  of  the  American  Declaration  of  Independ 
ence  in  favor  of  self-government. 

The  commissioners  had  already  expatiated  upon 
the  extent,  products  and  population  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  offering  arguments  to  prove  that  they  were  not 
rebels  and  pirates.  They  now  explained  why  it  was 
necessary  for  the  agricultural  South  to  resort  to  pri 
vateering  in  order  to  injure  American  commerce, 
stating  that  the  English  law  of  neutrality  as  to  ports 
favored  the  United  States.  They  announced  that 
the  blockade  was  ineffective  except  on  the  Chesa 
peake,  that  Confederate  resources  were  abundant  and 
that  reconstruction  was  impossible.  They  then  pro 
ceeded  to  show  that  anti-slavery  sentiment  could  not 
remain  in  sympathy  with  the  North.  They  were 
aware  of  the  strength  of  this  sentiment  in  Europe 
and  of  its  influence  in  preventing  friendly  relation 
with  the  Confederacy.  They  did  not  undertake  to 
discuss  the  morality  of  the  institution;  but  they  stated 
that  the  authors  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 

18  W.  H.  Russell:     Diary,  July  23,  1861. 


122  MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 

found  the  African  race  in  the  colonies,  in  slavery  by 
English  law  and  by  the  laws  of  nations,  that  they  left 
that  fact  where  they  found  it,  and  made  the  declara 
tion  of  freedom  for  the  white  race  only  and  perpetu 
ated  slavery  in  the  fundamental  theory  of  the  gov 
ernment.  As  to  the  wisdom  of  the  fathers,  they  said 
that  it  was  not  a  matter  for  them  to  discuss.  But 
they  informed  Russell  that  the  United  States  Con 
gress  had  declared  that  the  war  was  prosecuted  only 
to  maintain  the  constitution  and  to  preserve  the 
Union.  "It  was  not  from  fear  of  liberation  of  the 
slaves,"  they  said,  "  that  secession  took  place.  The 
new  party  in  power  has  proposed  to  guarantee  slav 
ery  forever,  if  the  states  of  the  South  will  but  remain 
in  the  Union."  Some  at  this  time  surmised  that  the 
United  States  might  change  its  policy  in  regard  to 
slavery.  The  commissioners  met  this  squarely  by 
stating  that  the  abrupt  destruction  of  a  labor  system 
which  had  given  bread  to  10,000,000  people  engaged 
in  manufacturing,  and  reared  so  vast  a  commerce  be 
tween  America  and  Europe,  "  would  be  disastrous  to 
the  world  as  well  as  to  the  master  and  the  slave."  In 
urging  the  claims  of  the  Confederacy  to  recognition 
as  a  de  facto  Government,  Texas  and  South  America 
were  mentioned  as  precedents,  and  reference  was 
made  to  the  necessity  of  British  commercial  rela 
tions  with  the  South  in  order  to  preserve  great  inter 
ests  in  England.  As  an  inducement  to  break  the 
blockade  the  commissioners  stated  that  the  cotton 
crop  would  be  delivered  at  the  Southern  wharves  and 
ports  whenever  there  was  a  prospect  of  the  blockade 
being  raised,  and  not  before.  An  embargo  had  been 
laid  as  an  offensive  measure  against  the  passage  of 


MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 


cotton  across  the  border  into  the  United  States,  thus 
making  it  necessary  for  Europe  to  seek  it  at  the  ports 
of  the  South.19  The  commissioners  closed  their  com 
munication  by  saying  that  they  would  be  surprised  if 
England  left  the  Confederacy  to  contend  alone  for 
interests  which  \vere  as  important  to  the  commercial 
powers  of  Europe  as  to  herself  without  giving  even 
friendly  countenance,  but  they  said  that  the  citizens 
of  the  South  would  continue  their  task  with  vigor 
and  that  when  peace  should  be  won  they  would  not 
be  responsible  for  all  the  bloodshed  and  for  the  suf 
fering  of  millions  in  the  eastern  as  well  as  the  western 
hemisphere.20 

Going  to  Paris,  the  commissioners  had  an  interview 
with  the  minister  of  the  marine  and  colonies,  who 
gave  hopeful  intimations.     They  also   soon  receivec 
private  information  that  the  letter  of/ August  14  hac 
made  a  good  impression  on  Russell;  that  there  was 
a  strong  feeling  in  the  cabinet  in  favor  of  recognition 
and  that  England  had  suggested  to  France  to  take  the 
nitiative  in  European  recognition.   They  also  learned 
:hat  Louis  Napoleon  had  officially  asked  England  to, 
cooperate  with  him  in  recognizing  the  Confederacy 
and  breaking  the  blockade,  but  that  England  had  re-; 
used.     Cotton  had  gone  up  100  per  cent;  the  facto- 
ies  were   running   on   short   time  and   there  was   a 
:>read  riot  in  Paris.     But  France  could  not  lead  in  a 
policy  of  intervention  or  interference.! 

3  Raising  the  blockade  by  England  of  course  meant  war 
with  the  United  States.  In  order  to  open  the  blockade, 
Yancey,  Rhett  and  Toombs  had  desired  that  the  Confederacy 
should  adopt  a  policy  of  offering  England  a  practical  monop 
oly  of  commerce  for  twenty  years,  as  well  as  other  stipula 
tions.  *°  See  McPherson:  Rebellion. 


\ 


124          MISSION   OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 

^4  Russell  replied  on  August  24,  stating  that  the  Brit- 
fish  Government  did  not  pretend  to  pronounce  judg 
ment  on  questions  in  debate  between  the  United 
States  and  her  adversaries  in  North  America;  that  it 
desired  to  remain  neutral  and  would  perform  all  tl  e 
duties  required  of  a  neutral;  that  it  could  not  ac 
knowledge  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy  until 
arms  or  some  peaceful  mode  of  negotiation  should 
better  determine  the  respective  positions  of  the  two 
belligerents.'1  Yancey  soon  sent  Hunter  a  letter  of 
resignation. 

On  August  24,  Hunter  instructed  the  commission 
ers  to  hurry  to  Madrid,  to  inform  Spain  that  since 
secession  the  South  no  longer  desired  Cuba;  to  reprc- 
;  sent  that  mutual  interests  seemed  to  invite  a  close  and 
mutual  alliance;  and  to  ask  for  recognition.     It  was 

1  stated  that  both  Spain  and  the  Confederacy  were 
interested  in  the  same  social  system,  that  the  growth 
of  Spanish  power  and  resources  could  never  be  a 
cause  for  Confederate  jealousy,  but  that  in  case  of 
reunion  the  non-slave-holding  states  would  also  desire 
to  annex  the  Spanish  colonies.  It  was  suggested  that 
Spain  would  be  justified,  even  at  some  risk,  in  assist- 

"'  ing  to  build  up  a  great  friendly  power  that  would 
prove  so  advantageous  to  her.22 

A  short  time  after  Hunter's  instructions  were  writ- 
vxten,   an   act  of   the   Confederate   Congress   disunited 
the  European  commission,  and  on  September  23,  Mr. 
i  Davis  appointed  Mason  and  Slidell 23  as  commission 
ers  to  England  and  France  respectively  with  instruc- 

21  51  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers. 

22  Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,"  Vol.  I,  p.  120. 
88Instr.  to  Mann,  No.  n,  Sept.  23,  1861. 


MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 


tions  to  urge  that  the  new  "  homogeneous  "  Southern 
union  could  serve  as  no  precedent  for  revolutionary 
violence,  that  its  existence  was  of  deep  commercial 
and  political  interest  to  other  nations,  and  that  they 
should  intervene  against  American  intervention  and 
an  ineffectual  blockade.  Of  the  former  commission 
Mann  was  sent  to  Belgium,  Rost  was  expected  to  go 
to  Spain,  and  Yancey  was  asked  to  remain  in  Europe 
until  Mason  should  arrive.  Though  Mason  received 
his  instructions  September  23,  he  did  not  reach  Eu 
rope  until  January  29/1862. 

In  the  meantime  the  attitude  of  the  European  pow- 
rs  toward  the  blockade  was  *a  disappointment  to  the 
Tonfederacy.     Russell,    having    heard    of    Mercier's 
.dvice  to  the  French  Government,  to  intervene  and 
orcibly  raise  the  blockade,  wrote  to  Palmerston,  on 
3ctober  17,  that  there  was  much  good  sense  in  Mer- 
ier's  observations,  but  that  it  was  not  advisable  to 
>reak  a  blockade  merely  for  the  sake  of  getting  cot 
ton.     He  intimated  that  good  offices  for  pacification 
should  first  be  offered,  and  that  in  case  they  failed, 
intervention  on  a  large  scale  might  be  taken  about  the 
end  of  the  year  in  order  to  close  the  war.     Palmers- 
ton  was  not  ready  at  that  time,  and  such  an  aggres 
sive  action  would  have  been  less  popular  in  England 
after  the  American  concession  in  the  Trent   affair. 
The  English  Government  knew  that  the  recognition 
f  the  tonfederacy  would  place  England  in  the  atti- 
ude  of  an  ally  against  the  United  States,  and  there 
;as  no  desire  to  assume  such  a  position. 

Yancey,  after  a  short  stay  in  France,  returned  to 
England  intending  to  depart  for  the  Confederate 
States  at  an  early  date.  He  was  still  confident  of  the 


126  MISSION    OF   YANCEY,    ROST  AND    MANN 

ability  of  the  South  to  resist  the  superior  numbers  and 
resources  of  the  North.  In  November,  at  a  dinner  of 
the  Fish-monger's  Society,  he  stated  that  the  Souta 
could  live  under  a  blockade.  Yancey's  return  to  the 
Confederacy  was  delayed  by  the  capture  of  Maso-i 
and  Slidell  on  the  British  steamer  Trent.  Mr. 
Hanckel  of  Charleston,  on  the  arrival  of  the  Trent  i  i 
England,  delivered  to  Mr.  Yancey  and  his  associates 
the  instructions  which  had  been  given  Mason  an  i 
Slidell.'"*  Information  of  the  Trent  affair  reached 
London  November  27,  and  the  press  was  indignant. 
Yancey,  immediately,  while  war  was  menacing,  ur 
gently  renewed  the  attempt  to  get  recognition,  anc", 
in  order  to  show  the  inefficiency  of  the  blockade,  pre 
sented  information  (brought  by  Mr.  Hanckel)  of  a  list 
of  over  forty  vessels  which  had  passed  the  blockade  in 
safety  (up  to  August  7). 

In  the  letter  to  Russell  (November  30)  the  commis 
sioners,  stating  that  the  United  States  and  the  Con 
federacy  had  both  agreed  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris 
on  the  subject  of  the  blockade,  urged  that  the  Euro 
pean  powers  should  enforce  it,  not  only  because  of  the 
principles  of  the  Declaration,  but  also  from  the  inter 
ests  affected.  They  declared  that  a  war  shutting  up 
cotton  was  directed  against  Europe  as  well  as  against 
the  Southland  suggested  that  since  transit  routes  had 
been  made  neutral,  cotton  could  be  made  so.  They 
informed  Russell  that  no  blockade  would  ever  sub 
due  the  South,  but  that  it  should  be  declared  ineffec 
tive  for  the  interests  of  mankind  as  well  as  for  those 
of  the  Confederacy.  They  insisted  that  real  neti- 

™  U.  S.  and  Confed.  Naval  Records,  Series  i,  Vol.  I,  p.  155- 


MISSION   OF   YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN  127 

trality  called  for  a  rigid  observance  of  international 
law  on  the  subject  <^L  blockades,  and  that  Europe 
should  not  give  aid  to  the  United  States  through 
considerations  of  her  embarrassed  condition.25 

Russell  briefly  replied  December  7,  as  follows: 
"  Lord  Russell  presents  his  compliments  to  Mr. 
Yancey,  Mr.  Rost  and  Mr.  Mann.  He  has  had  the 
honor  to  receive  their  letters  and  enclosures  of  the 
27th  and  3Oth  of  November;  but  in  the  present  state 
of  affairs  he  must  decline  to  enter  into  any  official 
communication  with  them." 

The  Confederate  expectations  which  arose  after  the 
Trent  affair  were  gradually  dissipated  when  the 
course  of  the  United  States  Government  became 
known.  When  Slidell  reached  Paris  in  February, 
1862,  Rost  handed  him  a  "  Confidential  Memoran 
dum "  dated  "London,  31  Jan.,  1862,"  and  indicating 
a  correspondence  between  the  British-Cabinet  and  the 
maritime  powers  of  Europe  concerning  the  Federal 
"  Stone  Fleet,"  and  the  blockade,  in  which  the  powers 
alluded  to  the  blockade  as  ineffectual.28  But  Slidell 
said  that  the  memorandum  was  either  a  hoax  played 
on  Rost's  credulity,  or  an  invention  of  his  own. 
Yancey  left  London  upon  Mason's  arrival,  carrying 
with  him  Mason's  first  despatch,  which  narrated  the 
incidents  relating  to  his  eventful  journey,  and  reported 
that  the  ministry  seemed  to  "  hang  fire."  Running  the 
blockade  at  Sabine  Pass,  Yancey  reached  New  Or 
leans,  where  he  informed  Soule  and  others  that  Prince 
Albert  and  Queen  Victoria  were  against  the  seces- 

25  51  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  pp.  254-57. 
28  Despatches  from  Mason  to  Benjamin,  No.  25,  January  14, 
1863. 


128  MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN 

sionists,  and  that  English  feeling  was  so  strong 
against  .slavery  that  the  Government  would  hardly 
dare  to  give  any  help  that  would  tend  to  perpetuate 
the  institutiori.(Tpn  March  29,  Mr.  Davis  accepted 
Yancey's  resignation  with  regretT""] 

Rost,  after  an  interview  with  trie  French  minister  in 
Paris  in  the  latter  part  of  January,27  soon  went  to  his 
post  at  Madrid.  In  March  he  was  informed  by 
Mr.  Calderon  Collantes  that  Spain  was  not  ready  to 
take  the  initiative  in  Europe  in  a  policy  recognizing 
the  Confederacy.28  There  was  no  encouragement  in 
this  mission.  While  waiting  for  news  Rost  wrote  to 
Yancey,  on  April  7,  that  there  was  no  hope  from  Eu 
rope  until  the  United  States  should  be  ready  to  treat 
with  the  Confederacy  as  an  independent  power,  and 
he  thought  it  was  to  the  interest  of  the  South  to 
make  concessions  to  secure  an  alliance  with  the 
North.  Seeing  "that  the  Confederacy  would  have  a 
big  war  debt  to  pay,  he  suggested  that  the  South 
should  intimate  to  the  North  its  willingness  to  agree 
to  make  its  tariff  equal  to  that  of  the  North  for  a  lim 
ited  time,  dispensing  with  frontier  custom  houses  and 
having  practically  free  trade  with  the  United  States. 
He  was  willing  to  give  the  North  commercial  advan 
tages  in  order  to  avoid  frontier  troubles,  and  said  that 
if  other  nations  complained  they  could  be  reminded 
of  their  course  in  the  Confederacy's  hour  of  need."9 
In  bad  health,  and  discouragedf~Rost  resigned  in 

"Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  i,  Feb.  n,  1862.  Rost's  inter 
view  of  Jan.  31  was  in  regard  to  the  blockade,  and  the 
number  of  vessels  leaving  Cuba  for  Confederate  ports. 

28  Despatches  of  Rost,  March  21,  1862. 

29  Rost  to  Yancey,  April  7,  1862. 


MISSION    OF    YANCEY,    ROST   AND    MANN  129 

May  and  left  Madrid  with  his  familyV- jThe  following 
September  his  health  was  still  wretCTred  and  he  had 
not  changed  his  views.30  He  said  that  France  waited 
for  England,  that  England  would  do  nothing  so  long 
as  she  could  keep  peace  a.t  home,  and  that  Spain  would 
be  the  last  power  to  act.31 

30  Despatches  of  Rost,  Paris,  Sept.   13,  1862. 

31  Perry,  who  represented  the  United  States  at  Madrid  in 
1861,  before  the  arrival  of  Carl  Schurz,  stated  that  the  sym 
pathies  of  the   Spanish  government  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  were  favorable  to  the  "  faction  "  which  seemed  to  offer 
some   hope  of  dividing   the  United    States   and   diminishing 
her  power  in  the  western  hemisphere.     He  said  that  Preston, 
of  Kentucky,   during  the  latter  part  of  his  term   as  United 
States   minister  at   Madrid,   had    endeavored   to   impress   the 
governing   classes   with   the   belief  that   the   aristocratic   and 
chivalrous  society  was  in  the  South,  and  that  the  sans  culottes 
democracy  was  at  the  North.     Perry  stated  that  the  conserva 
tive   classes   were   at  the   North,   and   the   filibusters   at   the 
South.     From  speeches  of  Southern  leaders  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  Civil  War  he  showed  that  they  contemplated  annexa 
tion  of  Cuba,  San  Domingo  and  Mexico,  and  that  the  Union 
of  South  and  North  was  the  best  guarantee  to  Spain  of  her 
own  peace  in  North  America. 


CHAPTER  V 

MISSION  OF  MASON  AND  SLIDELL 

On  October  12,  186$,  Secretary  Hunter  received 
from  W.  H.  Trescot,  of  Charleston,  a  telegram  of 
which  the  following  is  the  substance:  "  Our  friends 
left  here  last  night  at  one  o'clock.  Their  escape  was 
favored  by  having  a  fast  steamer  with  good  officers, 
and  by  the  darkness  and  rain.  The  boat  will  be  back 
in  about  a  week  and  nothing  should  be  said  of  it  in 
the  meantime."  : 

"  Our  friends "  were  James  Murray  Mason  and 
John  Slidell,  who  on  September  23  had  received  their 
instructions  as  commissioners  to  Engffhd  and 
France7,  respectively.2  It  was  felt  that  the  Confeder 
ate  claims  for  recognition  had  been  recently  strength 
ened,  and  the  commissioners  were  sent  to  obtain  aid 
in  every  way  possible.  Both  had  been  prominent 
men  in  national  affairs. 

James  Mason  was  born  in  Fairfax  county,  Virginia, 
in  1798.  He  was  a  grandson  of  George  Mason  who 
had  been  prominent  in  the  Revolution.  He  graduated 
from  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  in  1818,  prac 
ticed  law  in  Virginia,  served  in  the  state  legislature, 
and  was  a  member  of  the  state  constitutional  conven 
tion  of  1829.  In  1833  he  was  elected  to  the  United 
States  House  of  Representatives.  In  1847  he  entered 

1  With  Despatches  of  Mason. 

2  Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,"  Vol.  I. 


MISSION    OF    MASON   AND    SLIDELL  13! 

the  United  States  Senate,  of  which  body  he  remained 
a  member  for  fourteen  years,  and  for  ten  years  was 
chairman  of  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs.  He 
was  the  author  of  the  fugitive  slave  law  of  1850,  and 
was  always  a  strong  opponent  to  anti-slavery  agita 
tion.  He  had  urged  secession  in  Virginia  when  a 
majority  favored  the  Union,  and  took  a  prominent 
part  in  changing  the  decision  of  his  state.  He  was 
a  member  of  the  Confederate  Congress  when  ap 
pointed  commissioner. 

John  Slidell  was  born  in  New  York  about  1793, 
graduated  at  Columbia  in  1810,  moved  to  New  Or 
leans  in  1819,  and  began  the  study  of  law.  After  1828 
he  became  prominent  in  Louisiana  politics  and  in 
1842  he  was  elected  to  Congress  where  he  served  one 
term.  In  1845  ne  was  sent  as  commissioner  to 
Mexico,  but  Mexico  refused  to  receive  him.  In  1853 
he  entered  the  United  States  Senate  and  remained 
until  his  state  seceded  in  1861.  He  represented  the 
extreme  views  of  the  South,  and  was  active  on  com 
mittees,  though  not  prominent  in  debate.  In  send 
ing  these  two  commissioners  to  Europe  the  Confed 
eracy  hoped  soon  to  receive  such  support  as  would 
enable  it  to  break  the  blockade. 

The  investment  of  the  Southern  ports  was  becoming 
severe.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  United  States 
navy  undertook  to  blockade  the  coast  of  1900  miles, 
capture  seaports,  acquire  control  of  bays  and  sounds, 
assist  in  opening  the  Mississippi,  destroy  Confeder 
ate  cruisers,  and  protect  United  States  commerce. 
Most  of  the  steam  vessels  were  abroad  when  Sumter 
fell  and  there  was  then  no  cable  to  call  them  home, 
but  the  resources  of  the  North  soon  created  a  large 


/••^^  A  A^*~~ *  j 

l^tJ**^*^*          /Jf 
N    AND    SLIDELL    ~*~ £x>*~ 


132  MISSION    OF    MASO 

navy.  On  April  27,  1861,  Lincoln,  in  order  to  stop 
the  trade  and  supplies  of  the  Confederacy,  declared  a 
blockade  of  all  the  Southern  ports,  and  slowly  this 
became  more  and  more  effective.  The  cotton  exports 
of  $202,000,000  in  1860  fell  to  $42,000,000  in  1861,  and 
to  $400,000  in  1862.  This  was  a  serious  blow  to  the 
South,  which  was  dependent  on  England  for  supplies. 
A  social  and  industrial  revolution  had  improved  the 
conditions  in  the  free  states,  but  during  the  century 
there  had  been  very  little  change  in  the  slave  states. 
The  flow  of  European  immigrants  passed  by  the  South 
to  carry  their  skill,  energy  and  free  labor  to  the  new 
homes  in  the  Northwest,  so  that  the  resources  of  the 
slave  states  remained  undeveloped,  owing  to  their 
peculiar  industrial  system.  The  South  had  no  ships, 
no  gun  factories  and  no  machine  shops.  Even  medi 
cines  had  to  be  bought  in  a  foreign  country.  But 
the  English  manufacturers  and  merchants,  and  four 
million  laborers,  depended  upon  American  raw  cotton, 
of  which  the  South  in  1860  had  raised  4,700,000  bales. 
Smuggling  naturally  took  place  in  spite  of  the  block 
ade,  but  by  means  of  the  increase  of  Federal  vessels, 
and  by  sinking  the  hulks  of  vessels  in  the  channels 
leading  to  Charleston,  the  investment  became  so 
effective  that  cotton  fell  to  eight  cents  in  South  Caro 
lina  and  rose  to  fifty  cents  in  England — notwithstand 
ing  the  fact  that  Nassau  had  become  a  centre  for 
blockade-runners  which  carried  it  out  on  moonless 
nights  and  during  storms.  The  distress  of  the  South 
increased,  for  want  of  manufactured  goods,  and  the 
people  could  not  thrive  under  isolation  from  Europe.' 

3  T.  E.  Taylor:     Running  the  Blockade,  pp.  16-32,  44-54. 


MISSION    OF    MASON   AND    SLIDELL  133 

Would   England   and   France   recognize  the   Confed- 
leracy  and  oppose  the  blockade? 

Mason,  with  power  to  make  peace,  had  been 
directed  to  "  proceed  to  London  with  as  little  delay  as 
possible,"  in  order  to  state  the  Confederate  position 
md  urge  recognition  and  opposition  to  the  blockade 
as  a  means  of  shortening  an  unnecessary  war  and  sub 
serving  the  interests  of  England  as  well  as  of  the 
Confederacy.  He  was  instructed  to  say  that  a  dom- 
nant  majority  in  the  United  States  had  violated  the 
original  compact  which  had  been  made  between  sec 
tions  with  diverse  social  systems,  and  that  the  Gov 
ernment  no  longer  protected  the  Southern  system; 
that  the  South,  seeking  self-government,  had  decided 
to  form  a  new  union  of  more  homogeneous  materials 
and  interests,  but  that  the  old  institutions  would  be 
retained,  the  form  of  government  not  being  changed, 
and  that  secession  would  furnish  no  precedent  for  the 
overthrow  of  lawful  authority  by  revolutionary  vio 
lence;  that  the  United  States  had  rejected  the  offers 
of  amicable  adjustment  by  peaceful  separation;  that, 
notwithstanding  the  advantage  of  organization  which 
the  United  States  had  at  the  beginning  of  the  strug 
gle,  the  Confederacy  now  had  a  responsible  Govern 
ment,  a  united  people,  200,000  men  in  the  field  and 
bright  prospects,  while  the  North  was  suffering  from 
failures;  that  the  English  people  had  a  deep  political 
and  commercial  interest  in  the  establishment  of  the 
Confederacy  because  the  latter  would  not  be  a  rival, 
but  a  customer,  of  the  manufacturing  and  commercial 
nations — that  it  would  favor  free  trade,  prevent  the 
United  States  from  any  longer  controlling  the  cotton 
supply,  and  end  the  former  Southern  desire  to  seek 


134  MISSION    OF    MASON   AND    SLIDELL 

protection  and  balance  of  power  by  the  annexation 
of  contiguous  territory.  The  instructions  stated  that 
the  South  had  resolved  to  seek  protection  by  separa 
tion  instead  of  by  annexations,  and  would  no  longer 
threaten  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world,  but  would 
be  a  bond  of  peace  between  the  nations. 

It  was  urged  that  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy 
would  be  in  accord  with  the  previous  policy  of  Eng 
land.  Lord  John  Russell,  in  recent  despatches  to 
Lord  Cowley  on  the  Italian  question,  referring  to  the 
consistent  principles  upon  which  England  had  acted 
since  1821  (at  Troppau,  Laybach,  Verona,  and  in 
the  cases  of  South  America,  Greece  and  Belgium), 
said:  "  She  uniformly  withheld  her  consent  to  acts 
of  intervention  by  force  to  alter  the  internal  govern 
ment  of  other  nations;  she  uniformly  gave  her  coun 
tenance,  and  if  necessary  her  aid,  to  consolidate  the 
de  facto  governments  which  arose  in  Europe  or 
America."  The  Confederate  instructions  stated  that 
to  withhold  recognition  would  encourage  the  inter 
vention  of  the  United  States,  and  invited  the  applica 
tion  of  English  principles.  Hunter  desired  England 
to  treat  the  case  of  the  Confederacy  as  she  had  that  of 
Italy,  concerning  which  Russell  had  recently  said: 
"  We,  at  least,  are  convinced  that  an  authority  restored 
by  force  of  arms,  maintained  by  force  of  arms,  con 
stantly  opposed  by  the  national  wishes,  would  afford 
no  solid  and  durable  basis  for  the  pacification  and  wel 
fare  of  Italy."  Hunter's  instructions  also  insisted  that 
England  should  enforce  the  Declaration  of  Paris  upon 
the  question  of  blockade;  that  a  war  shutting  up  cot 
ton  was  directed  against  manufacturing  nations  and 
humanity  as  well  as  against  the  producing  nations; 


MISSION   OF   MASON   AND    SLIDELL  135 

and  that  cotton  should  be  made  neutral,  like  transit 
routes,  and  protected  by  most  of  the  chances  of  war.4 

The  strict  blockade  made  it  difficult  for  Mason  and 
Slidell  to  leave  the  Confederacy.  Going  to  Charles 
ton,  they  awaited  a  favorable  opportunity.  They 
found  three  United  States  steamers  and  a  sloop-of- 
war  patrolling  the  harbor.  On  October  3  they  con 
templated  taking  the  route  through  Texas  and  Mata- 
moras  unless  they  were  otherwise  directed.5  But  the 
next  day,  before  receiving  a  reply  from  Hunter,  they 
decided  that  the  route  by  Mexico  would  be  imprac 
ticable  and  unsafe.  They  found  that  the  Gordon,  a 
good  sea  boat  of  500  tons,  could  go  at  any  time,  and 
by  any  route,  to  Nassau  or  Havana,  and  that  it  could 
be  bought  for  $62,000,  or  chartered  to  either  port  for 
$10,000  for  the  trip,  the  Government  to  pay  for  its 
value  if  captured.  On  October  9,  the  Gordon  was 
chartered  and  its  name  changed  to  Theodora,  and  on 
the  night  of  October  12,  Mason,  Slidell,  with  his  wife 
and  four  children,  J.  E.  Macfarland,  and  George 
Eustis  6  and  wife,  started  on  their  journey  to  Europe. 
As  they  left  the  harbor,  a  shower  of  rain  increased  the 
darkness,  and  they  passed  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of 
the  nearest  United  States  ship  without  being  captured. 
When  near  Nassau  they  learned  that  they  could  not 
obtain  a  steamer  from  that  point  to  St.  Thomas,  and 
instead  of  landing  they  determined  to  go  to  Cuba. 

The  Theodora  reached  Havana  October  17,  but  the 

4  Confed.  "  Dip.  Cor.",  Vol.  I,  pp.  146-60,  Hunter  to  Mason, 
Sept.  23,  1861. 

5  Despatches  of  Mason.     Telegram,  Oct.  3,  1861. 

3  Macfarland  and  Eustis  were  the  secretaries  of  Mason  and 
Slidell,  respectively. 


136  MISSION    OF    MASON    AND    SLIDELL 

Confederate  party  disembarked  at  Cardenas,  where 
they  were  hospitably  treated  by  a  planter  until  they 
were  ready  to  go  to  Havana.  At  the  latter  port,  the 
British  consul,  Mr.  Crawford,  introduced  them  to  Gen 
eral  Serrano,  who  received  them  unofficially.  Slidell 
wrote  that  they  found  almost  universal  sympathy  in 
Cuba.7  After  their  departure  from  Charleston  had 
become  known  in  the  Confederacy,  there  had  been  an 
expression  of  much  delight.  The  Richmond  Exam 
iner  of  October  29,  said  that  the  bold,  straightforward 
manner  of  Mason  at  London  would  wield  an  influence 
in  England  which  would  enable  him  to  sign  a  treaty 
of  amity.  But  Wilkes,  stopping  at  Havana,  resolved 
to  prevent  both  Mason  and  Slidell  from  reaching 
Europe. 

On  November  7,  the  steamer  Trent,  with  the  Con- 
ederate  party  on  board,  left  Havana  for  St.  Thomas, 
nd  the  next  day  in  Bahama  channel  a  second  shot, 
red  across  her  bows  from  the  San  Jacinto,  caused  her 
stop.     Lieutenant  Fairfax  of  the  San  Jacinto  was 
nt  on  board  with  instructions  from  Wilkes  to  capture 
iason,    Slidell,   their   secretaries,   their  baggage   and 
espatches.     Captain   Moir   of  the   Trent  was   indig- 
ant  but   courteous.     The   commissioners   refused   to 
eave  the   vessel   peaceably,   but  they   arranged  their 
aggage  and,  under  protest,  yielded  to  arrest.     The 
rent,  though  its  seizure  had  been  contemplated,  was 
allowed  to  proceed  with  its  excited  passengers,  some  of 
whom   indulged   in    emphatic   words   of   anger.     The 
San  Jacinto  reached  Fortress  Monroe  November  15, 
and  sailed  by  way  of  New  York  to  Boston,  reaching 

7  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.   I,  Paris,   Feb.,   1862. 


MISSION    OF    MASON   AND    SLIDELL  137 

the  latter  place  on  November  24.  During  the  voyage 
Mason  and  Slidell  were  kindly  treated,  being  allowed 
to  occupy  Captain  Wilkes'  cabin.  They  were  taken  to 
Fort  Warren  and  given  comfortable  quarters.8  In 
their  baggage  were  fine  liquors  and  cigars,  but  their 
despatches  had  been  given  to  Mr.  Hanckel  of  Charles 
ton,  who,  on  his  arrival  in  England  on  the  La  Plata 
from  St.  Thomas,  delivered  them  to  Yancey,  Rost  and 
Mann.9 

From  Fortress  Monroe  on  November  15,  the  tele 
graph  informed  the  American  people  of  the  Trent  / 
affair.  The  people  in  the  North  had  known  of  the/ 
appointment  of  Mason  and  Slidell;  many  also  had  be 
come  anxious  at  the  news  of  their  departure,  and 
there  was  a  storm  of  applause  at  the  news  of  their 
capture.  -Even  the  Cabinet  was  elated  and  Congresfe 
gave  a  vote  of  thanks  to  Wilkes.  Lincoln  recognized  . 
that,  if  England  protested,  the  United  States  ought  to 
deliver  the  prisoners,  on  the  ground  that  their  seizure 
was  a  violation  of  the  American  principles  concern 
ing  the  rights  of  neutrals.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  a  mes 
sage  to  the  Confederate  Congress,  said  that  in  the 
seizure  the  United  States  had  assumed  a  right  to 
general  jurisdiction  over  the  high  seas,  and  that  a 
claim  to  seize  Confederates  in  London  would  have 
been  as  well  founded.  Many  felt  that  the  anxiety  of 
the  Washington  Government  to  prevent  the  Confed 
erate  diplomatists  from  reaching  Europe  showed  a 
weakness,  and  that  the  seizure  would  endanger  rela 
tions  between  England  and  the  United  States,  and 

8  Despatches  of  Mason  (to  Hunter),  London,  Feb.  2,  1862, 
No.  i. 

9  U.  S.  and  C.  S.  A.  Naval  Records,  Series  i,  Vol.  I,  p.  155. 


138  MISSION    OP   MASON   AND    SLIDELL 

strengthen  the  hands  of  not  uninfluential  persons  in 
England  who  were  urging  a  policy  of  interference  ir 
the    American    quarrel.     Seward    waited    to    see    the 
course  of  the  English  Government,  but  November  30, 
he  informed  Adams  that  the  seizure  was  not  author 
ized  by  the  Washington   Government. 
.|  The  report  of  the  seizure  reached  London  Novem-j 
per  27,  and  the  British  press  indignantly  demanded 
immediate  reparation.     The   British   Government  be 
gan  to  arrange  for  the  increase  of  the  British  nava 
force  in  American  waters,  and  in  a  few  days  the  trans 
portation  of  troops  to  Canada  was  begun.     The  Lonj 
don   press    declared   that   Seward    desired   a   pretex 
for  a  quarrel  with  England,  but  Thurlow  Weed,  wlu 
was  in   London  on  government  business,  denied  the 
report  through  the   Times.     Even  the  manufacturing 
classes  represented  by  Bright,   Cobden  and   Forster, 
who  were  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  hoped  to 
see  the  doom  of  slavery,  were  silenced  for  the  moment, 
but  they   counselled  moderation  and  were   confident 
that  the  United  States  had  not  authorized  the  capture. 
The  law  officers  of  the  crown  advised  Lord  Russell 
that  an  American  man-of-war  would  have  a  right  to 
board  a  British  mail  steamer,  open  her  mail  bags,  ex 
amine  their  contents,  and,  in  case  despatches  from  the 
enemy  were  found,  carry  the  vessel  to  a  United  States 
port  for  adjudication,  but  that  she  had  no  right  to 
seize  Mason  and  Slidell  and  leave  the  vessel  to  con 
tinue  its  voyage. 

On  November  29,  after  a  Cabinet  meeting,  Pal- 
merston  submitted  to  the  Queen  and  Prince  Albert 
the  draft  of  a  proposed  despatch  to  Lord  Lyons  urg 
ing  the  duty  of  Seward  to  deliver  the  prisoners  and 


MISSION   OF   MASON   AND    SLIDELL  139 

to  offer  a  suitable  apology  for  the  aggression.  After 
its  form  had  been  rendered  less  offensive,  Russell  sent 
a  copy  to  Lord  Lyons  (by  Conway  Seymour,  Novem 
ber  30),  together  with  a  private  letter,  instructing  him 
to  leave  Washington  if,  after  a  delay  of  seven  days, 
there  should  be  no  compliance  with  the  demand.  This 
ultimatum  intimated  that  a  crisis  was  impending. 
A  messenger  delivered  it  to  Lord  Lyons  on  Decem 
ber  1 8,  and  its  substance  was  given  to  Seward  in  a 
courteous  manner  the  next  day. 

European  opinion  generally  declared  the  seizure  to 
be  a  violation  of  neutral  rights;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  American  press  as  a  rule  opposed  the  surrender 
of  the  prisoners  and  was  ready  to  risk  a  war.  The 
leaders  at  Richmond  saw  the  great  disadvantage  which 
such  a  war  would  bring  to  the  United  States,  and  they 
hoped  that,  while  breaking  the  blockade  in  America 
and  the  cotton  famine  in  England,  it  would  result  in 
permanent  disunion  by  establishing  Confederate  in 
dependence. 

The  newspapers  announced  friction  between  Lord 
Lyons  and  Seward,10  and  this  was  followed  by  the 
information  that  Prince  Albert,  the  friend  of  "he 
United  States,  was  dead,  but  the  Lincoln  Adminis 
tration  was  determined  to  make  a  friendly  adjustment 
of  the  difficulty  with  England.  At  a  Cabinet  meeting 
on  Christmas  Day,  and  the  day  following,  it  was 
finally  decided  that,  notwithstanding  public  opinion, 
the  most  expedient  course  was  to  surrender  the  pris 
oners  for  diplomatic  reasons,  skillfully  stating  this 
policy  to  be  in  accord  with  the  principles  for  which 
America  had  long  contended.11 

1-  W.  H.  Russell:    Diary.  u  Nicolay  and  Hay. 


I4O  MISSION    OF    MASON   AND    SLIDELL 

International  law  forbids  a  neutral  to  perform  any 
act  which  will  aid  the  belligerent  in  conducting  hos 
tilities.  Among  such  acts  are  the  transportation  of 
officers,  soldiers,  despatches  of  a  military  character 
arms  or  military  stores,  and  vessels  so  engaged  are 
liable  to  be  confiscated.  Wilkes  had  a  right  to  search 
the  Trent  for  such  contraband  of  war.  But  Mason, 
Slidell  and  their  secretaries  were  not  contraband 
goods,  and  there  seems  to  have  been  no  right  to  seizj 
them  while  they  were  on  board  the  Trent  on  the  high 
seas.  Diplomatic  ministers  of  recognized  states 
are  entitled  to  special  immunities  and  the  protection 
of  other  governments,  but  the  government  repre 
sented  by  Mason  and  Slidell  had  no  recognition  ex 
cept  as  a  belligerent.  The  United  States,  however, 
could  not  justify  the  seizure  of  the  Confederate  com 
missioners  on  the  ground  that  they  were  political 
offenders  unless  there  had  been  some  treaty  providing 
for  the  extradition  of  such  offenders.  If  there  had 
been  some  valid  reason  for  seizing  the  Trent  and 
taking  her  into  an  American  port,  the  commissioners 
might  have  been  legally  arrested  while  in  American 
waters,  but  the  Trent  in  carrying  Confederate  pas 
sengers  had  not  violated  her  duty  as  a  neutral  ship. 

Though    Seward    disavowed    the    act    of    Captain 
Wilkes,   he   carefully   added:     "If   the   safety   of   thej 
Union  required  the  detention  of  the  captured  persons  1 
it  would  be  the  right  and  duty  of  this  Government  to  1 
detain    them.     But   the    effectual    check    and    waning  \ 
proportions   of  the   existing   insurrection,   as   well   as    \ 
the   comparative   unimportance   of   the   captured   per 
sons,  .  .  .  happily,  forbid   me   from  resorting   to   this 
defense."     In   the   later   discussions   of  the   principles 


MISSION    OF    MASON    AND    SLIDELL  14! 

involved,  Russell  informed  Seward  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  have  submitted  to  Wilkes'  act  "  however 
flourishing  might  have  been  the  insurrection  in  the 
South,  and  however  important  the  persons  captured 
might  have  been."  Feeling  in  the  United  States  was 
strong  against  the  English  attitude  at  a  moment  of 
national  embarrassment,  but  under  the  lead  of  Sum- 
ner,  Congress  and  the  people  were  influenced  to  sup 
port  the  surrender. 

On  December  30,  Lord  Lyons  directed  Commander 
Hewett,  of  the  British  war  vessel  Rinaldo,  to  receive 
the  released  prisoners  at  Provincetown,  Massachu 
setts,  and  to  treat  them  with  the  courtesy  due  to 
unofficial  persons.  On  January  I,  1862,  they  were 
received  on  board  and  expected  to  go  to  England  by 
way  of  Halifax,  but  on  account  of  bad  weather  they 
turned  to  the  Bermudas  from  whence  they  sailed  to 
Southampton. 

The  concession  of  Seward  was  a  sore  disappoint 
ment  to  the  Southern  hopes  of  European  complica 
tion,  and,  notwithstanding  the  hopes  of  Mason,  the 
prospects  at  London  were  by  no  means  encouraging. 
The  London  Times  (January  n),  recommending  that 
the  Commissioners  be  treated  simply  as  inoffensive 
visitors  to  Europe,  said:  "They  are  here  for  their 
own  interests,  and  .  .  .  rather  disappointed  perhaps 
that  their  detention  has  not  provoked  a  new  war.  .  .  . 
They  must  not  suppose,  because  we  have  gone  to  the 
very  verge  of  a  great  war  that  they  are  precious  in  our 
eyes.  We  should  have  done  just  as  much  to  rescue 
two  of  their  own  negroes.  .  .  .  Let  the  Commissioners 
come  up  quietly  to  town  and  have  their  say  with 
anybody  who  may  have  time  to  listen  to  them.  For 


142  MISSION    OF    MASON    AND    SLIDELL 

our  part,  we  cannot  see  how  anything  they  may  have 
to  tell  can  turn  the  scale  of  British  duty  and  delibera 
tion." 

When  Mason  and  Slidell  landed  at  Southampton,  a 
series  of  disastrous  reverses  to  the  North,  followed  b 
sluggish  action,  caused  many  abroad  to  consider  the 
the  North  and  the  South  would  never  be  united  again. 
England  and  France  were  suffering  from  lack  of  co 
ton,  and  the  South  was  suffering  from  a  congestion   A 
it.     Napoleon  was  planning  to  realize  the  dream    >f 
his  predecessors  by  founding  an  American  empire  to 
perpetuate   his   dynasty   in    Europe.     The   Civil   War 
was  his  opportunity,  and  he  was  anxious  to  win  glo  •  v 
by  playing  the  role  of  a  mediator  in  favor  of  the  Sout 
,He  promptly  granted  an  interview  to  Slidell,  who  "  i 
(sisted  on  the  insufficiency  of  the  blockade,  and  t 
vandalism  of  the   '  Stone   Fleet.' "        The  current     f 
feeling   in    France   ran   strongly   against   the    Nort 
>lidell  had  interviews  with  Napoleon  and  the  Fren 
Cabinet,  who  appeared  to  rejoice  at  Confederate  vie- 
>ries  and  regret  her  defeat.     He  learned  that  Napo- 
>on  had  asked  England  to  join  with  him  in  recog- 
tizing  the  South;  but  that  England  had  leaned  to  the 
jide  of  the  United  States,  and  had  declined  to  act. 
Lussell  refused  to  respond  to  £e  Confederate  protest 
igainst  "  the  paper  blockade."     He  afterwards  (May 
>)  said  that  though  thousands  in  England,  on  account 
)f  the  closing  of  the  Southern  ports,  were  obliged  to 

Slidell's  instructions  of  Sept.  23,  1861,  directed  him  to 
seek  recognition  and  commercial  intercourse,  and  -to  suggest 
the  importance  of  opening  water  communication  to  the  great 
coal  fields  of  western  Virginia,  which  would  be  valuable  and 
convenient  for  the  French  steam  marine. 


MISSION    OF   MASON   AND    SLIDELL  143 

resort  to  the  poor  rates,  the  British  Government  had 
sought  to  take  no  advantage  of  the  obvious  imper 
fection  of  the  blockade,  and  had  scrupulously  ob 
served  the  duties  due  to  a  friendly  state.13  Still,  there 
were  many  in  England  who,  fearing  the  tendency 
tpwards  democracy,  and  opposing  the  Liberals  in  their 
desire  to  Americanize  English  institutions,  did  not 
deplore  the  disruption  of  the  American  Union.  One 
of  these,  James  Spence,  had  just  published  a  book 
entitled  "  The  American  Union,"  in  which  he  strongly 
sympathized  with  the  secession  movement,  and  said 
that  slavery  was  not  its  real  cause.  A  writer  in  Black- 
wood's  Magazine  for  January,  1862, 'desired  to  claim  - 
no  ties  of  relationship  with  the  performers  in  the 
"  convulsive  dance "  which  was  being  executed  in 
America,  and  urged  recognition  of  the  Confederacy.14 
Mason  reached  London  January  29,  and  on  Feb 
ruary  2,  he  wrote  Hunter  that  the  ministry  seemed 
"  to  hang  fire,"  but  that  there  was  a  prevalent  opinion 
in  well-informed  circles  that  a  resolution  for  recogni 
tion  would  soon  be  introduced  in  the  Commons  as 
an  amendment  to-  the  Queen's  speech.  He  did  not  ^ 
then  anticipate  that  Earl  Russell  would  refuse  to  re 
ceive  him.  A .  few  days  after  his  arrival.  Parliament 
met.  Mr.  Gregory,  ttio  had  visited  the  Southern^, 
mn 


States,  in  1860,  found  him  a  place  in  the  Commons  to 
hear  the  Queen's  speech,  which  disappointed  him  by 
saying  nothing  about  the  blockade.15  He  wrote  that 


"Jefferson  'Davis:  Confederate  Government,  Vol.  II,  p. 
343. 

M  Blackwood's  Mag.,  Jan.,  1862,  p.  118;  April,  1862,  pp. 
514-36. 

15  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  2,  Feb.  7,  1862.     , 


144  MISSION    OF    MASON    AND    SLIDELL 

"  our  friends  in  Parliament  "  thought  best  not  to  at 
tempt  the  amendment  for  recognition,  while  the  Queen 
was  in  mourning,  and  that  they  proposed  first  to  try 
opposition  to  the  blockade.  On  February  7,  by  ad 
vice  of  Gregory,  who  was  "  steering  "  him,  Mason  ap 
plied  for  an  interview,  and  was  received  unofficiall} 
at  Russell's  home.  The  despatch  reporting  that  in 
terview  never  succeeded  in  getting  through  the  block 
ade;  but  subsequent  events  show  that  Russell  gave  no 
encouragement.115  Mason  said  afterward  that  the  min 
ister's  personal  sympathy  had  always  been  against 
the  Confederates.  Mason,  eagerly  watching  for  mail 
that  never  came,  was  disappointed  because  he  re 
ceived  no  words  of  encouragement  from  Richmond, 
and  on  May  15  wrote  Benjamin  that  the  public  mind 
at  London  "  should  be  kept  assured."  3 

18  On  Feb.  17,  1862,  Mason  submitted  to  Russell  a  list  of 
vessels  entering  and  clearing  Cuban  ports  engaged  in  com 
merce  with  Confederate  ports.  On  April  i,  he  supplemented 
the  list,  showing  there  had  been  28  vessels  for  January  and 
February.  On  Aug.  4,  Russell  asknowledged  the  receipt  of 
his  information.  [55  Brit,  and  For.  State  Papers,  p.  723.] 

17  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  10,  May  15,  1862. 


CHAPTER  VI 

EXPECTATIONS  OF  EUROPEAN  INTERVENTION 

Hunter,  still  hoping  that  England  and  France,  act 
ing  from  commercial  and  political  motives,  would  en 
deavor  by  force  of  arms  to  break  the  blockade  and  end 
the  war,  on  February  8,  instructed  Mason  that  Mr. 
Davis  would  not  deprecate  intervention,  but  that  he 
desired  that  the  treaty  of  peace  should  enlarge  the 
Southern  agricultural  area,  give  the  Confederacy  pos 
session  of  Chesapeake  bay  by  which  to  concentrate 
and  control  the  Western  commerce,  and  make  it  inde 
pendent  of  the  North.  He  urged  that  the  Confed 
eracy  should  have  Maryland,  Kentucky  and  Missouri, 
and  all  south  of  those  states,  together  with  New 
Mexico  and  Arizona,  through  which  the  Southerners 
could  have  railroad  connection  with  the  Pacific.  He 
stated  that  the  South  needed  North  Carolina,  Vir 
ginia,  Kentucky,  Missouri  and  Maryland  to  produce 
food  supplies  so  that  the  remaining  states  could  de 
vote  their  entire  attention  to  supplying  the  demand 
for  cotton  and  sugar.  Besides,  it  was  held  that  if 
Maryland,  Kentucky  and  Missouri  should  go  to  the 
TTorth,  it  would  end  the  hope  of  a  balance  of  power, 
and  lead  to  war  or  to  a  Southern  reunion  party  to  se 
cure  peace  and  trade.  It  was  claimed  that,  aside  from 
political  reasons,  it  was  England's  commercial  inter 
est  "  to  enlarge  the  area  from  which  she  draws 
tribute."  * 

1  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  4,  Feb.  8,  1862.   Congress  also  passed 
a    resolution    declaring    its    opposition    to    any    peace    which 
10 


146      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

It  was  not  until  June  23,  that  Mason  replied.  In  the 
meantime  the  Confederate  Government  had  been  born 
in  a  storm  on  February  22;  on  March  8,  the  Merri- 
mac  had  made  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  break  th<; 
blockade;  defeat  and  reverses  had  only  resulted  in 
sterner  stubbornness,  and  Benjamin,  still  confident  ot 
success,  declared  the  Confederacy  only  needed  arm ; 
and  ammunition;  on  March  5,  Congress  had  resolved 
never  to  affiliate  with  the  Northern  invaders;2  Count 
Mercier,  the  French  minister  at  Washington,  visited 
1  Richmond  on  a  mysterious  errand;3  missionaries  witli 
jplenty  of  money  were  sent  abroad  to  aid  and  direct 
public  opinion;4  Benjamin,  claiming  despatches  wer3 
not  contraband  of  war,  was  contemplating  the  organi 
zation  of  communication  with  Europe  by  French  de 
spatch  vessels;  Slidell  was  instructed  to  offer  Napo 
leon  seven  million  dollars  in  cotton  5  to  indemnify  him 
for  the  expense  of  a  fleet  to  relieve  the  Confederacy 
and  establish  communication  with  Europe;6  Mason 

should  exclude  any  of  the  soil  of  the  Confederacy.  C.  E. 
Evans  (Ed.):  Confederate  Military  History  (Atlanta,  1899), 
Vol.  I,  p.  436  et  seq. 

2  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  i,  April  5,  1862. 

8  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  8,  April  2,  and  No.  10,  May 
15,  1862.  J.  B.  Jones:  Diary,  May  21,  1862. 

4  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  3,  April  12,  1862. 

8  Ibid. 

8  Benjamin,  in  a  "  confidential  "  letter,  on  April  12,  wrote 
Slidell  that  there  were  certain  points  on  which  the  interests 
of  England  and  France  were  so  distinct,  if  not  conflicting, 
that  Napoleon  might  not  be  precluded  from  acting  alone  on 
the  basis  of  certain  commercial  advantages.  He  stated  that, 
as  a  rule,  Confederate  relations  should  be  on  the  same  footing 
with  all  nations,  leaving  commercial  relations  as  free  as  pos 
sible,  but  that  while  struggling  against  vastly  superior  re 
sources  no  means  to  open  Southern  ports  and  successfully 


EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION    (  147 

was  asked  to  say  that  England  by  a  few  words  could 
encourage  the  Northern  peace  party  to  stop  the  war; 
/"but  the  occupation  of  the  Confederate  ports  and  the 
vigorous  blockade  by  Federal  forces  gave  little  hope 
for  any  interference.  On  March  10,  Earl  Russell  had 
said  that  separation  would  probably  be  a  result  of  the 
war,  but  in  May,  when  Lord  Lyons  embarked  for 
England,  it  was  understood  in  Richmond  that  he 
would  "  report  the  rebellion  on  its  last  legs." 

Napoleon  asserted  that  he  was  ready  to  cooperate1 
in  declaring  the  blockade  ineffective;  but  said  that 
Russell  had  dealt  unfairly  in  sending  his  previous  pro 
posals  to  Lord  Lyons,  who  made  them  known  to 
Seward.7  Slidell  reported  that  Napoleon,  in  an  inter 
view  with  Lindsay  (on  April  n),  agreed  that  the  block 
ade  was  inefficient,  and  said  that  he  had__twice  ad 
dressed  the  British  Government  through  the  French 
\ambassador  at  London  in-regard  to  taking  steps  to  end 
it,  but  had  received  no  definite  response.  The  Em 
end  the  war  should  be  neglected.  He  said  that  Mr.  Davis,  as 
a  means  of  inducing  France  to  abandon  her  acquiescence  in 
the  United  States  interdict  (blockade)  on  Confederate  com 
merce,  would  be  willing  to  concede  to  the  French  Emperor 
the  right  to  introduce  French  products  free  of  duty  for  a 
certain  period.  It  was  seen  that  temporary  embarrassment 
of  the  French  finances  might  deter  Napoleon  from  initiating 
a  policy  likely  to  necessitate  naval  expeditions.  Slidell  was 
instructed  that  if,  after  cautious  inquiry,  it  should  appear 
probable  that  this  obstacle  might  be  removed  by  the  grant 
of  a  cotton  subsidy  to  defray  the  expenses  of  such  expedi 
tions,  he  might  stipulate  to  deliver  100,000  (or  more)  five- 
hundrtd-pound  bales  of  cotton  in  the  Confederacy.  It  was 
estimated  that  France  could  sell  the  cotton  for  20  cents  per 
pound  and  that  the  vessels  which  sailed  to  convey  the  cotton 
could  take  cargoes  of  merchandise  and  sell  them,  in  the  Con 
federacy,  at  four  times  their  cost  in  Europe. 
7  Despatches  of  Mason,  April  21,  1862. 


148       EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

peror  said  that  he  was  still  ready  to  act  promptly,  i  i 
cooperation  with  England,  by  sending  a  fleet  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  to  demand  free  ingress  and 
egress  for  merchant  vessels,  and  he  authorized  Lind 
say  to  so  inform  Lord  Cowley  and  to  ascertain  whether 
the  latter  would  recommend  such  a  course  to  Eng 
land.8  Lindsay  saw  Cowley  on  Sunday,  April  13,  and 
immediately  reported  to  Napoleon  that  Cowley  thought 
that  England  was  not  prepared  to  act,  and  that  the 
proper  moment  for  action  had  passed.  Napoleon 
then  requested  Lindsay  to  see  Lord  Palmerston  and 
Russell,  to  tell  them  all  that  had  occurred;  to  manage 
to  communicate  his  views  to  Derby  and  Disraeli  of 
the  opposition;  to  get  the  views  of  Russell;  and  to 
return.  Lindsay  returned  on  the  I7th  and  met  tie 
Emperor  on  the  i8th.  In  reply  to  his  note,  Russell 
had  informed  him  that  he  could  receive  no  communi 
cation  from  Napoleon  except  through  the  regular 
diplomatic  channel.  Disraeli  had  concurred  in  the  Em 
peror's  views.  He  had  no  reason  to  suspect  a  secret 
understanding  between  Russell  and  Seward  as  to 
England  respecting  the  blockade,  but  he  said  that  any 
initiative  which  France  might  take  would  probably 
be  supported  by  a  majority  in  Parliament  and  that 
Russell,  in  order  to  avoid  a  change  of  ministry,  would 
assent.9  Napoleon  was  interested  in  Disraeli's  sug 
gestion,  and  thought  that  the  best  course  was  to  make! 
a  friendly  appeal  to  the  United  States  to  open  the  ports, 
at  the  same  time  accompanying  it  with  a  proper  dem 
onstration  of  force,  ready  to  act  in  case  the  United 
States  should  fail  to  take  New  Orleans,  but  he  do 

8  Despatches  of  Slidell,  April  14,  1862. 

9  Ibid.,  April  18,  1862. 


EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION       149 

cided  to  wait  for  more  news,  and  asked  Lindsay  in 
the  meantime  to  observe  secrecy.  Perhaps  Napoleon 
meant  what  he  said,  but  while  he  was  saying  it,  th< 
Federal  guns  opened  fire  and  soon  New  Orleans  fell 

harles  Wood  of  England  wrote  Slidell  denying  tha 
the  British  Government  was  unwilling  to  act  ir 
American  affairs.  M.  Billault,  the/  minister  sans  port 
folio  of  the  French  Government,  said  that  the  whol< 
Cabinet,  except  Thouvenel,  had  been  in  favor  of  the 
South,  and  that  if  New  Orleans  had  not  fallen  recog 
nition  could  not  have  been  delayed  much  longer. 

In  June,  Mason  wrote  Benjamin  that  he  saw  little 
prospect  for  "  the  suggested  form  of  mediation  unless 
the  cotton  famine  should  urge  the  Government  to 
act."  ]  Seward  justified  his  obstruction  of  Charleston 
harbor  by  saying  that  the  holes  of  the  three  thousand 
miles  of  coast  line  could  not  all  be  blocked  by  ships  : 
alone.  On  May  6,  Russell  said  that  though  the  irreg 
ularity  of  the  blockade  had  injured  thousands,  yet  the 
British  Government  had  never  sought  to  take  advan 
tage  of  obvious  imperfections  in  order  to  declare  it 
inoperative.  Mason  had  heard  nothing  further  as  to 
the  purpose  of  Mercier's  visit  to  Richmond  and  was 
much  disappointed  as  to  the  results  achieved.  Na 
poleon  was  still  waiting.  Russell  and  Palmerston^ 
both  denied  that  France  had  proposed  joint  mediation,? 
and  said  that  such  a  policy  would  be  inopportune. 
Mason  complained  that  even  the  recent  seizure  of 
British  ships  on  the  high  seas,  between  England  and 
Nassau,  had  not  caused  the  British  Government  to 
intervene.  Though  he  found  much  sympathy  for  the 
Confederacy,  and  suggested  that  the  cotton  famine 

10  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.' 12,  June  23,  1862. 


A 

C^ 


I5O      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

might  urge  the  Government  to  act,  he  thought  it  in- 
expedient  even  to  renew  the  request  for  recognition, 
unless  it  should  be  done  as  a  demand  of  right,  to  be 
followed  by  his  retirement  to  the  continent  as  evidence 
of  Confederate  dignity.  Caleb  Hughes,  the  Confed 
erate  agent  for  buying  foreign  supplies,  wrote  from 
London  (July  3),  that  there  was  much  Southern  sym 
pathy  in  England,  but  that  no  one  could  see  how  the 
Government  could  interfere — though  in  case  the 
South  should  win  against  McClellan,  and  at  Charles 
ton,  he  did  not  see  how  recognition  could  be  deferred. 
The  Richmond  authorities  had  expected  that  Eng 
land,  in  the  interests  of  trade,  would  favor  the  Con 
federacy  on  the  question  of  blockade,  and  that  British 
vessels  would  seek  Confederate  ports  for  cotton.  In 
October,  1861,  they  had  prohibited  two  British  ves 
sels,  the  Bruce  and  the  Napier,  from  proceeding  out  to 
sea  from  Wilmington  with  their  cargoes  of  naval 
stores,  but  they  offered  compensation  for  the  cargoes, 
and  denied  that  it  was  their  policy  to  prohibit  the  ex 
portation  of  cotton  except  to  prevent  its  use  by  the 
United  States.  On  July  7,  Mason  asked  Russell  for 
an  interview,  and  for  a  statement  of  his  attitude  upon 
the  rules  of  blockade,  and  whether  it  would  be  prac 
ticable  to  require  blockaded  ports  to  be  designated. 
On  July  10,  Under-Secretary  Layard  simply  acknowl 
edged  the  receipt  of  his  letter  and  made  no  allusion  to 
his  request.  Mason  wrote  home  that  it  was  difficult 
to  hold  intercourse  under  such  circumstances,  and 
that  the  British  Government  would  probably  use  its 
own  pleasure  as  to  abiding  by  the  rules  of  1856." 

11  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  14,  July  30,  1862.     In  55  Brit, 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  p.  724  et  seq. 


EXPECTATIONS   OF  EUROPEAN   INTERVENTION      !$! 

The  news  of  the  defeat  of  the  United  States  army 
under  McClellan,  before  Richmond,  reached  London 
and  Paris  by  July  15,  and  for  several  days  Confederate 
efforts  were  vigorously  pushed.  Slidell,  in  an  inter 
view  with  the  Emperor  at  Vichy,  on  July  16,  ex 
plained  the  conditions  and  resources  of  the  South; 
proposed  to  pay  him  in  cotton  for  vessels  to  break 
the  blockade;  informed  him  that  the  United  States 
had  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Mexico,  agreeing  to  give 
$11,000,000  to  aid  Juarez  against  France;  and  sug 
gested  that  the  Emperor  now  had  a  chance  to  secure 
the  Confederacy  as  a  faithful  ally  in  return  for  recog 
nition.  The  Emperor  had  no  objection  to  Slidell's 
presenting  his  demand  to  Thouvenel  for  recognition. 
He  said  that  he  had  seen  the  nature  of  the  contest 
and  that  separation  was  a  mere  matter  of  time,  but 
that  "  the  difficulty  was  to  find  a  way  to  give  effect  to 
his  sympathies;  that  he  had  always  desired  to  pre 
serve  the  most  friendly  relations  with  England,  and 
that  in  so  grave  a  question  he  had  not  been  willing  to 
act  without  her  cooperation;  that  he  had  several  times 
intimated  his  wish  to  England,  but  that  he  had  received 
no  favorable  response;  and,  besides,  that  England  had 
a  deeper  interest  in  the  question  than  France,  and 
was  wishing  for  him  '  to  draw  the  chestnuts  from  the 
fire  for  her  benefit.'  He  regretted  that  France  had 
ever  respected  the  blockade,  and  said  that  Europe 
should  have  recognized  the  Confederacy  in  the  sum 
mer  of  1 86 1,  when  Washington  was  menaced  and  the 
Southern  ports  not  yet  all  closed." 

Lindsay's  carefully  studied  motion  for  mediation 
had  been  dangling  before  the  House  of  Commons  for 
some  time,  and  even  Lord  Brougham,  who,  since  the 


152      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

days  of  Jefferson,  had  been  known  as  the  friend  of  the 
United  States,  said  that  America  should  listen  to  the 
•voice  of  friends  and  stop  the  war.  Russell  and  Pal- 
•merston,  however,  feared  that  an  attempt  at  mediation 
would  only  irritate  both  of  the  contestants.  On  July 
17,  Mason  informed  Russell  that  there  was  no  au 
thority  for  saying  that  the  Confederacy  would  be 
offended  by  such  an  attempt.12  The  next  day  Lindsay, 
in  a  long  speech  in  the  Commons,  reviewed  the  causes 
of  the  war  and  the  "  compact  "  nature  of  the  former 
Government.  He  attributed  the  cause  of  the  struggle 
not  to  the  opposition  against  slavery,  but  to  taxation 
without  representation.  He  stated  that  emigration 
had  favored  the  North,  decreasing  the  proportion  of 
Southern  representation  in  Congress  without  decreas 
ing  the  taxes  of  the  property-holders  in  the  South.  He 
said  that  reunion  was  hopeless;  that  many  people  even 
in  the  United  States  were  anxious  for  England  to 
mediate  to  relieve  the  American  Government  of  an 
embarrassing  situation,  and  that  France  was  ready  to 
join.13  Others  declared  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Confederacy  would  lead  to  the  manumission  of  the 
slaves.  Whiteside  favored  secession  and  the  recog 
nition  of  a  de  facto  Government,  as  in  the  case  of 
Texas.  Taylor  and  others  took  the  opposite  view. 
Taylor  said  that  the  war  had  been  postponed  for  many 
years  by  concessions  to  slavery  until  that  institution 
now  struck  at  the  interests  of  freedom  in  the  North. 
He  gave  warning  tliat  intervention  would  lead  to  a  ter 
rible  conflict  with  the  United  States.  In  reply  to  the 
statement  that  the  tariff  was  the  cause  of  the.  war, 

12  55  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  p.  728. 
13 168  Parl.  Debates,  July  18,  1862. 


EXPECTATIONS   OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION      153 

Forster   quoted   from   A.    H.    Stephens'   speech   that 
"the  South  went  to  war  to  establish  slavery  as  the 
corner-stone  of  a  new  republic,"  and  drew  attention  I 
to  the  fact  that  the  South  Carolina  Declaration  of  In 
dependence  did  not  mention  the  tariff.14     Palmerston 
said  the  thirty-years  war  was  a  joke  compared  to  the 
Civil  War;  but  he  denied  that  England  would  be  jus-j 
tified  in  assuming  the  independence  of  the  Confed-Jk^ 
crates,  and  said  that  recognition  would  lead  to  direct^ 
intervention.     Lindsay's  resolution,  therefore,  was  not 
pressed  to  a  vote — because  there  was  no  reasonable 
assurance  of  its   success.     Mason  wrote  that  it  was 
vexatious    that    the    British    Government    could    not 
be  driven  to  a  decided  position  "  in  harmony  with  the 
public  sentiment "  of  England,  and  began  to  hope  for 
a  new  ministry.     He  said  that  Derby  could  take  the 
helm  at  any  time;  but  that  there  were  political  reasons 
for  not  ousting  Palmerston  while  the  Queen  was  in 
mourning,  and  while  there  were  fears  of  her  going 
insane. 

Slidell,   after    an    interview   with    Napoleon,   wroteA 
Mason  that  both  should  ask  recognition  at  the  samel 
time.     Slidell     presented     his     letter     on     July     23. 
Thouvenel  agreed  with  him  that  the  application  to 
England  and  France  should  be  simultaneous,  though 
he  advised  him  to  wait.     On  July  24,  Mason,  cooper 
ating  with  Slidell,  sent  a  letter  to  Russell  in  which  he  1 
said   the   Confederate  States  asked   recognition  as   a  I 
European  duty.     At  the  same  time,  desiring  to  state  1 
orally  that  a  failure  of  England  to  grant  recognition   I 
would  operate  as  an  incentive  to  the  United  States  to    ' 

14  1 68  Parl.  Debates,  pp.  527-78. 


154      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

protract  the  struggle,  he  sent  a  private  note  asking  for 
an  interview.  Russell  declined  the  interview  because 
he  thought  no  good  could  come  of  it.  Mason  then 
supplemented  his  previous  letter  by  stating  that  a  word 
of  recognition  would  encourage  many  in  the  North  to 
speak  openly  against  the  continuation  of  the  war. 
j  On  August  2,  after  a  Cabinet  meeting,  Russell  re- 
(plied  that  the  British  Government  had  never  presumed 
to  form  a  judgment  on  the  question  of  the  right  of 
withdrawal  of  "  certain  Confederates,"  nor  upon  the 
previous  conduct  of  the  United  States.  He  left  such 
cases  to  be  judged  by  interpretations  of  the  United 
States,  and  not  by  England.  He  informed  Mason  that 
Secretary  Seward  affirmed  that  a  large  portion  of  the 
disaffected  population  was  restored  to  union  and  loy 
alty,  and  that  the  Confederacy  owed  its  main  strength 
to  the  hope  of  assistance  from  Europe.  He  said  that 
in  the  face  of  fluctuating  events  and  contradictory 
allegations,  and  the  uncertainty  of  Confederate  sta 
bility  and  permanence,  the  British  Government  was 
"  determined  to  wait,"  and  could  only  hope  for  a 
peaceful  termination  of  a  bloody  and  destructive  con 
test.  On  August  4,  Mason  wrote  Benjamin  "  the 
British  Government  shuts  its  eyes  to  accumulating 
proof  .  .  .  and  relies  on  the  open  mendacity  of  Sew 
ard."  He  hoped  that  division  in  the  Cabinet,  together 
with  Napoleon's  attitude,  might  drag  the  Cabinet  into 
a  "  disgraceful  reversal  of  its  decision." 

Lord  Campbell  in  the  House  of  Lords  called  for 
Mason's  correspondence;  but   Russell   did   not  think 

18  In  Mason's  despatch,   No.    14,  begun  July   30,    1862.     In 
55  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  p.  733- 


EXPECTATIONS   OF   EUROPEAN   INTERVENTION      155 


it  then  expedient  to  submit  it,  stating  that  it  was  un 
official.  Russell  also  declared  that  he  had  no  com 
munication  with  any  foreign  power  upon  the 
subject  of  recognition,  but  that  he  would  favor  com 
munication  with  the  maritime  powers  if  the  Govern 
ment  should  adopt  a  new  line  of  policy.  Malmsbury 
suggested  that  England  should  act  with  the  other 
powers,  whenever  the  time  should  come,  upon  ques 
tions  of  blockade,  recognition  or  mediation,  and  that 
Lord  Lyons  should  not  be  long  absent  from  Wash 
ington.  Russell  stated  that  there  had  been  intimate 
and  unreserved  communication,  and  no  difference  of 
opinion,  between  England  and  Napoleon,  and  that 
in  case  it  became  the  duty  of  England  to  make  a  com 
munication  upon  American  affairs  it  would  be  very 
deliberately  considered,  on  account  of  the  feeling  in 
the  United  States  as  to  the  sympathies  of  Great 
Britain.16 

Davis  said  that  Mason's  whole  correspondence 
showed  that  the  feeling  of  the  British  Government  was 
unfriendly  to  the  Confederacy,  and  not  in  harmony 
with  public  opinion,  and  that  there  might  be  a  change 
of  policy  later.  Benjamin,  on  October  28,  in  a  letter 
which  was  captured  arid  published  before  it  reached 
Mason,  contrasted  the  friendliness  of  French  states 
men  with  the  "  rude  incivility  of  Russell."  But  not 
withstanding  Mason's  difficulty  in  holding  intercourse 
with  the  Government,  and  his  failure  to  obtain  recog 
nition,  Benjamin,  elated  over  McClellan's  defeat  and 
he  military  situation,  advised  him  to  remain  in  Eng- 

18 168  Parl.  Debates,  Lords,  Aug.  4,  1862.  Also,  Despatches 
of  Mason,  No.  15,  Aug.  5,  1862.  [Received  by  Benjamin  on 
Oct.  25.] 


156      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

* 

land,  where  he  could  disseminate  favorable  impres 
sions  and  where  contingencies  might  arise  to  make 
his  presence  important.17  Davis,  however,  agreed 
that  the  Confederacy  should  not  be  put  in  the  attitude 
of  a  supplicant.  Mason's  house  continued  to  be  a 
resort  for  Confederate  sympathizers.  The  Index  and 
other  papers  were  used  to  deny  that  the  United  States 
aimed  at  emancipation,  and  Confederate  aid  associa 
tions  were  formed  to  encourage  sympathy  with  the 
South. 

In  the  case  of  the  cruiser  Alabama  the  English  Gov 
ernment  apparently  had  favored  the  Confederates.  The 
departure  of  the  Florida  had  caused  the  United  States 
consul  at  Liverpool,  with  a  wakeful  and  agitated  mind, 
to  watch  for  new  vessels.  In  May,  1862,  "  No.  290," 
which  was  building  in  Laird's  dock-yard,  was  under 
suspicion.  The  building  went  on,  however,  and  the 
vessel  was  completed.  A  young  lady  christened  it 
Enrica,  and  its  testing  trip  was  satisfactory.18  As 
early  as  July  4,  the  British  Government  had  promised 
Adams  that  the  customs  officials  should  keep  a  strict 
watch  on  the  vessel.  On  July  26,  Bullock  received 
information  from  a  private  but  reliable  source  that  it 
would  not  be  safe  to  leave  the  vessel  in  Liverpool 
another  forty-eight  hours,  and,  as  previously  agreed 
with  Laird,  he  arranged  for  another  trial  trip  out  of 
the  harbor,  at  the  same  time  informing  Captain 
Butcher  that  the  ship  would  not  return.  Though  the 
report  of  the  British  law  officers  was  not  given  until 
July  29,  the  signs  indicated  that  it  was  time  to  get  out; 

1T  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  7,  Sept.  26,  1862. 
"Bullock:     Vol.  I,  Chap.  5. 


EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION       157 

for  inquiries  were  becoming  very  frequent  and  un 
comfortable.  Bullock  claimed  that  no  officer  of  the 
British  Government  ever  gave  him  a  hint  that  would 
lead  him  to  anticipate  the  future  action  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  but  Mason  kept  him  informed  of  all  he  heard 
as  to  naval  affairs,  and,  though  gathered  merely  from 
the  conversations  of  those  who  were  accustomed  to 
observe  the  conduct  of  the  ministers  and  draw  their 
own  conclusions,  the  information  often  proved  cor 
rect.  Bullock  says  "  it  is  probable  that  through  pri 
vate  friends  Mr.  Mason  could  and  did  have  very  fav 
orable  opportunities  of  learning  the  general,  and  in 
some  cases,  the  specific  purposes  of  the  Government." 

On  July  29,  "  No.  290,"  which  was  soon  to  be 
known  as  the  Alabama,  under  pretence  of  taking  out  a 
pleasure  party,  including  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  the 
family  of  John  Laird,  M.  P.,  left  Liverpool  in  spite  of 
Mr.  Adams'  warnings.  After  a  sail  of  fourteen  miles, 
the  excursionists  were  transferred  to  the  Hercules  for 
return,  and  the  Alabama  sailed  away  to  do  service  for 
the  Confederacy.  In  reply  to  Adams'  request  for  ex 
planation,  Russell  stated  that  the  delay  of  England 
was  due  to  the  sickness  of  the  Queen's  Advocate,  Sir 
John  D.  Harding,  which  "  made  it  necessary  to  call 
in  other  parties,  whose  opinion  had  been  at  last  given 
for  the  detention  of  the  gunboat,  but  before  the  order 
got  down  to  Liverpool  the  vessel  was  gone."  The 
Alabama  was  commissioned  on  the  high  seas,  and 
Seward  never  ceased  to  call  her  a  pirate,  nor  to  press 
England  to  seize  her,  though  she  was  flying  the  Con 
federate  flag. 

After  the  close  of  the  second  campaign  in  Virginia,  |* 
both  Palmerston  and  Russell  contemplated  the  right  I 


158      EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

or  expediency  of  mediation  or  intervention.19  On 
September  14,  Palmerston,  in  a  note  to  Russell,  sug 
gested  the  offer  of  joint  "  good  offices  "  by  England 
and  France.  Three  days  later  Russell  wrote:  ''The 
Federal  army  is  driven  back  to  Washington  and  .  . 
I  agree  with  you  that  the  time  is  come  for  offering 
mediation  to  the  United  States  with  a  view  to  the  rec 
ognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Confederates.  .  .  . 
In  case  of  failure  ...  to  recognize  the  Southern 
States  as  an  independent  state."  He  proposed  a  meet 
ing  of  the  Cabinet,  and  said  that  if  it  should  determine 
upon  mediation  England  should  propose  it  first  to 
France,  who  should  cooperate  in  proposing  it  to  Rus 
sia  and  other  nations  as  a  measure  decided  upon  by 
England,  and  he  suggested  that  the  latter  should 
make  herself  safe  in  Canada.  On  September  23,  Pal 
merston  replied,  pronouncing  the  plan  excellent,  and 
said:  "  Of  course  the  offer  would  be  made  to  both 
the  contending  parties."  He  suggested  that  in  case 
of  a  defeat  of  the  Federals,  which  might  make  them 
ready  for  mediation,  that  "  The  iron  should  be  struck 
while  it  was  hot;  "  but  that  if  the  Federals  should 
come  out  best,  England  should  wait  and  watch  awhile. 
In  October  there  was  an  impression  in  the  United 
States  that  England  would  soon  grant  recognition  and 
follow  by  mediation  or  intervention.  The  English 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  said  the  South  had  an 
army  and  would  soon  have  a  navy.20  Mallory,  at  that 

19  Mason  wrote:    "I  look  with  renewed  confidence  to  the 
effect  on  the  Emperor."     Slidell  had  not  yet  received  a  reply 
to  his  note  of  July  23.     [Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  17,  Sept. 
18,  1862.] 

20  Parl.  Debates,  March  27,  1863.     Quoted  by  Forster. 


EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION       159 

time,  had  sent  Mr.  G.  N.  Sanders  to  England  under 
contract  to  construct  six  iron-clad  steamers,  to  be  paid 
for  in  cotton.21 

On  October  17,  Adams  wrote  to  Secretary  Seward 
that  the  United  States  should  try  to  achieve  decided 
success  by  February  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  rec 
ognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  England.  The  Cab 
inet  meeting,  called  for  October  23,  was  recalled  as 
unnecessary,  but  some  English  statesmen  compli 
mented  Davis  upon  having  "  made  a  nation."  '  Lord 
Donnoughmore  and  Fitzgerald,  both  warm  friends  of  j 
the  Confederacy,  told  Mason  that  Palmerston  would 
probably  not  enter  into  a  treaty  with  the  Confederacy21 
unless  it  should  agree  not  to  permit  the  African  slave 
trade;  but  bankers  were  proposing  schemes  to  raise 
Confederate  finances  in  Europe.  Lindsay  was  plan 
ning  for  direct  intercourse  between  France  and  the 
South  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and  Mason,  watching 
for  the  slow  arrivals  from  the  South  of  "  calm  and  dig 
nified  revelations  of  truth,"  was  gaining  hope,  though 
he  had  received  no  epistle  from  Benjamin  of  a  later 
date  than  April  14." 

Napoleon  was  at  this  time  shaking  hands  with 
Slidell  and  listening  to  proposals  to  build  a  Confeder 
ate  navy  in  French  ports;  and,  a  few  days  later,  wher 
the  cotton  famine  "  was  looming  up,"  and  simultane 
ous  with  his  expedition  of  35,000  reinforcements  tc 
"  establish  stable  government  in  Mexico,"  he  formally 
invited  England  and  Russia  to  intervene  in  the  Amer- 

21  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  16,  Sept.  18,  1862. 

22  Ibid.,  No.  20,  Nov.  6,  1862. 

23  Ibid.,  "  Unofficial,"  Nov.  4,  1862. 

24  Ibid.,  No.  20,  Nov.  6,  1862. 


l6o      EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 


ican  war  by  offering  a  six  months'  armistice  with  the 
blockade  removed.  Dayton  had  heard  reports  of  Na 
poleon's  hostile  designs,  but  he  had  doubted  whether 
Slidell  ever  exchanged  a  word  with  the  Emperor. 
Lord  Cowley  at  Paris  had  recently  denied  that  France 
had  made  any  proposals  on  the  American  question, 
and  said  that  no  action  was  contemplated.23  Thouvenel 
expressed  surprise,  and  Mason  suggested  that  the 
English  denial  probably  referred  only  to  official  com 
munications.  Slidell  had  entire  confidence  in  Na 
poleon,  but  stated  that  English  statesmen  were  full  of 
duplicity  and  hypocrisy.  He  spoke  to  Napoleon 
concerning  the  British  denial,  and  the  latter,  smiling, 
suggested  that  in  diplomacy  nothing  existed  unless  it 
was  formally  written.  Thouvenel,  before  his  resign 
nation,  told  Slidell  that  the  British  denial  of  official 
knowledge  of  Napoleon's  views  was  a  "  mauvaise 
plaisanterie,"  for  there  had  been  "  des  pourparlers 
tres  reels  "  on  the  subject.  Slidell,  entertaining  little 
hope  from  England,  on  October  27,  had  an  interview 
with  Drouyn  de  L'Huys,  to  whom  he  recapitulate 
the  views  which  he  had  expressed  to  Thouvenel  in 
July.  He  referred  to  Russell's  statement  that  the  pur 
pose  and  policy  of  France  on  American  affairs  were 
the  same.  He  mentioned  the  conflicting  statements 
as  to  whether  France  had  communicated  Napoleon's 
views  to  England,  and  showed  L'Huys  a  letter  from 
a  leading  member  of  the  British  Parliament,  insinuat 
ing  that  France  was  playing  an  unfair  game.  L'Huys 
said  that  he  had  been  too  recently  in  office  to  know 
what  Thouvenel  had  said  or  done,  and  when  Slidell 

25  Despatches  of  Slidell,  Oct.  20,  1862. 


EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION       l6l 

tried  to  show  him  how  divergent  were  the  interests  of- 
France  and  England  on  the  subject  of  American  affairs 
he  said  that  there  were  grave  objections  to  France 
acting  without  England.28 

It  appears  that  the  armistice  plan  originated  withj^ 
Napoleon.  On  October  22,  at  St.  Cloud,  Slidell 
shook  hands  writjrthe  Emperor  and  asked  him  to  break 
the  blockade,  ?  The  Emperor  averred  that  his  sym 
pathies  were  with  the  Confederacy,  but  that  England 
might  embroil  him  with  the  United  States  if  he  acted 
alone,,' and  that  he  preferred  to  make  a  proposition 
for  an  armistice  of  six  months  with  the  Southern 
ports.  He  stated  that  the  refusal  of  his  plan  by  the 
North  would  give  such  strong  reason  for  recognition, 
and  perhaps  for  intervention,  that  England  might  be 
induced  to  cooperate.  Slidell  was  pleased  with  the 
plan,  and  on  November  8,  Mason  wrote  that  there  was 
no  doubt,  but  that  the  proposal  had  been  made 
officially  to  Russia  and  England,  and  that  it  was  "  con 
fidently  asserted  that  Russia  would  assent  to  it."  The 
French  note,  dated  October  10,  was  read  to  Russell 
on  November  10.  No  copy  was  left,  but  it  was  pub 
lished  in  the  Monitcur.  Russell  replied  on  the  thir 
teenth,  declining  immediate  action.27  Russia  kept  the 
promise  made  through  Gortchakoff  to  Bayard  Taylor 
earlier  in  the  war,  and  refused.  Napoleon  now  con 
templated  mediation  through  the  French  minister  at 
Washington,  but  seeing  that  the  United  States  would 
reject  such  a  suggestion,  he  proceeded  with  his  plan 
to  attack  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Mexico — a  policy 

26  Despatches  of  Slidell,  Oct.  28,  1862. 

27  172  Parlc  Debates,  July  2,   1863.     Layard  in  the   House 
cf  Commons. 

II 


l62       EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

which  could  conciliate  neither  England  nor  Spair. 
Some  in  the  North  would  have  favored  the  French 
tender  of  mediation.  Mr.  Cox  in  the  United  States 
House  of  Representatives,  on  December  15,  said  that 
the  recent  elections  indicated  that  "  the  eagle  must  use 
the  dove." 

The  report  of  the  French  proposals  to  England  and 
Russia  reached  New  York  on  November  25.  A  few 
days  later,  after  the  news  reached  Richmond,  Benja 
min  decided  that  it  was  a  favorable  time  to  further 
encourage  England  and  France  to  come  to  the  rescue, 
by  insisting  on  the  restoration  of  pre-blockade  condi 
tions  and  by  taking  steps  to  obtain  a  monopoly  of  the 
trade  with  the  Confederacy.  In  a  letter  to  Mason  "9 
on  December  n,29  he  said  that  there  were  indications 
that  Europe  would  soon  recognize  the  Confederacy 
and  that  trade  with  the  South  would  be  brisk.  To  en 
courage  Europe  to  take  measures  to  break  the  block 
ade,  he  said  that  the  Confederacy,  in  the  interests  of 
permanent  peace,  would  expect  a  treaty  of  free  trade 
with  the  United  States  at  the  end  of  the  war,  and  that 
the  rush  of  the  Southern  people  to  get  commodities 
might  enable  the  agents  of  Northern  merchants  by 
their  cupidity  to  monopolize  Southern  products  and 
become  the  intermediaries  in  Southern  commerce.  To 
prevent  this  monopoly,  he  urged  that  the  European 

28  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  n,  Dec.  u,  1862. 

29  Mason,    still    looking    forward    to    a    cotton    famine,    on 
Dec.  ii  (No.  23)  wrote:     "We  hear  little,  but  I  think  events 
are  maturing  which  must  lead  to  some  change  in  the  attitude 
of  Europe."     The  Alabama,  in  a  successful  cruise,  had  taken 
British  property  in  some  instances.     When  British  merchants 
complained,   Russell  intimated  that  they  should  apply  to  the 
Confederate  prize  courts  for  redress. 


EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION       163 

governments,  looking  toward  an  early  renewal  of 
trade,  should  encourage  their  citizens  to  purchase 
Southern  products  en  depot  before  the  close  of  the  war; 
to  establish  West  Indian  depots  of  supplies  needed 
by  the  Confederacy,  ready  for  immediate  introduction; 
and  to  prepare  merchant  steamers  for  sale  in  Confed 
erate  ports,  in  order  to  provide  communication  with 
Europe.  He  urged  that  the  cessation  of  Southern 
commerce  was  not  due  to  the  blockade,  but  to  the 
seizure  along  the  coasts,  or  on  the  high  seas,  of  neutral 
vessels  "  bound  to  points  where  not  a  blockade  vessel 
was  ever  stationed,"  and  that,  by  stopping  such  seiz 
ures,  rrany  neutral  vessels,  which  before  had  not  dared 
to  sail  for  fear  of  capture,  could  transport  a  large 
supply  of  Southern  staples  upon  which  the  North 
hoped  to  get  the  profits.  He  said  that  Europe,  by 
encouraging  trade  with  the  Confederacy  as  a  bellig 
erent,  could  prevent  the  seizure  of  neutral  property 
by  the  United  States,  and  thereby  make  it  unneces 
sary  to  destroy  resources  at  the  approach  of  the  Fed 
eral  army.  On  March  2,  Mason  sent  a  copy  of  these 
instructions  to  Russell,  and  the  latter  merely  thanked 
him  for  the  information. 

On  October  31,  Mr.  Davis  had  complained  that 
England,  after  asking  the  Confederacy  to  concur  in 
the  adoption  of  principles  of  international  law  regard 
ing  neutrals,  had  shown  herself  unfriendly  by  deviat 
ing  from  her  own  principles,  that  no  blockade  was 
binding  unless  enforced,  and  by  refusing  to  reply  to 
requests  for  explanation.30  Mason  was  instructed  to 
protest  against  the  British  modification  of  the  Decla- 

30  Confed.  "Dip.  Cor.,  Great  Brit.",  p.  38.  Instr.  to  Mason, 
No.  9,  Oct.  31,  1862. 


164 


EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 


ration  of  Paris,  and  on  January  3,  1863,  he  brought 
the  complaint  to  the  attention  of  Lord  Russell.31  On 
February  10,  in  replying  to  his  note,32  Russell  stated 
that  England  would  practically  adhere  to  the  rule  of 
1856,  which  was  aimed  against  paper  blockades,  but 
added  that  the  escape  of  vessels  on  dark  nights  or  dur 
ing  adverse  winds  did  not  make  a  blockade  ineffectual 
and  that  the  neutral  powers  had  no  excuse  for  assert 
ing  that  the  United  States  had  not  maintained  an 
effectual  blockade.  In  was  in  vain 33  that  Mason 
urged  (February  18)  that  the  departure  of  vessels  was 
notorious;  that  Confederate  vessels  had  raised  the 
blockade  of  Charleston  and  Galveston  and  that  the 
duties  collected  at  Confederate  ports  on  foreign  goods 
were  twice  as  much  as  before  the  war.34  In  January, 
Stephens  said  that  there  had  been  a  change  of  tone  in 
the  British  press  since  the  preceding  summer,  when 
Lord  Lyons  visited  London,  and  that  the  latter  having 
never  become  acquainted  with  Southern  men  had 
probably  influenced  the  change.35 

In  December,  many  in  the  Confederacy  had  de 
spaired  of  the  intervention  by  European  powers,  and 
only  hoped  that  the  Great  Power  above  would  inter 
vene  and  create  an  armistice  by  freezing  the  Chesa 
peake.  In  January  the  newspapers  published  the  in 
tercepted  correspondence  of  Benjamin,  in  which  Rus 
sell  was  much  berated  and  Napoleon  was  charged 
with  designs  on  Mexico  and  Texas.36  Lincoln's  eman- 

81  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  24,  Jan,  14,  1863. 

82  In  55  Brit,  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  p.  734. 

33  Despatches  of  Mason,  March  19,  1863. 

34  Ibid.,  No.  31,  March  19,  1863. 

35  Johnston  and  Browne:     Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens. 

36  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  Jan.  23,  1863.     Instr.  to  Mason,  No. 
15,  Feb.  7,  1863. 


EXPECTATIONS   OF  EUROPEAN   INTERVENTION      165 

v       & 

cipation  proclamation  was  received  with  favor  in  Eng-;i) 
land.  After  two  years  of  the  irrepressible  conflict 
many  in  the  North  had  changed  their  early  feelings 
against  emancipation.  On  March  6,  1862,  Lincoln 
had  proposed  that  Congress  should  provide  for  re 
munerating  persons  in  the  loyal  slave  states  who  would 
free  their  slaves.  This  was  based  on  the  idea  that 
there  was  a  strong  Union  sentiment  at  the  South,  and 
was  proposed  as  a  war  measure.  Slaves  had  been  a 
great  aid  to  the  South  by  supplying  food  while  the 
whites  fought.  After  the  defeat  of  Lee  at  Antietam, 
Lincoln  decided  to  declare  the  freedom  of  all  slaves 
belonging  to  persons  at  war  with  the  United  States, 
and  when  his  proclamation  was  issued  it  gave  no 
strength  to  the  Confederate  sympathizers  in  England. 
The  North  now  fought  not  only  for  the  Union,  but 
also  for  emancipation;  and  the  English  workingmen,  Uj 
notwithstanding  the  prophecies  of  the  South,  and  the  II 
dangers  of  a  cotton  famine,  prayed  for  the  North  and 
the  emancipation  of  slaves. 

On  January  17,  the  French  Minister  of  Marine,  ad 
vised  the  French  admiral  off  Mexico  to  protect  some 
vessels  belonging  to  M.  Bellot  which  were  returning 
to  Havre  laden  with  cotton,  and  Bellot  suggested  to  / 
Mason  that  this  seemed  to  suggest  intervention  for 
getting  cotton  to  Matamoras.37  Mason  was  elated 
over  the  recent  democratic  victories  in  the  North,  and 
said  that  the  Commons  would  respond  unanimously 
if  Palmerston  would  recommend  recognition;88  but 
he  was  not  hopeful  as  to  any  favorable  action  by  the 
British  Government.  A  few  days  later  he  wrote  that 

87  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  28,  Jan.  31,  1863. 

88  Ibid.,  No.  27,  Jan.  15,  1863. 


l56      EXPECTATIONS    OF    EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

both  the  ministry  and  the  opposition  agreed  that  it 
:  was  not  a  favorable  time  for  recognition.  Derby 
stated  that  recognition  without  intervention  would 
have  no  fruits.  "  With  those  willingly  deaf/'  said 
Mason,  "  it  was  vain  to  argue."  !  Mason  suggested 
that  the  United  States  might  provoke  a  conflict  with 
England  in  order  to  avert  an  internecine  war  at  home . 
But,  by  March,40  he  was  provoked  that  the  British 
Government  was  determined  to  do  nothing  objection 
able  to  the  United  States,  and  he  feared  that  Na 
poleon  41  could  do  nothing  owing  to  his  ill-timed 
Mexican  expedition  and  the  complications  which  re 
sulted  from  the  outbreak  of  Poland.  Benjamin,  read 
ing  the  British  debates,  also  saw  little  hope  from  that 
direction,  but  he  "  awaited  the  onset  on  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Mississippi  with  calm  confidence."  Layard 
said  that  the  British  Government  had  given  orders  to 
keep  a  strict  watch  on  vessels  suspected  to  be  preparing 
for  the  Confederacy  in  English  ports.42 

When  Campbell  urged  that  it  was  the  duty  of  Eng 
land  to  recognize  the  Confederacy  and  send  an  am 
bassador  to  Richmond,  Russell  replied  43  that  though 
Napoleon  had  actually  proposed  to  the  United  States 
to  negotiate  with  the  Confederacy,  no  offer  of  good 
offices  could  now  end  the  contest.  Though  Russell 
doubted  the  ultimate  success  of  the  United  States, 
he  favored  British  neutrality,  leaving  the  belligerents 

39  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  30,  Feb.  9,  1863. 

40  Ibid.,  No.  31,  March  19,  1863. 

41  The    British    Government    claimed    to    have    no    official 
document  from  France  as  to  mediation. 

42  169  Parl.  Debates,  Commons,  Feb.  24,  1863.     Palmerston 
in  reply  to  Hopwood. 

43  Parl.  Debates,  March  23,  1863,  PP-  1714-34- 


EXPECTATIONS   OF   EUROPEAN   INTERVENTION      167 

to  conclude  their  own  quarrel.  In  his  speech  of 
March  23,  he  said  that  England  had  nothing  to  be 
ashamed  of  in  her  past  intervention — that  it  had  al 
ways  been  in  behalf  of  the  independence,  freedom  and 
welfare  of  a  great  portion  of  mankind,  and  that  he 
would  be  sorry  if  it  should  ever  be  for  any  other  pur 
pose,  no  matter  how  much  English  interests  were 
affected.  He  predicted  that  if  interference  should 
ever  be  necessary  again,  it  would  again  be  "  in  the 
cause  of  liberty  and  to  promote  the  freedom  of  man 
kind."  In  concluding  his  speech,  he  said:  "Depend 
upon  it,  my  Lords,  that  if  that  war  is  to  cease,  it  is 
far  better  it  should  cease  by  a  conviction  on  the  parts 
of  the  North  and  South  that  they  can  never  live  again 
happily  as  one  community  and  one  republic,  than  that 
the  termination  of  hostilities  should  be  brought  about 
by  the  advice,  the  mediation  or  the  interference  of 
any  other  power."  ' 

Mason  saw  a  double  meaning  to  part  of  Russell's 
speech,  and  suggested  that  he  was  not  disposed  to 
recognize  a  state  with  slavery.  He  was  certain  the 
Confederacy  could  take  no  action  with  England  be 
yond  the  protest  at  that  time.45  During  the  spring 
and  summer  Russell  remained  firm,  and  said  the 
United  States  blockade  of  2500  miles  was  as  legitimate 
as  the  English  blockade  of  2000  miles  was  in  the  war 
against  Napoleon.  In  June  Mason  wrote  that  Russell 
repudiated  the  rules  of  1856  and  that  the  Confederacy 

**  On  May  20,  Benjamin  wrote  Mason  that  even  if  the 
defeats  of  the  United  States  forces  had  no  effect  on  Europe, 
and  even  in  the  face  of  the  strong  blockade,  the  Confederates 
were  still  determined  to  secure  separation  from  the  United 
States. 

48  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  31,  March  19,  1863. 


l68      EXPECTATIONS    OF   EUROPEAN    INTERVENTION 

would  have  to  watch  him  when  the  time  came  to  make 
treaties.40  In  September  he  wrote  again  that  Russell, 
with  unchanged  opinions,  was  resorting  to  evasions  of 
the  convention  of  Paris.47 

In  the  spring  of  1863,  Davis  and  Benjamin  hoped 
that  by  disclaiming  all  designs  on  Cuba,  and  by  agree 
ing  to  guarantee  the  island  to  Spain,  the  Government 
at  Madrid  could  be  induced  to  take  the  initiative  in 
recognition.  They  appointed  Slidell  as  special  com 
missioner  to  Spain,48  but  the  latter  received  no  intima 
tion  from  Madrid  that  his  presence  there  would  be 
acceptable  and  did  not  go,  though  he  held  long  con 
versations  with  Isturitz,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris,  who  professed  sympathy  for  the  Confederates.49 
In  June  Slidell  contemplated  plans  by  which  Spain 
could  be  induced  to  take  the  initiative  in  recognition, 
and  cooperate  with  France  in  breaking  the  blockade.50 
Napoleon  gave  assurance  that  he  concurred  in  the  plan, 
and  it  appears  that  the  Spanish  Government  was 
sounded  upon  the  subject;  but  after  the  news  of  Gettys 
burg  and  Vicksburg,  Isturitz  informed  Slidell  that 
nothing  could  be  effected  at  Madrid. 

48  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  40,  June  20,  1863. 

47  Ibid.,  No.  44,  Sept.  4,  1863. 

48  Confed.    "  Dip.    Cor.,   France."     Instr.    to   Slidell,   March 
22  and  May  g  (No.  16),  1863. 

49  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  36,  May  28,  1863. 
80  Ibid.,  No.  38,  June  21,  1863. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CONTROVERSIES 

During  the  spring  of  1863,  the  fate  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  hung  in  the  balance.     Doubt  succeeded 
expectancy.     The  Confederate  bonds  were  floated  in 
Europe  above  par  on  March  28;  but,  in  a  few  weeks, 
Mason  was  unable  to  keep  them  propped  up  even  by 
"  bulling  "  the  market.     After  the  publication  of  cap-") 
tured  Confederate  correspondence  relating  to  vessels 
building  in  England,  Palmerston  became  very  alert  in  r 
investigating    cases    brought    to    his    attention.     But 
Confederate  friends  in  Parliament  kept  up  an  agita 
tion  in  American  affairs.     They  protested  against  the 
American  seizure  of  British  vessels  near  the  Confed 
erate  coast;  they  complained  of  American  prize  court 
proceedings,   and   brought   accusations    of   American; 
enlistments  in  Ireland. 

In  the  last  week  of  March,  1863,  Forster  and  others 
in   Parliament,   complaining  that  Confederate  vessels 
were  building  in  Liverpool  and  referring  to  the  neu 
trality  of  the  United  States  in  the  Crimean  War,  urged 
the  Government  to  prevent  further  departures  of  ves 
sels  like  the  Alabama.     Bright  gave  warning  that  thA 
United  States,  which  had  the  sympathy  of  the  English 
workingmen,    and    was    receiving   large    numbers    of  f 
Irish    immigrants,    might    be    inclined   to    remember  V  . 
England's  unfriendliness.     Baring  desired  Russell  toy 
allay  irritation  by  expressions  of  anxiety  to  avoid  a 


170  CONTROVERSIES 

recurrence  of  such  incidents.  Laird,  who  built  the 
Alabama,  replied  that  the  Northern  armies  were  also 
obtaining  war  supplies  in  England,  and  that  he  would 
rather  build  one  hundred  Alabama*  than  laud  the 
institutions  of  the  United  States,  whose  "  ubiquitous 
spies  made  her  boasted  liberty  an  absurdity."  The 
Solicitor-General  quoted  American  decisions  and  the 
opinions  of  Hamilton,  Webster  and  Pierce  to  show 
that  the  United  States  did  not  forbid  its  citizens  to 
sell  war  supplies,  and  said  that  the  Government  had 
acted  promptly  and  in  good  faith  to  prevent  the  de 
parture  of  the  Alabama.  As  precedents  of  the  Ameri 
can  policy,  he  alluded  to  the  cases  of  the  Caroline  at 
Niagara,  and  Walker  in  Honduras.  Palmerston,  in 
closing  the  debate,  said  that  neutrality  was  difficult  to 
execute,  but  that  English  neutrality,  whether  warm  or 
cold,  was  honest,  and  that  the  Government  was  ready 
to  act  on  evidence.1  Mason,  a  few  days  later,  in  writ 
ing  Benjamin  of  the  success  of  the  Confederate  loan, 
said  that  the  debate  \vas  "  damaging  to  Yankee  pre 
tensions  as  well  as  to  their  advocates." 

The  seizure  of  the  Alexandra 2  on  April  6,  by  order 
of  the  British  Government,  caused  several  to  make 
protest  in  Parliament  that  the  vessel  was  not  building 
for  the  Confederacy,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  offer 
objections  to  the  Federal  stone  fleet  in  Charleston 
harbor,  the  large  emigration  of  Irish  3  and  shipment 
of  arms  to  the  United  States,  and  even  to  eulogize  the 

1  170  Parl.  Debates,  pp.  33-72  and  90-101. 

2J.   B.   Moore:     International  Arbitrations,  Vol.  I,  p.  586. 

8  Benjamin  instructed  Mason  to  inform   Earl   Russell  that 
there  were  "  extensive  enlistments  in  Ireland  of  recruits  for 
the  armies  of  the  United  States."     Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  21 
April  29,  1863. 


CONTROVERSIES  I/I 

growing  success  of  the  Confederacy.  Cobden  said 
that  the  equipment  of  ships  of  war  was  a  different 
question  from  that  of  traffic  in  fire-arms,  and  that 
they  should  be  seized  in  English  ports  even  after  their 
escape  from  the  place  of  building.  Collier  thought 
that  armed  vessels  left  United  States  ports  in  1793, 
and  said  .that  the  American  Government  could  not 
complain  of  the  construction  of  law  in  the  English 
courts  followed  the  example  of  the  United  States.4  But 
he  stated  that  England  had  no  right  to  refuse  to  en 
force  the  law  against  the  Confederacy. 

Many  long,  low,  greenish-gray  blockade-runners 
were  fitted  out  in  the  Clyde  to  engage  in  the  trade 
between  Nassau  of  the  Bahamas  and  Confederate 
ports.  The  United  States  found  it  difficult  to  stop 
this  trade.  Nassau  merchants  complained  of  the  law 
of  the  American  Congress  by  which  vessels  bound 
from  New  York  to  that  port  were  refused  a  clearance, 
but  the  British  Government  was  unable  to  induce  the 
Federal  Government  to  change  its  orders. 

As  the  Federal  navy  increased  along  the  Atlantic, 
part  of  the  trade  retreated  to  the  Rio  Grande  and  es 
pecially  to  Matamoras,  \vhich,  from  1862,  had  become 
a  seat  of  flourishing  traffic  with  both  Europe  and  New 
York.  The  United  States  had  captured  several  neu 
tral  vessels  engaged  in  this  commerce,  but,  later, 
made  the  claim  that  these  vessels  were  not  really 
destined  to  Matamoras,  but  that  they  intended  to  dis 
charge  their  freights  into  lighters  to  be  conveyed  di 
rectly  to  Confederate  territory. 

When   the   news   arrived   at   London   that   Captain 

*  70  Parl.  Debates,  Commons,  April  24,  1863. 


172  CONTROVERSIES 

Wilkes  of  the  United  States  Navy  had  captured  the 
Peterhoof  while  she  was  on  her  way  from  London  to 
'Matamoras,  Mason  and  his  friends  cooperated  to 
induce  the  British  Government  to  take  some  action. 
A  deputation  headed  by  Mr.  Crawford,  a  London 
member  of  Parliament,  waited  upon  Russell  and  asked 
him  to  protest,  and  it  was  believed  for  a  while  that 
he  would  demand  her  release  without  reference  to  a 
prize  court.5  The  Peterhoof  was  one  of  the  vessels 
which  had  been  recommended  to  the  protection  of  the 
French  admiral  off  the  coast  of  Mexico,  and  Mr. 
Mason  had  sent  by  Mr.  Mohl,  who  sailed  on  the  ves 
sel,  triplicates  of  five  despatches  which  Benjamin  had 
never  yet  received,  and  which  Mohl  subsequently 
found  necessary  to  destroy  in  order  to  prevent  their 
capture.8  The  Peterhoof  was  taken  to  New  York  as 
a  prize.  Archibald,  the  British  consul,  refused  to 
open  the  packages  which  had  been  taken  from  the 
sealed  mail-bag,  and  the  latter  was  soon  forwarded  to 
its  destination,  but  the  vessel  was  held  for  the  decision 
of  the  court.  Mj\J$pence  at  once  asked  the  British 
Government  to  relieve  his  vessels  from  carrying  mail. 
Although  Russell  had  desired  to  keep  the  subject 
from  being  discussed  in  Parliament  at  that  time,  Mr. 
Peacock,  in  the  Commons,  precipitated  a  debate  on 
April  23,  by  calling  for  the  correspondence.  He  had 
understood  that  Russell  had  refused  to  allow  certain 
vessels  to  carry  the  mail.  He  and  Mason  were  both 
encouraged  by  the  recent  publication  of  a  letter  of 

B  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  33,  March  30,  1863.  [This 
despatch  was  carried  by  Hobson  of  Richmond,  who  found  it 
necessary  to  destroy  it.] 

0  Ibid.,  No.  39,  June  12,  1863. 


CONTROVERSIES  173 

Adams,  who,  by  the  advice  of  W.  H.  Aspinwall  of 
New  York,  J.  M.  Forbes  7  of  Boston  and  R.  J.  Walker, 
had  offered  protection  to  a  vessel  sailing  to  Mata- 
moras  with  ammunition  for  the  Mexican  Government 
to  use  against  France,  and  Mason  now  wrote  that  the 
British  Cabinet  might  grant  recognition  and  adopt 
a  bolder  front  as  a  policy  to  prevent  drifting  into  war 
with  the  United  States.8 

Layard,  in  reply  to  Peacock,  said  that  the  Govern 
ment  could  not  furnish  the  correspondence;  that  it 
had  not  refused  to  allow  vessels  to  carry  mail,  but  that 
the  owners  of  the  vessels,  fearing  that  Confederate 
correspondence  might  be  found  by  a  visiting  Federal 
vessel,  had  asked  to  be  relieved.9 

Hugh  Cairns  was  surprised  that  the  Government 
seemed  to  admit  that  the  United  States  could  take 
correspondence  from  an  English  vessel  and  place  its 
fate  before  an  American  prize  court.  Malins  hoped 
that  England  would  not  allow  American  dictation  to 
make  her  so  timid  that  she  dare  not  enforce  the  obli 
gation  of  vessels  to  carry  mail-bags.  The  Solicitor- 
General  merely  referred  to  Russell's  letter  of  Xovem- 

7  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  had  been  sent  to  England  by  the 
United  States  Government  with  instructions  to  negotiate  pri 
vately  for  blocking  the  progress  or  changing  the  destination 
of  the   Confederate  cruisers   then   building   in    English    ship 
yards.     They  failed  to  purchase  the  cruisers,  but  their  repre 
sentations   to    prominent    Englishmen,    who    were   fearful    of 
provoking  a  war,  had  some  influence  in  inducing  the  British 
Cabinet  to  stop  the.  sailing  of  the  rams  and  to  purchase  them 
for  the  Government.     [Sarah  F.  Hughes:     Letters  and  Recol 
lections  of  John  Murray  Forbes,  2  Vols,   Boston,   1899.] 

8  Despatches    of    Mason,    No.    34,    April    27.    1863.     "  The 
recent  debates  in  Parliament,"  said  Mason,  "  have  this  good 
effect  at  least — they  keep  up  agitation  on  American  affairs." 

9 170  Parl.  Debates 


174  CONTROVERSIES 

her  28,  1862,  to  Lord  Lyons,  which  stated  that  the 
right  of  search  must  depend  upon  circumstances. 
Lord  Robert  Cecil  said  that  England  waited  for  Pal- 
merston's  decision  and  expected  it  at  once,  but  Os- 
born  proposed  that  it  was  wise  to  drop  the  discussion, 
and  Peacock  consented  to  withdraw  his  motion. 

Lord  Russell  wrote  Lord  Lyons  on  April  24  that 
the  Matamoras  trade  was  perfectly  legitimate,  even  if 
part  of  the  goods  was  afterwards  carried  to  Texas. 
On  the  same  day,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  he  seemed 
to  admit  that  the  United  States  had  a  right  to  require 
an  examination  of  sealed  packages  taken  from  seized 
ships.  He  decided  that  if  the  English  Consul,  on 
opening  a  mail-bag,  should  find  a  letter  to  the  Con 
federate  Secretary  of  State,  he  could  send  it  to  the 
prize  court  unopened.  The  Earl  of  Hardwick  was 
pained  by  this  decision,  stating  that  it  made  the  Brit 
ish  Consul  a  tool  of  the  United  States.  He  desired  to 
see  an  ."  impression  made  upon  the  .  .  .  dis-United 
States  "  by  a  fearless  stand  which  he  claimed  would  be 
the  best  method  of  preventing  collision.10  On  April 
27,  Russell  stated  that  it  was  not  then  desirable  to 
state  the  opinion  of  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown;  but 
he  agreed  with  Seward  that  the  mail-bags  of  a  neutral, 
if  duly  certified  and  authenticated,  should  not  be 
opened  or  detained  in  case  of  the  seizure  of  a  mer 
chant  vessel,  but  should  be  forwarded  immediately 
to  their  destination.  At  the  same  time  he  intimated 
that  the  United  States  was  the  sole  judge  of  whether 
a  vessel  should  be  captured  on  suspicion.11  On  April 

10  170  Parl.  Debates,  Lords,  April  24,  1863. 

11  Ibid.,  April  27,  1863.     For  correspondence  between  Great 
Brit,   and  the  U.   S.,   see  Parlia.   Papers,   "  North   America, 
No.  5." 


CONTROVERSIES  175 

30  he  announced  that  the  Peterhoof  would  not  be  re 
leased,  but  that  her  mail-bags  had  been  forwarded. 
The  United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  the  Peterhoof 
case,  decided  that  the  blockade  could  not  be  extended 
to  the  Mexican  half  of  the  Rio  Grande;  that  the  trade 
from  London  to  Matamoras,  even  with  intent  to  sup 
ply  Texas,  was  not  a  violation  of  the  blockade  and 
could  not  be  called  unlawful;  but  that  contraband  of 
war  on  a  voyage  to  a  neutral  port,  with  a  probable 
ulterior  destination  to  the  Confederacy,  were  liable 
to  condemnation.13 

On  May  2,  Mason  wrote  Benjamin  that  the  British 
Government,  in  its  anxiety  to  prevent  collision,  seemed 
etermined  to  yield  everything  to  the  United  States.13 
le   understood  that  Adams  had   clandestinely   made 
is  peace  with  Russell,  but  he  still  predicted  that  the 
ublic  would  not  be  satisfied  with  this  settlement  of 
le     question.     Marquis     Clanricarde     recommended 
tat  a  squadron  be  sent  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  but  he 
was  informed  that  such  an  act  would  mean  war.     On 
May  18,  in  the  Lords,  while  asking  for  copies  of  the 
proceedings  in  the  United  States  prize  court,  he  in 
timated  that  those  courts  "  set  aside  the  whole  inter 
national    law    of    the    world."     Russell    denied    his 
charges  and  said  that  the  United  States  judges  had 
always  been  quoted  with  respect.     In  a  calm  speech, 
he  referred  to   Clanricarde's  speech  as  a  "  desultory 
lecture  on  international  law,"  and  proceeded  to  show 
the  error  of  his  charges.14     He  stated  that  it  was  nat- 

13  A  treatment  of  the  Nassau  and  Matamoras  trade,  and  the 
Peterhoff  case,  may  be  found  in  Montague  Bernard's  "  Brit 
ish  Neutrality,"  Chap.  12. 

13  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  34,  April  27  and  May  2. 

"  171  Parl.  Debates,  pp.  1818-32. 


176  CONTROVERSIES 

ural  for  the  United  States  to  suspect  vessels  bound 
for  Nassau;  and  that  while  successful  English  cap 
tains  exulted  over  running  the  blockade,  those  who 
failed  and  lost  their  vessels  came  to  the  Foreign  Of 
fice  with  an  air  of  injured  innocence. 

Many  Irish  were  emigrating  to  the  United  States, 
some  to  join  the  army.  Peel  said  that  the  Govern 
ment  had  knowledge  that  United  States  agents  were 
in  Ireland,  and  Mason,  stating  that  Adams  had  tor 
mented  the  ministry  as  to  Confederate  agents  until  it 
would  be  alert  to  establish  counter-charges  against 
United  States  agents,  employed  detectives  to  obtain 
evidence  of  enlistments  in  Ireland,  but  no  clear  dis 
coveries  were  made.15 

The  Confederate  authorities  at  Richmond,  angered 
by  their  failure  to  establish  diplomatic  relations  with 
England,  and,  by  the  evident  care  which  the  British 
Government  exercised  to  prevent  giving  offense  to 
Seward,  refused  to  recognize  the  exequaturs  of  the 
British  consuls  in  the  Southern  states.  On  December 
19,  1862,  Mr.  Bunch,  the  British  Consul,  complained 
of  the  forcible  detention  of  an  unnaturalized  Irish  de 
serter,  and  stated  that  his  letters  had  not  been  an 
swered.  The  Richmond  authorities  replied  in  scath 
ing  terms.  In  the  early  part  of  1863,  several  members 
of  the  Confederate  Congress  favored  recalling  the 
diplomatic  agents  and  notifying  the  foreign  consuls 
to  leave  the  country.  Mr.  Davis  held  that  the  British 
consuls,  having  been  appointed  under  the  original 
compact,  of  which  the  Southern  states  had  been  mem 
bers,  should  be  allowed  to  stay  so  long  as  they  sought 

15  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  38,  Paris,  June  4,  1863. 


CONTROVERSIES  177 

not  to  evade  nor  deny  Confederate  authority.  But 
England,  while  refusing  recognition,  had  authorized 
Lord  Lyons  at  Washington  to  exercise  authority  over 
the  British  consuls  in  the  Confederacy,  thus  ignoring 
the  existence  of  the  Confederate  Government,  and,  in 
June,  Davis  ordered  that  no  further  communication 
should  be  allowed  "  between  consuls  of  neutral  na 
tions  in  the  Confederate  States  and  the  functionaries 
of  those  nations  in  the  United  States,"  16  stating  that 
there  was  now  ample  opportunity  for  correspondence 
by  Confederate  fleets  and  neutral  steamers  between 
neutral  ports  and  the  South. 

Since  February  20,  Davis  had  refused  to  recognize 
Moore  as  consul  at  Richmond.  But  the  latter  con 
tinued  to  perform  his  duties.  Two  Irishmen,  Mo- 
loney  and  Farrell,  claimed  exemption  from  enroll 
ment  as  conscripts  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
British  subjects.  Moore,  who  had  been  asked  by  Ben 
jamin,  to  show  his  commission  and  had  not  done  so, 
in  April  presented  the  two  cases  of  the  Irishmen  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  who,  after  ordering  an  investi 
gation,  found  that  both  men  had  exercised  the  right 
of  suffrage  and  were  thus  subject  to  military  duty. 
Moore,  incensed  by  his  treatment,  on  May  5  wrote  to 
•  J.  B.  Caldwell  of  White  Sulphur  Springs  of  Virginia, 
•that  from  1826  to  1858,  he  had  lived  in  despotic  coun- 
[  tries  where  he  had  met  with  more  official  courtesy  on 
•  complaint  of  grievances  than  he  had  received  at  the 
hands  of  his  own  blood  and  kin  in  the  Confederacy. 

In  June,  Davis  also  refused  to  recognize  the  con 
sul  at  Mobile.  In  the  preceding  November  the  Bank 
of  Mobile,  as  agent  for  the  state  of  Alabama,  informed 

18  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  24,  June  6,  1863. 


178  CONTROVERSIES 

Magee,  the  British  Consul,  that  the  state,  owing  Eng 
lish  citizens  interest-coupons  for  the  sum  of  for:y 
thousand  pounds,  payable  in  London,  asked  to  place 
coin  in  the  consul's  hands  for  safe  transportation  at 
the  expense  of  Alabama.  On  November  14,  Magoe 
replied  that  he  had  asked  the  British  Consul  at  New 
Orleans  whether  the  British  Rinaldo  could  be  sent  ;o 
take  the  coin  from  Mobile  to  Havana,  from  whence 
it  could  go  to  London.  Later,  the  British  Vesuvius 
received  thirty-one  kegs  of  specie,  amounting  to  $155,- 
ooo.  The  American  commander  of  the  blockading 
squadron  offered  no  objection,  saying  "  we  cannot 
examine  an  English  man-of-war;  we  trust  all  you  do 
will  be  right  and  proper."  The  specie  was  received 
in  England  and  paid  to  the  British  subjects.  Lord 
Lyons,  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  intention  to  trans 
mit  the  specie,  sent  despatches  to  Mobile  forbidding 
it,  but  the  Vesuvius  had  already  sailed  when  his  de 
spatches  arrived.  Magee,  having  been  dismissed, 
Warner,  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  in  the 
following  May,  asked  whether  he  had  been  incon 
sistent  with  British  neutrality  and  whether  the  United 
States  had  suggested  his  removal.  Under-Secretary 
Layard  replied  that  the  permission  for  the  Vesuvius 
to  do  private  business  was  in  violation  of  the  pledge 
given  to  the  United  States,  and  that  a  dismissal  was 
made  before  receiving  the  complaint  of  the  American 
Government.  Though  he  did  not  know  whether  the 
specie  was  intended  for  the  payment  of  interest  on  the 
Alabama  bonds,  or  for  use  for  purchasing  privateers 
in  Europe,  he  felt  that  the  British  Government  had 
taken  the  right  course.17 

17  170  Parl.  Debates,  p.  1952,  May  19,  1863. 


CONTROVERSIES  179 

In  May,  the  Richmond  Whig  contained  an  article 
complaining  that  Mr.  Cridland,  who  had  sometimes 
acted  in  place  of  Moore  in  Richmond,  was  accredited 
as  consul  to  Mobile  under  the  United  States  Govern 
ment.  The  article,  suggesting  that  the  appointment 
might  tend  to  excite  the  Southern  people  to  "take 
the  liberty  of  making  a  remark  "  before  the  close  of 
the  war,  said:  "We  know  that  sundry  private  citi 
zens  of  the  South,  nick-named  ministers,  are  cooling 
their  heels  to 'no  earthly  purpose  in  the  ante-chambers 
of  St.  James  and  the  Tuileries;  and  this  useless  refriger 
ation  of  the  ossa  calcis  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell 
has  been  going  on  for  above  a  year.  Intimations  of 
this  have  reached  the  '  so-called.' "  On  May  18,  Mr. 
Cridland  sought  an  interview  with  Benjamin,  called 
his  attention  to  the  article  in  the  Whig,  and  denied  that 
he  was  going  to  Mobile  except  as  a  private  citizen  to 
look  after  certain  interests  of  the  British  Government. 
There  was  no  objection  to  his  going  unofficially,  but, 
after  his  arrival,  a  telegram  from  Admiral  Buchanan 
stated  that  he  had  papers  showing  him  to  be  acting 
consul  at  Mobile  by  appointment  of  Lord  Lyons. 
Cridland  was  at  once  informed  that  he  would  not  be 
permitted  to  act  as  consul  and  a  hint  was  given  him 
that  it  would  be  agreeable  if  he  would  leave  Mobile.18 
On  June  n,  Benjamin  wrote  Mason  that  he  hoped 
the  British  Government  might  be  induced  to  change 
its  whole  policy  and  soon  instructed  him  to  bring 
to  its  attention  all  matters  relating  to  consuls.  As  to 
the  specie  sent  from  Mobile,  he  said  that  "  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  modern  public  code  debts  due 

18  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  25,  June  n,  1863. 


ISO  CONTROVERSIES 

by  a  state  are  not  subject  to  the  operations  of  the  law 
of  war,  and  that,  notwithstanding  the  recent  United 
States  confiscation  laws  (of  August  6,  1861),  they  were 
beyond  confiscation;  that  England  had  always  ab 
horred  such  breaches  of  faith,  and  during  the  Crimean 
War  had  paid  to  the  enemy  money  that  she  knew 
would  be  used  against  her;  that  the  recent  confiscation 
laws  of  the  United  States  had  caused  the  Confederacy 
to  pass  (August  30,  1861)  a  law  for  the  sequestration 
of  the  enemy's  property,  but  that  it  exempted  public 
debts;  that  the  United  States,  in  trying  to  prevent  the 
remittance  of  specie,  either  hoped  that  she  herself 
would  be  able  to  get  it  by  the  fortunes  of  war  or  de 
sired  to  dishonor  Alabama.  Benjamin  held  that  if 
Alabama  was  still  a  part  of  the  Union  the  United 
States  had  no  right  to  prevent  the  payment  of  her 
debts;  and  that  if  she  was  a  member  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  Lord  Lyons,  by  his  cooperation  with  the  United 
States  concerning  the  British  consuls  in  the  South, 
had  been  unfriendly  to  the  Confederacy.19 

In  July,  Russell  wrote  Mason  concerning  the  cases 
of  both  Moore  and  Cridland,  and  intimated  that  the 
consular  agents  should  have  been  allowed  to  remain. 
Mason  informed  him  that  the  Confederacy  would 
doubtless  be  willing  to  receive  agents  properly  ac 
credited.20 

The  extradition  of  one  Hester,  who  committed  a 
murder  on  board  the  Confederate  privateer  Sumter, 
which  had  landed  in  a  port  under  British  jurisdiction, 
became  a  subject  of  correspondence  between  Russell 

19  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  25,  June  n,  1863. 

20  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  44,  Sept.  4,  1863. 


CONTROVERSIES  l8l 

and  Mason  in  June  and  July.  Hester  was  impris 
oned  by  the  British  authorities,  and  the  London  Gov 
ernment  offered  to  deliver  him  in  the  West  Indies  or 
in  a  Confederate  port,  in  case  the  United  States  would 
allow  a  British  vessel  to  pass  the  blockade.  Seward, 
or  Adams,  protested  against  the  delivery  of  the  pris 
oner  through  the  blockade,  and  on  July  25,  Russell 
informed  Mason  that  the  British  Government  had  de 
cided  that  he  could  be  detained  in  custody  by  the 
British  authorities  no  longer  than  might  be  necessary 
to  dispose  of  him  on  the  shore  at  the  Bermudas. 
Mason  expressed  regret  that  Russell  had  not  adhered 
to  the  original  purpose  of  delivering  the  prisoner.21 

21  Despatches   of   Mason,    No.   41,   July    10,    1863;    No.    42, 
July  21,  1863;  No.  43,  Aug.  6,  1863. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  CRISIS  IN  ENGLAND 

The  crisis  in  England  came  in  the  middle  of  186.5 
when  Lee  was  in  the  heart  of  the  North.  Napoleon, 
shaking  hands  with  Slidell  in  friendly  conferences, 
consenting  to  the  building  of  Confederate  vessels, 
denying  the  English  rumors  that  he  was  not  ready 
to  act,  and  sitting  with  the  map  of  the  United  States 
unrolled  before  him,  only  waited  for  Lee  to  take 
Washington  in  order  that  he  might  grant  recogni 
tion.1  Roebuck  and  Lindsay,  by  a  stroke  of  ama 
teur  diplomacy,  in  which  tliey  said  that  Napoleon  had 
proposed  joint  mediation  to  England,  made  an  at 
tempt  through  parliament  to  force  the  British  Gov 
ernment  into  cooperation  with  France.  But  Palmers- 
ton  opposed  double  diplomacy,  and  the  govern 
ment  refused  "  to  pull  Napoleon's  chestnuts  from  a 
fire  that  was  too  hot  for  imperial  hands."  Lindsay, 
Roebuck,  and  other  friends  of  the  Confederacy,  were 
soon  depressed  by  the  news  of  Lee's  retreat,  and, 
Mason  received  instructions  to  quit  London. 

Notwithstanding  the  recent  publication  of  Benja 
min's  correspondence  suspecting  Napoleon  of  occult 
designs  in  Texas,  the  Emperor  in  the  spring  and 

1  Dayton  wrote  Seward  (July  10)  that  news  from  the  U.  S. 
gave  him  anxiety;  that  it  was  already  hard  enough  to  prevent 
recognition,  and  if  Lee  should  take  Washington  he  could 
foresee  the  probable  results. 


THE   CRISIS   IN   ENGLAND  183 

summer  of  1863  professed  great  friendship  for  the 
Confederates  and  showed  a  disposition  to  favor  them. 
On  April  14,  Mocquard,  Napoleon's  private  secre 
tary  and  confidential  friend,  stating  that  he  was  di 
rected  by  the  Emperor,  sent  Slidell  a  copy  of  a  des 
patch  from  Adams  to  Dayton  concerning  a  Confed 
erate  cruiser  which  was  expected  to  enter  a  French 
port.2  It  appears  that  all  despatches  passed  through 
the  French  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and,  if  of  politi 
cal  interest,  were  telegraphed  to  Napoleon — so  that 
Slidell  did  not  doubt  that  the  copy  was  handed  to 
him  as  early  as  the  original  reached  Mr.  Dayton  at 
the  American  legation. 

A  year  before,  Napoleon,  in  a  conference  with 
Lindsay  and  Slidell,  said  he  was  ready  to  act  with 
England,  but,  as  an  objection  to  his  initiating  official 
communications  with  London  upon  American  affairs, 
he  stated  that  Earl  Russell  had  dealt  unfairly  in 
sending  his  previous  proposals  (as  to  the  blockade) 
to  Lord  Lyons,  who  made  them  known  to  Seward.8 
Since  that  time  England  had  rejected  Napoleon's 
proposal  for  mediation  upon  the  basis  of  a  six- 
months'  armistice,  and  he  did  not  care  to  take  the 
initiative  in  any  more  proposals. 

In  June,  1863,  news  from  the  United  States,  an< 
the  condition  of  French  affairs,  again  encouraged  th< 
Confederacy  to  ask  for   recognition.     Roebuck  am 
Lindsay  were  preparing  to  insure  the  success   of 
motion  which  it  was  proposed  to  offer  in  Parliament 
on  June  30.     There   were   rumors   in  England  that 

2  Despatches  of  Slidell,  April  20,  1863. 

8  Despatches  of  Mason,  July  2,  1863,  and  No.  8,  April  21, 
1862. 


1 84  THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 

the  Emperor  thought  recognition  would  be  unwise 
at  that  time,  and  Lindsay  was  anxious  to  see  him 
before  the  motion  should  be  offered,  for  he  saw  that 
Palmerston  would  probably  inform  Parliament  of  the 
rumors  of  the  reports  concerning  Napoleon's  adverse 
views.  On  June  13,  Lindsay  enclosed  to  Slidell  a  let 
ter  from  Roebuck  which  referred  to  Napoleon  and 
the  proposed  interview  as  follows:  "  You  know  that 
I  am  not  a  great  admirer  of  that  great  personage,  but 
still  I  am  a  politician — so  is  he,  and  politicians  have 
no  personal  likes  or  dislikes  that  stand  in  the  way  of 
their  political  ends.  I  therefore  would  act  as  if  I  had 
no  feeling  either  friendly  or  hostile  to  him — he  could  i 
do  the  same  as  to  myself,  and  therefore  I  have  no  \ 
fear  but  that  he  would  listen  to  all  I  have  to  offer 
by  way  of  suggestion  and  advice  ....  and  good 
might  come  of  our  interview."4 

On  June  18,  Slidell  obtained  an  interview  with  the 
Emperor  who  said  that  without  the  cooperation  of 
England  with  her  strong  navy,  recognition,  by  creat 
ing  a  rupture  with  the  United  States  would  jeopard 
ize  French  commerce  and  the  success  of  the  Mexi 
can  expedition.  He  stated  that  other  powers  of 
Europe  had  no  navies,  but  Slidell  suggested  that  Spain 
had  a  fleet,  and  that  a  Confederate  guaranty  of 
Cuba,  and  an  assurance  of  French  concurrence, 
might  induce  her  to  take  the  initiative  in  recognition. 
Napoleon  agreed  that  France  in  such  a  case  would 
act  even  without  England.  Speaking  of  the  possi 
bility  of  forcing  the  English  cabinet  to  act  or  to  give 
\way  to  a  new  ministry,  and  asking  an  interview  for 

*  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  38,  June  21,  1863. 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  185 

Lindsay  and  Roebuck,  Slidell  stated  that  Lord 
Malmsbury,  who  was  friendly  toward  the  Emperor, 
would  probably  be  the  new  English  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  case  of  a  change  in  the  govern 
ment.5  Napoleon  replied  that  the  Tories  were  very 
good  friends  of  his  when  in  the  minority,  but  that 
their  tone  changed  very  much  when  they  came  into 
power.  He  made  an  appointment,  however,  to  re 
ceive  Roebuck  and  Lindsay,  and  gave  his  permission 
for  Slidell  to  give  an  authorized  unqualified  denial 
of  the  correctness  of  the  rumor  in  England  that  he 
thought  it  unwise  to  recognize  the  Confederacy. 
Slidell  in  his  report  to  Benjamin  stated  that  Napo 
leon  added :  "  I  think  that  I  can  do  something  bet 
ter:  make  a  direct  proposition  to  England  for  joint 
recognition.  This  will  effectually  prevent  Lord 
Palmerston  from  misrepresenting  my  position  and 
wishes  on  the  American  question.  I  shall  bring  the 
question  before  the  cabinet  meeting  to-day,  and  if 
it  should  be  decided  not  to  make  the  proposition 
now,  I  will  let  you  know  in  a  day  or  two  through 
Mr.  Mocquard,  and  what  to  say  to  Roebuck." 

On  June  19,  Slidell's  friend  in  the  French  Foreign 
Office  wrote  him  that  the  council  had  decided  to  con 
tradict  the  reports  that  France  was  less  favorable 
to  the  Confederacy,  and  also  to  remind  the  English 
Government  of  previous  French  propositions.  On 
June  22,  Mocquard  wrote  Slidell  that  the  Emperor 
requested  him  to  say  that  L'Huys,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  had  written  Baron  Gros,  the  French 
ambassador  at  London,  to  sound  Russell  on  the  sub- 

8  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  38,  June  21,  1863. 


1 86 


THE    CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 


ject  of  recognition,  and  to  say  that  the  French  Cabi 
net  was  ready  to  discuss  the  subject.6 

On  June  20,  Mason  having  received  an  account  oi 
Slidell's  interview  with  Napoleon  sent  a  note  to  Lind 
say  and  Roebuck,  and  they  went  to  Paris  that  night 
to  urge  the  Emperor  to  invite  England  formally,  b 
fore   June   30,   to   join   France    in   recognition,   ar 
that,  in  case  England  should  refuse  to  cooperate,  1 
should  act  alone,   with   the   assurance   that   Englai 
would   follow   or   have   a   change   of   ministry.7     C 
June      25,      Slidell      wrote      Benjamin      that      tlu 
interview   with   the   Emperor  at   Fontainebleau  was 
highly  satisfactory,  and  that  they  "  were  authorized 
to  state   in  the  House  of  Commons   that  the   Em 
peror  was  not  only  willing  but  anxious  to  recognize 
the  Confederate  States  with  the  cooperation  of  Eng 
land.     The  Emperor,  however,  did  not  promise  them 
that  he  would  make  any  formal  proposition  to  the 
British    Government.     But    a    few    days    later,    the 
Paris  correspondent  of  the  Times  said  that  Russell 
had  received  a  communication  from  France,  through 
Baron  Gros,   looking  toward  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  in  America.     On  June  29,  Roebuck  asked  Gros 
the  substance  of  his  communication  to   Russell   on 
this  subject,  and  Gros  replied  that  he  had  made  no 
formal  communication.     The  next  day,  Lord  Camp 
bell,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  asked  Russell  if  he  had 
received  such  a  document  or  verbal  communication." 
Russell  replied  that  the  French  ambassador  had  told 
him  "  an  hour  ago  "  that  he  had  not  even  received  an 
order  to  deliver  to  him  such  a  communication. 

6  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  38,  June  21,  1863. 

7  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  40,  June  20,  1863. 
8 171  Parl.  Debates,  June  30,  1863. 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 


On  June  30  Roebuck  presented  his  petition  in  the 
Commons,  in  favor  of  entering  into  negotiations 
with  the  great  powers  of  Europe  with  the  object  of 
recognizing  the  Confederate  Government.  He  re 
viewed  the  establishment  of  the  colonies  in  America; 
the  American  Revolution,  in  which  he  said  that 
France  in  aiding  the  colonies  had  borne  a  similar 
relation  to  them  as  that  which  England  now  bore  to 
the  Confederate  States;  and  the  opposition  of  the 
South  to  the  tariff  since  1827.  Announcing  that 
secession  was  now  successful,  he  stated  that  if  the 
United  States  had  kept  growing  she  would  have 
been  the  greatest  bully  in  the  world;  and  though  he 
did  not  favor  slavery  he  was  determined  to  try  to 
prevent  the  reconstruction  of  the  Union.  He  said 
that  England  by  recognition  could  avoid  the  misery 
of  the  cotton  famine;  and  that,  if  recognition  was  de 
layed,  the  people  would  look  to  the  Government  as 
the  cause  of  their  misery  and  sweep  the  existing 
Cabinet  from  its  seat.  Roebuck,  in  telling  of  his 
interview  with  Napoleon,  accused  the  Cabinet  ,ofi 
misrepresenting  the  Emperor's  views,  of  concealing/ 
his  offers,  and  of  disclosing  to  Mr.  Seward  the  na 
ture  of  the  Emperor's  despatches.  He  said  that  Na 
poleon  was  stronger  than  ever  in  favor  of  recogni 
tion,  notwithstanding  reports  to  the  contrary;  that 
on  account  of  the  leakage  of  previous  overtures  he 
could  not  make  a  formal  application  to  England; 
but  that  he  had  authorized  Lindsay  and  himself  to 
say  to  Parliament  that  he  was  ready  to  act  writh 
England. 

Roebuck's  motion  evidently  had  little  chance  of  suc 
cess.      Robert    Montague    in    discussing    the    legal 


l88  THE   CRISIS   IN   ENGLAND 

aspect  of  recognition,  and  historical  precedents,  fa 
vored  strict  neutrality,  feeling  that  England  might 
as  well  declare  war  against  the  United  States  at  once 
as  to  adopt  the  policy  of  recognition  which  would 
certainly  lead  to  war.  He  stated  that  the  Confed 
eracy  should  not  be  aided  to  fight  its  own  battles, 
and  that  Napoleon  should  be  left  to  pull  his  own 
chestnuts  from  the  fire.  Clifford  denied  that  the 
Confederate  States  were  in  rebellion,  and  prophesied 
military  despotism  and  failure  in  the  United  States, 
but  he  also  favored  neutrality.  The  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer9  did  not  believe  that  the  restoration 
of  the  United  States,  by  force,  was  obtainable,  how 
ever  much  those  who  favored  American  institutions 
might  dislike  to  see  great  visions  destroyed;  but  he 
did  not  fear  American  expansion,  nor  think  that  the 
United  States  should  be  divided  in  order  to  prevent 
it  from  becoming  a  menace  to  England.  He  said 
that  England  should  suppress  passion  and  treat  the 
matter  as  one  of  facts.  Though  he  thought  that 
nineteen-twentieths  of  the  House  favored  an  end  of 
the  war,  he  considered  that  Roebuck's  motion  was 
untimely  and  inconvenient.  Forster,  whose  father 
had  been  killed  in  a  slave  state,  favored  neutrality 
not  only  because  it  was  a  duty,  but  because  a  war 
with  the  United  States  would  endanger  Canada  and 
commerce,  and  because  he  was  opposed  to  any  more 
division  and  strife  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  Lord 
Robert  Cecil  defended  the  course  of  Napoleon  and 
suggested  that  the  fear  for  Canada  would  not  in 
fluence  England.  But  Bright  had  no  faith  in  the 

8  171  Parl.  Debates,  p.  1807. 


THE    CRISIS    IN    ENGLAND  189 

scheming  and  land-hungry  Emperor  of  France  who, 
he  said,  ran  the  chance  of  being  "  far  too  much  rep 
resented  in  this  House."  He  considered  that  Lin 
coln  represented  a  moral  and  peaceful  party,  and 
warned  England  not  to  lift  her  hand  "  to  aid  the 
most  stupendous  act  of  guilt  in  history."  "  The 
more  I  study  this  war,"  said  he,  "  the  more  I  con 
clude  that  it  is  improbable  that  in  the  future  the 
United  States  will  be  broken  into  separate  republics. 
Even  if  separation  occur,  sympathies  will  later  bring 
the  whole  continent  under  one  central  government." 
George  Grey  could  not  understand  the  extraordinary 
statement  of  Roebuck  as  to  what  Napoleon  said 
about  the  danger  of  making  proposals  >to  the  Eng 
lish  Government,  and  he  referred  to  the  apparent 
contradiction  between  the  statements  of  Roebuck  and 
Baron  Gros. 

On  July  2,  Layard,  the  Under  Secretary  of  State, 
answered  Roebuck's  accusation  against  the  British 
Foreign  Office.10  He  stated  that  the  Emperor's  des 
patch  of  November  10,  1862,  which  was  the  only  one 
to  which  Napoleon  could  have  made  reference,  had 
been  published  at  once  in  France,  and  then  in  other 
newspapers;  and  that  it  had  been  communicated  to 
Seward  by  Mercier,  the  French  minister,  and  not  by 
Lord  Lyons.  He  further  said  that,  since  the  French 
communication  of  the  previous  November,  France, 
notwithstanding  the  statements  of  Roebuck,  had  not 
made  any  overtures  to  the  British  Government  upon 
the  subject  of  proposed  intervention,  mediation  or 
recognition;  that  Gros  of  his  own  accord  had  stated 

10  172  Parl.  Debates,  July  2,  1863. 


19°  THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 

that  he  had  received  no  such  communication  from 
Paris;  and  that  Earl  Cowley  at  Paris  knew  of  no 
such  communication.  Roebuck  asked  if  France  had 
not  made  a  proposal  in  the  spring  of  1862.  Lay- 
ard  had  looked  over  every  despatch  and  could  find 
none  upon  that  subject. 

Mason,  July  2,  said  that  the  debates  and  the  lan 
guage  of  Gros  reduced  to  a  mere  shadow  the  profes 
sions  of  Napoleon  to  Slidell,  Lindsay  and  Roebuck. :l 
At  the  same  time  he  saw  an  article  in  the  Times, 
from  the  Paris  correspondent,  stating  that  a  private 
letter  from  Madrid  gave  the  information  that  the 
Spanish  Government  had  been  sounded  upon  the 
question  of  recognition,  with  an  intimation  that  if 
Spain  were  ready  she  would  have  the  support  of 
France.  He  remarked  that  France  seemed  to  be 
playing  a  complicated  diplomatic  game.  Slidell  be 
lieved  that  the  Emperor  had  kept  his  promise,  and 
that  the  fault  rested  either  with  the  French  Foreign 
Office,  Palmerston,  or  with  Russell  and  Layard. 
Mason  wrote  that  the  Commons  were  agitated  by  the 
entanglements,  and  that  four-fifths  of  the  members 
were  with  the  Confederacy,  but  that  as  parties  stood 
Roebuck's  motion  would  probably  be  lost;  and  he 
anxiously  awaited  news  from  General  Lee.12 

The  debate  on  Roebuck's  motion  was  resumed  on 
July  10,  when  the  latest  report  from  Lee's  movement 
in  the  North  was  favorable  to  the  Confederacy,  in 
dicating  to  Mason  that  Washington  and  Baltimore 
might  fall,  and  make  it  impossible  for  the  ministry 
to  hold  out  against  recognition.13  Sir  James  Fergu- 

11  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  41,  July  2,  1863. 

12  Ibid.,  No,  42,  July  10,  1863.  la  Ibid. 


THE   CRISIS    IN    ENGLAND  19! 

son  stated  that  the  Confederacy  seemed  to  be  no 
longer  on  the  defensive,  but  that  the  debate  should 
be  postponed  until  the  result  of  the  campaign  was 
learned.  Though  the  debate  was  postponed  until 
July  13,  there  was  a  long  discussion  on  July  10. 
Palmerston  said  that  all  knew  the  wishes  of  Napo 
leon  now*  and,  while  stating  that  England  was  ready 
to  interchange  views  with  France  on  American 
affairs,  he  suggested  that  Napoleon  should  know  that 
conversation  between  himself  and  two  members  of 
Parliament  was  not  a  question  for  discussion  in  the 
Commons.  He  hoped  that  Roebuck  would  let  the 
debate  drop,  claiming  that  it  could  not  go  on  without 
a  revival  of  personal  discussions  as  to  what  Napo 
leon  had  said  in  private.  Lindsay  explained  that  in 
the  previous  four  years  he  had  held  several  conver 
sations  with  Napoleon  upon  the  subject  of  naviga 
tion — some  of  which  had  occurred  since  the  Civil 
War — and  that  he  had  told  nothing  except  when  Na 
poleon  gave  him  permission.  He  vouched  for  the 
truth  of  what  Robeuck  had  said,  but  he  desired  to 
avoid  such  discussions  in  the  House.  He  said  that 
he  felt  for  the  Southern  people,  but  others  replied 
that  the  Confederacy  need  look  for  no  sympathy 
from  the  workingmen  of  England.  O'Donoghue 
declared  that  disunion  would  be  one  of  the  greatest 
calamities  to  the  world  and  protested  against  the 
feeling  of  hostility  to  American  prosperity  in  which 
Roebuck's  motion  had  been  conceived. 

After  a  long  discussion,  much  of  which  related  to 
Napoleon's  statements,  Layard  still  declared  that 
he  himself  had  gone  through  all  the  papers  and  that 
no  despatch  sent  by  France  to  the  British  Govern- 


192  THE    CRISIS    IN    ENGLAND 

ment  had  ever  been  sent  to  the  American  Govern 
ment.  He  also  mentioned  a  previous  case  where 
Lindsay  had  come  from  Paris  as  an  amateur  diplo 
matist  to  make  communications  which  he  had  no  au 
thority  to  do.  Lindsay  in  reply  spoke  of  his  con 
versation  with  Napoleon  on  April  n,  1862,  stating 
that  Napoleon  had  asked  him  to  report  it  to  Russell. 
As  to  the  recent  conference,  he  said  that  Napoleon 
was  anxious  to  recognize  the  Confederacy,  had 
wished  to  see  him,  and  had  authorized  the  use  of  any 
means  to  notify  the  Commons  of  his  readiness  to  acl. 
He  took  no  offense  at  what  Lord  Palmerston  had 
said,  but  he  did  not  like  to  be  called  an  "  amateur 
diplomatist "  by  the  Under  Secretary.  He  said  that 
if  he  was  an  amateur  diplomatist  the  British  Govern 
ment  had  made  him  so  by  authorizing  his  talks  with 
Napoleon  on  the  subject  of  navigation.  Palmerston 
made  another  speech  on  July  13,  regretting  the  at 
tack  on  the  Under  Secretary,  and  stating  that  it  was 
necessary  to  receive  communications  through  re 
sponsible  ministers — even  if  the  correspondence 
should  be  between  Napoleon  and  Victoria.  He  said 
that  it  was  not  the  habit  of  the  British  Government 
to  carry  on  double  diplomacy  or  irregular  negotia 
tions  by  private  individuals.  He  explained  that 
Lindsay  had  offered  to  talk  with  Napoleon  on  navi 
gation;  and  that  the  Government,  considering  him 
informed  upon  that  subject,  had  accepted  his  offer 
with  the  best  intentions.  At  the  request  of  Palmers- 
ton,  Roebuck  moved  to  discharge  the  order  for  re 
suming  the  debate.  In  doing  so  he  said  that  there 
Avere  two  great  dangers  to  England  which  the  Gov 
ernment  would  have  to  meet:  (i)  The  possibility  of 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  IQ3 

reconstructing  the  Union  on  a  Confederate  basis,  or, 
(2)  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  France  alone. 
The  statement  of  Lindsay  and  Roebuck  as  to  Na 
poleon  became  a  subject  of  conversation  between 
Dayton  and  L'Huys  at  Paris,  and  Dayton  wrote 
Seward :  "  Take  it  all  in  all,  it  was  the  most  futile 
and  abortive  attempt  to  help  on  the  recognition  of 
the  South  that  men  in  prominent  positions  ever 
made."  Both  English  and  French  officials  declared 
that  there  were  no  such  official  despatches  as  those 
to  which  Napoleon  had  referred.  L'Huys  informed 
Dayton  that  after  the  most  diligent  search  he  could 
find  no  despatch  to  which  Lindsay's  statement  could 
possibly  apply — except  the  November  proposal  for 
an  armistice.14  Perhaps,  in  his  interview  with  Lind 
say  in  1862,  Napoleon  may  have  referred  to  unoffi 
cial  representations  made  through  the  French  min 
ister  at  London,  but  Secretary  Seward  positively 
stated  that  Russell  had  never  furnished  him  any  com 
munication  of  the  Emperor.  Seward  distrusted  Na 
poleon,  but  his  distrust  probably  arose  from  the 
rumors  and  reports  which  found  their  way  into  the 
newspapers.  L'Huys  stated  to  Dayton  that  the 
Emperor  had  at  no  time  made  a  proposal  to  Eng 
land  to  acknowledge  the  South,  though  Roebuck 
and  Lindsay  had  pressed  him  hard  to  do  so  and  had 
told  him  that  England  was  ready  and  would  offer 
recognition  if  it  were  not  believed  that  France  would 
refuse  to  follow— ^that  if  he  would  but  say  the  word 
their  proposals  in  the  House  of  Commons  would 
pass  at  once;  that  Napoleon  had  replied  that  he  had 

14  Dayton  to  Seward,  No.  333,  Aug.  5,  1863. 
13 


194  TIIE   CRISIS    IN    ENGLAND 

given  England  no  cause  to  believe  that  he  would  not 
act  with  her,  but  that  he  would  not  initiate  the  move 
ment;  that  when  Roebuck  and  Lindsay  asked  him  if 
they  might  communicate  his  views,  the  Emperor  had 
replied  that  his  views  were  no  secret,  little  dreaming 
that  they  would  use  his  words  in  the  Commons.  An 
article  in  the  Monitcur  admitted  the  readiness  of  the, 
Emperor  to  follow  England  in  case  the  latter  be 
lieved  that  acknowledgment  of  the  Confederacy 
would  end  the  war.15 

Notwithstanding  the  assurances  of  L'Huys,  it 
jseems  that  Napoleon  may  have  sent  some  kind  of  a 
despatch  through  L'Huys,  asking  Gros  to  sound 
Palmerston  and  Russell  and  to  notify  them  that  he 
was  ready  to  join  in  recognition  if  England  would 
make  the  official  proposal.  Mocquard  in  explain 
ing  the  subject  to  Slidell  said:  "On  the  next  day 
after  the  interview  of  Messrs.  Roebuck  and  Lindsay 
with  the  Emperor,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
telegraphed  Baron  Gros  to  inform  Lord  Palmerston 
'  officiously  '  that,  should  Great  Britain  be  willing  to 
\ecognize  the  South,  the  Emperor  would  be  ready  to 
follow  her  in  that  way."  Either  Gros  did  not  get  the 
telegram,  or,  seeing  the  feeble  support  which  Roe 
buck's  motion  met,  he  denied  receiving  any  official 
communication  on  the  subject  of  recognition — as  he 
had  a  right  to  do  if  his  despatch  was  purely  confi 
dential. 

It  is  possible  that  if  Lee  had  won,  and  the  draft  riots 
had  not  failed  in  the  North,  and  if  Vicksburg  had 
not  fallen,  that  England  and  France  might  have 

15  Dayton  to  Seward,  No.  329,  July  30,  1863. 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  195 

intervened  and  sent  iron-clads  to  America.  Some 
still  hoped  for  foreign  aid  and  complications,  and 
said  that  if  France  and  England  feared  reconstruc 
tion  of  the  Union,  they  would  manifest  their  purpose 
when  they  heard  of  the  recent  Confederate  calami 
ties.  Still  others,  seeing  that  the  United  States 
would  continue  the  war,  would  have  been  willing  to 
be  included  in  the  new  Mexican  empire,  whose 
notables  were  now  asking  France  for  an  emperor.16 
A  few  favored  the  abolition  of  slavery  as  a  means  of 
obtaining  recognition.  By  August,  it  became  evi 
dent  that  what  nature  and  man's  genius  had  bound 
together  could  not  be  separated  by  the  storms  of  a 
single  generation.  Peoples  might  come  and  pass 
away  but  the  Mississippi  would  roll  on  through  a 
united  country. 

Parliament  was  prorogued  July  28,  and  the  expec 
tations  of  the  Confederate  sympathizers  were  much 
depressed  by  the  news  from  America."  The  Con 
federate  engagements  in  Europe  for  an  army  and 
navy  required  large  sums,  and  Confederate  affairs  in 
the  stock  market  became  more  and  more  doubtful. 
The  loan  fell  to -70;  and  Mason,  seeing  that  another 
could  not  be  expected,  advised  that  the  Confederate 
authorities  at  Richmond  should  take  control  of  the 
shipment  of  cotton  by  fast  steamers,  and  avoid  the 
exorbitant  rates  of  the  blockade  runners.  On  Au 
gust  10,  in  reply  to  Mason's  note  of  July  16,  Russell 
stated  that  he  saw  no  reason  to  change  his  opinion 
on  the  subject  of  the  blockade.18  Mason  reported  that 

16  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary.  July  31,  1863. 

17  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  43,  Aug.  6,  1863. 
13  Ibid.,  No.  44,  Sept.  4,  1863. 


196  THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 

England  would  still  resort  to  evasions  of  the  Decla 
ration  of  Paris.  Confederate  agents  had  been  sent 
to  Ireland  to  stop  Irish  emigration  to  the  United 
States,  by  assurances  of  Southern  friendship,  but 
Mason  doubted  whether  they  could  make  much  im 
pression.  Mason  saw,  in  fact,  very  few  crumbs  of 
comfort;  but  he  wrote  Benjamin  that  if  Russia  should 
modify  her  policy  toward  Poland  so  as  to  remove  ap 
prehension  of  European  war,  France,  compelled  by 
her  interests  in  Mexico,  might  take  a  position  of 
value  to  the  Confederacy.  He  suggested  that  the 
authorities  at  Richmond  should  define  their  pol.cy 
with  the  view  of  endeavoring  to  obtain  France  and 
Mexico  as  allies  against  the  supposed  future  designs 
of  the  United  States. 

After  the  failure  of  Mason  to  obtain  recognition, 
in  the  summer  of  1862,  the  Southerners  had  become 
irritated,  and  many  desired  the  recall  of  the  diplo 
matic  agents.19  The  withdrawal  of  Mason  was  con 
templated  by  the  Government,  but  it  was  decided  that 
his  recall  would  interfere  with  Slidell's  arrangements 
for  the  purchase  of  war  materials.  The  press  com 
plained  that,  while  the  Confederacy  should  have 
agents  abroad,  the  dignity  of  the  country  was  com 
promised  by  having  them  sit  or  kneel  at  the  gate 
of  kings  to  petition  for  admission  to  the  family  of 
nations.  It  was  stated  that,  since  European  minis 
ters  had  spoken  so  plainly,  no  one  now  believed  in 
the  delusion  of  European  recognition  and  that  self- 
respect  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  the  diplomatic 
agents;  that  Europe  wished  to  see  the  war  pro- 

18  Instr.  to  Slidell,  Jan.  15,  1863. 


THE    CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  197 

tracted  till  both  sides  should  become  exhausted,  and 
would  interfere  only  when  it  was  clear  that  the  South 
could  not  succeed  alone.20 

In  the  spring  of  1863  England  published  the  cor 
respondence  between  Mason  and  Russell  on  the  le 
gality  of  the  blockade,  and  when  it  reached  the  Con 
federacy  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  Mason  was 
strongly  urged.  Editorials  suggested  that  he  had 
no  position  from  which  to  retire,  save  that  of  a  waiter 
on  the  pleasure  of  the  English  Government.  Others, 
adopting  the  policy  of  Davis,  saw  no  humiliation  in 
allowing  him  to  remain  in  London  "  to  be  ready  for 
any  event  which  might  turn  up."  They  remembered 
that  they  had  received  valuable  assistance  from  some 
of  the  English  people  who  were  "  not  so  cold  as 
Russell."  But  a  strong  party  in  the  Confederacy 
continued  to  speak  of  Mason  "  cooling  his  heels  in 
the  ante-chamber  of  St.  James  to  no  earthly  advan- 
tage.'" 

On  August  4,  Benjamin,  seeing  by  the  parliamen 
tary  debates  that  England  would  decline  overtures 
for  a  treaty,  wrote  Mason  that  his  residence  in  Lon 
don  was  "  no  longer  conducive  to  the  interests  nor 
consistent  with  the  dignity  of  the  Confederacy,"  and 
advised  his  withdrawal.22  In  a  private  note,  however, 
he  asked  him  to  use  his  discretion  if  the  British 
Government  showed  any  sign  of  a  change  of  policy. 
On  September  21,  Mason,  after  consulting  Slidell, 
notified  Russell  and  the  newspapers  of  his  reasons 
for  withdrawal. 


20  Richmond  Dispatch,   March  31,   1863. 

21  Ibid.,  April  8,  1863. 

"  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  30,  Aug.  4,  1863. 


198  THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 

The  London  papers  for  which  the  Confederate 
press  agent  (Hotze)  wrote  editorials  to  "  affect  the 
public  mind,"  commented  upon  Russell's  very  marr 
ed  and  impolitic  partisanship  in  favor  of  the  United 
States,  stating  that  he  licked  the  feet  of  Adams  and 
bit  every  one  else  who  ventured  within  the  length  of 
his  chain — while  rifles  and  Irishmen  were  sent  to 
New  York  in  shiploads  with  impunity.  The  Morning 
Herald  (September  23)  spoke  of  the  inconvenience 
which  would  result  from  England  having  no  means 
of  communication  with  the  South,  and  said  that 
Davis  had  reluctantly  reached  his  determination  after 
enduring  much  provocation  and  lack  of  courtesy 
from  Russell,  who,  in  order  to  please  the  indignant 
American  minister,  had  not  even  been  disposed  un 
officially  to  converse  with  Mason  as  a  private  citizen, 
concerning  interests  of  British  citizens  in  the  vast 
territories  over  which  Davis  affirmed  himself  the 
ruling  executive.  Alluding  to  the  continental  idea 
that  Russell  was  "  a  very  bear  of  diplomacy,"  the 
Herald  suggested  that  the  bear  had  found  his  keeper, 
and  inquired:  "  How7  much  dirt  is  this  nation  to  eat 
in  order  to  escape  the  bugbear  of  an  American  war?  " 
It  was  urged  that  the  Confederacy,  with  its  seat  at 
Richmond  unshaken  by  the  hosts  from  the  North, 
had  a  right  to  expect  more  sympathy  than  it  had  re 
ceived  in  Europe;  and  that  it  was  unwise  for  Russell 
to  grow  colder  with  the  waning  fortunes  of  the  Con 
federacy,  while  Napoleon  was  growing  so  friendly 
that  rumor  spoke  of  a  possible  alliance  of  France, 
Mexico  and  the  Confederacy  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot 
of  the  American  difficulty.  But  Russell,  remaining 
unmoved  in  his  policy,  replied  (September  25)  that 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  199 

the  reasons  for  declining  Confederate  overtures 
were  still  in  force,  and  that  he  regretted  that  circum 
stances  had  prevented  the  cultivation  of  Mason's  per 
sonal  acquaintance. 

Mason  still  complaining  of  Russell's  evasions  in 
favor  of  the  North  on  the  question  of  the  blockade, 
withdrew  from  London  to  Paris  to  await  orders  from 
Richmond.23  He  decided  that  it  would  be  best  for 
him  to  remain  in  England — or  at  least  in  Europe. 
Accustomed  to  dealing  in  futures,  he  was  not  yet 
disheartened.  Who  could  say  when  there  might  cease 
to  be  a  Palmerston  and  a  Russell  in  the  Cabi 
net.  To  Jefferson  Davis  on  October  2,  he  presented 
his  views  in  substance  as  follows :  "  I  await  orders. 
We  think  best  for  me  to  stay  in  Europe.  Notwith 
standing  the  reluctance  of  those  really  our  friends  in 
the  Commons  to  vote  for  Roebuck's  motion,  ...  it 
resulted  from  no  disaffection  to  our  cause,  but  was 
due  to  the  peculiar  structure  of  parties  in  England 
just  now.  Palmerston's  personal  popularity  is  the 
mainstay  of  his  administration,  and  if  his  party  \vere 
overthrown  it  might  be  returned.  The  opposition 
members  think  that  if  he  were  out  of  the  way  they 
could  come  in  with  their  strength  greatly  increased 
— and  he  is  now  far  advanced  in  years,  and  subject  to 
sharp  attacks  of  the  gout  or  its  incidents.  Were 
there  a  new  administration,  or  one  reconstructed  on 
the  loss  of  its  chief,  or  any  event  which  would  dis 
place  Lord  Russell,  it  is  thought  that  the  policy  of 

23  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  46,  Sept.  25,  1863  (received 
at  Richmond  on  Oct.  23).  On  Sept.  25,  Russell  wrote  Mason 
that  the  reasons  for  declining  Confederate  overtures  were 
still  in  force.  [Despatches  of  Mason,  Oct.  19,  1863.] 


200  THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND 

England  in   regard  to  our  country  would   undergo 
great  modification." 

Mr.  Davis  in  his  message  to  Congress  strongly 
criticised  the  Governments  of  Europe  for  refusing 
to  admit  the  Confederacy  into  the  family  of  nations.'4 
Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  very  disturbed  condition 
of  European  affairs,  the  wars  which  might  arise, 
therefrom,  the  probable  relations  of  France  and 
Austria  in  Mexico,  and  contingencies  and  unexpected 
relations  in  which  the  Confederate  interests  could 
not  wait  for  the  delays  of  uncertain  communication, 
Mason  was  appointed  commissioner  to  the  continent 
with  duplicate  full  power  addressed  in  blank  so  they 
could  be  used  for  any  capital  in  Europe.25  He  never 
had  any  occasion  to  use  them.  Yet  he  continued  to 
draw  his  salary  of  $12,000  per  year  until  the  end  of 
the  war,  conferring  alternately  with  Slidell  at  Paris, 
and  with  Southern  sympathizers  in  the  British  Parlia 
ment  who  were  seeking  to  embarrass  the  Palmerston 
ministry.  He  watched  the  ebbing  tide  of  the  Con 
federacy's  fortunes  and  hoped  against  fate  until  the 
last.26 

"The  Richmond  Examiner  (J.  M.  Daniels),  Dec.  10,  1863. 
Davis  »was  criticised  at  Richmond  for  "  bad  taste "  in 
complaining  too  much  of  the  foreign  powers.  [J.  B.  Jones: 
Diary,  Dec.  9,  1863.] 

24  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  34,  Jan.  25,  1864.  The  Confederate 
Senate,  on  Jan.  18,  had  confirmed  the  appointment  of  both 
Mason  and  his  secretary.  Macfarland's  salary  was  $3600. 

26  The  tenacity  with  which  some  clung  to  the  hope  of 
foreign  recognition  and  support  is  surprising.  It  appears 
that  their  ideas  as  to  English  sympathy  with  the  cause  of 
the  secessionists  were  very  much  exaggerated.  In  April, 
1864,  L.  Q.  C.  Lamar,  who  had  recently  returned  from  his 
fruitless  mission  to  Russia,  in  a  speech  at  Macon,  Georgia, 


THE   CRISIS   IN    ENGLAND  2OI 

said  England  was  almost  unanimously  Southern  in  its  sym 
pathies,  and  that  the  majority  in  Parliament  were  sym 
pathizers  with  the  Confederacy,  but  that  the  Cobden-Bright 
element  held  the  balance  of  power.  He  declared  that  Napo 
leon,  the  artful  politician,  was  friendly,  but  was  opposed  by 
his  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  could  do  nothing.  He  con 
sidered  that  the  Confederacy  was  favored  "by  Austria  and 
Spain,  and  by  Italy  through  the  Pope,  and  might  be  able  to 
secure  as  an  ally  Mexico,  under  the  rule  of  Maximilian. 
[The  Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg),  April  23,  1864.] 


CHAPTER  IX 

NAPOLEON,  AND  THE  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

While  Napoleon  was  contemplating  an  American 
empire  around  the  Gulf,  Slidell  was  planning  in 
France  for  a  Confederate  navy,  and  Mason  was  com 
missioned  to  await  contingencies.1  Some  who  favored 
rushing  headlong  into  political  combinations  for 
"  gigantic  increase  "  urged  entangling  alliances  with 
France.  Henry  St.  Paul,  in  a  pamphlet  published  at 
Mobile  (November,  1863)  on  "  Our  Home  and  For 
eign  Policy,"  stating  that  France  had  contemplated 
and  panted  for  it,  proposed  making  the  gulf  a  Franco- 
Confederate  lake,  of  which  Cuba  and  the  French 
islands  would  be  the  central  key,  by  which  the  isth 
mus  could  also  be  brought  under  control. 

Louis  Napoleon  desired  to  perpetuate  his  dynasty 
by  a  military  revival  and  a  strong  foreign  policy. 
Even  before  the  civil  war  he  dreamed  of  restoring  to 
France  her  long-lost  colonial  empire.  A  professor  in 
the  University  of  Virginia  told  Benjamin  of  an  hour's 
conversation  which  he  had  with  the  Emperor  in  1859 
or  1860.  He  said  that  the  latter  drained  him  by  ques 
tions,  and  was  especially  eager  to  talk  of  Mexican 
affairs.  The  professor  had  just  returned  from  Cuba, 
but  he  found  Napoleon  apparently  better  informed 
than  himself  concerning  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the 
gulf.  He  knew  the  exact  number  of  guns  on  Morro 

1  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  32,  Nov.  13,  1863. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    203 

Castle  and  how  much  the  United  States  spent  on  the 
Florida  fortifications.  He  seemed  to  seek  in  Mexico 
a  compensation  for  the  lost  colonies  in  the  West 
Indies,  which  he  said  could  not  be  peaceably  recov 
ered.  He  stated  that  France  must  soon  have  a  pied-a- 
terre  on  the  Florida  coast  to  protect  her  gulf  com 
merce.  "  Nous  ne  voulons  pas  d'un  autre  Gibraltar 
de  ce  cote-la."  He  seemed  also  to  revolve  in  his 
mind  the  possibility  of  getting  a  foothold  in  Louisiana. 
In  asking  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  French  in  Texas, 
the  tendency  of  the  German  colonists,  and  the  feeling 
on  the  Mexican  border,  he  twice  said  "  La  Louisiane 
n'est  ce  pas  qu'elle  est  Franchise  au  fond?  .  .  .  Eh 
bien,  il  faut  reconstruire  Tempire  la  bas." '' 

At  the  opening  of  the  civil  war  Napoleon  saw  his 
opportunity,  and  he  was  favored  by  the  conditions 
around  the  gulf.  Spain  was  ready  to  introduce  her 
authority  in  San  Domingo;  and  England  and  Spain 
were  cooperating  with  France  in  contemplated  inter 
vention  in  Mexico  in  order  to  collect  claims  resulting 
from  the  revolutions  there.  The  United  States,  how 
ever,  would  not  join  the  European  powers,  but  soon 
expressed  a  readiness  to  help  Mexico  in  the  settle 
ment  of  her  claims.  In  the  early  part  of  1862  Eng 
land,  Spain,  and  France  landed  troops  at  Vera  Cruz. 
Mexico  soon  arranged  with  England  and  Spain  by 
negotiations,  and  they  withdrew  their  forces.  Napo 
leon  refused  the  terms  offered,  and  by  invitation  of  the 
clerical  party  declared  war  against  Juarez.  He  ex 
pected  the  Confederacy  to  be  successful,  and  hoped 
that  thereby  the  United  States  would  be  prevented 

2  Confed  "  Dip.  Cor.",  France,  Benjamin  to  Slidell,  Feb.  7, 
1863. 


2O4      NAPOLEON:    PROJECTED    CONFEDERATE    NAVY 

from  interfering  with  his  designs.  French  journalists 
stated  that  intervention  was  rendered  necessary  by  the 
ambitious  views  of  the  United  States  as  to  expansion. 
The  American  Government  was  apprehensive  that 
Spain  might  renew  her  cooperation  with  France. 
Perry  at  Madrid  suggested  to  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment  that  it  was  time  for  her  to  end  her  participation 
in  the  Mexican  affair.  Referring  to  the  possible  large 
merchant  navy  which  might  traverse  the  waters  be 
tween  Mexico  and  France,  he  suggested  that  the 
strategical  position  of  the  Spanish  colonies  should 
make  Spain  careful.  For  a  while  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  at  Madrid  was  lessened  by  the  report 
that  Mexico  was  to  pledge  territory  for  a  loan  from 
the  American  Government,  but  Spain  held  aloof  from 
Mexican  affairs. 

The  Confederate  officials  expressed  no  disapproval 
of  the  policy  of  either  France  or  Spain  in  Mexico  and 
San  Domingo.  They  informed  Spain  that  they  de 
sired  to  see  her  power  grow.  Slidell  in  1862  told 
Napoleon  that  the  Confederacy  would  have  no  objec 
tion  to  his  taking  the  west  end  of  San  Domingo. 

The  Confederates  were  much  encouraged  by  Napo 
leon's  attitude.  In  May,  1861,  the  Due  de  Morny,  the 
greatest  person  in  France  after  the  Emperor,  informed 
Rost  that  the  recognition  of  the  South  was  only  a 
matter  of  time.  France  only  waited  for  England. 
In  April,  1862,  Napoleon  freely  stated  to  Slidell  that 
he  was  ready  to  send  an  Anglo-French  fleet  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  to  break  the  blockade,  but 
New  Orleans  soon  fell  and  postponed  the  chances  of 
Confederate  recognition.  In  the  fall  of  1862  Napo 
leon  had  been  ready  to  mediate  for  a  six  months' 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    205 

armistice  but  England  and  France  had  refused  to  join 
him.  Apparently  his  friendship  grew  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1863,  but  Lee  was  driven  from  the 
North  and  England  firmly  declared  against  coopera 
tion  in  recognizing  the  South,  and  Napoleon  soon 
found  it  inconvenient  to  facilitate  plans  for  building 
a  Confederate  navy  in  his  ports.  Gradually  the  signs 
of  the  times  rudely  destroyed  his  vision  of  a  great 
Latin  empire  beyond  the  seas. 

While  Napoleon,  declaring  the  necessity  of  a  stable 
government  in  Mexico  to  prevent  the  United  States 
from  controlling  the  entire  gulf,  was  preparing,  in 
the  summer  of  1862,  an  expedition  for  Vera  Cruz,  his 
consuls  at  Galveston  and  Richmond  were  acting  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  make  Benjamin  suspicious  that 
the  Emperor,  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the' 
French  policy,  had  secret  and  occult  designs  on  some 
of  the  Southern  states,  as  well  as  on  Mexico.  Under 
date  of  August  18,  Theron,  the  French  consul  in 
Texas,  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Lubbock,  confidentially 
asked  his  views  as  to  whether  the  annexation  of  Texas 
to  the  United  States,  and  its  subsequent  secession  and 
incorporation  with  the  Confederacy  were  good  politi 
cal  movements,  and  whether  the  reestablishment  of 
the  republic  of  Texas  would  be  beneficial.  He  stated 
that  he  was  seeking  information  to  guide  him  in  his 
political  correspondence  with  his  government.  Lub 
bock  forwarded  this  letter  to  Davis ;  and  shortly  after 
wards  Benjamin,  in  a  communication  which  was  cap-  - 
tured  and  published  in  the  newspapers  3  of  the  follow 
ing  January,  informed  Slidell  as  to  the  discovery  of 

3  Richmond  Examiner,  Jan.  23,  1863. 


206    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

a  political  intrigue  believed  to  have  been  set  on  foot 
by  the  French  consul  for  the  purpose  of  detaching 
Texas  from  the  Confederacy.  Benjamin  suggested 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  Napoleon  to  hold  Mexico 
as  a  colony,  and  to  establish  Texas  as  a  weaker  power 
between  Mexico  and  the  Confederacy  so  that  he  might 
feel  secure — or  that  it  was  his  purpose  to  take  Texas 
under  his  protection  as  an  independent  republic,  so 
that  he  could  get  cotton  to  offset  the  India  supply  of 
England,  thus  making  Texas  as  subservient  to  French 
interests  as  if  it  were  a  French  colony.  Benjamin 
asked  Slidell  to  investigate. 

The  Richmond  Examiner,  whose  editor  was  not  an 
admirer  of  Benjamin,  feeling  that  the  publication  of 
this  captured  despatch  would  give  the  Yankees  more 
news  than  could  possibly  have  been  given  by  any 
Confederate  newspaper,  and  tend  to  disgust  Napoleon 
with  the  Confederate  cabinet — and,  at  the  same  time, 
ironically  feigning  to  believe  that  the  despatch  was  a 
fabrication — said  that  two  idle  French  consuls  might 
have  conceived  the  "  silly  idea "  of  sandwiching 
Texas  between  two  strong  governments,  but  that  so 
stupid  a  conception  could  not  possibly  have  attracted 
the  serious  attention  of  even  the  feeblest  secretary  of 
state.*  L'Huys  voluntarily  spoke  to  Dayton  concern 
ing  the  alleged  intrigue,  and  said  that  he  would 
severely  censure  ("  pound  them  "),  the  French  con 
suls,  for  assuming  to  interfere.  Seward  seems  to 
have  attached  no  importance  to  Mr.  Benjamin's  fears, 
nor  to  have  apprehended  any  danger  from  the  various 
rumors  as  to  French  designs.  He  considered  that 

4  Richmond  Examiner,  Jan.  26,  1863. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED   CONFEDERATE  NAVY    207 

the  French  element  around  New  Orleans  had  become 
entirely  Americanized.  At  the  close  of  1862,  in  writ 
ing  to  Dayton  that  the  relations  between  France  and 
Louisiana  did  not  have  any  political  significance  in 
the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  he  said  that  there 
was  no  hook  in  Louisiana  upon  which  French  inter 
vention  could  grapple.5 

Notwithstanding  the  suspicions  of  Benjamin,  Napo-  / 
leon  did  not  appear  to  take  offense.  He  still  professed  / 
to  be  ready  to  cooperate  with  England  in  any  policy 
affecting  the  Confederacy,  and  a  few  months  later 
he  even  appeared  willing  to  act  with  Spain  alone  if 
the  latter  would  take  the  first  step.  In  March,  1862, 
Spain  had  not  been  ready  to  take  the  initiative  in 
recognizing  the  Confederacy.  At  the  close  of  1862, 
when  by  the  mutations  of  Spanish  affairs  General 
Serrano  was  called  to  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs 
in  the  O'Donnel  cabinet,  Slidell  saw  a  possibility  that 
Spain  might  review  her  decision,  and  he  recommended 
that  the  Confederacy  should  be  represented  at  Madrid. 
On  March  22,  1863,  Benjamin  appointed  Slidell  to 
act  as  special  commissioner  to  that  court;  and,  on 
May  9,  sent  him  instructions  to  assure  Spain  that  the 
South,  since  secession,  no  longer  desired  Cuba,  nor 
sought  to  extend  its  boundaries,  but  that  it  foresaw 
future  aggression  of  the  United  States  for  acquisi 
tions,  and  was  willing  to  form  an  alliance  with  Spain, 
and  to  guarantee  her  possession  of  Cuba.  When 
Slidell  received  his  instructions  Serrano  had  gone  out 
with  the  other  members  of  the  O'Donnel  cabinet. 

8  U.  S.  Dip.  Cor.,  1863,  parts  i  and  2.  pp.  640,  642,  646  and 
702.  Dayton  to  Seward,  Feb.  13,  1863.  Seward  to  Dayton, 
Dec.  29,  1862,  March  2,  Sept.  26,  1863. 


208    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

Slidell  did  not  go  to  Madrid,  but  he  held  long  con 
versations  with  Isturitz,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris,  who  stated  that  the  sympathy  of  himself  and  his 
government  was  with  the  Confederacy,  and  that  Spain 
was  prepared  to  act  with  France  and  England,  but  that 
she  could  not  take  the  initiative  in  recognition  and 
risk  the  results  of  a  war  with  the  United  States.9 
Slidell  suggested  that  Spain  and  other  powers  might 
unite  with  France  without  the  cooperation  of  England, 
and  with  apprehension  of  consequences  no  more  ser 
ious  than  "  Seward's  ebullitions."  Isturitz  seemed  to 
admit  that  Spain  would  be  favorably  disposed  to  his 
suggestion,  but  he  did  not  commit  himself.  He  wrote 
Miraflores,  the  Spanish  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
that  Slidell  would  promptly  go  to  Madrid  in  case  he 
should  receive  an  intimation  that  his  presence  would 
be  acceptable.7  Napoleon,  on  June  18,  was  more  fav 
orably  disposed  than  ever  to  a  general  European 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy;  but  he  feared  the 
large  navy  of  the  United  States,  unless  he  could  re 
ceive  English  cooperation.  Slidell  suggested  that 
Spain  had  a  navy,  and  that,  by  a  guaranty  of  Cuba 
and  with  assurance  that  France  would  concur,  she 
might  be  induced  to  act.  Napoleon  gave  the  assur 
ance,  Slidell  informed  Isturitz,  the  Paris  correspond 
ent  informed  the  London  Times,  and  Benjamin  ex 
pected  a  treaty;  but  after  the  defeat  of  the  Confederacy 
at  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg,  Isturitz  stated  that 
nothing  could  be  effected  at  Madrid. 

The  Confederates  at  this  time  were  calculating  upon 
success  in  obtaining  a  navy  in  French  ports.  In  an 

8  Despatches  of  Slidell,  May  28,  1863. 
7  Ibid.,  June  21,  1863. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    209 

interview  of  October,  1862,  Napoleon  had  intimated 
to  Slidell  that  if  the  Confederacy  would  arrange  to 
build  ships  in  France,  the  builders  would  not  be  inter 
rupted,  and  that  by  making  some  plausible  plea  the 
vessels  would  be  allowed  to  leave.     The  two  had  just 
been  speaking  of  a  plan  of  joint  mediation  for  a  six 
months'  armistice,  when  Napoleon  changed  the  sub 
ject  by  asking  why  the  Confederacy  had  not  created 
a  navy.     Slidell  said:    "If  the  Emperor  would  give 
only  some  kind  of  verbal  assurance  that  the  police 
should  not  watch  too  closely  when  we  put  on  the  guns  j 
and  men,  we  would  gladly  avail  ourselves  of  it."     The  ! 
Emperor  replied:    "Why  could  you  not  have  them: 
built  as  if  for  the  Italian  Government?     I  do  not  think  j 
it  would  be  difficult,  but  I  will  consult  my  ministers." 
Slidell  was  further  encouraged,  in  December,  by  an 
interview  with  Mocquard,  though  in  the  early  part  of 
January  the  latter  said  that  Napoleon  found  greater 
difficulties  as  to  building  the  ships  than  he  had  an 
ticipated.8 

On  January  7,  M.  Arman,  a  deputy  of  the  French 
legislative  body,  came  to  Slidell  with  a  proposition  to 
build  steamers,  and  the  latter,  feeling  that  he  came  at 
the  Emperor's  instance,  asked  him  to  wait  until  he 
learned  the  action  of  the  Confederacy  upon  the  propo 
sition  of  European  bankers  to  float  a  loan.  L'Huys, 
who  was  consulted  as  to  building  the  vessels,  said  that 
he  preferred  to  close  his  eyes  to  the  affair  until  some 
direct  appeal  should  be  made  to  him,  and  that  Slidell 
had  better  communicate  with  him  through  his 
"  friend,"  except  when  there  was  something  special. 

8  Despatches  of  Slidell,  Jan.   II,  1863. 
14 


2io    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

The  Minister  of  Marine  officially  assured  Slidell  and 
Deputy  Voruz  that  the  builders  of  the  corvettes  "  for 
commercial  purposes  in  the  Indian  ocean  "  would  be 
permitted  to  arm  and  equip  them,  and  that  the  vessels 
would  be  allowed  to  go  to  sea.9  The  Emperor  also 
informed  Arman  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  i  i 
arming  the  steamers. 

By  the  last  of  March  the  success  of  the  Confederate 
loan  seemed  to  be  assured  and  Mason  and  Slidell  ad 
vised  that  the  building  of  vessels  should  begin.  On 
April  15,  Captain  Bullock  made  a  contract  with  J.  L. 
Arman  for  four  clipper  corvettes  of  the  Alabama 
type,  to  run  between  Shanghai,  Yedo  and  San  Frar- 
cisco,  and  built  with  the  contemplation  of  a  sale  to  the 
Emperor  of  China  or  of  Japan.  Arman  arranged  with 
M.  J.  Voruz  of  Nantes  for  two  of  the  vessels.  Bul 
lock,  soon  after,  received  Mallory's  note,  of  May  16, 
stating  that  the  Confederate  Congress  by  a  secret  act 
had  appropriated  £2,000,000  for  building  iron-clad 
ships  of  war  abroad.  Expectations  at  Richmond  had 
become  much  aroused  by  the  hopes  held  out  by 
France.  In  an  interview  with  Napoleon  on  June  18, 
Slidell,  in  thanking  him  for  his  sanction  of  the  con 
tract  for  building  the  four  corvettes,  stated  that  the 
Confederacy  was  also  prepared  to  build  several  iron 
clads  if  he  would  only  give  verbal  assurance  that  they 
would  be  allowed  to  proceed  to  sea.  To  this  request 
Napoleon  replied  that  if  the  ships  were  built  it  would 
be  necessary  to  conceal  their  destination.  Slidell 
urged  that  it  would  be  no  violation  of  neutrality  for 
the  Emperor  to  give  his  permission  to  the  Confeder- 

9  Despatches  of  Slidell,  March  4,  1863;  Feb.  16  and  18,  1864. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    211 

acy,  and  mentioned  the  precedent  of  a  ship  built  for 
the  Chilean  Government,  but  the  Emperor  said  there 
was  a  distinction.10  On  July  16,  Bullock  closed  an 
other  contract  with  Arman  for  two  iron-clad  vessels. 
There  was  no  official  assurance,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
corvettes,  that  the  vessels  would  be  allowed  to  go  to 
sea;  and  afterwards,  when  Slidell  found  that  they  could 
not  leave  except  under  the  apparent  ownership  of 
some  recognized  government,  he  stated  that  he  did 
not  know  of  the  contract  until  it  was  made.11 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  statements,  as 
reported  by  Slidell,  that  Napoleon  only  promised  that 
the  vessels  should  be  built,  and  allowed  to  sail  if  their 
real  destination  could  be  kept  concealed.  But  the 
secret  of  their  destination  becoming  known  through 
no  fault  of  his,  in  the  face  of  American  protest  he 
finally  found  it  inexpedient  to  favor  the  Confederacy 
in  its  plans  to  secure  a  navy. 

On  September  10,  1863,  a  mysterious  stranger 
walked  into  the  office  of  John  Bigelow,  the  United 
States  consul  at  Paris,  and  informed  him  of  Bullock's 
contract  to  secure  Confederate  vessels  by  having  them 
built  for  China.  The  stranger  was  Peterman,  a  clerk 
of  M.  Voruz,  who  had  abstracted  his  employer's  cor 
respondence.  Bigelow  at  once  informed  Seward  and 
Dayton,  who  brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of 
the  French  Government.12  Arman  claimed  that  he 
was  no  longer  dealing  with  the  Confederacy;  but,  on 
October  22,  L'Huys  informed  Dayton  that  the  Min- 

10  Despatches  of  Slidell,  No.  38,  June  21,  1863  (in  cipher). 
Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  40,  June  20,  1863. 

11  South.  Hist.  Ass'n  Papers,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  454. 

12  Bigelow:     France  and  the  Confederate  Navy. 


212    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED   CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

ister  of  Marine  had  notified  both  Voruz  and  Arman 
of  the  withdrawal  of  the  authority  which  had  been 
obtained  for  the  armament  of  the  four  vessels.13  Some 
time  later,  when  Dayton  placed  into  the  hands  of  the 
French  authorities  full  proofs  as  to  the  Confederate 
vessels,  L'Huys  expressed  amazement. 

Slidell  became  uneasy,  and  on  November  6,  wrote  to 
Napoleon  that  the  confident  assertions  of  the  agents 
of  the  United  States  Government,  and  certain  remarks 
made  at  the  office  of  foreign  affairs,  and  of  marine, 
caused  him  to  apprehend  that  orders  might  be  given 
to  interfere  with  the  completion  of  the  vessels,  and 
he  stated  his  confidence  that  Napoleon  would  take 
necessary  steps  to  prevent  such  interference.  Three 
days  later  L'Huys  asked  Slidell  to  call  November  9. 
He  then  told  him  that  what  passed  with  the  Emperor 
was  confidential,  and  that  France  being  bound  by  a 
declaration  of  neutrality  would  not  risk  a  war  with 
the  United  States.  Slidell  replied  that  the  vessels 
were  building  by  an  invitation  of  Napoleon,  who  had 
originated  the  idea,  and  he  invoked  an  adherence  to 
the  promises  confidentially  given. 

The  Minister  of  Marine  (November  19)  drew  a 
broad  line  of  distinction  between  corvettes  and  iron 
clads,  stating  that  if  the  latter  be  allowed  to  sail  in 
spite  of  the  remonstrances  from  Washington  and  in 
violation  of  the  declaration  of  neutrality  it  would  be 
an  overt,  act  of  hostility.  He  informed  Arman  that 
the  iron-clads  would  not  be  allowed  to  go  to  sea  ex 
cept  as  the  property  of  some  non-belligerent  govern 
ment,  and  Bullock,  after  consulting  Mason  and  Slidell, 

13  U.  S.  Dip.  Cor.,  1863,  Vol.  II. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    213 

determined  to  sell  them.  Bullock  also  desired  to  dis 
pose  of  the  corvettes,  which  he  said  were  built  only  to 
act  in  conjunction  with  the  iron-clads  in  raising  the 
blockade.  Slidell,  however,  suggesting  that  a  few 
months  might  change  affairs,  was  in  favor  of  using  the 
corvettes  as  cruisers  like  the  Alabama.  "  I  know  the 
Emperor's  feelings  are  as  friendly  as  ever,"  said  he, 
"  and  the  new  ministry  in  England  may  enable  him 
to  indulge  them.  The  chapter  of  accidents  is  always 
in  the  long  run  fruitful  of  great  and  unexpected  re 
sults.  Perhaps  it  may  be  better  to  go  on  and  com 
plete  the  ships."  Davis  and  Mallory  agreed  that  it 
was  best  to  complete  the  vessels  and  take  chances. 

A  short  time  later,  Slidell's  hopes  received  a  fresh 
shock.  The  steam  sloop  Rappahannock,  pierced  for 
four  guns  and  purchased  by  Confederate  agents  in 
Great  Britain,  left  November  25,  without  armament 
or  war  equipments,  and  by  permission  entered  the 
French  port  of  Calais  for  repair,  to  adjust  her  engines, 
and  to  complete  preparations  for  her  voyage  to  the 
Confederacy.  Napoleon  wrote  Persigny  that  he  had 
given  orders  that  she  might  leave  the  French  port, 
but  that  the  American  minister  must  not  know  it.  A 
few  days  later,  however,  by  an  order  which  Benjamin 
called  unfriendly,  the  French  Government  prevented 
the  vessel  from  proceeding  to  sea  with  more  than 
thirty-five  officers  and  men.  This  being  insufficient 
to  manage  the  vessel  she  was  detained  at  Calais.1* 

Slidell  soon  had  fresh  evidence  that  the  turn  of 
events  in  America  and  Europe,  and  the  policy  of  Eng 
land,  were  forcing  Napoleon  to  endeavor  to  conciliate 

14  Rp.  of  Mallory,  Sec'y  of  the  Confed.  Navy,  Richmond, 
Nov.  5,  1864. 


214    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

the  United  States.  James  Williams,  a  confidentia 
agent,  had  spent  two  weeks  at  Miramar  in  frequent 
communication  with  Maximilian,  and  wrote  Davis  tha* 
the  latter  was  disposed  to  enter  into  an  alliance  will 
the  Confederacy.  Slidell  was  told  by  his  friend  in  the 
foreign  office  that  Maximilian  would  recognize  the 
South,  but  when  the  latter,  while  at  Paris,  did  noi. 
receive  him,  he  wrote  that  the  whole  policy  of  the 
Emperor  had  changed.  Mercier  was  on  a  visit  to 
Paris,  and  Mason  suggested  that  perhaps  Lincolr 
had  sent  a  message  to  the  Emperor  offering  to  recog 
nize  the  Mexican  Government  if  France  would  noi. 
recognize  the  Confederacy.15 

Arrangements  for  extricating  vessels  in  Englanc 
also  met  with  serious  interference.  The  British  Gov 
ernment  had  detained  several  steam  rams  upon  com 
plaints  that  they  were  building  for  the  Confederacy, 
and  Earl  Russell  soon  found  occasion  to  warn  Mr. 
Davis  that  British  neutrality  must  be  respected.  In 
December,  1863,  Seward  sent  Russell  a  copy  of  what 
purported  to  be  an  annual  report  of  Mallory  of  the 
Confederate  navy.19  It  alluded  to  Confederate  vessels 
building  in  England,  and  to  contemplated  Confederate 
operations  in  Canada.  Seward  stated  that  "  The  re 
cognition  of  the  insurgents  without  navy,  ports, 
courts,  or  coasts,  as  a  belligerent,  was  deemed  by 

18  Despatches  of  Mason,  March  16,  1864.  Despatches  of 
Slidell,  Dec.  3,  1863,  Mar.  16,  1864,  and  May  2,  1864. 

10  U.  S.  Dip.  Cor.  Instr.  No.  789,  Seward  to  Adams,  Dec. 
20,  1863.  As  to  the  spurious  character  of  the  Mallory  report, 
see  Adams  to  Seward,  Nos.  574  and  579;  Seward  to  Adams, 
Nos.  824  and  883;  Adams  to  Seward,  Nos.  596  and  640;  and 
Seward  to  Dayton,  Feb.  25,  1864.  Also,  Despatches  of 
Mason. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    215 

them  ...  as  an  invitation  to  use  the  British  ports," 
and  he  urged  that  for  the  British  Government  to  tol 
erate  the  Confederate  agents  while  they  were  carrying 
on  their  avowedly  hostile  purposes  against  the  United 
States  could  not  be  called  neutrality. 

In  March,  1864,  Lord  Russell  asked  Lord  Lyons 
to  convey  to  Davis  in  a  spirit  of  neutrality  and  impar 
tiality  a  protest  against  the  efforts  of  the  agents  of  the 
"  so-called  "  Confederate  States  to  build  or  purchase 
war  vessels  in  British  dominions  for  use  against  the 
United  States — stating  that  they  gave  the  United 
States  just  cause  for  serious  complaint,  even  if  the 
vessels  were  armed  out  of  port.17  He  further  stated 
that  even  if  it  should  be  difficult  to  prove  in  a  court 
of  law  that  the  parties  procuring  the  building  of  these 
vessels  were  Confederate  agents,  nevertheless  it  was 
so  undersood  everywhere,  and  the  British  were  satis 
fied  that  Davis  would  not  deny  it.18  There  were  no 
regular  diplomatic  or  consular  agents  near  Richmond, 
and  Lord  Lyons  (April  i)  by  permission  of  the  United 
States  Government  sent  Russell's  protest  to  Rich 
mond  by  special  messenger.  Davis  replied  (April  6) 
through  Burton  N.  Harrison,  his  private  secretary, 
protesting  against  the  term  "  so-called,"  stating  that 
the  British  plea  of  neutrality  was  clearly  contradicted 
by  British  action  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  and 
refusing  to  notice  Russell's  argument  upon  a  ques 
tion  which  was  still  before  the  highest  courts  of  Eng 
land.19 

17  Despatches  of  Mason,  March  16,  1864. 

18  Despatches  of  Adams  to  Seward,  No.  596,  Feb.  12,  1864. 
Enclosure. 

"Frank  Moore:  The  Rebellion  Record  (N.  Y.,  1861-65, 
8  Vols),  Vol.  VIII,  p.  513,  et  seq.  Mrs.  Davis:  Jefferson 
Davis,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  48- 


216    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

A  few  days  later  Benjamin  instructed  Mason  that 
he  could  use  his  own  discretion  about  going  to  Lon 
don,  in  case  he  thought  his  presence  would  be  useful 
there.20  Mason  had  already  been  going  to  Londo  i 
to  help  "  keep  the  public  mind  awake,"  to  combat  the 
anti-slavery  sentiments  of  his  friends,  to  organize 
Southern  societies,  and  to  communicate  to  Lori 
Robert  Cecil  information  which  he  might  use  in  com 
bating  the  Government.21  He  was  feeling  the  pulse  of 
the  opposition  and  of  public  opinion,  but  he  could 
expect  nothing  from  the  British  Government  unless 
Grant  should  be  driven  from  before  the  gates  of  Rich 
mond.22 

At  the  beginning  of  1864  the  vigilance  and  pro 
tests  of  the  United  States  officials  in  France  had 
caused  the  French  Government  to  notify  the  builders 
that  vessels  for  the  Confederacy  must  not  leave,  and 
Arman  saw  that  his  only  opportunity  was  to  make  a 
fictitious  sale  and  have  the  vessels  delivered  to  the 
Confederacy  on  the  ocean.  Bullock,  feeling  that  he 
had  been  deceived,  refused  to  agree  to  Arman's  plan. 
Maury  returned  to  the  Confederacy  (February)  to 
report  the  failure  to  get  out  vessels  from  either  France 
or  England.  It  was  a  painful  disappointment." 
Mason  wrote  that  there  was  no  excuse  for  the  defeat 
in  France  where  the  Confederate  agents  had  a  right 

20  Instr.  to  Mason,  April  18,  1864. 

21  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  i,  Paris,  Jan.  25;  No.  2,  Paris, 
Feb.  8;  No.  3,  London,  Feb.   18;   No.  4,  London,  Feb.   18; 
No.  5,  March  n,  1863. 

22  On  June  22,   1864  (Instr.  to  Mason,   No.  36),   Benjamin 
wrote  that  the  British  action  regarding  the  Tuscaloosa  was 
an  "  outrage." 

23  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  3,  London,  Feb.  18,  1864. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    217 

to  expect  better  results.2*  A  month  later  he  said  that 
there  was  no  more  hope  from  France  than  from 
Austria,  notwithstanding  Napoleon's  mysterious  pol 
icy  and  his  "  fairest  professions  sedulously  made." 
Again  in  July  he  wrote:  "  We  have  been  duped  by 
that  power  and  worse."  Bullock  stated  that  in  future 
it  would  be  necessary  to  be  very  cautious  in  dealing 
with  France.  Perhaps  Napoleon  had  expected  Con 
federate  victory,  or  contemplated  an  alliance  which 
would  give  him  an  opportunity  to  allow  the  vessels  to 
go,  but  he  finally  found  it  necessary  to  discountenance 
any  arrangement  which  would  offend  the  United 
States.  Bullock  had  finally  agreed  to  the  fictitious 
sale  of  the  corvette  tn  a  Denmark  banker,  to  be  deliv- 
ered  to  the  Confederacy  on  the  sea,  but  Arman  sold 
Ifiem  outright,  claiming-  that  he  did  so  by  the  order 
of  Napoleon.  The  two  Bordeaux  corvettes  and  the 
ram  were  sold  to  Prussia!  The  builder  at  Nantes 
declared  that  he  would  deliver  the  other  two  corvettes 
at  sea  but  Slidell  was  not  confident.  On  June  2,  in  / 
a  letter  stating  that  ex-Senator  Gwin  with  a  recom 
mendation  from  Napoleon  was  on  his  way  to  colonize 
Sonora  with  persons  of  Southern  birth  and  proclivi 
ties,  Slidell  advised  that  no  further  attempt  be  made 
at  that  time  to  fit  out  a  navy  in  Europe — but  he  said 
that  the  Confederacy  ivould  need  a  navy  at  the  close  of 
the  war.™  Napoleon  still  studied  the  United  States 
map,  but  he  ceased  to  see  Slidell,  except  occasionally 
at  the  races. 

Of  the  prospective  navy  only  one  vessel  was  ever  I 

u  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  5,  March  16,  1864.     Ibid.,  No. 
7,  Paris,  April  12,  1864.     Ibid.,  No.  11  July  8,  1864. 
25  Despatches  of  Slidell,  June  2,  1864. 


218    NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY 

delivered  to  the  Confederates.  About  the  last  of 
January,  1865,  the  ram  JStoerkodder,  which  Arrran 
pretended  to  have  sold  to  Denmark,  sailed  from  Bor 
deaux.  She  changed  her  name  to  Olindc  on_Jhe 
FrenetLcoast,  discharged  her  Danish  crew,  and  taking 
on  arms,  sailed  to  Spain  as  the  Stonezvall.  France 
declined  to  meddle  with  the  vessel  after  it  reached 
Spain.  Commodore  Craven,  of  the  United  States 
navy,  arrived  to  prevent  its  escape  but  he  mysteriously 
failed.  The  Stonewall  escaped  to  Nassau  and  fina'ly 
reached  Havana,  where  it  was  sold  for  $16,000,  though 
the  captain-general  was  willing  to  make  the  contract 
read  $100,000.  The  war  had  then  ended  and  it  was 
too  late  to  attempt  to  break  the  blockade.  Bigelow 
afterwards  instituted  suit  against  Arman  for  money 
received  from  Confederate  agents,  but  the  claim  was 
rejected. 

The  failure  to  get  out  vessels  in  France  was  a  blow 
from  an  unexpected  quarter.20  It  disappointed  both 
Davis  and  Benjamin  who  seem  already  to  have  ha«l 
grave  doubts  of  the  good  faith  of  Napoleon.  Davis 
while  walking  through  the  capitol  square  with  some 
Richmond  ladies  said:  "  We  have  no  friends  abroad."1 
Benjamin  ceasing  to  put  his  faith  in  foreign  powers 
and  expressing  expectation  of  an  early  victory  without 
them  said  (April  18):  "It  has  been,  perhaps,  fortu 
nate  for  us,  notwithstanding  the  awful  price  paid  in 
blood  .  .  .  that  European  powers  have  remained  so 
inconceivably  blind  to  their  own  interests  in  this 
trouble.  The  end  is  seen  to  be  approaching  and  we 
.  .  .  shall  have  no  favor  to  reciprocate,  but  many 

20  Instr.  to  Mason,  April  16,  1864. 

27  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  March  21,  1864. 


NAPOLEON:  PROJECTED  CONFEDERATE  NAVY    219 

wrongs  to  forget — some,  perhaps,  for  which  to  ask 
for  redress."  In  September,  1864,  Benjamin  fur 
nished  Slidell  with  a  long  catalogue  of  acts  of  the 
French  Government — in  France,  in  the  Confederacy 
and  on  the  Mexican  border — which  he  said  had  been 
injurious  to  the  Confederate  States.28  He  stated  that 
England  had  scarcely  disguised  her  hostility,  but  that 
the  Emperor  had  obscured  his  under  profuse  pro 
fessions  of  friendship.  He  decided,  however,  to  defer 
complaints  against  the  French  Government  until  a 
more  favorable  season.  There  w%ere  rumors  of  pros 
pective  French  aid  until  the  visions  of  both  the  Con 
federacy  and  Napoleon  vanished  in  the  fall  of  Rich 
mond.  But  there  was  no  longer  a  cordial  feeling 
toward  the  Emperor,  and  Davis,  while  travelling 
through  Europe  after  the  war,  refused  to  call  upon 
him.29 

28  Instr.  to  Slidell,  Sept.  20,  1864. 

29  J.  W.   Daniel:     Jefferson  Davis,  p.  45. 


CHAPTER  X 

CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM   CANADA 

The  plans  in  the  British  Parliament  had  failed;  the 
British  war  vessels  kept  a  close  watch  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Mersey  to  prevent  the  escape  of  Confederate 
vessels;  Spain  would  not  act;  and  France,  owing  to 
the  vigilance  of  the  United  States  officials,  had  he- 
come  more  careful  than  had  been  anticipated,  leaving 
doubt  as  to  whether  a  Confederate  navy  would  be 
allowed  to  sail  even  if  it  were  secretly  built  in  European 
ports.  The  decrease  of  Confederate  opportunities  in 
Europe,  together  with  the  desire  to  embarrass  the 
United  States  Government,  and  to  create  national 
complications,  caused  the  Confederates  to  turn  to 
Canada  as  a  base  of  operations. 

The  Richmond  authorities  in  making  their  plans 
placed  much  reliance  upon  the  disaffection  (against 
the  Lincoln  administration)  which  existed  in  portions 
of  the  North,  and  which  found  expression  in  the  or 
ganization  of  the  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle  and 
the  Sons  of  Liberty.  Some  even  expected  a  counter 
revolution.  The  West,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
had  been  much  excited  as  to  the  Confederate  policy 
on  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi.  On  February  25, 
1861,  the  Confederate  Congress  had  passed  an  act  for 
free  navigation  of  that  river.  In  January,  1863,  Foote, 
in  the  Confederate  Congress,  offered  a  resolution 
tempting  the  Northwest  to  make  peace.  A  few  days 


CONFEDERATE    OPERATIONS    FROM    CANADA      221 

later  he  stated  that  if  Indiana  and  Illinois  should 
recede  from  the  war  and  aid  the  Confederacy  he 
would  be  willing  to  furnish  them  an  army  for  protec 
tion  against  Lincoln.  A  month  later  it  was  stated  in 
Richmond  that  a  gentleman  from  the  Northwest  de 
clared  that  Ohio,  Kentucky  and  Illinois  would  secede 
and  form  a  new  confederacy,  or  join  the  South. 
Though  this  was  not  reliable,  the  people  began  to  dis 
cuss  whether  Virginia  would  be  willing  to  take  back 
her  "  erring  children  of  the  Northwest/'  and  whether 
the  cotton  states  would  oppose  such  an  accession.1 
In  March,  it  was  suggested  that  conscription  in  the 
North  might  cause  a  new  civil  war  that  would  result 
in  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  Confederacy.  In 
the  following  June,  Mr.  Vallandigham  of  Ohio, 
whom  Lincoln  had  banished  to  the  Confederacy  for 
an  intemperate  speech  in  Mount  Vernon,  Ohio,  was 
in  Richmond,  and  told  Ould  that,  if  the  Confederacy 
could  only  hold  out  for  the  year,  the  peace  party  of 
the  North  would  sweep  the  Lincoln  dynasty  out  of 
existence.  In  September,  J.  C.  Jones  asked  Davis 
for  permission  to  run  the  blockade  to  confer  with 
Secretary  Bates  of  Lincoln's  Cabinet  on  terms  of  peace 
by  assuring  the  United  States  that  none  of  the  North 
western  states  would  be  admitted  to  the  Southern 
Confederacy.2  In  February,  1864,  one  of  Morgan's 
secret  agents,  who  had  spent  several  months  in  the 
North,  doubted  whether  Lincoln  would  be  able  to  re 
cruit  the  army  by  a  draft,  and  stated  that  there  was 
a  perfect  organization  all  over  the  North  for  a  revolu- 

*J.   B.  Jones:     Diary,  Jan.  24  and  27,   Feb.   14,   March  3, 
June  22.  1863. 
2  Ibid.,  Sept.  10,  1863. 


222   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

tion,  and  for  the  expulsion  or  death  of  the  aboli 
tionists.8 

As  early  as  February,  1863,  Mr.  Mallory  had  favored 
an  expedition  against  Johnson's  Island  for  the  pur 
pose  of  releasing  Confederate  prisoners.  Davis  and 
other  members  of  the  Cabinet,  fearing  complications 
with  England,  opposed  the  expedition,  but  it  was 
finally  arranged.  The  plans,  however,  miscarried. 
In  November,  1863,  Lord  Monck,  Governor-Genen.l 
of  Canada,  telegraphed  Lord  Lyons  at  Washington 
that  there  was  a  rumor  of  a  Confederate  plot  to  capture 
steamers  on  Lake  Erie,  release  Confederate  prisoners, 
and  then  to  invade  the  United  States  by  an  attac  c 
upon  Buffalo.  On  the  night  of  November  n,  Lyons 
notified  Seward,  and  a  close  watch  being  kept  along 
the  frontier  by  both  Canada  and  the  United  States,  the 
Confederates  made  no  attempt  to  execute  the  plot. 
Lieutenant  Minor  soon  returned  from  Canada  and 
stated  that  his  contemplated  expedition  had  failed  on 
account  of  the  gratuitous  action  of  Lord  Lyons.* 

Notwithstanding  the  close  watch  kept  by  Lord 
Monck,  the  United  States  Government  in  1864  ex 
pressed  much  anxiety  concerning  the  large  number 
of  Confederates  in  Canada  and  the  suspicious-looking 
vessels  in  Canadian  waters.  Seward  had  been  pro 
testing  vigorously  against  the  British  policy,  and  there 
was  a  widespread  belief  in  the  United  States  that  the 
Confederates  received  assistance  which  the  British 

3J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  Feb.  22,  1864. 

4  Lieut.  Minor's  letter  of  Feb.  2,  1864.  In  Naval  War 
Records,  Series  i,  Vol.  II,  No.  36,  House  Docs.,  Vol.  XLI, 
54-1,  1895-96. 

J.  M.  Callahan:  The  Neutrality  of  the  American  Lakes 
and  Anglo-American  Relations,  pp.  145-46. 


CONFEDERATE    OPERATIONS    FROM    CANADA      223 

Government  could  have  prevented.  With  the  rise  of 
controversies,  the  Confederates  contemplated  the  con 
tingency  of  an  Anglo-American  war  which  would 
embarrass  the  United  States  and  aid  the  cause  of 
secession.  In  April,  1864,  Seward  said:  "We  must 
finish  the  Civil  War  soon  or  we  shall  get  into  a  war 
with  England."  Two  months  later  he  declared  that 
British  sympathy  was  clearly  with  the  South. 

In  February,  1864,  the  Confederates  expected  to 
gain  some  advantage  from  the  Chesapeake  affair.  On 
December  5,  1863,  J.  C.  Braine  and  H.  A.  Parr,  with 
twelve  equipped  men,  boarded  the  United  States 
steamer  Chesapeake,  leaving  New  York  for  Portland. 
They  pretended  that  they  were  passengers  for  Port 
land.  On  December  8,  while  on  the  high  seas,  they 
captured  the  vessel,  after  a  brief  struggle,  made  pris 
oners  of  those  on  board,  and  sailed  to  the  bay  of 
Fundy.  Near  St.  Johns,  New  Brunswick,  the  pas 
sengers,  and  most  of  the  crew,  were  released,  and 
Captain  Parker  took  command.  While  the  Chesapeake 
was  receiving  coal  from  a  British  vessel  in  Sambro 
harbor,  Nova  Scotia,  the  United  States  gunboat,  Ella 
and  Annie,  entered  the  harbor  and  seized  her;  but, 
after  reaching  the  sea,  orders  were  received  from  a 
Federal  officer  to  deliver  her  to  the  British  authorities 
at  Halifax.  The  United  States  Government  re 
quested  that  the  men  engaged  in  capturing  the  Chesa 
peake  on  the  high  seas  should  be  delivered  to  the 
United  States.  Davis  and  Benjamin  decided  to  as 
sume  responsibility  for  the  seizure  of  the  Chesapeake, 
stating  that  the  original  conception  of  the  plan  was 
probably  by  Captain  John  Parker,  alias  Locke,  a  Brit 
ish  subject,  who  had  enlisted  as  a  Confederate  priva- 


224   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

teer,  and  whose  vessel  had  become  unseaworthy.  They 
stated  that  Braine  and  Parr  were  Confederate  citizens 
;   and  that  they  had  intended  to  take  the   Chesapeake 
through  the  blockade  at  Wilmington.5 

On  February  15,  Benjamin  instructed  Hon.  J.  P. 
Holcombe  to  go  to  Nova  Scotia  to  defend  the  men 
and  to  claim  the  vessel.  In  case  the  authorities  re 
fused  to  give  him  an  official  interview,  he  was  to  re 
monstrate  firmly  and  inform  them  that  the  Confed 
eracy  would  hold  England  responsible.  He  received 
$3000  salary,  and  $5000  for  expenses  in  carrying  out 
his  instructions.  He  was  also  given  $25,000  to  se 
cure  passage  to  Bermuda  for  Confederate  prisoners 
who  had  escaped  to  Canada.6  Holcombe's  instruc 
tions  asked  him  to  insist  upon  the  following  points: 
(i)  That  citizens  of  the  Confederacy  had  a  right,  dur 
ing  the  war,  to  make  captures  even  without  a  com 
mission,  and  that  while  engaged  in  such  enterprises 
they  were  neither  pirates  nor  murderers.  (2)  That 
the  Chesapeake,  while  in  a  neutral  harbor,  was  beyond 
the  reach  of  legal  recapture,  and  that  voluntary  rendi 
tion  of  the  vessel  gave  the  United  States  no  right  to 
retain  it.  (3)  That  the  Richmond  admiralty  court, 
and  not  those  of  a  neutral  power,  had  jurisdiction  in 
determining  whether  the  Chesapeake  was  a  good  prize 
of  war.  (4)  That  this  particular  case  was  not  affected 
by  the  English  prohibition  against  privateers  carrying 
prizes  to  English  ports,  as  the  vessel  went  to  the  Eng 
lish  port  only  to  get  fuel.  (5)  That  England  had  rec 
ognized  the  Confederates  as  belligerents.  (6)  That  if 
the  British  authorities  had  delivered  the  vessel  to  the 
North,  they  must  reimburse  the  Confederates 

6  Instr.  of  Benjamin  to  Holcombe,  No.  I,  Feb.   15,  1864. 
8  Instr.  to  Holcombe,  No.  2,  Feb.  24,  1864. 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   225 

Holcombe  found  Confederate  sympathizers  in 
Canada;  but,  in  April,  the  Confederate  Government, 
acknowledging  that  it  had  been  led  into  error,  dis 
claimed  the  seizure  of  the  Chesapeake.'1 

In  April,  1864,  just  before  Grant  began  his  advance 
to  Richmond,  the  Confederacy  had  recognized  its 
perilous  condition.  Many,  both  North  and  South, 
were  weary  of  war.  The  Confederate  Congress,  be 
lieving  that  an  organization  in  the  North  and  West 
would  aid  the  South,  secretly  appropriated  a  million 
dollars  to  be  used  by  Confederate  agents.8  In  March, 

Mrs. ,  of  Maryland,  whose  son  was  in  a  Federal 

prison,  had  already  received  secret  service  money,  and 
had  gone  to  Canada  on  some  enterprise  in  which  she 
expected  aid  from  Catholic  priests  and  nuns.9  On 
April  27,  Jefferson  Davis  sent  Jacob  Thompson  and 
C.  C.  Clay  as  special  agents  to  Canada  to  carry  out 
instructions  10  received  orally,  by  which  that  country 
was  to  be  made  the  base  for  striking  the  United  States 
in  the  back.11  Thompson,  on  April  28,  received  bills 
of  exchange  for  $900,000. 

A  subsequent  report  of  Thompson  to  Benjamin  (from 

7  Instr.  to  Holcombe,  April  20,  1864. 

8  See  N.  Y.  Herald,  July  28,  1872. 

*J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  March  22,  1864. 

10  Their  credentials  are  in  Confed.  "  Diplomatic  and  Con 
sular  Commissions."  On  April  30,  Benjamin  wrote  Slidell: 
"  We  have  sent  Jacob  Thompson  of  Mississippi,  and  Clement 
C.  Clay  of  Alabama,  to  Canada  on  secret  service  in  the  hope 
of  aiding  the  disruption  between  the  Eastern  and  Western 
States  in  the  approaching  election  at  the  North.  It  is  sup 
posed  that  much  good  can  be  done  by  the  purchase  of  some 
of  the  principal  presses,  especially  in  the  Northwest."  [Con- 
fed.  "  Dip.  Cor.,  France."] 

u  Benjamin  to  Thompson,  April  28,  1864. 
t-5 


226   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

Toronto,  December  3,  1864)  indicates  the  nature  of  his 
mission.  By  conferences  with  disaffected  men,  some  of 
whom  hoped  that  without  war  the  South  would  soon 
consent  to  reconstruction,  Thompson  encouraged  tae 
organization  of  an  insurrection  in  the  North;  he  ad 
vised  with  Colonel  Martin  in  regard  to  burning  New 
York  City,  and  with  Captain  C.  H.  Cole,  who  made  a 
tour  of  the  lakes,  studying  forts,  channels  and  peo 
ple  preparatory  to  plans  for  the  release  of  Confed 
erate  prisoners  and  the  inauguration  of  operations  in 
which  the  prisoners  were  expected  to  assist;  he  aided 
a  plot  undertaken  by  J.  Y.  Beall  for  the  capture  of  lake 
steamers.  By  Benjamin's  instructions,  he  urged  t;ie 
people  of  the  North  to  convert  their  paper  into  geld 
and  withdraw  it  from  the  market.  John  Porterfield  of 
Nashville  was  sent  to  New  York  with  $100,000  to  use 
in  purchasing  and  exporting  gold.12 

On  July  9,  Thompson  wrote  Benjamin  from  Wind 
sor:  "  We  have  sixty  escaped  prisoners  who  are 
ready  for  any  enterprise."  He  said  that  nothing  could 
be  done  in  the  Eastern  States,  but  suggested  that  the 
Confederate  movements  to  Kentucky  and  Missouri 
would  facilitate  a  movement  in  the  West,  where  there 
was  much  discontent  against  the  Lincoln  Govern 
ment.  In  a  letter  sent  by  Captain  Hines,  he  stated 
that  "  the  work  "  would  probably  not  begin  before  the 
middle  of  August  and  that  much  caution  would  be 
necessary.  About  the  same  time  there  were  rumors 
from  Canada  that  the  Confederate  agents  had  ma 
chines  in  Canada  which  were  to  be  mounted  on  lake 
vessels  and  shipped  to  destroy  Northern  cities. 

13  Report  of  Thompson  to  Benjamin,  Toronto,  Dec.  3,  1864. 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   227 

The  coming  presidential  election  in  the  United 
States  was  at  this  time  an  absorbing  question  and  the 
Confederates  were  reckoning  upon  some  chapter  of 
possible  accidents  to  defeat  Lincoln.  Some  in  the 
North,  like  Wendell  Phillips,  the  stormy  petrel  of 
political  troubles,  thought  Lincoln  \vas  going  too 
slowly  in  his  policy.  Others  who  opposed  military 
arrests  and  the  suspension  of  the  habeas  corpus,  said 
that  he  was  going  too  fast  and  that  recent  reverses 
justified  efforts  to  obtain  peace.  Some  had  opposed 
the  war  policy  from  the  beginning.  But  the  nearly 
universal  desire  of  the  Union  party  was  to  renominate 
Lincoln  and  to  support  the  campaigns  of  Grant  be 
fore  Richmond  and  Sherman  before  Atlanta.  The 
Baltimore  Convention  which  met  June  7,  declared  in 
favor  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  Union,  of 
ratifying  an  amendment  for  emancipation,  of  con 
structing  a  railway  to  the  Pacific,  of  paying  the  public 
debt  and  of  re-electing  Lincoln.  It  opposed  any  com 
promise  with  secession. 

Many  of  the  opposition  had  charged  Lincoln  with 
refusing  to  negotiate  for  peace  on  reasonable  terms. 
A.  H.  Stephens,  who  desired  peace,  had  been  stopped 
before  he  reached  Fortress  Monroe  on  his  way  to 
Washington,  and  had  not  been  permitted  to  come 
within  the  Union  lines  because  he  had  refused  to  state 
the  object  of  his  visit.13  In  July,  1863,  Colonel 
Jacques,  a  Methodist  clergyman,  serving  in  Rosen- 
cranz's  army,  returned  from  an  unofficial  visit  to  Rich- 

13  President  Davis  to  Gov.  Vance,  Jan.  8,  1864.  On  Dec. 
30,  1863,  Vance  had  urged  efforts  to  secure  peace.  [Weekly 
Register  (Lynchburg),  June  4.  1864.]  See  also  Stephens' 
"War  Between  the  States,"  Vol.  IT,  pp.  557-80;  ^and  Nicolay 
and  Hay's  "  Abraham  Lincoln,"  Vol.  VII,  pp.  369-74. 


228       CONFEDERATE    OPERATIONS    FROM    CANADA 

mond  and  reported  that  he  had  proposals  for  peace. 
He  said  that  prominent  men  in  the  South  were  willing 
to  give  up  slavery,  but  that  they  would  not  take  the 
initiative  in  a  movement  for  peace.  On  June  14,  1864, 
Davis  issued  a  manifesto  stating  that  the  Confederacy 
was  willing  to  negotiate  on  points  which  required  c.d- 
justment  and  that  it  desired  the  United  States  to  cease 
the  war  against  secession.  He  stated  that  if  the 
United  States  would  withdraw  its  armies,  the  war 
would  be  at  an  end.  On  July  8,  Col.  J.  T.  Jacques,  in 
company  with  J.  R.  Gilmore,  a  novelist  (Edmund 
Kirke),  made  an  "  unofficial  visit "  to  Richmond, 
where  Davis  listened  (July  17)  to  their  plans  of  ad 
justment — to  decide,  by  majority  vote,  whether  there 
should  be  union  without  slavery  or  disunion  with  it. 
Davis  pronounced  their  plan  impracticable,  said  that 
the  Confederate  States  seceded  to  get  rid  of  the  rule  of 
the  majority,  and  would  not  consider  proposals  for 
peace  except  on  the  basis  of  independence.14 

About  the  same  time  another  peace  comedy  15  was 
being  enacted  on  the  Canadian  boundary.  After  a 
recent  conference  at  Niagara  Falls  between  Thomp 
son,  Clay  and  several  prominent  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  the  Confederate  agents  decided  to  open  a  cor 
respondence  looking  toward  negotiations  for  peace. 
Holcombe  in  the  following  November  wrote  Ben 
jamin  that  it  was  intended  that  the  correspondence 
snould  have  effect  in  rendering  probable  the  defeat  of 
Lincoln  at  the  polls.10  Clay  and  Holcombe  opened 

14  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  IX,  p.  212.  Benjamin  to  Mason, 
Aug.  25,  1864.  Register  (Lynchburg),  Aug.  27,  Sept.  24,  1864. 
Gilmore,  Recollections  of  Lincoln;  Atlantic  Mo.,  Vol.  59. 

13  The  Index  (London),  Aug.  4  and  6,  1864. 

10  Despatches  of  Holcombe  (Richmond),  Nov.  16,  1864. 
Also,  N.  Y.  Herald,  July  31,  1872. 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   22() 

communication  with  Greeley,  and  G.  N.  Sanders  ex 
pressed  his  willingness  to  go  to  Washington  on  a 
peace  mission.17  In  the  early  part  of  July,  Greeley 
wrote  Lincoln  that  Colonel  Jewett  was  at  Niagara  in 
communication  with  Confederates  who  had  power  to 
make  negotiations  for  peace.  Lincoln  had  no  faith  in 
Jewett' s  story,  but  replied  July  9:  "If  you  can  find 
any  person,  anywhere,  professing  to  have  any  propo 
sition  of  Jefferson  Davis  in  writing,  for  peace,  em 
bracing  the  restoration  of  the  Union  and  the  aban 
donment  of  slavery  .  .  .  say  to  him  he  may  come 
to  me  with  you."  A  few  days  later  he  again  wrote: 
"  I  am  disappointed  you  have  not  reached  here  with 
those  commissioners  ...  I  not  only  intend  a  sincere 
effort  for  peace,  but  I  intend  you  shall  be  a  personal 
witness  that  it  is  made."  On  July  20,  Major  John 
Hay,  Lincoln's  private  secretary,  arrived  at  Niagara 
with  the  following  note: 

"  Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  July  18,  1864. 
To  Whom  it  may  concern: 

Any  proposition  which  embraces  the  restoration  of 
peace,  the  integrity  of  the  Union,  and  the  abandon 
ment  of  slavery,  and  which  comes  by  and  with  an 
authority  that  can  control  the  armies  now  at  war 
against  the  United  States  will  be  received  and  be  con 
sidered  by  the  Executive  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  will  be  met  with  liberal  terms  on  other  sub 
stantial  and  collateral  points,  and  the  bearer  or  bearers 
thereof  shall  have  safe  conduct  both  ways. 

ABRAHAM   LINCOLN." 
"The  Weekly  Register  (Lynchburg),  Aug.  6,  1864,  p.  214. 


230   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

It  was  discovered  that  the  Confederates  at  Niagara 
with  whom  Greeley  opened  peace  negotiations  had  no 
authority  from  the  Confederate  Government.18  They 
were  endeavoring  to  have  Lincoln  take  the  initiative 
in  the  peace  negotiations  and  to  recognize  the  official 
status  of  the  Confederate  Government.  Lincoln  con 
sidered  that  the  Niagara  Confederates  were  cooperat 
ing  to  aid  the  anti-administration  movement  by  cre 
ating  an  impression  that  he  was  opposed  to  peace  ex 
cept  on  the  basis  of  immediate  emancipation.  Cn 
August  24,  Lincoln  wrote  a  letter  with  the  intention 
of  sending  Henry  J.  Raymond  to  propose  peace  with 
out  mention  of  slavery,  but  events  soon  occurred  10 
weaken  the  extreme  peace  men  and  the  letter  was 
never  used.19 

Thompson  and  Clay,  by  confidential  conferences 
with  men  from  the  Northwest,  had  declared  the  readi 
ness  of  the  Confederacy  to  seize  Illinois,  Indiana  and 
Ohio.  Peace  meetings  were  inaugurated  at  Peoria 
and  other  places,  but  the  fire  soon  diminished  and  the 
nerves  of  the  leaders  began  to  relax.20  The  return  of 
Vallandigham  in  June  encouraged  the  opposition  to 
attempt  to  defeat  Lincoln  by  the  ballot-box.  The 
half-formed  project  of  an  insurrection  was  given  up 
with  the  hope  of  success  at  the  polls.  The  leaders  of 
the  anti-administration  party  had  called  a  national 
convention  on  July  4;  but  after  the  Baltimore  Conven 
tion,  hoping  to  receive  advantage  from  some  new 
chapter  of  accidents,  they  agreed  to  postpone  the  meet 
ing  to  a  more  inconspicuous  date.  Thompson,  in  his 

18  Instr.  to  Mason,  Aug.  25,  1864. 

19  Nicolay  and  Hay. 

20  Thompson  to  Benjamin,  Toronto,  Dec.  3,  1864. 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   231 

report  to  Benjamin,  said  this  postponement  inter 
rupted  the  calculations  for  a  general  uprising  in  the 
North.  The  Democratic  convention  finally  met  at 
Chicago,  August  29,  the  day  which  had  been  set  for 
a  counter-revolution,  and  nominated  McClellan  for 
president.  It  was  a  time  of  depression  and  gloom. 
The  terrible  fighting  in  the  Wilderness,  the  horrible 
slaughter  at  Cold  Harbor,  the  Confederate  raid  into 
Maryland  had  shocked  and  depressed  the  country. 
Early,  defiant,  stormed  up  the  Shenandoah;  Sherman 
was  delayed  at  Kenesaw;  Chase,  tired  of  providing  the 
funds  while  others  controlled  the  expenditures,  had 
resigned  from  the  Cabinet,  and  seemed  to  see  the 
mirage  of  the  presidency;  the  Wade-Davis  manifesto 
had  been  issued  in  August  and  the  Democrats,  attack 
ing  the  administration  and  hoping  to  change  the  Gov 
ernment,  pronounced  the  war  a  failure.  Mason,  also 
from  London,  wrote:  "  I  do  not  see  how  the  war  can 
be  carried  on  when  .  .  .  people  have  no  stomachs  for 
the  fight."  a 

The  Confederates  had  recently  received  fresh  proof 
that  Europe  would  not  take  any  action,  and  Mason 
saw  nothing  to  do  but  await  events,  hoping  that  the 
presidential  election  and  the  anti-war  feeling  in  the 
United  States,  together  with  the  distress  in  England, 
would  favor  the  South.  In  the  last  week  in  May, 
Lindsay  had  had  a  conversation  with  Palmerston  to 
endeavor  to  conciliate  the  British  Government's  sup 
port  on  a  resolution  for  joint  mediation  in  the  Amer 
ican  war.  He  wrote  Mason  that  Palmerston  favored 
his  resolution,  but  thought  it  best  to  wait.  At  the 

21  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  13,  Paris,  Sept.  29,  1864. 


232   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

suggestion  of  Lindsay,  Palmerston  said  he  would 
be  willing  to  see  Mason  and  hear  his  views  if  he  were 
in  London.22  Mason  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  ap 
proach  the  British  Government  without  some  intima 
tion  of  its  disposition  to  enter  into  official  relation; 
but,  urged  by  Lindsay,  he  went  to  London,  expecting 
to  see  Palmerston  in  case  he  should  be  invited.  He 
found  that  only  the  news  of  a  great  victory  against 
Grant  before  Richmond  would  give  any  hope  that  the 
ministry  would  support  Lindsay's  resolution.23  Rus 
sell  remarked  that  Adams  still  spoke  confidently.  On 
July  8,  however,  Mason,  in  a  note  to  Benjamin,  stal 
ing  that  new  Confederate  successes  might  cause  Eng 
lish  public  opinion  to  compel  the  Government  to  ac :, 
said:  "  Palmerston  has  sent  me  a  note  that  he  de 
sires  to  see  me."  :  Benjamin  had  already  (July  12), 
in  a  note  advising  occasional  conferences  with  Lind 
say,  favored  the  proposed  interview  and  instructed 
Lindsay  to  meet  Palmerston's  advances  with  courte 
ous  but  lofty  bearing."  23 

On  July  14,  Palmerston  received  Mason  and  Lind 
say  in  a  friendly  manner  at  his  home.  He  asked 
Mason  his  opinion  of  the  nature  and  probable  length 
of  the  war;  the  probable  results  of  the  presidential 
election  upon  it;  whether  the  United  States  would  be 
as  much  opposed  to  intervention  as  formerly,  and 
what  prospects  the  South  had.  Mason,  in  his  reply, 
stated  that  the  North  was  strongly  against  a  continua 
tion  of  the  war  and  indicated  that  the  United  States 

22  Despatches  from  Mason,  No.  8,  Paris,  June  i,  1864. 

23  Ibid.,  No.  9,  London,  June  9,  1864. 
"Ibid.,  No.  n,  July  8,  1864. 

25  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  37,  July  12,  1864. 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   233 

would  be  forced  to  cease  hostilities  and  make  peace. 
He  did  not  doubt  the  final  success  of  the  Confederacy. 
Though  he  did  not  urge  recognition,  he  suggested  that 
recognition  alone  by  any  European  power  would  stop 
the  war.  Palmerston,  though  friendly,  did  not  define 
his  policy  for  the  future.26  Lindsay,  unable  to  con 
ciliate  the  ministry,  abandoned  his  resolution.27  On 
July  25,  Palmerston,  in  reply  to  Lindsay  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  said  that  the  Government  lamented  the 
sacrifice  of  life  and  property  in  America  and  the  dis 
tress  in  England,  but  in  the  existing  state  of  affairs 
there  would  be  no  advantage  in  entering  into  concert 
with  European  powers  to  propose  mediation.18  Mason 
soon  returned  to  Paris,  from  whence  he  wrote,"  a  few 
weeks  later,  that  he  might  .be  able  to  do  some  good  at 
Frankfort  by  efforts  to  prevent  emigration  to  the 
United  States  and  aid  a  catastrophe  to  United  States 
securities.  Palmerston  had  stated  that  recognition 
would  be  of  no  value  unless  England  should  intervene 
by  raising  the  blockade,  but  Benjamin  said  that  rec 
ognition  from  whatever  quarter  would  end  the  war 
and  that  nothing  else  would.  He  insisted  the  Confed 
eracy  did  not  seek  intervention,  but  he  expected  noth 
ing  from  England  except  a  "  policy  dictated  by  the 
United  States."  As  Benjamin  was  writing,  Davis 
was  on  a  tour  through  Mississippi,  Alabama  and 
Georgia  endeavoring  to  dispel  increasing  disaffection 

28  Despatches  of  Mason.  July.  1864.  Duplicate  copy  in 
Mason's  MS.  Record  Book.  Ibid.,  No.  14,  Nov.  10. 

27  Ibid.,  No.  12,  Aug.  4,  1864. 

M  176  Parl.  Debates.  Also,  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  12, 
London,  Aug.  4,  1864. 

*"  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  14,  Nov.  10,  1864, 


234      CONFEDERATE    OPERATIONS    FROM    CANADA 

for  the  Confederacy.  But  Benjamin  wrote :  "  There 
is  no  reason  for  despondency."  : 

From  the  moment  of  the  Chicago  convention,  the 
stars  in  their  courses  seemed  to  fight  against  both  the 
Confederacy  and  the  Chicago  platform.  During  a 
flow  of  rhetoric  and  the  march  of  torchlight  proces 
sions,  following  the  nominations,  Hood  was  preparing 
to  evacuate  Atlanta.  The  Union  success  at  Mobile 
knocked  the  second  plank  out  of  the  platform. 
McClellan  seemed  to  see  the  poison  of  death  in  the 
platform  and  his  letter  of  acceptance  he  practicallv 
repudiated  part  of  it  and  disappointed  the  Confed 
erates  in  their  expectation  of  an  early  end  of  the  at 
tempts  to  preserve  the  Union.  In  September,  Na 
poleon  shook  hands  with  .Slidell  at  the  races,  and 
agreed  with  him  that  McClellan's  letter  was  disap 
pointing.  Slidell  said  the  war  would  probably  con 
tinue  till  a  revolution  broke  out  in  the  North.  As 
the  campaign  proceeded,  the  thunder  of  great  guns 
announced  new  Union  victories.  Peace  did  not  ap 
pear  so  far  distant,  but  it  was  the  peace  of  reunion. 

The  crisis  on  the  lakes  came  September  19,  1864, 
when  the  steamer  Philo  Parsons,  running  between  De 
troit  and  Sandusky,  was  captured  by  Confederates 
who  had  boarded  her  as  passengers.  The  Confederate 
flag  was  unfurled  and  the  vessel  started  on  her  way  to 
Sandusky  to  capture  the  armed  steamer  Michigan,  but 
the  design  failed  and  the  Parsons  was  taken  back  to 

30  Instr.  to  Mason,  Sept.  2,  1864.  The  Confederate  Con 
gress  prepared  a  manifesto  (July)  which  Mason,  Slidell  and 
Mann,  in  November,  decided  to  engross  and  present  to  the 
principal  European  powers.  [Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  14, 
Nov.  10,  1864.] 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   235 

the  Detroit  river  and  left  at  Sandwich  in  a  sinking 
condition.31  Air.  Seward  had  just  prepared  a  state 
ment  of  the  Parsons  affair  for  the  British  Govern 
ment  when  the  news  arrived  at  Washington  that 
twenty-five  desperate  men  had  plundered  St.  Albans, 
Vermont,  and  escaped  on  stolen  horses  into  Canada.82 
Excitement  in  the  United  States  followed.  It  was 
felt  that  Canada  was  responsible  for  her  Confederate 
guests,  and  that  their  bad  conduct  might  endanger 
the  peace  with  Canada.  This  feeling  wras  not  mollified 
by  the  declaration  of  Lieutenant  Bennett  H.  Young, 
commander  of  the  St.  Albans  raiders,  that  he  went  to 
Canada  as  a  commissioned  officer  in  the  provisional 
army  of  the  Confederate  States  M  and  that  he  had  vio 
lated  no  law  of  Canada.  False  reports  continued 
to  alarm  the  people  and  to  add  to  the  excitement 
which  naturally  existed  upon  the  eve  of  a  great  presi 
dential  election.  On  Sunday,  October  30,  church 

81  Thompson  to  Benjamin,  Dec.  3,  1864. 

"Seward  to  Adams  (19  Instr.,  Great  Brit.),  No.  1136,  Oct. 
24,  1864. 

33  The  St.  Albans  raiders  were  afterwards  tried  in  the 
Canadian  courts.  Mason,  learning  that  Lieutenant  Young 
had  acted  under  orders  of  war,  took  steps  to  appeal  his  case 
to  the  courts  of  England  in  case  it  should  be  necessary. 
[Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  15,  Dec.  16,  1864.]  In  Decem 
ber  Sanders  wrote  from  Montreal  to  Richmond  asking  for 
copies  of  orders  showing  that  the  Vermont  raid  was  author 
ized  by  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War.  [J.  B.  Jones: 
Diary,  Dec.  15,  1864,]  It  appears  that  Thompson  had  no 
knowledge  that  the  raid  was  contemplated,  but  Sanders  in 
his  testimony  before  the  court  at  Montreal  stated  that  Young 
acted  under  the  instructions  of  Clay.  Davis  issued  a  procla 
mation  assuming  Confederate  responsibility  for  Young's  raid 
[N.  Y.  Times,  Jan.  i,  1865],  and  Seddon,  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  War,  said  that  the  raid  was  authorized  by  in 
structions  of  June  16,  1864.  [N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  19,  1865.] 


236   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

services  at  Detroit  were  disturbed  over  the  report 
from  Toronto  that  one  hundred  Confederates  had 
left  that  place  for  the  purpose  of  raiding  Detroit.  The 
State  Department  at  Washington  received  information 
that  there  was  a  conspiracy  to  fire  all  the  principal 
cities  in  the  North  on  election  day,  and,  on  that  day, 
General  Butler  and  General  J.  R.  Hawley,  as  a  pre 
cautionary  measure,  were  placed  upon  lake  steamers 
ready  for  service  at  any  point  in  case  Confederate 
sympathizers  should  attempt  to  execute  any  of  the 
reported  plots.  But  no  Confederate  attempts  were 
made. 

After  the  people  had  so  strongly  supported  Lin 
coln  at  the  polls,  the  Confederacy  saw  its  approach 
ing  doom — unless  the  United  States  should  become 
involved  in  foreign  difficulties.  The  Sons  of  Liberty 
had  been  demoralized  by  the  election.  Thompson, 
holding  letters  from  prominent  Northern  men,  and 
with  much  money  still  unused,  was  not  anxious  to 
continue  his  operations  from  Canada.  "  The  bane 
and  curse  of  carrying  out  anything  in  this  country," 
said  he,  "  is  the  surveillance  under  which  we  act. 
Detectives  stand  at  every  corner."  3  Holcombe,  how 
ever,  advised  further  encouragement  of  disaffection 
in  the  North.  In  a  letter  to  Benjamin  dated  at  Rich 
mond,  November  16,  he  said:  "The  Northwest  is 
not  .  .  .  ready  for  a  revolution.  But  it  is  fermenting 
with  the  passions  out  of  which  revolutions  have  been 

84  Report  of  Thompson  to  Benjamin,  Toronto,  Dec.  3, 
1864.  [Received  by  Benjamin  on  Feb.  13,  1865.]  Published 
in  the  N.  Y.  Herald  of  July  25,  1872,  and  in  Naval  War 
Records,  i°,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  379,  p.  714.  [House  Doc.,  Vol. 
LXXIII,  54-1.] 


CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA   237 

created.  In  Illinois,  Indiana  ...  a  majority  are 
hostile  to  the  present  administration  ...  it  would  be 
a  fatal  mistake,  in  my  opinion,  to  abandon  all  effort  to 
separate  this  section  from  the  United  States  because 
no  results  have  as  yet  been  achieved  commensurate 
with  our  expectations.  .  .  .  We  should  employ  money 
and  talent  without  stint  to  give  this  brooding  resent 
ment  the  proportions  of  anarchy  and  civil  strife.  Let 
us  preserve  our  communication  with  our  friends  in 
the  North,  .  .  .  introduce  arms  .  .  .  gradually  and 
cautiously  .  .  .  subsidize  leading  presses.  .  .  .  With 
arms,  leaders  and  an  opportunity,  we  could  strike  a 
deadly  blow."  !  Benjamin  did  not  recall  Thompson 
until  March  2,  i865.36 

Confederate  operations  from  Canada  caused  excited 
debates  in  the  United  States  Congress  in  December, 
and  for  a  while  affairs  seemed  to  be  drifting  toward  an 
Anglo-American  war.  The  English'  Parliament  be 
came  alarmed  at  the  proceedings  in  the  American  Con 
gress,  but  Palmerston,  seeking  to  avoid  angry  debate 
/(February  n),  said:  "We  cannot  deny  that  things 
did  take  place  of  which  the  United  States  were  justly 
entitled  to  complain."  The  London  Times  became 
friendlier  in  its  tone  toward  the  United  States,  and 
said  that  the  Confederacy  was  seeking  to  involve  Eng 
land  in  the  war.  The  Richmond  Dispatch,  in  reply, 
said  that  England,  seeking  her  own  prosperity,  was 
responsible  for  the  anti-slavery  feeling  in  the  North, 
for  secession,  and  "  for  the  present  calamities  of  this 
continent,"  but  that  her  precarious  hold  on  Canada 
was  indicative  of  the  coming  day  of  retribution  when 

35  Holcombe  to  Benjamin,  Richmond,  Nov.   16,  1864. 

36  See  N.  Y.  Herald,  July  24,  1872. 


238   CONFEDERATE  OPERATIONS  FROM  CANADA 

that  province  would  be  "  tied  like  a  tinpail  to  the  tai 
of  New  England."  87 

On  February  13,  Russell  informed  Mason,  Slidel: 
and  Mann  by  a  note,  that  the  Confederates,  by  not 
respecting  the  British  neutrality,  were  attempting  to 
involve  England  in  a  war  in  which  she  had  declared 
her  intentions  to  take  no  part.  Referring  to  the  seiz 
ure  of  the  Philo  Parsons,  the  plan  to  capture  the  Mich 
igan,  and  the  raid  into  Vermont,  he  stated  that  the 
"  so-called  Confederate  States,"  by  assuming  respon 
sibility  for  such  acts  and  claiming  them  to  be  bellig 
erent  operations,  showed  "  a  gross  disregard  of  her 
Majesty's  character  as  a  neutral  power,  and  the  de 
sire  to  involve  her  Majesty  in  hostilities  with  a  coter 
minous  power  with  which  Great  Britain  is  at  peace." 
In  conclusion,  he  said:  "  I  trust  you  will  feel  your 
selves  authorized  to  promise  that  such  practice  shall 
cease,  and  shall  be  entirely  abandoned  for  the 
future."  8S 


87  Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  14  and  18,  and  Feb.  24,  1865. 

88  MS.  at  U.  S.  Dept.  of  State:     Vol.  88  Despatches,  Great 
Brit.     Enclosure  in  Russell  to  Adams,  Feb.  15,  and  in  Adams 
to  Seward,  Feb.  16,  1865. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  LAST  EFFORT — KENNER'S  SECRET  MISSION. 

Near  the  close  of  1864  two  Confederate  officials  at 
Richmond  apprehensive  of  an  approaching  crisis 
were  closeted  in  deep  deliberation.  One  of  them 
had  been  suffering  for  days  with  neuralgia,  and  once 
there  had  been  rumors  over  the  city  that  he  was 
dead;  but,  still  bearing  evidences  of  recent  illness, 
he  had  returned  to  his  laborious  work  of  reading  let 
ters  of  complaint,  examining  monotonous  detail,  and 
deciding  on  applications  for  positions.  The  other 
was  the  picture  of  robust  health — though  in  his  face, 
over  which  there  usually  played  a  pleasant  smile, 
could  now  be  seen  the  worry  of  those  troubled  times. 
Both  had  been  hearing  the  old  dull  sullen  sounds  of 
bombs  down  the  river  for  weeks  and  months,  and 
now  they  were  informed  that  Lee's  army  was  be 
coming  depleted  by  desertions;  that  the  nitre  and 
mining  companies  were  ceasing  operations;  that 
Hood  was  defeated;  that  Sherman  had  seized  Savan 
nah;  and  that  persons  in  high  places  were  aiding 
Federals  to  obtain  information.  They  saw  the  people 
feeding  upon  poor  supplies  and  condemning  the 
speculators.  The  croakers  were  made  gloomier  by 
dismal  rain  and  fogs.  Some  of  the  states  refused  to 
obey  the  Richmond  authorities  and  were  threatening 
to  make  peace  with  the  United  States,  or  to  estab- 


240  THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER's    MISSION 

lish  a  counter  revolution.1  The  soldiers  and  clerks 
were  complaining  that  rich  property  holders  were 
exempt  from  military  service.  Military  officers  and 
disaffected  congressmen  were  quarrelling  with  the 
administration.  Lee's  shelterless  men  were  shive:;- 
ing  over  feeble  fires  before  Richmond,  and  pulling 
the  trigger  with  frozen  fingers;  and  Lee  himself  was 
despondent. 

In  all  attempts  to  secure  European  recognition  or 
aid  by  offer  of  commercial  advantages  or  alliance,  or 
by  international  complications,  the  Confederacy  had 
failed;  and,  in  its  plans  to  raise  a  navy  in  French 
ports,  it  had  been  duped  by  Napoleon.2  Notwitl  - 

1  Governor   Brown   of  Georgia  refused  to   obey   the    Coi  - 
federate  authorities.     The  conditions  in  North  Carolina  were 
such  that  Governor  Z.  B.  Vance  urged  Davis  (Dec.  30,  1863) 
to  send  envoys  to  Washington  to  endeavor  to  bring  the  war 
to  an  end.   Davis  in  his  reply  expressed  the  fear  that  some  of 
the  people  of  North  Carolina  would  inaugurate  a  movement 
to  give  aid  and  comfort  to  the  Union,  and  that  there  would 
be  a  civil  war  in  that  State.     He  hoped  that  Vance,  by  not 
too  long  delaying  action  for  conciliating  men  suspected  of 
disloyalty  to  the  Confederacy,  would  make  it  unnecessary  to 
use    "  physical    force    to    suppress    treason."     [South.    Hist. 
Society  Papers,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  412.     Jefferson  Davis  to  Z.  B. 
Vance,  Jan.  8,  1864.] 

2  Davis  in  his  message  of  November  said  that  the  policy 
of   European   nations   in   refusing  recognition   discriminated 
unfairly  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  and  that  it  was  chari 
table   to   say   that   they   were    indifferent.     Referring   to   the 
impossibility  of  peace  without  independence  he  said:    "The 
common  judgment  of  history  will  be  unable  to  absolve  the 
neutral  nations  of  Europe  from  a  share  in  the  moral  respon 
sibility  for  the  myriads  of  human  lives  unnecessarily  sacri 
ficed."     On  November  25,  Earl  Russell — in  a  communication 
acknowledging   a  joint   note   of   Slidell,    Mason   and    Mann, 
which  had  as  an  inclosure  the  manifesto  of  the  Confederate 
Congress — lamented  the  "  protracted  nature  of  the  struggle 


THE   LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S   MISSION          24! 

standing  the  immense  war  debt  which  had  been  piling 
up,  the  United  States  had  the  confidence  of  for 
eign  powers,  and  they  feared  to  oppose  her  while  the 
Confederacy  was  being  crushed,  and  while  the 
clauses  of  Lincoln's  message  contained  the  Monroe 
doctrine  coiled  up  for  a  spring.  Very  few  now  as 
serted  the  political  power  of  cotton  stored  in  Con- 
between  the  Northern  and  Southern  States  of  the  formerly 
United  States  of  North  America,"  and  said  that  Great 
Britain  since  1783  had  remained  connected  by  friendly  rela 
tions  with  both  the  Northern  and  Southern  States,  and  that 
her  policy  was  strict  neutrality.  [Despatches  of  Mason,  No. 
15,  Dec.  16,  1864.]  Some  thought  that  there  was  a  relaxa 
tion  in  Russell's  tone,  but  Mason  attached  no  importance 
to  the  reply.  In  December  some  hoped  that  complications 
might  arise  over  the  seizure  of  the  Confederate  cruiser 
Florida  in  Brazilian  waters  [Mason  to  Benjamin,  Nov.  10, 
1864],  and  some  still  looked  across  the  Atlantic  to  see  aid 
brought  from  the  East  in  ships,  but  Europe  spoke  not. 
The  editor  of  the  Richmond  Examiner  said  that  a  Confed 
erate  commission  to  Brazil  might  do  more  service  than  the 
Erlanger  loan  would  ever  be  able  to  do.  He  stated  that  if 
Brazil  should  demand  redress  and  the  United  States  should 
laugh  at  her  that  nothing  would  be  more  natural  than  a 
Confederate-Brazilian  alliance  which  might  also  include  Mex 
ico  and  "  erect  a  barrier  against  the  encroachments  of  the 
Hoosier."  [Richmond  Examiner,  Dec.  8,  1864.]  Some  pro 
posed  to  enter  into  colonial  or  other  subordinate  relations 
with  European  nations.  The  Sentinel  counselled  the  Con 
federate  States  to  resume  their  places  as  the  colonies  of 
England,  France  and  Spain — like  prodigal  sons,  or  like 
young  birds  that  had  broken  their  shells  too  soon.  This 
would  have  been  a  recantation  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence  in  order  to  escape  defeat  in  a  nearly  lost  cause. 
[J.  B.  Jones:  Diary,  Dec.  15,  1864.]  The  same  paper  shortly 
afterwards  advised  that  in  order  to  secure  recognition  or; 
intervention — and  the  good  opinion  of  mankind — that  the 
Confederacy  should  inform  Europe  of  its  readiness  to  abolish 
slavery.  The  Examiner  (Dec.  30,  1864)  preferred  to  put 
military  affairs  in  a  really  responsible  hand,  give  him  carte 
blanche  and  carte  noire  and  let  Europe  alone. 
16 


242  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION 

federate  warehouses,  or  doubted  that  the  crisis  in  the 
English  "  cotton  famine "  was  over.8  It  was  the 
darkest  period  in  the  Confederacy,  and  Presic  ent 
Davis  and  Secretary  Benjamin,  seeing  a  com 
ing  cataclysm  in  which  the  Confederacy  m;ght 
be  swept  to  its  doom,  began  to  feel  convinced  lhat 
intervention  by  European  powers  was  the  only  hope 
— and  they  resolved  to  play  their  last  card  by  sacri 
ficing  slavery,  as  a  war  exigency,  for  success  against 
the  United  States. 

It  had  often  been  suggested  that  Europe  was  prej 
udiced  against  the  Confederacy  chiefly  on  account 
of  the  question  of  slavery.  Mason  so  interpreted 
one  of  Earl  Russell's  speeches  in  the  House  of 

8  George  McHenry,  in  a  paper  on  "  The  Approaching 
Cotton  Crisis "  (Dec.  31)  endeavored  to  prove  that,  act- 
withstanding  the  general  belief  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic, 
the  cotton  famine  was  not  over,  and  the  calamity  was  still  in 
store.  On  January  5,  1865,  the  Committee  of  Ways  and 
Means  (F.  S.  Lyon,  Chairman)  passed  a  resolution  asking 
McHenry  to  furnish  such  information  as  he  had  in  his 
possession  relating  to  "  cotton  products,  cotton  trade,  and 
its  importance  to  the  commerce  of  the  world."  McHenry 
replied  January  8.  His  belief  in  1861  had  been  that  cotton 
was  not  then  king,  and  now,  although  he  found  himself 
almost  alone,  he  asserted  its  political  power — if  the  Confed 
erate  authorities  would  take  the  proper  steps.  He  stated 
that  a  supply  of  good  cotton  would,  after  the  lapse  of  a 
few  months,  be  of  vital  importance  to  England,  and  endeav 
ored  to  show  that  90  per  cent  of  all  the  cotton  yarns  and 
goods  manufactured  in  England  were  from  southern  cotton, 
the  China  and  Indian  cotton  being  of  a  damaged  or  inferior 
quality.  He  said  that  the  time  was  at  hand  when  the  British 
cotton  manufacturers  would  not  remain  quiet  if  they  were 
deprived  of  the  raw  material  to  make  the  fabrics  for  which 
there  was  a  demand— that  unless  the  mills  obtained  a  full 
supply  of  American  cotton  there  would  be  a  revolution  in 
the  British  isles.  He  considered  it  a  mistake  to  attribute 


THE   LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S    MISSION  243 

Lords  (March  23,  1863),  in  which,  while  urging  the 
present  duty  of  England  to  stand  still,  he  had  stated 
that  if  interference  should  be  necessary  in  the  future 
it  would  be  "  in  the  cause  of  liberty  and  to  promote 
the  freedom  of  mankind."  Mason  saw  a  double 
meaning  in  these  words  and  intimated  that  Russell 
was  not  disposed  to  recognize  a  state  with  slavery. 
Even  the  most  ardent  friends  of  the  Confederacy 
were  opposed  to  its  system  of  labor.  In  November, 
1862,  while  Mason  was  taking  dinner  with  Lord 
Donnoughmore,  a  warm  Confederate  sympathizer, 
the  latter  informed  him  that  Palmerston  would 
doubtless  not  enter  into  any  treaty  with  the  Con 
federacy  unless  it  should  agree  not  to  permit  the 
African  slave  trade.  Mason  was  surprised,  and  still 

the  previous  distress  in  the  English  manufacturing  districts 
to  a  cotton  famine.  He  stated  that  there  were  large  stocks 
of  cotton  and  cotton  goods  in  England  when  the  war  began— 
enough  for  three  years — and  that  these  goods  had  been  sold 
at  from  two  to  five  times  the  regular  prices,  and  that  the 
supply  from  the  Confederacy  had  never  been  fully  shut  off. 
He  believed  that  the  cotton  crisis  had  been  staved  off  only 
by  the  steady  arrivals  of  4000  bales  of  American  cotton  per 
week,  together  with  that  which  had  been  received  in  the 
United  States.  It  was  to  this  that  he  attributed  the  fact  that 
the  neutral  powers  had  been  passive  viewers  of  the  American 
conflict.  He  declared  that  the  American  slavery  question 
had  not  in  any  degree  influenced  the  course  of  the  rulers  of 
England — that  they  knew  that  cotton  could  not  be  cultivated 
by  free  negro  labor  and  that  they  would  not  oppose  the 
South  in  obtaining  necessary  help  even  from  Africa.  Ac 
cording  to  his  view,  England  would  already  have  been  pre 
pared  to  offer  recognition  if  the  export  of  cotton  from  the 
Confederacy  had  been  prohibited  a  year  before.  He  ex 
pected  the  famine  sometime  during  1865,  and  said,  "  If  recog 
nition  or  mediation  could  only  be  brought  about  in  time  to 
permit  of  a  good  cotton  planting  in  1865,  the  finances  of  the 
South  would  soon  be  righted. 


244  THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S    MISSION 

more  so  when  Fitzgerald,  another  member  of  Par 
liament,  coincided.  The  Confederate  constitution 
forbade  the  opening  of  the  slave  trade,  but  Benjamin 
stated  that  the  Confederacy  could  not  make  a  treaty 
on  the  subject.4  He  informed  Mason  that  after  all 
it  was  not  wise  to  impose  restraints  on  men  for  the 
future,  and  requested  him,  in  case  England  should  in 
sist  on  this  subject,  to  refer  the  matter  back  to  Rich 
mond.5  In  June,  1863,  De  Leon  wrote  Benjamin 
that  the  prejudice  against  slavery  was  so  great  that 
the  Confederate  reasons  and  arguments  were  power 
less.6  M.  de  Lesseps  said  that  France  could  not 
acknowledge  the  Confederacy  without  some  promise 
of  emancipation.  De  Leon  recommended  that  the 
Richmond  Government  should  withdraw  the  commis 
sioners  from  Europe,  stand  on  its  dignity  and  en 
lighten  public  opinion.  In  January,  1864,  Mann  in 
formed  Benjamin  that  the  Southern  Independence 
association  was  against  "  our  cherished  institution  " 
and  had  desired  kindly  to  show  him  that  recognition 
must  lead  to  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery.7  Ma 
son  at  the  same  time  wrote  that  he  found  it  "  but 
vain  to  combat  their  sentiment " — though,  still  ex 
pecting  to  convert  them,  he  told  them  that  the  film 
would  fall  from  their  eyes  in  time.8  Mr.  Spence,  who 
wrote  a  book  and  many  articles  in  favor  of  the 
South,  lost  a  prominent  position  under  the  Confed 
erate  Government  because  his  published  opinions 

4  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  14,  Feb.  6,  1863. 

6  Ibid.,  No.  13  (and  circular),  Jan.  15,   1863. 

6  De  Leon  to  Benjamin,  June  19,  1863. 

7  Mann  to  Benjamin,  London,  Jan.  24,  1864. 

8  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.   I,  Paris,  Jan.  25,  1864.     [Re 
ceived  at  Richmond  on  April  19.] 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER*S   MISSION          245 

were  unfavorable  to  the  Confederate  institution  of 
slavery. 

Many  prominent  men  in  the  Confederacy  had 
favored  the  abolition  of  slavery.  Others  had  pro 
posed  drafting  slaves  into  the  army.  In  1862  John 
T.  Pickett  favored  emancipation.  After  the  defeat 
at  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  in  1863,  E.  S.  Dargon, 
a  member  of  Congress  said  that  he  would  agree  to 
abolish  slavery  in  order  to  obtain  intervention.9  In 
August  of  the  same  year  B.  H.  Micon  of  Florida 
proposed  that'  slaves  be  drafted  into  the  army  to  fight 
for  their  masters.  Benjamin  in  his  reply  stated  the 
following  difficulties:  (i)  Slaves  as  property  would 
cost  the  Confederacy  $2000  each.  (2)  If  the  Govern 
ment  should  hire  them  they  would  cost  $30  per 
month,  and  only  $11  per  month  were  paid  for  white 
men.  (3)  The  banding  together  of  negro  men  might 
be  an  unsafe  experiment,  giving  facilities  for  deser 
tion.  (4)  The  males  were  needed  in  the  mines,  on 
fortifications,  and  in  other  fields  of  labor.10  The  sub 
ject  was  frequently  discussed  at  that  time.  Lee,  in 
the  fall  of  1864,  recommended  the  employment  of 
negroes  as  soldiers,  and  a  few  months  later  he  stated 
to  the  Senate  committee  that  slaves  should  have  their 
liberty  if  put  in  the  field  to  fight.11  In  the  early  part 
of  the  war  Davis  refused  to  respond  to  the  intima 
tions  that  England  or  France  might  recognize  the 
Confederacy  without  slavery.  The  constitution  gave 
him  no  power  to  treat  with  foreign  nations  on  the 

*  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  July  31,  1863. 

10  Confed.  "  Domestic  Letters/'  Aug.  18,  1863. 

11  H.  A.  White:     R.  E.  Lee  and  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
N.  Y.,  1897. 


246          THE   LAST   EFFORT — KENNER's  MISSION 

subject  of  slavery.  At  last,  however,  he  was  per 
suaded  to  favor  gradual  emancipation,  and  reluc 
tantly  he  recommended  the  arming  of  the  slaves.12 
In  November,  1864,  after  Davis's  recommendation, 
the  Confederate  Congress  began  a  several  months' 
debate  upon  the  proposition  for  arming  and  emanci 
pating  a  part  of  the  slaves.13  Some  declared  it  was 
Benjamin's  idea  for  foreign  effect,  and  the  press  at 
first  strongly  opposed  it."  Howell  Cobb  thought  it 
would  be  better  to  "  concede  the  demands  of  England 
and  France  for  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  and  to 
enlist  them  afterwards."  In  December  and  January 
some  of  the  newspapers  counselled  the  Government 
to  propose  to  Europe  that  the  Confederacy  should 
abolish  slavery  in  order  to  obtain  recognition  ani 
ships  to  break  the  blockade,  but  the  majority  of  the 
leaders  did  not  favor  such  a  course. 
)  In  the  fall  of  1864  Benjamin  realized  even  more 
fully  than  Davis  that  desperate  measures  and  new 
forces  were  necessary  to  secure  Confederate  success. 
He  informed  Davis  that  future  negotiations  with 
Europe  must  be  on  the  basis  of  emancipation  and  the 
Government  seizure  of  cotton  to  purchase  ships  by 
,  which  to  break  the  blockade.  Davis  hesitated  to  act 
I  in  a  matter  so  clearly  extra-constitutional,  stating 
that  the  Confederate  constitution  was  his  supreme 
court  of  law.  But  Benjamin  justified  his  proposi 
tion  as  a  war  measure;  he  believed  that  by  emancipa- 

12  J.  W.  Daniels:    Jefferson  Davis,  p.  59. 

18  Seward's  Diary,  Nov.  21  and  Dec.  17,  1864.  Richmond 
Observer,  Dec.,  1864.  Seward  to  Adams,  No.  1193,  Dec.  17, 
1864,  and  No.  1298,  March  13,  1865.  [Instr.  Great  Brit., 
Vols.  XIX  and  XX.] 

14  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  Nov.  8,  1864. 


THE   LAST   EFFORT — KENNER  S   MISSION          247 

tion,  and  a  promise  to  ship  cotton,  the  recognition 
of  France  and  perhaps  of  England  might  be  ob 
tained;  he  urged  that  the  only  way  to  get  ships  and 
money  was  by  cotton,  the  only  unexhausted  resource 
of  the  Confederate  Government  and  the  people. 
Mr.  Davis  was  influenced  or  controlled  by  few  men, 
but  he  had  entire  confidence  in  Mr.  Benjamin.  After 
careful  deliberation,  without  appealing  to  Congress, 
and  independent  of  that  body,  he  finally  agreed  to 
accept  the  last  and  only  hope  of  an  almost  expiring 
Confederacy,  trusting  that  if  successful  the  plan 
would  gradually  receive  the  support  of  Congress  and 
the  states. 

In  determining  what  agencies  to  use  in  order  to 
carry  out  this  new  policy,  Benjamin  proposed  the 
selection  of  some  one  man  of  sound  judgment  who 
\vould  be  ready  and  able  to  meet  contingencies  as  they 
might  arise.  For  several  reasons  it  was  not  consid 
ered  expedient  to  work  through  Mason  and  Slidell 
alone.  It  was  seen  that  they  might  not  be  enthusiastic 
with  the  new  policy,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to  send 
some  one  from  Richmond  pledged  to  the  new 
scheme,  and  with  power  to  act  independently  of  diplo 
matic  agents,  or  even  to  dismiss  them  if  necessary. 
The  blockade  was  very  stringent  and  communication 
was  very  hazardous.  Speedy  action  was  necessary. 
There  was  no  time  to  refer  questions  back  to  Rich 
mond.  Benjamin  opposed  sending  more  than  one 
prominent  man  on  account  of  the  danger  of  pub 
licity,  and  of  jars  and  quarrels. 

The  new  plans  were  domestic  dynamite,  and  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  guard  against  exposure  until 
after  a  diplomatic  triumph  had  secured  a  navy.  This 


248          THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER*S   MISSION 

was  expected  to  reconcile  the  people  to  the  means 
used  to  achieve  the  end.  At  the  same  time  it  was 
desired  to  send  an  agent  who  had  a  commanding  in 
fluence  in  Congress — one  who  would  prove  a  link 
between  that  body  and  the  executive  authorities. 
Such  a  man  was  Duncan  F.  Kenner  of  Louisiana,  the 
intimate  friend  of  Benjamin.  He  was  an  able  man 
of  conservative  views,  a  wealthy  sugar  planter,  rep 
resenting  personally  and  by  his  family  connections 
one  of  the  largest  slaveholdings  in  the  South,  and  he 
was  chairman  of  the  committee  of  ways  and  means 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.  He  had  been  edu 
cated  in  Europe  and  spoke  French.  He  was  asked 
by  Mr.  Benjamin  to  go  to  Europe  with  general  in 
structions  giving  him  not  only  full  powers  as  a  com 
missioner  to  make  treaties  and  bind  the  Confederate 
States  to  the  emancipation  of  slaves,  but  also  with 
separate  instructions  to  negotiate  for  the  sale  of  cot 
ton.  These  instructions  were  based  upon  the  prin 
ciple  that  the  Confederacy  was  a  de  facto  Govern 
ment,  and  could  take  extra-constitutional  power  if 
necessary  to  its  preservation.  Mr.  Kenner  had  be 
fore  proposed  to  offer  a  motion  in  Congress  author 
izing  a  commission  to  be  sent  to  Europe  to  promise 
emancipation  for  recognition,  but  had  surrendered  his 
determination  at  the  advice  of  Davis,  who  did  not  yet 
approve  his  proposal,  and  begged  him  not  to  make 
the  move  at  that  juncture.  He  now  hesitated  to  ac 
cept  powers  given  neither  by  Congress  nor  by  the 
constitution. 

But  Kenner  finally  yielded  to  Mr.  Benjamin's  rep 
resentation  that  it  was  necessary  to  ignore  the  con 
stitution  in  order  to  save  the  Confederacy.  He  still 


THE    LAST    EFFORT  —  KENNER*S   MISSION 


objected  to  the  form  of  his  credentials,  stating  that 
his  instructions  should  be  more  specific  as  to  the 
plans  of  emancipation,  but  Benjamin  prevailed.  The 
power  given  to  Mr.  Kenner  to  sell  cotton  was  not  dip 
lomatic,  nor  was  it  necessarily  intended  to  be  a  mat 
ter  of  discussion  with  the  European  Governments, 
but  only  with  capitalists.  The  instructions  relating 
to  this  power  were  entirely  separate  and  distinct 
from  his  credentials  as  a  high  commissioner,  and 
were  much  fuller.  They  gave  him  power  to  sell  all 
the  cotton  in  the  Confederacy  if  necessary,  to  receive 
the  price  thereof,  and  to  invest  in  vessels  and  war 
material.  It  was  not  expected  that  any  contract  to 
sell  cotton  to  the  capitalists  would  be  completed  until 
after  the  success  of  diplomatic  negotiations  wTith 
either  England  or  France,  when  it  was  expected  that 
France  at  any  rate  would  wink  at  the  fitting  out  of 
a  navy  in  her  ports.13 

In  a  letter  addressed  to  Slidell  on  December  29, 
Benjamin  stated  that  the  Confederacy  in  a  four 
years'  courageous  struggle  for  self-government  had 
really  been  fighting  the  battles  of  England  and 
France;  that  if  the  war  had  been  against  the  United 
States  alone  it  would  have  long  since  ceased,  but 
that  in  calculating  the  length  of  the  war  the  Con 
federacy  had  not  expected  Europe  to  aid  the  United 
States  by  the  abandonment  of  the  rights  of  neutrals, 
by  closing  ports  to  Confederate  prizes,  by  the  seiz- 
.  ure  of  vessels  intended  for  the  Confederacy,  and  by 
indifference  to  an  unequal  fight;  that,  notwithstand 
ing  miscalculations  and  the  afflictions  caused  by  the 

15  From   notes   of  an  interview  with   Gen.   J.    L.    Brent  in 
1898,  and  from  correspondence  with  him  in  1899. 


250       THE  LAST  EFFORT — KENNER'S  MISSION 

blockade  and  devastation,  the  Confederates  were  de 
termined  never  to  reunite  with  the  North.  At  the 
same  time  Benjamin  mentioned  Seward's  "  One  war 
at  a  time  "  policy,  and  warned  Europe  against  future 
Northern  aggression.  Then  he  approached  the  mari 
question — were  there  no  terms  upon  which  recogni 
tion  could  be  obtained?  "Will  Europe  never  recog 
nize  us  till  the  United  States  consent?"  If  so,  he 
said  that  it  might  be  necessary  to  deliberate  upon 
the  terms  that  could  be  secured  from  the  Federals. 
But  he  urged  if  Europe  had  objections  to  recogni 
tion  not  already  made  known  that  she  should  give 
the  Confederacy  a  chance  to  meet  them — or  if  it  were 
her  purpose  to  exact  terms  or  conditions  before  rec 
ognition,  a  frank  exposition  of  that  purpose  was  due 
to  humanity — "  for,"  said  Benjamin,  "  it  may  enable 
us  to  save  many  lives  by  consenting  to  such  terms  in 
advance  of  another  year's  campaign."  On  Decem 
ber  30  a  copy  of  this  despatch  was  addressed  to 
Mason  with  a  statement  that  it  would  be  handed  to 
him  by  Hon.  Duncan  F.  Kenner,  whose  verbal  com 
munication  upon  the  subject  embraced  in  the  des 
patch  should  be  accepted  as  reliable,  and  "  as  ema 
nating  from  the  department  under  the  instructions  of 
the  President." 

Kenner  was  delayed,  probably  by  the  increased 
blockade  at  Wilmington,  and  Mason  was  told  that  he 
need  not  wait  his  arrival  before  taking  steps  toward 
sounding  the  European  Governments.  "  Confer 
with  Slidell "  continued  the  instructions,  "  as  to 
measures  best  adapted  to  elicit  some  decisive  re 
sponse  from  France  and  England  as  to  their  inten 
tions  concerning  the  war  after  having  freely  con- 


THE   LAST   EFFORT — KENNER'S   MISSION          251 

versed  with  Kenner  and  obtained  the  information  he 
will  convey."  5 

It  was  intended  that  Kenner's  mission  should  for 
the  time  be  kept  secret.  In  such  a  crisis  it  is  not 
likely  that  Benjamin  gave  out  any  information  except 
so  far  as  it  could  not  be  avoided.  On  December  29, 
the  Senate,  in  secret  session,  among  other  things 
asked  the  President  for  information  as  to  the 
finances,  the  condition  of  foreign  relations  and  as  to 
whether  any  aid  from  abroad  was  expected  or  had 
been  sought  or  proposed.  No  reply  was  ever  sent 
to  the  Senate.  The  Richmond  newspapers,  at  the 
beginning  of  1865  however,  indicate  that  public  opin 
ion  was  being  prepared  for  the  new  policy.  The 
Enquirer  said  that  the  absence  of  a  Confederate  decla 
ration  of  the  causes  of  secession,  and  of  the  war, 
had  enabled  the  United  States  to  say  that  slavery 
was  the  corner-stone;  that  the  thirty  years'  violent 
anti-slavery  discussion  in  the  United  States  had  led 
anti-slavery  Europe  "  to  think  our  war  is  to  perpetu 
ate  slavery;  and  that  an  avowal  that  slavery  would 
not  be  permitted  to  prejudice  the  question  of  recog 
nition  might  not  be  too  late,  and  might  induce  recog 
nition  or  intervention."  The  Enquirer  followed  the 
Sentinel  in  agreeing  to  urge  upon  its  readers  a  policy 
of  emancipation,  if  it  should  be  necessary  as  a  means 
of  securing  recognition  and  a  guarantee  of  inde 
pendence  by  England  and  France."  The  Sentinel, 

19  Instr.  to  Mason,  No.  39,  Dec.  30,  1864. 

17  An  editorial  from  the  Richmond  Sentinel  concluded  with 
this  paragraph:  "  If  France  and  England  will  enter  into  a 
treaty  with  these  Confederate  States,  recognizing  our  nation 
ality  and  guaranteeing  our  independence  upon  the  abolition 
of  slavery  in  all  these  states,  rather  than  continue  the  war 


252          THE   LAST   EFFORT — KENNER's   MISSION 

which  was  often  quoted  as  an  "  official "  organ, 
stated  that  such  a  proposition  ought  to  be  made  to 
England  and  France.  It  despondently  spoke  of  the 
recent  reverses "  as  having  done  much  to  prepare 
the  minds  of  the  people  for  the  most  extreme  sacri 
fices.  It  said:  "Any  sacrifice  of  opinion  and  sacri 
fice  of  property,  any  surrender  of  prejudice,  if  neces 
sary  to  the  defeat  of  our  enemy,  is  now  the  watch 
word."  It  favored  exhausting  every  resource,  and 
throwing  overboard  all  the  cargo  if  necessary,  to 
keep  afloat  the  storm-tossed  ship  of  the  Confederacy. 
"  Let  the  Government  determine  what  it  needs  and 
what  it  can  use,"  said  the  editor,  "  and  if  it  be  our 
land  .  .  .  our  negroes  ...  it  shall  have  them  .... 
Our  constitution  .  .  .  may  not  provide  for  all  the 
exigencies  of  war;  questions  may  arise  ....  when 
our  best  welfare  will  require  of  our  rulers  the  exer 
cise  of  a  bold  responsibility  (as  in  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana)  ....  Statesmen  have  sometimes  to 
throw  themselves  upon  the  intelligence  of  their 
countrymen  and  seek  their  advantage  by  irregular 
means."1 

On  January  25,  after  having  had  General  Lee  at 

his  house  for  tea  the  day  before,  Mr. Lyons, 

informed  Mr.  J.  B.  Jones  that  as  a  last  resort  he  was  in 

we  should  be  prepared  to  urge  the  measure  upon  our  readers. 
We  believe  such  a  proposition  would  be  favorably  received 
and  acted  upon  by  those  nations  and  it  ought  to  be  made  to 
them."  Some  in  the  North  declared  this  to  be  from  the 
pen  of  Davis,  and  Seward  ordered  copies  of  it  to  be  sent  to 
foreign  leaders.  [Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  7,  1865.] 

18  This  despondent  tone  is  also  seen  in  the  Whig  of  Jan.  2, 
1865. 

19  Richmond  Sentinel,  Jan.  2,  1865. 


THE   LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S    MISSION  253 

favor  of  sending  out  a  commission  to  Europe  for  aid, 
on  the  basis  of  emancipation,  etc.  He  stated  that  to 
use  negroes  as  soldiers  in  the  war  would  mean  eman 
cipation,  and  he  thought  that  Lee  always  had  been  an 
emancipationist.  George  D.  Prentiss,  of  the  Louis 
ville  Journal,  in  the  early  part  of  January  returned 
from  a  month's  visit  to  Richmond  and  informed  the 
Kentuckians  in  the  United  States  Congress  that  the 
Confederate  Congress  had  conclusively  resolved  to 
free  and  arm  the  slaves — that  200,000  of  them  would 
soon  be  equipped  to  fight  under  promise  of  liberty 
and  a  proprietary  interest  in  the  soil.20 

In  January  before  Kenner  sailed  for  Europe  there 
was  much  discussion  in  favor  of  peace  negotiations, 
and  several  preliminary  unofficial  interviews  finally 
resulted  in  the  Hampton  Roads  conference.  Gov 
ernor  Vance  of  North  Carolina,  in  December,  1863, 
had  urged  Davis  to  communicate  with  Washington 
with  a  view  of  ending  the  war.  Davis  replied  that 
he  had  already  made  three  such  attempts,  and  that 
it  was  Lincoln's  policy  to  grant  pardons  to  the  Con 
federates  only  after  they  had  emancipated  their  slaves 
and  sworn  allegiance  to  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Blair,  without  any  official  authority,  went  from 
Washington  to  Richmond,  in  January,  1865,  and  urged 
Davis  to  take  steps  looking  toward  a  cessation  of 
hostilities.  He  stated  that  Lincoln  would  receive 
Confederate  commissioners,  and  that  he  did  not 
sympathize  with  the  radicals  in  Congress.  He  ex 
pressed  a  hope  that  the  pride  of  the  South  would 

20  Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  13,  1865.  Quotes  from  North 
ern  papers  of  Jan.  10. 


254  THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER'S    MISSION 

suffer  no  shock  and  the  Southern21  territory  would 
be  extended  even  to  the  isthmus  of  Darien.  He  pro 
posed:  (i)  The  gradual  abolition  of  slavery  by  the 
State  legislatures,  (2)  The  Confederate  States  to  re 
turn  to  the  Union  with  their  old  rights;  (3)  The  ir- 
corporation  of  the  Confederate  army  with  the  United 
States  army  in  case  of  a  foreign  war;  (4)  The  past  to 
be  forgotten.22  He  suggested  to  Davis  that  slavery 
was  doomed  even  if  reunion  should  be  prevented 
by  foreign  intervention,  and  said  that  rather  tha:i 
continue  the  war  to  make  themselves  dependencies 
of  European  potentates,  after  having  abandoned 

"Jefferson  Davis:  Confederate  Government,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
612-15. 

22  The  Richmond  Enquirer  about  this  time  stated  that  the 
Confederacy  if  it  yielded  would  join  the  North  in  applying 
the  Monroe  doctrine  from  Behring's  Straits  to  the  Isthmus 
of  Darien.  There  was  much  talk  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  in 
both  Confederate  and  United  States  papers.  [The  Index, 
Feb.  9,  1865.]  Later  the  Confederacy  desired  to  remove  the 
impression  that  it  was  the  first  to  propose  a  peace  based 
upon  foreign  aggression  as  a  means  of  sustaining  the  Monroe 
doctrine.  The  Index  of  March  16  quotes  from  the  Owl  a 
paragraph  which  doubtless  relates  to  Mr.  Kenner's  official 
instructions  on  the  subject  of  Blair's  mission.  The  para 
graph  is  as  follows:  "A  gentleman  of  the  highest  position 
and  character,  and  a  member  of  the  Confederate  Congress 
has  just  arrived  in  England,  having  left  the  South  as  late 
as  the  end  of  January.  Enjoying  as  he  does  the  entire  con 
fidence  of  President  Davis,  he  received  prior  to  his  departure 
the  account  of  Mr.  Blair's  mission  from  Mr.  Benjamin,  the 
Secretary  of  State  at  Richmond,  who  used  these  words: 
'  The  object  of  the  mission  was  to  assure  President  Davis 
that  commissioners  would  be  received  at  Washington  to 
open  negotiations  on  the  following  basis:  (i)  All  questions 
in  dispute  to  be  left  undecided,  and  considered  as  open 
questions.  (2)  An  armistice  to  be  granted,  and  a  league 
offensive  and  defensive  to  be  made  to  drive  the  French  out 
of  Mexico.'  " 


THE   LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S    MISSION  25$ 

slavery  to  escape  the  embrace  of  the  United  States, 
it  would  be  better  for  the  Confederates  to  send  a 
Southern  army  to  restore  the  rights  of  Mexico.  He 
even  suggested  that  Davis  might  realize  previous 
Southern  dreams,  and  complete  the  work  of  Jeffer 
son,  by  modelling  the  Mexican  states  so  as  to  adapt 
them  to  the  Union,  and  by  extending  the  United 
States  to  the  Isthmus.23  Blair  left  Richmond  on 
January-  16,  on  a  flag-of-truce  boat,  and  Singleton,  a 
peace  democrat  from  Illinois  returned  to  Richmond 
on  the  same  boat  on  some  unauthorized  mission. 

Mr.  McMullin  in  a  recent  resolution24  in  the  Con 
federate  Congress  had  proposed  a  selection  of  peace 
commissioners,  and  about  the  time  that  Blair  reached 
Richmond  there  were  rumors  that  the  resolution  had 
been  passed,  and  that  Orr,  Gilmore,  Stephens,  and 
twelve  others  had  been  selected  to  meet  at  Grant's 
headquarters.25  On  January  14  the  Sentinel,  alluding 
to  a  rumor  that  Mr.  Atkins  of  Tennessee  had  intro 
duced  a  resolution  before  Congress  in  secret  session 
to  open  irregular  intercourse  through  commissioners 
with  Lincoln,  pronounced  it  treachery  and  disloy 
alty.2*  The  article  was  evidently  intended  as  a  criti 
cism  of  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs.  The  edi 
tor  of  the  Sentinel  was  public  and  private  printer  of 
the  House,  and  many  considered  that  his  paper  was 
the  organ  of  the  administration.  Several  members 
of  Congress  were  offended  by  the  evident  intention 

23  Rhodes,  Vol.  III. 

24  On  Dec.  16,  1864.     Several  other  peace  resolutions  were 
offered  on  the  same  day.     Printed  copies  may  be  seen  at  the 
Library  of  Congress  at  Washington. 

25  Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  16,  1865. 
29  Ibid.,  Jan.  18,  1865. 


256          THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER'S   MISSION 

of  the  article  in  regard  to  appointing  peace  commis 
sioners.  On  January  17,  Lester  of  Georgia  moved 
to  suspend  the  rules  in  order  to  allow  him  to  intro 
duce  a  resolution  stating  that  the  imputations  of  the 
article  were  false.  The  vote  stood  32  to  26,  but  a 
two-thirds  vote  was  required,  and  thus  the  motion 
failed.  Atkins  was  willing  to  have  his  resolution 
considered  in  public,  instead  of  in  secret  session,  and 
intimated  that  he  was  willing  to  assault  the  adminis 
tration  if  necessary.  He  considered  that  the  Sentinel 
spoke  for  the  administration.  W.  R.  Smith  of  Ala 
bama,  a  member  of  the  committee  of  foreign  affairs 
was  offended  because  the  House  refused  to  allow 
Lester's  resolution.  He  ceased  to  attend  sessions 
and  prepared  to  return  home,  stating  that  he  favored 
honest  efforts  to  end  the  carnival  of  blood;  that  he 
believed  that  this  policy  was  sustained  by  a  volume 
of  Southern  sentiment,  and  that  it  could  not  be  in 
timidated  by  the  Sentinel  nor  "  the  power  behind  the 
throne  of  the  Sentinel." '' 

Lincoln  (January  18)  informed  Blair  on  the  return 
of  the  latter  from  Richmond,  that  he  was  ready  to 
receive  any  agent  informally  sent  with  a  view  of  se 
curing  peace  to  "  our  one  common  country."  But 
he  said  nothing  of  a  joint  invasion  of  Mexico.  Blair 
returned  to  Richmond  a  second  time  (January  21) 
to  inform  Davis  of  his  interview  with  Lincoln.  Many 
in  the  South  were  urging  peace  negotiations,  and  a 
few  days  later  Davis  decided  to  appoint  Stephens, 
Hunter  and  Campbell  as  peace  commissioners.  Ben 
jamin,  with  Lincoln's  note  to  Blair  before  him,  in 
his  instructions  to  the  commissioners  proposed 

"  Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  21,  1865. 


THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER  S    MISSION  257 

to  say  simply  that  they  were  empowered  to  confer 
"  upon  the  subject  to  which  it  relates,"  but  Davis 
(January  28)  changed  the  instructions  so  that  they 
authorized  a  conference  "  upon  the  issues  of  the  war 
and  for  the  purpose  of  securing  peace  to  the  two 
countries."  The  commissioners  expected  to  go  to 
Washington,  but  Seward  decided  to  meet  them  at 
Fortress  Monroe.  Lincoln  arrived  later,  and  the 
Hampton  Roads  informal  conference  was  held  on 
the  River  Queen,  on  February  3,  between  Seward 
and  Lincoln  and  the  Confederate  Commissioners/* 
Stephens  thought  that  an  arrangement  for  the  in 
vasion  of  Mexico  would  be  a  rational  and  proper 
enterprise,29  but  Lincoln  informed  him  that  what 
ever  Blair  said  as  to  occupying  themselves  with  con 
tinental  questions  until  the  anger  of  the  contestants 
should  cool  "  was  of  his  own  accord  and  not  by  au 
thority  "  from  Lincoln;  that  the  restoration  of  the 
Union  was  a  sine  qua  non,  and  that  there  could  be  no 
armistice  until  this  question  was  settled.  The  Con 
federate  commissioners  could  not  agree  to  accept 
the  terms  of  peace,  and  after  a  long  informal  talk — 
which  ended  by  shaking  hands — Stephens,  Hunter 
and  Campbell  returned  to  Richmond  and  reported 
the  failure  of  negotiations.30 

~s  South.  Hist.  Papers,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  212-14.  Benjamin  to 
Davis,  May  17,  1877. 

19 John  A.  Campbell:  Reminiscences  and  documents  re 
lating  to  the  Civil  War  during  the  year  1865.  Baltimore, 
1887.  Stephens  had  no  hope  of  European  intervention. 
While  going  down  the  river  to  Hampton  Roads  he  told 
Campbell  that  European  intervention  was  only  a  dream  of 
Benjamin's. 

30  Perhaps  Mr.  Davis  expected  different  terms  than  those 
offered  at  Hampton  Roads.  H.  S.  Foote,  who  had  recently 
17 


258  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION 

It  was  an  opportune  time  to  hold  an  indignation 
meeting  to  reanimate  the  people,  and  cautiously  pre 
pare  them  for  the  contemplated  new  policy.  Such 
a  meeting  was  held  on  February  9,  on  Capitol  Square 
at  Richmond.  Hunter  presided  and  made  a  speech 
picturing  the  future  expansion  of  the  Confederacy 

resigned  his  place  in  the  Confederate  Congress,  said  that 
the  mission  of  Stephens,  Hunter  and  Campbell  was  only  a 
ruse  of  Davis  and  a  forced  concession  to  the  peace  men  of 
the  South.  [N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  14,  1865.]  Seward,  in  a 
very  confidential  note  to  Adams  on  March  I,  enclosed  tl  e 
contents  of  a  cipher  of  February  13,  from  a  Confedera  e 
emissary  in  Canada  to  Jefferson  Davis,  concerning  tie 
attempt  of  Thompson  and  Clay  to  get  terms  of  assistance 
and  recognition  from  England  and  France.  Seward  believed 
that  it  would  throw  some  light  upon  the  "  late  rebel  pro 
posals  to  the  United  States  for  a  conference."  [20  Instr., 
Great  Brit.,  p.  75.]  The  Richmond  Dispatch  of  March  3r, 
quoted  a  Washington  letter  of  March  23d  to  the  New  York 
Tribune,  stating  that  Clay  had  recently  returned  from  an 
unsuccessful  mission  to  England.  The  records  do  not  appear 
to  indicate  any  such  mission  of  Clay.  A  Confederate  cor 
respondent  of  the  London  limes,  had  written  from  New 
York  in  January  that  there  was  an  unexpected  theatrical 
change  in  favor  of  the  South  which  would  make  it  possible 
for  Davis  to  secure  independence.  The  Times  suggested 
that  the  clue  to  this  startling  mystery  was  to  be  found  in 
the  report  that  the  Emperor  of  Mexico  had  conveyed  in 
trust  to  Napoleon  the  province  of  Sonora  to  be  held  and 
administered  by  a  French  viceroy  in  liquidation  of  the  claims 
of  France  upon  the  Mexican  government;  that  it  was  as 
sumed  in  the  North  that  this  could  not  occur  without  the 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  France,  and  that  such 
recognition  would  be  followed  by  England  and  other  powers. 
The  Times  further  stated  that  these  presumptions  were 
strengthened  by  the  anticipations  entertained  of  a  Confed 
erate  emancipation  policy.  [N.  Y.  Times,  March  i,  1865.] 
By  February  9,  there  was  a  report  at  London  that  ex- 
Senator  Gwin,  of  California,  who  was  a  good  adventurous 
leader  of  the  Southern  men  in  California,  had  been  appointed 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S   MISSION  259 

into  the  countries  bordering  on  the  South.31  But  he 
was  evidently  not  in  harmony  with  the  recent  aboli 
tion  movement,  and  probably  knew  nothing  of  Ken- 
ner's  mission  to  Europe.  He  said  that  it  was  no 
comfort  to  contemplate  the  terms  offered  by  the 
United  States  Government — that  3,000,000  negroes 
would  be  let  loose  to  wander  about  as  the  lazzaroni 
of  the  land,  and  that  Congress  would  be  constantly 
interfering  between  the  whites  and  the  blacks.  He 
considered  that  under  the  existing  system  the  slaves 
were  provided  for  and  were  happy,  but  that  under  a 
system  of  emancipation  they  must  perish.  "  In  the 
fierce  competition  for  food  between  white  and  negro," 
said  he,  "  the  latter  will  be  blasted  like  human  life 
before  the  burning  Sirocco  and  vanish  like  mist  be 
fore  the  sun." 

The  other  speeches  were  in  harmony  with  Benja 
min's  recent  instructions  for  negotiations  in  Europe. 
Senator  Henry  of  Tennessee  said  that  he  would  not 
hesitate  to  give  the  negro  his  freedom  and  to  em 
ploy  him  in  the  army,  and  he  urged  the  people  to 
deposit  with  the  Government  their  gold,  cotton  and 
tobacco.  Benjamin,  after  having  "  worked  night 
after  night  under  infamous  Richmond  gas-light " 
studying ,  data  and  problems,  announced  that  it  was 

viceroy  of  Sonora.  It  appears  that  before  Maximilian  went 
to  Mexico,  Gwin  had  laid  before  him  plans  for  rendering 
the  mineral  riches  of  Sonora  available  for  the  Mexican 
Empire.  [The  Index,  Feb.  9,  1865.]  In  France  it  was  stated 
that  his  views  were  ultra  French  and  that  he  would  carefully 
look  after  French  interests.  Gwin  returned  to  France  on 
March  2.  Many  Southerners  like  Foote  had  contemplated 
emigration  to  Sonora. 
31  Richmond  Dispatch,  Feb.  10,  1865. 


26O  THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER'S    MISSION 

necessary  for  all  the  means  (cotton,  tobacco,  bacon, 
etc.),  and  men  to  be  given  to  the  Government  and 
the  army.  He  favored  emancipating  the  negroes  and 
placing  them  in  the  army,  though  he  admitted  i; 
could  only  be  done  by  the  states.  He  said:  "  We 
want  means.  Are  they  in  the  country?  If  so,  thcv 
belong  to  the  country  and  not  to  the  man  who 
chances  to  hold  them  now.  ...  I  would  take  even- 
cotton  bale  in  the  land  .  .  .  and  make  it  the  basis  of 
means  without  which  we  cannot  go  on.  ...  I  am 
going  to  open  my  whole  heart  to  you.  .  .  .  Let  us 
say  to  every  negro  who  wishes  to  go  into  the  ranks 
on  the  condition  of  being  made  free:  '  Go  and  fight, 
you  are  free.' >:  This  speech  from  the  Secretary  o ' 
State  of  the  Confederacy  caused  considerable  ex 
citement  among  slaveholders  who  had  no  desire  to 
lose  their  slaves.33  Oukl,  in  January,  had  stated  that 
rather  than  adopt  the  administration  policy  of  free 
ing  and  arming  the  slaves  many  in  Virginia  would 
seek  reconstruction.  Wigfall  of  Texas,  Graham  of 
North  Carolina,  Orr  and  Miles  of  South  Carolina, 
were  among  those  who  strongly  opposed  the  policy 
in  Congress. 

About  January  12,  Kenner  with  full  powers  and 
letters  of  credit  had  gone  to  Wilmington  which  he 
found  strongly  invested.33  After  the  fall  of  Fort 
Fisher  on  January  17,  General  Bragg  suggested  that 
he  should  sail  from  Charleston  but  he  decided  that 
he  could  reach  Europe  at  least  a  month  earlier  by 
way  of  New  York.  Returning  to  Richmond  he  stated 

32  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  Feb.  9,  1865. 

B3War  Records,  Series  i,  Part  2,  Vol.  XLVI,  p.  1089. 


THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION  26l 

his  plan  to  Benjamin  and  Davis  who  at  first  opposed 
it  on  the  ground  that  it  was  excessively  perilous  to 
a  man  whose  prominence,  and  especially  whose  inter- 
terests  in  horse-racing  before  the  war  had  made  him 
well  known  in  the  North,  and  that  his  capture  would 
be  almost  certain.  The  Confederacy  had  secret  ser 
vice  communication  across  the  Potomac,  and  two  of 
its  officers  were  detailed  to  assist  Kenner,  one  to 
carry  his  papers  and  deliver  them  to  him  in  New 
York,  the  other  to  accompany  him  as  far  as  Baltimore. 
The  companion  was  not  acquainted  with  Mr.  Kenner, 
and  was  only  informed  that  he  was  a  Confederate 
agent  who  was  trying  to  get  to  Canada  in  order  to 
assist  the  Confederates  who  had  been  arrested  for 
operations  on  the  lakes.  Reaching  the  Potomac  they 
found  it  full  of  ice  and  dangerous  to  cross.  The 
boatmen  hesitated  to  try  the  river.  They  remained 
a  few  days  at  the  home  of  a  woman  to  whom  they 
promised  to  bring  some  needles  and  cloth  as  they  re 
turned.  They  finally  crossed  in  the  night  and  pro 
ceeded  on  horseback  to  a  place  where  they  could 
safely  take  a  train.  They  passed  the  house  of  Mrs. 
Surratt  who  had  recently  moved  to  Washington; 
they  spent  a  night  in  the  woods,  and  another  at  the 
house  of  a  Confederate  sympathizer;  and  after  hav 
ing  passed  near  Washington  they  boarded  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  train,  occupying  seats  far  apart,  and 
were  soon  in  Baltimore.  Mr.  Kenner,  after  obtain 
ing  a  suit  of  clothes  which  gave  him  the  appearance 
of  a  Pennsylvania  farmer,  took  leave  of  his  com 
panion  and  boarded  the  train  for  New  York.  Ar 
riving  at  his  destination  early  the  next  morning,  he 
drove  to  a  Ne\v  York  hotel  \vhose  proprietor  he 


262          THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER*S    MISSION 

had  frequently  entertained  at  his  Louisiana  home. 
Taking  a  room  on  the  upper  floor  he  sent  for  the 
proprietor  and  informed  him  that  he  was  going  to 
London  with  a  commercial  enterprise  in  view. 
Through  his  friend  he  obtained  a  ticket  to  Europe, 
and  also  a  trunk  that  had  just  come  off  a  European 
voyage  and  was  covered  with  foreign  advertisements 
of  hotels.  His  presence  in  New  York  was  kept  quiet 
until  his  departure.34  On  the  steamer  he  escaped 
the  attention  of  Government  officials  and  was  soon 
en  route  for  England.35 

Coming  events  cast  their  shadows  before.  By  the 
time  Kenner  reached  Europe  the  new  policy  of  the 
Confederacy  was  already  anticipated  at  London  and 
Paris.  Perhaps  a  copy  of  Benjamin's  instructions  of 

34  Memoranda  by  the  late  Wm.  Wirt  Henry  of  Richmond, 
March  24,  1899,  regarding  a  narrative  which  he  and  the  Hon. 
J.  L.  M.  Curry  heard  Mr.  Kenner  give  at  the  White  Sulphur 
Springs,  W.   Va.,  several   years  alter   the  close  of  the   Civil 
War. 

35  One    finds    in    the    Richmond    papers    no    reference    to 
Kenner's  departure,  but  J.  B.  Jones  says  in  his  diary,  under 
date  of  January  23d,  that  there  were  rumors  that  a  commis 
sioner    (Louisianian)    sailed    that    day    to    England    to    make 
overtures  to  that  government.     In  the  Richmond  Examiner, 
February   3d,    we   find    the    following:     "  On   the    whole,    we 
believe   the    Confederacy  has   given   up   the   idea   of   making 
a  present  of  itself  to   England,  France  and  Spain,  and  that 
however  willing  we  might  be  to  give  up  slavery  as  the  price 
of  independence,  there  is  no  more  talk  of  offering  that  as  a 
bribe  to  some  foreign  power  in  order  to  induce  it  to  do  for 
us   what   we   should   confess  we   are  unable   to   do   for    our 
selves."     [Also,    in    London    Times    of    Feb.    20.]     Another 
Richmond   paper    of    February   6th    stated    that    neither   the 
United  States  nor    Europe  desired  the  abolition  of  slavery 
and  that  no  rational  being  in  the  Confederacy  had  seriously 
entertained  the  suggestion  of  emancipation  for  recognition. 
It  seems  evident  that  the  editors  of  these  papers  knew  noth 
ing  of  the  pending  negotiations.     Did  they? 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER'S   MISSION  263 

December  29-30  to  Slidell  and  Mason  had  preceded 
Kenner.  A  letter  from  Paris,  dated  January  31, 
stated  that  there  was  little  doubt  that  a  proposition 
had  been  ccmmunicated  to  England  and  France  with 
in  the  preceding  month  (and  in  a  manner  to  leave  no 
doubt  of  its  official  character),  which  suggested  that 
in  return  for  recognition  the  Confederates  were  pre 
pared  to  abolish  slavery,  or  for  practical  assistance 
they  were  ready  to  offer  "  physical  concrete  advan 
tages."  The  letter  suspected  from  appearances  that 
the  proposition  would  not  be  accepted.  In  the  Inde- 
pcndance  Bclgc,  a  few  days  before  February  i,  a  Paris 
correspondent  stated  that  he  had  seen  a  letter  from 
a  member  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  stating  that 
President  Davis  intended  at  an  early  day  to  invite 
Congress  to  abolish  slavery,  and  that  Mason  and 
Slidell  had  since  informed  him  that  if  England  and 
France  had  decided  to  acknowledge  the  Confederacy 
it  could  only  be  after  the  abolition  of  slavery.  He 
also  said  that  immediately  on  the  adoption  of  the 
emancipation  measure  instructions  and  probably  dep 
uties  would  be  sent  to  Europe,  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  mission  of  Mason  and  Slidell.  Another  corre 
spondent  at  Paris  wrote  to  the  Index  in  February, 
stating  that  he  knew  "  from  a  good  source "  that 
neither  Slidell  nor  Mason  had  communicated  to  Rich 
mond  any  views  as  to  slavery  hindering  the  recogni 
tion  of  the  Confederacy;  nevertheless,  he  was  con 
vinced  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  would  gain  the 
favorable  opinion  of  the  liberal  party,  especially  in 
France,  and  that,  as  a  result,  Confederate  "  political 
rights  would  be  speedily  acknowledged."  ! 

88  The  Index.,  Feb.  2,  1865.     About  the  middle  of  January, 
the  London  Times  stated  that  a  Confederate  offer  to  abandon 


264  THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER's    MISSION 

The  Index  a,nd  other  periodicals  published  a  state 
ment  that  after  March  4,  Lincoln  could  only  be  recog 
nized  as  the  President  of  the  states  which  took  part  in 
the  election  of  the  preceding  November.37  The  Indcv 
of  February  16  said  that  England  and  France  both 
admitted  that  after  March  4,  the  government  of  tl  e 
United  States  could  not  be  regarded  as  the  dc  facto  cr 
de  jure  of  the  South.  "  We  are  not  prepared  to  say," 
it  continued,  "whether  England  and  France  will  there 
fore  recognize  the  South  on  that  day.  .  .  .  There  an1, 
however,  some  indications  that  recognition  is  contem 
plated,  at  least  by  one  of  these  governments  .  .  . 
Whether  or  not  recognition  shall  be  postponed,  under 
all  circumstances  a  re-union  or  conquest  of  the  Sout'i 
is  to  be  prevented  by  recognition,  and  if  necessary 
by  intervention."  This  proved  to  be  only  a  contribu 
tion  to  a  volume  of  unfulfilled  prophecies. 

Kenner,38  arriving  at  London  in  the  latter  part  of 
February,  found  that  Mason  was  in  Paris.     He  there 
upon  hastened  thither  to  present  his  instructions  and 
hold  a  conference  with  Mason  and  Slidell.    When  the} 

slavery  could  not  secure  the  recognition  of  Europe,  because 
recognition  was  withheld  for  many  other  reasons.  It  was 
also  seen  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  could  not  propitiate 
Spain.  [Richmond  Sentinel,  Feb.  3.]  The  Times  of  Feb 
ruary  13  said:  "The  assumption  that  the  failure  of  Eng 
land  to  recognize  the  Confederacy  is  due  to  the  abhorrence 
of  slavery  is  based  on  ignorance  of  the  real  opinions  o) 
Englishmen  as  to  the  abstract  principles  of  public  policy." 
[The  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  4.] 

37  N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  12,  1865.     London  Times,  Jan.  23. 

88  Kenner  may  possibly  have  arrived  by  the  middle  of  Feb 
ruary,  for  the  eccentric  Owl,  whose  articles  attracted  atten 
tion  from  its  alleged  special  sources  of  information,  had 
resumed  publication  on  February  15,  and  stated  that  it  was 
"  enabled  from  special  sources  "  to  give  the  Blair  proposals. 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNEKS    MISSION  265 

came  together,  Mr.  Kenner,  seeing  that  Mr.  W.  W. 
Corcoran  was  in  the  room,  said:  "  I  was  directed  to 
show  my  instructions  to  Mr.  Mason  and  Air.  Slidell 
and  to  no  one  else."  But  the  latter  gentlemen  in 
formed  him  that  he  could  safely  proceed  in  the  pres 
ence  of  Corcoran  as  he  was  their  confidential  adviser. 
The  instructions,  which  were  in  cipher,  were  then 
translated  by  a  clerk  of  Slidell.  Both  Mason  and 
Slidell  were  greatly  astonished.  Mason  at  first  was 
disinclined  to  cooperate  in  obeying  the  instructions, 
but  he  yielded  upon  finding  that  he  must  assist  or 
be  suspended.89 

Kenner  afterwards  said  that  through  Slidell  he  ob 
tained  an  interview  with  the  French  Minister  of  For 
eign  Affairs,  who  asked  to  defer  his  reply  for  two 
weeks.  Mr.  Slidell  learned,  however,  that  the  Em 
peror  was  still  ready  to  offer  recognition  if  England 
would  do  so.  A  Confederate  "  diplomatic  council," 
which  had  been  in  session  for  several  days  at  the 
Grand  Hotel  at  Paris,  adjourned  on  March  2.  Mann 
and  Buchanan  had  gone  over  from  Brussels  to  join 
Mason,  Slidell  and  their  secretaries.  Members  of  the 
council  boasted  that  there  would  be  a  peace  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Confederacy  before  May  i.40 
The  Index  stated  that  negotiations  which  were  going 
on  between  European  governments  would  "  give  quite 
a  turn  to  affairs  in  America."  A  Paris  letter  of  March 
2,  in  the  London  Telegraph,  said:  "Mr.  Kenner,  a 
distinguished  Confederate,  has  just  arrived  and  brings 

sa  From  memoranda  of  Kenner's  narrative,  by  Wm.  Wirt 
Henry. 

40  N.  Y.  Times,  March  20.  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  25, 
1865. 


266          THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER*S   MISSION 

what  the  Southerners  evidently  consider  good  news."  4 
Mr.  Mason  and  Mr.  Kenner  returned  to  London  on 
March  3,  to  sound  the  Prime  Minister.  Mr.  Kenner 
obtained  no  interview  with  Palmerston,  though  he 
afterwards  stated  that  Mason  asked  for  one.  Whi^e 
waiting  two  weeks  for  a  definite  answer  from  France, 
he  opened  negotiations  with  the  bankers  for  the  sale 
of  cotton.  A  syndicate  of  capitalists  offered  to  invest 
$15,000,000,  and  Kenner  was  encouraged  to  expect 
$30,000,000,  but  his  plans  in  this  direction  depended 
upon  recognition. 

On  March  14,  Mason  had  an  interview  with  Pal 
merston,  in  which  he  mentioned  the  substance  of 
Benjamin's  instructions  of  December  30.  He  also 
gave  the  substance  of  later  instructions  which  Kenner 
had  received  after  leaving  Richmond.  He  denied  that 
an  aggressive  alliance  had  been  first  proposed  by  the 
Confederate  commissioners  at  Hampton  Roads.  He 
stated  that  Blair  had  proposed  that  an  armistice  be 
granted,  and  that  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies 
be  united  to  drive  the  French  out  of  Mexico,  leaving 
internal  questions  in  dispute  to  be  decided  later. 
While  endeavoring  to  leave  the  impression  that  the 
United  States  was  planning  aggression  against  neigh 
boring  possessions,  Mason  informed  Palmerston  that 
the  Confederacy  had  made  an  offer  to  France  to 
guarantee  the  French  West  Indies  in  return  for  alli 
ance.  He  frequently  and  studiously  reverted  to  the 
suggestion  of  emancipation  in  a  way  that  Palmerston 
could  not  have  misunderstood,  but  he  "  made  no  dis 
tinct  proposal  in  terms  of  the  private  note  borne  by 

41  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  24,  1865. 


THE   LAST    EFFORT — KENNER's   MISSION          267 

Mr.  Kenner."  He  said  that  the  Confederacy  might 
be  induced  to  agree  to  terms  which  it  would  not  have 
accepted  under  more  favorable  circumstances.  He 
did  not  use  the  word  "  slavery,"  but  Palmerston  could 
not  have  had  any  doubt  as  to  his  meaning  upon  the 
subject  of  emancipation  of  the  slaves.  Desiring  that 
Palmerston  should  at  the  close  of  the  interview  have 
an  impression  that  the  Confederate  chances  were  not 
as  hopeless  as  they  seemed,  Mason  informed  him  that 
the  change  in  the  Confederate  military  policy,  by 
which  the  coast-line  was  abandoned,  encouraged  the 
people  by  making  it  possible  to  concentrate  forces  in 
the  interior. 

Palmerston  in  reply  to  Mason  stated  that  England 
had  no  reason  back  of  those  already  given  against 
recognition,  and  that  those  reasons  still  held.  He  said 
that  while  England  might  have  taken  exception  to  the 
blockade  during  the  first  year  of  the  war,  it  would  not 
have  been  a  good  policy — in  view  of  possible  wars 
which  England  might  have  in  the  future  in  which  she 
might  be  placed  in  a  position  similar  to  the  United 
States  upon  the  question  of  the  blockade.42  On  Sun 
day,  March  26,  Mason  had  a  conversation  with  Lord 
Donnoughmore  also,  in  which  Mr.  Kenner's  mission, 
so  far  as  it  related  to  emancipation,  was  plainly  dis 
cussed.  Lord  Donnoughmore  said  that  it  was  too 
late  to  secure  recognition  by  the  abolition  of  slavery. 

Across  the  Atlantic,  at  Richmond,  on  Sunday,  two 
days  before  Mason's  interview  with  Palmerston,  the 
two  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  again  sat  closeted  in 
an  all-day  interview.  The  bill  for  arming  and  eman- 

42  Despatches  of  Mason,  March  14.  1865.  [From  a  dupli 
cate,  in  the  possession  of  Miss  Virginia  Mason.] 


26&  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION 

cipating  200,000  negroes  had  at  last,  after  months  of 
consideration,  passed  the  Senate,  Mr.  Hunter  havii  g 
finally  decided  to  vote  for  it,  and  in  order  to  be  a  law  it 
lacked  only  the  President's  signature.  But  both  Davis 
and  Benjamin  saw  that  more  than  the  negro  bill  won  id 
be  required  to  save  the  Confederacy.  Congress  had  in 
tended  to  adjourn  on  March  10,  but  Davis  had  askt  d 
it  to  remain  a  few  days.  Many  supposed  that  a  trea  y 
of  alliance  with  France  was  expected.  There  were 
rumors  that  France  had  offered  to  intervene  if  the 
Confederacy  would  cede  Louisiana  and  oppose  the 
Monroe  doctrine."  But  Mr.  Davis  had  evidently  re 
ceived  no  dispatches  from  France.  On  March  13, 
the  day  following  the  Sunday  interview,  Mr.  Davis 
sent  to  Congress  a  secret  message,  making  no  refer 
ence  to  foreign  relations,  but  stating  that  Congress 
had  so  long  debated  and  delayed  his  November  recom 
mendation  as  to  the  negro  bill,  etc.,  that  much  of  the 
value  was  now  lost.44  He  asked  for  additional  legis 
lation  increasing  the  power  of  the  executive.  It  was 
observed  that  day  that  Benjamin's  old  smile  had  re- 
turned,  and  it  was  interpreted  to  mean  a  new  triumph 
over  Congress,  but  it  was  only  temporary.  Congress 
on  March  16,  in  a  dissentient  and  defensive  reply,  said 
that  the  executive  had  not  urged  the  immediate  neces 
sity  of  the  negro  bill,  that  he  had  even  seemed  to 
dissent  from  the  policy  of  arming  the  negroes,  thrit 

43  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  13,   1865. 

44  Lee   wrote    to    the    War    Department    March    10,    "The 
situation  is  full   of  peril  and  difficulty  and  requires  prompt 
action.     If  my  situation  is  not  greatly  improved  I  can  neither 
hold  my  lines  before  Richmond,  neither  can  I  remove  with 
my    army    from    there."     This    was    sent    to    Congress    with 
Davis'  secret  message.     [Campbell's  Reminiscences.] 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER?S    MISSION  269 

he  had  failed  to  reply  to  requests  for  information  as 
to  the  condition  of  affairs,  and  had  left  Congress  to 
determine  its  policy  of  necessity  by  consulting  the 
opinion  of  General  Lee.45 

When  the  committee  waited  upon  Davis  the  latter 
in  a  vigorous  broadside  declared  that  the  causes  of 
defeat  could  not  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  executive; 
but  Congress,  still  refusing  to  pass  his  recommenda 
tion,  adjourned  on  Match  18,  sine  die,  after  issuing  a 
five-column  address  advising  the  Confederacy  not  to 
pause  or  commit  suicide.  "  The  shades  of  our  de 
parted  heroes  hover  over  us  and  beckon  us  on,"  it 
said,  "...  The  enemy  is  far  spent.  .  .  .  Let  us  stand 
firm."  " 

When  Congress  issued  its  advice,  and  dispersed, 
there  was  little  chance  of  holding  out  much  longer 
against  Grant's  campaign  of  shot  and  shell.  For 
nearly  two  weeks  the  packing  and  boxing  of  govern 
ment  archives  had  been  going  on  quietly.  Even  far 
ther  South  there  was  little  chance  to  prolong  the 
struggle.  When  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  fell,  in 
February,  and  the  lady  employees  of  the  "  paper 
money  bureau  "  returned  to  Richmond,  many  wept  in 
real  despair.  News  was  scarce,  but  it  was  almost 
all  news  of  defeat.  The  Richmond  newspapers 
thought  that  the  Northern  Menelaus  was  too  persist 
ent  in  running  after  the  wayward  Southern  Helen  to 
induce  her  to  return  to  political  wedlock  after  she  had 
so  long  trifled  with  marital  relations.47  But  there  were 
now  many  who  were  not  opposed  to  returning  to  the 


45  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  20. 

46  Ibid.,  March  31,  1865. 

47  Ibid.,  March  10,  1865. 


270  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION 

old  "  political  wedlock."  "  Street-corner  generals  " 
were  merely  dissatisfied  with  the  plans  of  the  West 
Pointers  in  the  field,  but  many  others  contemplated 
reconstruction  or  a  counter  revolution.48  Hon.  H.  S. 
Foote  of  Tennessee,  who,  from  the  banks  of  the 
majestic  Potomac,  on  December  24,  had  proposed  :o 
resign  his  place  in  the  Richmond  Congress,49  wrote  ;o 
Seward  on  January  30,  concerning  the  "  strong  Union 
feeling  of  the  majority  in  the  South/' 50  and  on  Feb 
ruary  6,  before  sailing  for  Europe,  he  suggested  as  a 
political  measure  that  Lincoln  should  issue  a  proc 
lamation  of  amnesty  to  the  people  of  the  South.  Foote 
said  that  he  had  never  favored  secession.  In  March,  he 
published  a  pamphlet  in  London  advising  his  friends 
to  return  to  the  Union,  and  he  proceeded  to  do  the 
same  himself.31  In  estimating  Foote's  statements,  it 
is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  he  was  one  of  the 
boldest  members  of  the  Confederate  Congress  in  his 
opposition  to  the  Davis  administration.  But  Mr. 
Foote's  declaration  was  based  upon  what  he  had  seen 
and  heard,  and  the  voice  for  peace  and  reunion  as 
serted  itself  more  and  more.  In  the  Virginia  House 
of  Delegates,  on  March  9,  when  it  was  proposed  to 
reconsider  a  bill  to  confer  conventional  powers  on  the 
General  Assembly,  Speaker  Sheffey  made  strong  op- 

48  On   March  5,    Campbell,   in   a   note  to   Breckinridge,   re 
ferring  to   the   large   number  of  desertions   and  advising  an 
investigation  of  the  Confederate  resources,  said:    "  Georgia 
is   in  a   state   of   what   may   be   properly   called    insurrection 
against  the  Confederate  authorities." 

49  N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  3,  1865. 

50  N.  Y.  Tribune,  March  17. 

Bl  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  24,  1865.  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
March  17,  1865.  H.  S.  Foote:  War  of  the  Rebellion  (N.  Y., 
1866). 


THE    LAST    EFFORT — KENNER  S    MISSION  2/1 

position,  saying  that  a  convention  contemplated  sever 
ance  from  the  Confederacy  and  consideration  of  re 
construction.32  He  said:  "If  other  states  fly  madly 
from  their  sphere  to  blaze  awhile,  then  die  out  in  eter 
nal  night  forever,  let  them  fly;  but  let  Virginia  be 
one  of  the  calm  fixed  stars,  veiled  sometimes  in  cloud 
and  tempests,  but  indestructible  as  the  firmament 
from  which  it  shines.  .  .  .  The  ship  of  state  is  upon 
the  rapids,  and  ...  if  we  are  to  sink,  let  us  sink 
where  we  stand."  Of  the  members  of  the  Confed 
erate  Congress  who  were  reported  to  be  Unionists, 
there  were  nine  from  Virginia,  ten  from  North  Caro 
lina,  two  from  South  Carolina,  nine  from  Georgia,  six 
from  Alabama,  and  four  from  Mississippi. 

After  the  closing  of  navigation  at  Wilmington  the 
The  London  Times  had  altered  its  tone.  Lord  Rus 
sell's  conferences  with  Mr.  Adams  were  friendlier.53 
On  February  13,  Russell  had  notified  Mason,  Slidell 
and  Mann  of  complaints  that  Confederate  agents  did 
not  respect  British  neutrality — that  they  sought  to  in 
volve  Great  Britain  in  foreign  complications  by  at 
tempting  to  procure  war  armaments  in  British  waters. 
He  stated  that  to  buy  vessels  in  one  place  and  prepare 

52  Richmond  Dispatch,  March  10.  1865. 

53  A    London    correspondent    said    that    the    Emperor    of 
France  might  urge  the  recognition  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy,  but  that  England  would  not  be  shaken  by  the  daily 
letters  of  the  Paris  correspondent  to  the   London  papers — 
that  England  had  turned  Quaker,  Palmerston  was  too  gouty, 
and    Earl    Russell   and  the    Queen    desired    peace   with    the 
United  States.     "  You  may  cover  the  lakes  with  gun-boats," 
said  he  to  the  New  York  Times,  "  and  England  will  give 
the  St.  Lawrence  for  a  summer  outlet  for  the  western  pro 
ducts.     If  you  take  Canada  she  will  throw  in  New  Bruns 
wick/'     [N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  13,  1865.] 


272  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER  S    MISSION 

them  for  war  in  another  was  manifestly  offensive  to 
the  British  Crown;  and  that  the  Confederate  instruc 
tions  for  cruisers  set  aside  some  of  the  most  settkd 
principles  of  international  law,  and  broke  the  English 
laws  of  neutrality.54  This  communication,  besides  bo- 
ing  delivered  to  the  three  commissioners,  was  sent 
through  Seward  by  way  of  General  Grant's  lines;  aid 
General  Lee,  receiving  it  under  a  flag  of  truce,  fcr- 
warded  it  to  Benjamin  at  Richmond.55 

When  Russell's  note  came  to  Benjamin  (March  i/.), 
his  career  as  a  diplomatist  had  about  run  its  course. 
For  several  weeks  he  had  seen  very  little  diplomatic 
correspondence  except  what  he  read  in  Northern 

54  Inclosure  in  Russell  to  Adams,  Feb.   15,   1865.     The  Ssa 
King,  built  in  the  river  Clyde,  Scotland,  left  London  October 
7,  1864,  ostensibly  for  Bombay,  but  she  was  quietly  purchased 
by  Confederate  agents  and  a  few  days  later  at  Madeira  was 
transformed   into   the   Shenandoah,   the    crew   and   armament 
going  from  Liverpool  on  the  Laurel  which  ostensibly  sailed 
for  Nassau.     During  the  next  year  the  Shenandoah  circum 
navigated   the    globe,    cruising   much   of   the   time    until    the 
end  of  the  war  against  the  American  whalers  in  the  Arctic 
and  Okhotsk  seas,  and  finally  returned  to  the  Mersey,  where 
on    November    5,    1865,    Commander    Waddell    asked    Earl 
Russell  that  his  men  be  released  and  that  his  vessel  revert 
to  the  United  States.     [C.  E.  Hunt:     Cruise  of  the  Shenan 
doah;  J.  T.   Mason:     The   Last  of  the  Confederate   Cruisers 
(Century,  Aug.,  1898).] 

55  When  the   note   was   first   issued   in    London   the    Index 
bitterly    referred    to    Seward's    indecency    and    stated    that 
though  he  danced  a  "  can-can,  he  would  not  allow  England 
to  lift  her  petticoat  one  inch  to   escape  the  dust,  and  that 
England,  while  hiding  her  own  ankles,  shut  her  eyes  to  the 
scantiness   of  the    Federal   petticoat."     The   Richmond    Dis 
patch  announced  that  England  had  been  "  brought  to  play 
second  fiddle  in  the  concert  of  nations,"  and  philosophically 
stated  that  the  "  greatest  bullies  are  always  first  to  succumb 
when  real  danger  presents  itself."     [London  Index,  Feb.  16, 
1865.] 


THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER  S    MISSION  273 

newspapers,  and  his  principal  work  had  been  to  grant 
passports.  He  returned  Russell's  letter  to  General 
Lee  (March  21),  diplomatically  declining  to  receive 
through  the  Federals  a  communication  from  a  neutral, 
and  expressing  doubt  as  to  its  authenticity.  General 
Lee  suggested  that  the  expression  of  doubt  be 
omitted.66  On  March  25,  Benjamin  forwarded  to 
Mason  the  correspondence  relating  to  the  transmis 
sion  of  Russell's  note  through  Grant  and  Lee,  and 
stated  that  he  only  had  time  to  say  that  it  was  returned 
to  Grant's  lines.87 

All  hope  of  recognition  by  England  was  now  gone, 
but  rumors  of  French  alliance  or  assistance  floated 
in  Richmond  until  the  end.  The  officials  took  no 
pains  to  put  the  press  in  possession  of  authentic  infor 
mation,  or  to  correct  false  reports.58  On  April  i,  the 
people  were  "  fooled  "  by  a  report  that  a  treaty  had 
been  signed  with  Maximilian.  The  next  day  the 
Union  army  broke  the  lines,  and  eight  trains  started 
south  with  the  archives  and  executive  baggage  of  a 
now  hopeless  Confederacy,59  which  had  for  four  long 
years  stubbornly  but  unsuccessfully  fought  and,  to  the 
last,  struggled  for  recognition  as  a  nation.  A  few  still 
expected  to  continue  the  war.  On  May  I,  Mason 

06  J.  B.  Jones:     Diary,  March  14  and  21,  1865. 

57  Instr.    to    Mason,    No.    40.     No    copy    appears    on    the 
records  kept  at  Richmond,  but  the  original,  written  on  very 
thin  paper,  is  among  the  papers  left  by  Mr.  Mason. 

58  Richmond  Dispatch,  Jan.  30,  1865. 

59  Stephen    R.    Mallory,    of   Mr.    Davis'    cabinet,   wrote    an 
interesting  account   of  the   removal   from   Richmond   which 
has  just  been  published  by  his  daughter  under  the  caption: 
"  The   Last   Days   of   the   Confederacy."     [McClure's    Mag., 
Dec.,  1900,  and  January,  1901.] 

18 


THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER  S    MISSION 

nrote  Benjamin:  "  It  is  the  almost  universal  opinion 
in  Europe  that  the  war  is  at  an  end,  but  I  apprehend 
no  such  event."  He  expected  the  Confederacy  to  ta  <e 
a  new  stand  farther  South,  and  to  prolong  the  fight 
until  the  North  should  be  forced  to  come  to  terms  on 
account  of  internal  dissension.00  But,  fortunately  for 
both  North  and  South,  the  war  had  ended. 

Notwithstanding  the  prediction  of  statesmen  tl  at 
the  Union  was  dead,  the  Mississippi  still  flowed  un- 
vexed  to  the  sea,  with  its  springs  and  its  mouth  be  th 
in  the  control  of  one  people.  Not  one  Confederate 
was  executed  for  participating  in  the  long  political 
disturbance.  Aside  from  Benjamin  and  a  few  otl  er 
leaders  who  preferred  to  live  in  foreign  lands,  the 
brave  sons  of  the  South  took  the  oath  of  allegiai  ce 
and  faced  the  problems  of  reconstruction.  Kennor, 
going  to  the  United  States  Legation  at  Paris,  accepted 
the  provisions  of  the  President's  amnesty  proclama 
tion,  and  returned  to  his  native  state  to  recover  pos 
session  of  his  estates.01  Soldiers  returned  to  fields  of 
productive  labor  to  build  up  what  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  cruel  fate  of  war.  Emancipation,  though  not 
contemplated  as  a  purpose  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  came  as  a  result  of  it.  But  the  prophecies  that 
territorial  aggrandizement  would  follow  reunion  re 
mained  unfulfilled.  The  lapse  of  years,  and  mutual  in- 
f  .  • 

terests  and  sympathies,  have  tended  to  heal  the  wounds 

of  war  and  the  irritations  of  reconstruction,  and  to-day 
an  undivided  nation  looks  upon  England  not  with  the 

jealousies   and   suspicions   of   former   days,   but   as    a 
/ 

v ' 

00  Despatches  of  Mason,  No.  21,  May  i,  1865. 

61  Mr.  Kenner  died  in  July,  1887. 


THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER  S    MISSION  275 

friendly  power,  and  even  as  a  possible  ally  in  case  of 
national  danger.     Friendly  association,   the   study  of 
industrial     conditions,     better     railway     connections, 
stronger  economic  interests  and  higher  education  have 
been    clearing    away    misunderstandings.     The    Con-^ 
federate  armies  fought  gallantly,  but  now  the  veterans 
of  the  South  are  as  much  a  part  of  the  nation  as  are  the^' 
veterans  of  the  North  or  of  the  West. 

NOTE. — There  may  have  been  other  official  "  mis 
sions  "  of  which  there  is  no  official  record  owing  to 
their  secret  nature.  There  were  also  "  missions  "  of 
self-appointed  agents  who  had  errands  abroad,  and 
saw  fit  to  surround  themselves  with  mystery.  In 
some  cases,  persons  who  visited  Europe  to  publish 
books,  or  pamphlets,  to  influence  public  opinion,  prob 
ably  went  with  the  aid  and  encouragement  of  the  Con 
federate  authorities  at  Richmond. 

Near  the  close  of  the  war  there  were  rumors  re 
garding  various  "missions"  and  of  possible  or  expected 
alliances.  There  were  ttiose  who,  in  order  to  win 
in  the  war  of  secession,  would  have  made  great  sacri 
fices  which  would  not  have  been  offered  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  struggle.  Their  policy  was  dictated  by  the 
feeling  that  dreads  the  chagrin  of  defeat.  Though 
they  probably  could  not  have  induced  Mr.  Davis  to 
accept  their  policy,  some  of  them,  in  order  to  obtain 
foreign  aid,  would  have  made  promises  which  they 
never  expected  to  fulfill.  They  would  have  promised 
France  and  England  to  set  the  negroes  free;  but  at 
the  same  time  they  hoped  for  international  conditions 
that  would  have  enabled  the  Confederacy  to  ignore 
its  agreements  without  fear  of  being  forced  to  keep 


276  THE    LAST    EFFORT KENNER's    MISSION 

them.  The  policy  of  Mr.  Davis  was  based  on  higher 
grounds.  A  prominent  Confederate  has  recently  said: 
"  If  he  had  been  less  honest,  we  might  have  succeeded 
in  our  efforts." 

An  editorial  in  the  Washington  Post  of  March  14, 
1901,  states  the  belief  that  Prince  Polignac,  who  cc-m- 
..  manded  a  brigade  under  General  Kirby  E.  Smith, 
was  sent  to  Europe  [early  in -1865]  on  a  very  delicate 
mission,  accompanied  by  Major  John  C.  Moncure. 
"Gossip  had  it  [at  Shreveport,  La.]  that  Polig  lac 
went  authorized  from  Richmond  to  offer  Louis  Na 
poleon  all  that  part  of  the  original  Louisiana  Purchase 
\  then  included  in  or  claimed  by  the  Southern  Confed- 
\eracy,  the  consideration  being  that  France  would 
send  an  army  to  aid  Jefferson  Davis  and  othenvise 
cooperate  in  the  establishment  of  his  Government  in 
the  rest  of  the  Southern  States."  The  editor  says  he 
heard  of  the  mission  from  Moncure  himself,  when  the 
latter  returned  from  Europe. 

That  such  a  mission  was  authorized  by  Mr.  Davis, 
is  emphatically  denied  by  Burton  N.  Harrison,  Esq., 
who  was  the  private  secretary  of  the  Confederate 
President; — and  also  by  General  John  H.  Reagan,  the 
only  surviving  member  of  the  Confederate  cabinet.02 
Polignac  himself  has  cabled  a  denial  (on  April  2,  1901). 


62  See  also  letters  from  Col.  James  Morris  Morgan  and  others 
in  the  Washington  Post  of  March  18  and  25,  1901.  The  dip 
lomatic  archives  contain  no  record  of  this  mission.  The 
records  for  the  early  part  of  1865  were  destroyed  or  lost. 


APPENDIX 

CAUSES  OF  SECESSION. 

The  statements  of  the  real  causes  of  secession,  and  of  the 
beginning  of  the  Civil  War,  are  to  be  found,  not  in  the 
archives  of  Confederate  diplomacy,  but  by  following  the 
course  of  events  immediately  preceding  the  war,  and  by 
examining  the  contemporary  speeches  and  writings  of  the 
secession  leaders. 

The  assertion  that  the  tariff  was  a  cause  of  the  secession 
movement  was  evidently  a  ruse  diplomatique,  intended  for 
effect  upon  foreign  powers  that  favored  free  trade.  The 
subject  of  the  tariff  was  scarcely  mentioned  in  the  discussions 
of  Southern  statesmen.  Toombs,  it  is  true,  on  November  13, 
1861,  while  excitedly  demanding  hasty  action,  without  the 
formality  of  State  conventions  to  ascertain  the  will  of  the 
people,  characterized  the  Union  as  a  curse  which  by  tariffs, 
navigation  laws',  and  otherwise,  had  legislated  against  the 
South.  But  Stephens,  in  a  reply,  on  the  following  day, 
opposing  secession  and  advising  calmness  and  deliberation 
in  meeting  the  crisis,  said  he  could  not  agree  with  Toombs. 
He  declared  that  the  South  had  prospered  under  the  Ameri 
can  system  of  government  and  had  been  protected  and  aided 
in  many  ways  by  its  provisions.  Among  other  things,  he 
said:  the  Southern  presidents  had  not  opposed  the  early 
fishing  bounties  of  New  England;  the  tariff  had  ceased  to 
distract  public  councils;  the  navigation  laws  had  been  begun 
under  a  Southern  president,  and  no  subsequent  president 
had  ever  recommended  their  repeal;  South  Carolina,  and 
also  Toombs,  had  voted  for  the  existing  tariff,  which  was 
just  as  low  as  the  South  had  asked. 

The  declaration  adopted  by  the  South  Carolina  Conven 
tion,  in  December,  1861,  said  nothing  of  the  tariff  as  a  cause 


278  APPENDIX 

of  secession.  Maxey  Gregg  suggested  that  it  should  be 
mentioned;  but  Keitt  replied  that  all  of  the  South  Carolinian 
senators  and  congressmen  had  voted  for  the  recent  tariff,  and 
that  no  tariff  since  that,  ot  1832  had  caused  any  desire  for 
secession.  The  address  of  the  convention  to  the  slaveholding 
states  (prepared  by  R.  B.  Rhett),  however,  had  mentioned 
the  tariff,  and  unequal  distribution  of  appropriations,  among 
other  causes  of  grievance,  and  had  made  vague  charges  about 
the  consolidation  of  the  North  and  the  reduction  of  tie 
South.  Stephens,  who  was  not  favorably  impressed  by  tl  e 
address,  said  these  charges  were  not  well-founded  and  aro.-e 
from  peevishness  rather  than  from  reason.  Concerning  tl  e 
tariff,  he  suggested  that  "  perhaps  the  less  said  about  it  tl  e 
better,"  stating  that  the  South  though  in  a  minority  ruid 
controlled  the  administration  for  sixty  out  of  seventy-t\\  o 
years,  and  had  made  the  tariff  and  the  government  what  tluy 
were. 

The  principal  sources  of  contention  were  connected  with 
the  institution  of  slavery,  which  was  seeking  extension  into 
new  territory  —  even  into  territory  which  had  not  yet  been 
acquired. 

Questions  relating  to  slavery  had  been  most  prominent 
after  Folk's  nomination  to  the  presidency.  Stephens,  during 
the  M^qcan^war,  fearing  the  rock  which  Jefferson  had  pre 
dicted  would  endanger  the  Ship  of  State,  favored  a  policy 
which  would  tend  to  avoid  slavery  discussions.  The  natural 
tendency  of  slavery  interests  to  seek  expansion  led  to  at- 
temjjts-to^annex  Cuba,  and  ajl£sij^Lj£LJ3t)tain  control  pf_othcr 
countries  southward  —  Mexico  and  Central 


^ 

chance  to  acquire  new  slave  territory  faded  away  after  the 
passage  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  and  the  decision  in  the 
Dred  Scott  case.  Notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  the  Buch 
anan  Administration,  the  Kansas  struggle  terminated  in  favor 
of  free  soil,1  and  plans  to  acquire  Cuba  and  part  of  Mexico 
failed. 

1  Stephens   did   not   attribute    the   result   entirely    to    the    eternal 
vigilance  of  the  Northern  leaders  and  to  the  developing  sentiment 


APPENDIX  279 

In  April,  1860,  the  Democratic  party  split  at  the  Charleston 
convention.  Both  factions  agreed  that  personal  liberty  laws 
were  unconstitutional,  that  Cuba  should  be  acquired,  and 
that  the  Pacific  railway  should  be  built.  The  Southern 
leaders,  however,  feeling  the  moral  reproach  under  which 
they  were  living,  complained  that  the  admission  by  men  from 
the  North  that  slavery  was  a  wrong,  but  a  wrong  for  which 
they  were  not  to  blame,  had  been  the  cause  of  the  discord, 
and  intimated  that  the  Northern  Democrats  must  pronounce 
the  institution  a  necessary  good.2  Senator  Pugh  of  Ohio 
replied:  "  Gentlemen  of  the  South,  we  will  not  do  it."  Other 
sources  of  disagreement  arose.  Gaulden  of  Georgia  asked 
that  the  ruthless  restrictions  which  cut  off  the  supply  of 
slaves  from  foreign  lands  should  be  taken  off.  Some  said 
that  slavery  by  the  intention  of  the  constitution  should  be 
encouraged  and  protected  by  the  Federal  government,  thus 
deserting  the  argument  of  non-intervention  as  held  by  pre 
vious  statesmen.  The  Dred  Scott  decision  has  been  charac 
terized  as  the  rock  upon  which  the  party  went  to  pieces. 
The  Southern  minority  desired  the  platform  to  declare  in 
favor  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision  permitting 
the  Supreme  Court  to  settle  the  question  of  the  rights  of 
property  in  states  or  territories.  The  Western  and  Northern 
majority  rejected  this  plan,  though  they  were  willing  to  deny 

against  slavery.  On  March  11,  1858,  he  wrote  that  the  Lecompton 
constitution  would'  be  defeated  on  account  of  several  Southern 
members  being  too  drunk  to  get  to  the  House.  "  If  we  are  to 
separate,"  said  he,  sadly,  "  what  is  to  become  of  us  in  the  hands 
of  such  representatives."  In  the  early  part  of  1860  Stephens 
expected  to  retire  from  politics,  and  to  a  friend  who  asked  him 
why,  he  said:  "  When  I  am  on  one  of  the  two  trains  coming  in 
opposite  directions  on  a  single  track,  both  engines  at  high  speed, 
and  both  engineers  drunk,  I  get  off  at  the  first  station." 

2  George  Fitzhugh,  five  or  six  years  before,  had  written  a  book, 
"  Sociology  for  the  South,"  which  justified  slavery  not  only  from 
expediency  but  from  right— stating  that  it  was  the  happiest  form 
of  socialism,  the  true  relief  for  pauperism,  and  better  than  the 
latescz  faire  labor  policy  for  the  protection  of  the  poor  laborer  in 
his  struggle  for  existence.  [Also,  see  De  Bow,  July,  1855.] 


280 


APPENDIX 


the  power  of  Congress  or  the  territorial  legislatures  to  abol 
ish  slavery  in  the  territories.  Thereupon,  the  minority 
seceded  from  the  convention,  leaving  the  majority  to  ad 
journ.  In  June,  the  majority  nominated  Stephen  A.  Douglas 
and  Herschel  V.  Johnson.  The  minority  named  John  C. 
Breckenridge  and  Joseph  Lane.  On  May  Qth,  the  Consti 
tutional  Union  party  had  nominated  John  Bell  and  Edward 
Everett.  On  May  16,  the  Republicans  had  met  at  Chicago 
and  nominated  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hannibal  Hamlin  upon 
the  platform  repudiating  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  opposing 
the  extension  of  slavery  into  the  territories,  but  denying  any 
sympathy  with  interference  with  slavery  in  the  states,  and 
declaring  in  favor  of  the  Pacific  railway  and  the  homestead 
law. 

The  Democratic  tangle  at  Charleston  gave  the  rapidly 
growing  Republican  party  such  an  advantage  that  a  majority 
of  the  Lincoln  electors  were  chosen  on  November  6.  The 
South  Carolina  legislature  chose  electors  on  that  day  and 
remained  in  session  to  learn  the  result  of  the  election,  and 
then,  being  encouraged  by  the  governor  to  expect  aid  from 
other  states,  provided  for  the  purchase  of  arms  and  called  a 
state  convention  to  determine  upon  secession.  A  shower  of 
expressions  on  the  subject  of  secession  followed.3 

Some  urged  a  declaration  of  dissolution  by  state  legisla 
tures  instead  of  by  conventions.  Cobb  of  Georgia  advised 
the  legislature  of  that  state  to  declare  for  secession  without 
waiting  "  to  hear  from  the  crossroads  and  groceries." 
Toombs,  fearing  that  a  convention,  if  called  by  the  state 
authorities,  "  would  vote  for  abolition  rule,"  said  to  the 

3  Col.  R.  B.  Ithett  of  Charleston  received  a  letter  from  Thomas 
J.  Butler  of  Mobile,  Alabama,  dated  November  14,  saying:  "  I 
break  down  every  barrier  in  order  to  effect  the  great  object  I  have 
had  for  over  thirty  years — the  fli^mimn — oik^he  states  and  the 
security  of  slavery.  If  1  betray  unusual  feeling~Trffll~ "zeal  you 
must  attribute  it  in  a  degree  to  a  somewhat  impulsive  tempera 
ment,  but  more  to  the  severe  schooling  I  have  had  in  the  lessons 
of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  your  illustrious  father." 


APPENDIX  28l 

Georgia  legislature:  "  Give  me  the  sword,  for,  if  you  do 
not  give  it  to  me,  as  God  lives,  I  will  take  it  myself."  It  was 
in  vain  that  Stephens  urged  the  Southern  leaders  not  to  yield 
to  temptation  as  did  their  first  parents  who  "  reopened  their 
eyes  only  to  discover  their  own  nakedness."  * 

No  advice  from  a  conservative  could  stay  the  action  of  the 
South  Carolina  convention.  In  December  it  seceded,  issued 
a  declaration  of  independence,  and  adopted  an  address  to 
the  people  of  the  slaveholding  states.  The  declaration,  pre- 

4  Stephens  urged  that  the  South  should  not  break  the  constitu 
tion  because  she  failed  iu  the  election,  but  that  she  should  wait 
until  the  North  broke  it.  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate  were  largely  Demo 
cratic,  thus  tying  Lincoln's  hands  and  leaving  him  no  opportunity 
to  do  any  thing  unconstitutional.  He  saw  no  reason  why  the  South 
should  take  the  last  step,  so  long  as  there  was  a  chance  that  the 
Northern  and  Western  legislatures  would  recede  from  their  hostil 
ity  towards  the  fugitive  slave  laws. 

On  November  24,  Stephens  wrote  his  brother  that  he  had  no 
doubt  that  redress  might  be  obtained  if  it  was  sought  in  the 
proper  spirit  and  with  an  honest  purpose,  but  he  feared  that  such 
was  not  the  object  of  the  agitators.  "  We  are,  I  fear,"  said  he, 
"  in  the  hands  of  those  who  are  bent  upon  dissolution  at  all 
hazards.  Nothing  will  satisfy  them  but  to  get  out  of  the  Union. 
.  .  .  The  evil  genius  of  civil  discord  seems  to  be  rampant." 
Again,  on  November  30,  while  Insisting  that  the  popular  will  should 
be  as  fairly  represented  as  possible,  he  said,  "  The  truth  is  our 
leaders  do  not  wish  any  redress  .  .  .  are  disunionists  per  se  .  . 
and  .  .  they  will  carry  the  state."  [Johnston  and  Browne:  Life 
of  A.  H.  Stephens.] 

There  were  others  who  threw  their  weight  on  the  brakes  to  stop 
the  accelerating  movement  of  the  car  of  secession.  One  of  these 
was  J.  A.  Campbell,  who,  although  he  had  emancipated  his  slaves 
while  a  member  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  exerted  great 
influence  in  the  government  at  Richmond  during  the  entire  period 
of  the  war.  On  November  26,  he  protested  against  secession  on 
the  ground  that  all  classes  tend  towards  the  same  standard  of 
intelligence  and  submit  eventually  to  the  same  rule  of  opinion — 
stating  that  the  South  could  gain  nothing  and  that  the  election 
of  Lincoln  was  not  a  sufficient  cause  for  revolt.  [Du  Bose:  Life 
and  Times  of  William  Lowndes  Yancey,  p.  689.] 


282  APPENDIX 

pared  by  Memminger  and  adopted  December  24,  declared 
the  right  of  a  state  to  govern  itself  or  to  abolish  govern 
ments,  advocated  the  compact  theory  of  government,  said  the 
Northern  states  had  disobeyed  the  compact,  complained  that 
the  ends  of  1787  had  been  defeated  and  that  a  sectional  party 
was  now  in  power,  endangering  the  institution  of  slavery. 
The  address  recited  that,  notwithstanding  the  prosperity  of 
the  United  States,  discontent  had  been  caused  by  taxation 
without  representation,  by  unequal  distribution  of  appro 
priations,  by  Northern  evasion  of  the  compromises,  by  abro 
gation  of  the  limitations  of  the  constitution,  and  by  the  atti 
tude  of  the  majority  toward  the  minority.  It  spoke  of  the 
constitution  as  only  an  experiment  begun  when  there  was  no 
tariff  and  no  negro  fanaticism;  it  did  not  seek  reform  but 
desired  only  to  be  let  alone.  It  preferred  a  system  of  slavery 
"  where  capital  and  labor  are  identified  in  interests "  to  a 
system  of  industry  where  capital  and  labor  are  in  conflict/' 

Stephens  was  not  favorably  impressed  by  the  address  of 
the  convention.  He  said  that  it  hardly  deigned  to  specify 
grievances  and  that  it  almost  entirely  ignored  the  slavery 
question — barely  glancing  at  the  personal  liberty  acts  which 
were  the  real  cause  of  complaint.0 

Events  were  now  hurrying  rapidly  to  a  catastrophe.  "  The 
times  are  fearfully  distempered,"  said  Stephens,  "  We  are 
on  the  high  road  to  ruin."  But  when  his  state  seceded  a 
few  days  later,  he  resolved  to  "  go  down  with  a  fragment  of 
the  wreck." 

American  public  opinion  had  not  yet  decided  in  favor  of 
coercion,  but  expected  compromise.  Horace  Greeley,  in  the 

5  McPherson:    Political  History  of  the  Itebellion. 

0  In  a  loiter  to  Lincoln,  Stephens  said  that  previous  presidents, 
Washington  and  Jefferson,  had  had  antislavery  opinions,  and  thai 
in  his  judgment  "  the  people  of  the  South  did  not  fear  that  the 
Republican  administration  would  attempt  to  interfere  directly  or 
immediately  with  slavery  in  the  states,  but  that  their  discontent 
and  apprehension  was  created  by  the  fear  of  results  of  fanaticism 
like  that  of  John  Brown." 


APPENDIX  283 

Tribune  of  November  9,  favored  letting  the  seceding  states 
go  rather  than  holding  them  by  bayonets.  Many  in  the 
North  and  in  the  border  states  desired  compromise,  and 
various  plans  were  proposed.  Thurlow  Weed,  in  his  Albany 
Evening  Journal t  proposed  a  law  for  the  payment  of  rescued 
slaves  by  counties  and  the  extension  of  the  Missouri  com 
promise  to  the  Pacific.  George  P.  Curtis  believed  that 
Massachusetts  would  repeal  her  personal  liberty  law,  and  the 
House  of  Representatives,  on  December  17,  by  a  vote  of  153 
to  14  recommended  a  repeal  of  these  laws  as  far  as  they 
were  in  conflict  with  the  constitution,  but  Senator  Iverson 
said  that  the  immediate  repeal  of  all  these  laws  could  not 
stop  the  progress  of  the  "  revolution."  Davis  and  Toombs 
complained  that  the  North  refused  to  recognize  slaves  as 
property  in  the  territories.  Southerners  were  sensitive  to  the 
Northern  sentiment  that  slavery  was  out  of  harmony  with 
the  moral  progress  of  the  age.  Crittenden  of  Kentucky, 
December  18,  introduced  into  the  Senate  a  plan  of  com 
promise  favoring  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  extend 
ing  the  Missouri  compromise  line  of  division  to  all  territory 
of  the  United  States  so  long  as  it  should  remain  as  territory, 
and  providing  that  when  states  should  be  organized  in  such 
territory,  either  north  or  south  of  the  line  of  36°  30',  they 
should  be  admitted  free  or  slave  as  their  constitution  might 
provide.  Congress  was  to  have  no  power  to  shut  slavery 
from  the  territories;  slaves  were  to  be  protected  as  property 
by  all  the  departments  of  the  territorial  government;  Con 
gress  was  never  to  have  the  power  to  interfere  with  slavery 
in  the  states  where  the  laws  permitted  that  institution — not 
even  in  places  within  those  states  where  Congress  had  ex 
clusive  jurisdiction^  and'  payment  for  rescued  slaves  was  to 
be  made  by  the  United  States  government.  Such  was  the 
Crittenden  plan  to  which  the  Republicans  could  not  agree, 
and  no  agreement  could  be  reached  on  other  plans  before  the 
issue  came. 

On  December  18,  1860,  Senator  Powell  of  Kentucky  offered 


284  APPENDIX 

a  resolution  for  the  selection  of  a  committee  of  thirteen  to 
consider  the  grievances  of  the  slaveholding  states.  The 
Senate  adopted  it  and  the  Vice-President  appointed  Powell, 
Crittenden,  Hunter,  Toombs  and  Davis  with  the  Northern 
Democrats,  Douglas,  Bigelow  and  Rice,  and  the  Republi 
cans  Seward,  Collamer,  Doolittle  and  Grimes.  Before  they 
met,  South  Carolina  had  seceded.  On  December  22,  Crit 
tenden  presented  his  plan  to  the  committee.  Article  i  relat 
ing  to  territories  was  the  most  important.  It  was  opposed 
by  all  the  Republicans  and  by  Toombs  and  Davis.  The 
Republicans  also  opposed  the  other  articles.  They  probably 
feared  Southern  filibustering  to  get  Mexico,  Cuba  and  Cen 
tral  America.  Nevertheless  there  was  considerable  opinion 
in  the  North  in  favor  of  the  Crittenden  amendment.  The 
Northern  Democrats  and  Hunter,  Powell  and  Crittenden 
would  have  accepted  the  compromise  but  Seward,  on  De 
cember  26,  wrote  Lincoln  that,  even  with  the  restoration  of 
the  36°  30'  line,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mississippi  and  Louisiana 
would  secede.  As  a  congressional  law,  instead  of  a  consti 
tutional  amendment,  Lincoln  would  have  accepted  all  the 
compromise  except  article  i.  He  believed  that  the  agitation 
could  be  stopped  for  a  time  by  the  provision  to  extend  the 
36°  30'  line,  but  would  probably  be  renewed  by  Southern 
attempts  to  seize  and  annex  Mexico.  He  believed  that  com 
promise  could  only  postpone,  but  thought  that  the  fugitive 
slave  law  ought  not  to  be  resisted  in  the  North. 

The  Republicans  offered  a  plan  of  compromise.  On  De 
cember  24  Seward  proposed  to  the  committee  of  thirteen: 
(i)  That  there  should  be  a  constitutional  amendment  that 
the  constitution  should  never  be  amended  so  as  to  authorize 
Congress  to  interfere  with  slavery  in  the  state.  (2)  That  the 
fugitive  slave  law  should  be  amended  so  as  to  grant  jury 
trial  to  the  fugitive.  (3)  That  Congress  should  recommend 
the  repeal  of  the  personal  liberty  acts  that  were  unconstitu 
tional.  Two  days  later  he  also  proposed  that  Congress 
should  pass  no  law  for  the  punishment  of  persons  engaged  in 


APPENDIX  285 

the  armed  invasion  of  any  state  from  another.  Grimes  of 
Iowa  was  \villing  to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Wyandotte 
constitution,  and  to  admit  the  rest  of  the  western  terri 
tories  as  two  states  divided  by  the  line  of  36°  30'  with  pro 
visions  for  their  future  sub-division  when  the  population 
should  be  sufficient.  This  would  have  made  New  Mexico 
a  pro-slavery  pocket  borough — though  physical  laws,  even  in 
the  face  of  congressional  laws  to  the  contrary,  would,  per 
haps,  have  prevented  slavery  from  thriving  there.  Of  the 
above  Republican  proposals  only  the  first  one  was  carried. 

After  considering  other  propositions,  the  committee  of 
thirteen  reported  to  Congress  that  they  could  not  agree  on 
a  plan  of  adjustment.  Crittenden  then  proposed  (January 
3,  1861)  in  the  Senate,  that  his  compromise  plan  should  be 
submitted  to  the  people.  Douglas  favored  it,  but  the  ques 
tion  never  came  to  a  vote  in  the  Senate. 

Clingman  of  North  Carolina  said  that  he  was  astonished 
that  the  North  hesitated  to  accept  the  Crittenden  plan;  that 
it  gave  that  section  the  larger  amount  of  present  territory 
and  left  undisturbed  the  right  to  a  vote  as  to  the  acquisition 
of  further  territory  toward  the  South.  Lincoln,  however, 
was  opposed  to  surrendering  his  principles  in  order  to  please 
those  beaten  at  the  elections,  whom  he  feared  would  next  ask 
for  Cuba  as  a  condition  for  remaining  in  the  Union.  He 
stated  that  the  constitution  was  the  same  as  before  the 
election,  and  that  there  never  was  a  more  shallow  pretext 
for  extorting  a  compromise.  "  There  is  in  my  judgment," 
said  he,  "  but  one  compromise  which  would  really  settle  the 
slavery  question,  and  that  would  be  a  prohibition  against 
acquiring  any  more  territory."  In  a  letter  to  Seward  on 
February  i,  1861,  he  said,  "  I  am  for  no  compromise  which 
permits  extension  of  slavery  to  soil  now  owned  by  the  nation, 
or  allows  any  trick  by  which  the  nation  is  to  acquire  terri 
tory  and  allow  some  local  authority  to  spread  slavery  over 
it."  7 

7  Nicolay   and  Hay :    Abraham  Lincoln,   Complete  Works,   Vol.    I. 


286  APPENDIX 

On  February  4,  while  the  Southern  leaders  were  making 
their  farewell  speeches  in  Congress,  and  while  delegates  from 
six  cotton  states  were  convening  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
to  form  a  Southern  confederacy,  a  peace  convention  in  which 
21  states  were  represented,  met  at  Washington  in  response 
to  a  proposal  (January  19)  from  Virginia,  whose  legislative 
deprecated  disunion.  The  seceding  states  were  not  repre 
sented.  Virginia  desired  to  save  the  Union  and  was  willing 
to  accept  the  Crittenden  compromise  as  a  constitution  il 
amendment.  The  subject  of  future  expansion8  was  a  promi 
nent  feature  of  the  debates  and  many  of  the  speeches  ga\e 
the  intimation  that  the  South  was  contemplating  national 
suicide  because  there  was  no  constitutional  amendment  re 
garding  future  acquisitions  of  territory.  Some  Southern 
delegates,  like  Reid  of  North  Carolina,  were  looking  foi- 
ward  to  the  glory  of  future  expansion.  Some  of  the  Northern 
delegates  spoke  of  the  evils  of  expansion,  and  desired  re 
strictions  on  future  acquisitions.  Loomis  of  Pennsylvania, 
declaring  that  new  acquisitions  would  only  bring  new 
troubles,  said:  "  We  want  no  more  territory  north  or  south." 
Others,  however,  were  opposed  to  restrictions  for  the  future 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  unnecessary  and  might  prove 
troublesome.  Frelinghuysen,  of  New  Jersey,  told  the  South 
ern  delegates  that  there  was  no  reason  for  discussing  con 
tingencies  which  might  never  happen — that  they  had  enough 
territory  for  the  next  two  hundred  years,  and  that,  before  they 
should  need  more  land  possibly  even  the  North  would  want 
Cuba  and  Mexico  for  trade  advantages.  In  discussing  a 
resolution  based  on  the  Crittenden  plan,  Reverdy  Johnson  of 
Maryland,  who  thought  we  had  sufficient  territory  and  hoped 
that  we  would  not  separate  on  account  of  territory  we  did 
not  have  and  did  not  need,  desired  to  insert  the  word 

8  On  the  influence  of  the  South  on  expansion,  see  C.  E.  Evans 
(Ed.):  Confederate  Military  History,  Vol.  I,  pp.  59-2-16,  [\V.  R. 
Garrett:  The  Si  nth  as  a  factor  in  the  territorial  expansion  of  the 
United  States.] 


APPENDIX  287 

"  present "  before  "  territory  "  in  article  I,  stating  that  a 
constitutional  amendment  should  not  go  forth  to  the  world 
indicating  that  the  United  States  proposed  to  acquire  new 
territory  in  any  way.  The  word  "  present "  was  inserted. 
Afterwards  Summer  offered  an  amendment  that  no  territory 
should  be  acquired  except  by  discovery  or  for  naval  depots 
and  transit  routes,  without  the  concurrence  of  the  majority 
of  the  senators  from  each  section.  The  motion  was  carried, 
but  the  proposition  failed  in  the  final  vote  upon  the  report  of 
the  convention.9  On  February  27,  the  convention,  voting  by 
states,  recommended  to  Congress  a  constitutional  amend 
ment  which  was  less  favorable  to  the  South  than  the  Critten- 
den  plan  but  was  not  satisfactory  to  the  radicals  or  the 
Republicans.  It  advocated  the  extension  of  the  Missouri 
compromise  line  to  the  Pacific,  the  establishment,  by  Con 
gress,  of  slavery  south  of  that  line,  and  compensation  by  the 
United  States  for  fugitive  slaves  rescued  after  arrest.  A 
committee  of  Congress  joined  in  favoring  the  compromise, 
but  it  was  too  late.  On  March  4,  Crittenden  offered  the 
report  to  the  Senate  and  it  received  only  seven  ayes,  among 
whom  were  Crittenden,  Douglas  and  two  Republicans.  The 
radical  republicans  had  been  opposed  to  the  peace  conven 
tion.  The  House  by  113  to  80  and  the  Senate  by  20  to  19 
refused  to  submit  the  Crittenden  compromise  to  the  people, 
but  Congress  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  each  House  recom 
mended  a  constitutional  amendment  providing  that  no  future 
amendment  should  ever  give  Congress  power  to  interfere 
with  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  states.  This  satisfied 
many  in  Virginia,  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee.  Nelson 
of  Tennessee  said  it  would  remove  the  only  ground  of  appre 
hension  to  the  slave  states.  But  it  could  not  stop  secession. 
Public  sentiment  changed  with  the  course  of  events.  Virginia 

9  L.  E.  Chittenden:  Report  of  the  Debates  and  Proceedings  of 
the  Secret  Sessions  of  the  Conference  Convention  for  proposing 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  Feb.,  1861. 
N.  Y.,  1864. 


288  APPENDIX 

was  at  first  strongly  opposed  to  disunion,  but  she  was  aho 
opposed  to  coercion  in  case  conciliation  failed  to  bring  back 
seceded  states. 

A  statement  of  the  causes  of  secession  may  be  found  in 
the  farewell  speeches  of  Southern  congressmen  delivered  in 
January  and  February  and  also  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
seceding  conventions.  The  predominant  tone  was  that  the 
states  seceded  because  they  believed  the  election  of  Linco  n 
meant  a  blow  to  the  institution  of  slavery.  Toombs,  on 
January  7,  in  the  Senate,  said  that  the  South  made  fi-e 
demands  to  cure  grievances  and  prevent  secession:  (i)  Equil 
right  to  go  to  the  territories.  (2)  The  same  protection  for 
slaves  as  for  other  property — leaving  each  state  to  prote  :t 
or  prohibit  slavery.  (3)  The  delivery  of  persons  committing 
crimes  against  slave  property  and  fleeing  to  other  state?. 
(4)  The  surrender  of  fugitive  slaves.  (5)  The  passage  1  y 
Congress  of  laws  for  the  punishment  of  those  aiding  or 
abetting  invasion  or  insurrection  in  any  state.10  The  Missis 
sippi  convention  said:  "  Our  position  is  thoroughly  identified 
with  the  institution  of  slavery  .  .  .  There  was  no  choice 
left  us  but  submission  to  the  mandates  of  abolition  or  a  dis 
solution  of  the  Union."  "  Your  votes,"  said  Jefferson  Davis, 
"  refuse  to  recognize  our  domestic  institution  which  pre 
existed  the  formation  of  the  Union,  our  property  which  was 
guaranteed  by  the  constitution."1  In  his  farewell  speech  to 
the  Senate,  January  21,  Mr.  .Davis  said:  "  Mississippi 
secedes  because  she  hears  the  theory  that  all  men  are  created 
free  and  equal  made  the  basis  of  an  attack  upon  her  social 
institutions." 

Mr.  Slidell,  February  4,  in  presenting  to  the  Senate  an 
ordinance  to  dissolve  the  compact  between  Louisiana  and 
the  United  States,  stated  that  the  mere  election  of  Lincoln 
was  not  the  cause  of  secession,  but  that  it  indicated  that 
outside  of  New  Jersey  there  was  a  solid  North  against 

lu  P.  A.  Stovall.    Life  of  Robt.  Toombs. 
"Alfriend:    Jefferson  Davis,   pp.  225-30. 


APPENDIX  289 

Southern  institutions,  and  he  declared  that  the  inauguration 
of  Lincoln  with  Southern  assent  would  mean  slave  outbreaks. 
He  spoke  of  the  advantages  which  the  South  would  have  in 
forming  a  new  nation,  and  said  there  was  no  reason  to  fear 
coercion.  He  was  willing  to  adhere  to  the  old  constitution 
and  treaties,  pay  a  portion  of  the  national  debt,  and  leave 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  free  to  the  inhabitants  of 
its  valley;  and  he  expected  foreign  nations  to  acknowledge 
the  de  facto  Southern  government  and  to  insist  upon  com 
munication  with  Southern  ports.12 

Mr.  Benjamin,  in  his  "farewell"  of  February  5,  said: 
"  Of  all  the  causes  which  justify  the  action  of  the  Southern 
states  I  know  none  of  greater  gravity  and  more  alarming 
magnitude  than  that  now  developed  of  the  denial  of  the 
right  of  secession."  He  declared  that  the  purchase  of  Louis 
iana  by  the  United  States  did  not  bind  the  white  men  of 
the  state  by  ties  that  could  not  be  severed.  Clingman  held 
that  after  an  honest  effort  to  defeat  Lincoln  the  South  was 
not  responsible  for  his  election  and  was  justified  in  seceding. 

The  foregoing  speeches  indicate  the  presence  of  a  general 
belief  among  Southern  leaders  that  the  perpetuation  of  the 
institution  of  slavery,  or  of  Southern  rigfits~crmnected  with 
slavery,  were  endangered  by  the  election  of  Lincoln.  It  must 
be  remembered,  however,  that,  until  the  Southerners  with 
drew,  the  Republicans  were  still  the  smaller  party  in  both 
Houses,  and  that  the  President  had  no  power  to  abolish 
slavery  except  as  a  war  measure.  But  the  secessionists  were 
correct  in  their  conviction  that  the  Northern  moral  sense 
against  slavery  pointed  toward  the  ultimate  doom  of  the 
institution,  and  they  made  the  election  of  Lincoln  a  pretext 
for  secession.  Did  secession  and  the  war  then  result  from 
the  desire  to  perpettfaTe^slavery? TrThis  speech~at  Savannah 
on  March  I,  1861,  Stephens  stated  that  race  servitude  was 
the  real  cornerstone  upon  which  the  Confederacy  was  based. 
But,  years  after  the  close  of  the  war,  when  the  people,  drawn 

18  Cong.  Globe,  Feb.  4.  1861. 
19 


290  APPENDIX 

together  by  mutual  interests,  were  again  being  fused  into  a 
durable  nationality,  Jefferson  Davis  said:  "To  whatever 
extent  the  question  of  slavery  may  have  served  as  an  occa 
sion,  it  was  far  from  being  a  cause  of  the  war." 

Davis  held  that  slavery  was  only  an  incident  in  a  group 
of  causes — than  the  South  did  not  secede  on  account  of  tl  e 
Northern  attitude  toward  slavery,  but  rather  from  the  fear 
of  what  a_sgctional  party  might  do  when  7mce"Tn  power.13 

In  the  farewell  spisecFTes  one  sees  no  reference  to  niary 
causes  which  had  contributed  to  embitter  feeling  on  tie 
subject  of  slavery:  the  lack  of  communication,  the  economic, 
educational,  social  and  political  differences  which  arose  fro  n 
different  systems  of  labor,  and  the  influence  of  climate  arc! 
soil  in  producing  them.  The  Southern  states  being  agricul 
tural  communities,  were  led  to  the  general  introduction  of 
slavery,  and  this  in  turn  kept  them  agricultural  while  tLe 
North  was  developing  into  a  country  of  diversified  interes:s 
and  of  denser  population  than  the  South.  The  North  hr.d 
outgrown  the  economic  conditions  of  1776,  and  material  in 
terests  had  been  changed  by  the  growth  of  manufacturing  and 
commercial  towns  in  the  North  and  West.  Helper,  in  h  s 
pamphlet  of  1859,  on  the  Impending  Crisis,  said  that  if 
slavery  could  be  abolished  manufacturing  might  become  an 
industry  in  the  South;  and  that  the  social  position  of  the 
non-slaveholding  whites,  consisting  of  about  two-thirds  of 
the  voters,  would  soon  compare  with  the  mechanics  and 
farmers  of  the  North. 

With  the  conditions  of  soil  and  climate  which  made  slavery 
more  profitable  in  the  South  and  secured  greater  immigra 
tion  to  the  North;  with  the  differences  in  institutions  which 
resulted  from  slavery;  with  railroads  of  different  gauge  and 
inconvenient  connections;  sometimes  in  an  atmosphere  of 
misunderstanding  where  neighbor  was  ignorant  of  neighbor, 
and  where  some  of  the  opposing  politicians  learned  nothing' 
and  forgot  nothing-v-compromise  failed,  passions  controlled, 

13  ,T.  Davis:    Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government.   1SS1. 


APPENDIX  291 

the  spirit  of  secession  spread,  and  war  was  precipitated. 
Southern  leaders,  feeling  that  the  social  and  industrial  system 
of  the  South  was  insecure,  preferred  tcfappeal  toTiTe  pre- 
natioirafr"  pTJrrdpte^'ot~CoTrred€«itioH-  -  an  d— tO~~fep  u'diate  the 
idga~bt  nationality?*""" 

The  secession-  movement  had  continued  under  the  man 
agement  of  the  political  leaders  aid  on  February  4,  1861, 
delegates  met  at  Montgomery  to  organize  a  government. 
Conservatives  like  Stephens  were  still  opposed  to  secession 
as  a  "remedy  against  anticipated  aggressions."  Stephens 
finally  decided  to  accept  a  place  in  the  provisional  govern 
ment,  though  he  wrote  that  when  he  considered  the  "  ambi 
tious  .  .  .  men  at  the  head  of  the  movement,  who  neces 
sarily  control  [led]  at  least  for  the  present"  he  had  appre 
hension  and  mistrust  for  the  future.  Some  who  joined  the 
movement  hoped  for  something  to  occur  to  prevent  perma 
nent  dissolution,  and  expected  to  obtain  better  terms  for 
slavery  by  a  temporary  withdrawal  from  the  Union;  others 
dreamed  of  a  peaceful  dissolution,  for  many  in  the  North 
were  opposed  to  coercion.  There  was  a  strong  Southern 
opposition  to  secession,  especially  in  Georgia,  Virginia, 
North  Carolina  and  Louisiana.  Yet  the  movement  did  not 
lack  the  substantial  support  of  the  majority  of  the  people 
after  it  was  once  begun,  though  in  Georgia  especially  there 
was  at  first  a  majority  of  the  white  people  who  opposed  it. 
It  was  only  by  impassioned  persuasion,  or  by  argument  of 
temporary  expediency,  that  the  leaders  in  some  parts  ob 
tained  popular  support  for  their  project.  Perhaps  the  United 
States  constitution  could  never  have  been  carried  in  1788 
if  its  ratification  had  been  voted  upon  by  the  whole  people 
at  the  polls,  and  it  has  been  said  that  secession  would  have 
failed  if  it  had  depended  upon  the  popular  vote. 

14  Papers  rel.  to  the  ratification  of  the  ordinances  of  secession. 


INDEX 


Acquisition,  territorial;  demanded  by 
slavery,  278,  285;  and  the  Critten- 
den  compromise  plan,  283,  284; 
discussed  in  "  peace  conference  " 
of  1861,  286;  attempt  to  limit,  287. 

Adams,  C.  F. ;  U.  S.  Minister  to  Lon 
don,  114;  possibility  of  recognition 
seen  by,  159. 

Aggressions,  anticipated.  [See  "  Se 
cession  "  and  "  United  States."] 

Alabama,  The;  built  at  Liverpool,  156; 
escape  and  commission  on  high 
seas,  157. 

Alexandra,  The  ;  seizure  of,  170. 

Alliance;  proposed  with  Spain,  75,  78, 
98,  207;  proposed  with  Mexico,  71; 
proposed  with  northern  provinces 
of  Mexico,  76;  proposed  with 
France,  83,  151,  202,  266;  proposed 
with  European  powers,  84;  ex 
pected  between  England  and 
France,  115;  advocated  with  the 
U.  S.,  128,  257;  suggested  with 
France  and  Mexico,  196,  198;  sug 
gested  with  Maximilian,  201,  213; 
suggested  with  Brazil  and  Mexico, 
241;  rumor  of  with  Maximilian, 
273. 

Anglo-American  relations,  108,  115, 
120,  188,  222,  237,  271,  274. 

Archives.  [See  "  Correspondence  " 
and  "  Pickett  Papers."] 

Armistice,    proposed   plan  of,    159. 

Aspinwall,  W.  H.,  173. 

Barksdale,  of  Miss.,  35. 

Barnwell,  of  South  Carolina,  31. 

Beall,  J.  Y.,  226. 

Belgium,  diplomatic  mission  to,  125. 

Belligerency,  recognition  by  England, 
112;  views  of  Fish  on,  114;  views 
of  Seward,  214. 


Benjamin,  Judah  P. ;  papers  destroyed 
by,  12,  20;  secretiveness,  23; 
sketch,  31;  complains  against  the 
British  policy,  94,  95,  155,  233; 
suspicions  as  to  French  designs, 
98,  205,  206;  arguments  to  Europe 
[see  "Europe"];  and  bureau  of 
export  and  import,  105;  contrasts 
French  friendliness  with  the  "  rude 
incivility"  of  Earl  Russell,  155; 
urges  that  England  and  France 
should  break  the  blockade  to  se 
cure  monopoly  of  Southern  trade, 
162;  on  cooperation  of  Lord  Lyons 
with  the  U.  S.  as  to  consuls  in 
the  South,  180;  complains  of  Euro 
pean  powers,  218,  249;  accuses 
Napoleon  of  duplicity,  219;  covert 
threat  of  future  war  against 
France,  219;  hopes  against  fate, 
234;  instructions  to  Kenner,  248; 
warns  Europe  against  future  ag 
gression  by  the  North,  250; 
"  dreams  "  of  European  interven 
tion,  257;  advocates  emancipation, 
and  seizure  of  cotton,  etc.,  260; 
Sunday  talk  with  Davis,  267;  dip 
lomatically  declines  to  receive 
Russell's  note,  273;  on  cause  of 
secession,  289. 

Bigelow,  John  (U.  S.  Minister  at 
Paris);  "France  and  the  Confed 
erate  Navy,"  24. 

Blair,    mission  of,   253-254,   256,    266. 

Blanche,   The,  78. 

Blockade,  106,  115,  121,  122,  126,  131, 
144;  attitude  of  England  to,  125, 
127,  267;  attitude  of  France  to, 
125,  147;  and  the  cotton  policy, 
122,  126,  132;  Confederate  repre 
sentations  as  to,  126,  144,  163; 


294 


INDEX 


severity  of  on  South,  132,  147,  163, 
247,  260;  inefficiency  of,  urged  by 
Mason,  144,  164  (also  admitted  by 
Napoleon,  147);  irregularities,  Rus 
sell's  fairness  as  to,  149,  167; 
Confederate  expectation  for  Eng 
land  to  favor  the  South  as  to,  150. 

Blockade  running,  104,  132,  169,  171; 
government  control  of  recom 
mended,  105,  195. 

Border  States;  necessity  of  to  the  ex 
istence  of  the  Confederacy,  145. 

Brazil,  241. 

Bread  riot,  threatened,  55. 

Brent,  Gen.  J.  L.,  249. 

Bright,  John;  opposed  to  disunion  in 
the  U.  S.,  189. 

British  consuls  in  the  South;  exe 
quaturs  finally  revoked  by  Davis, 
176;  authority  exercised  over  by 
Lord  Lyons,  177;  complain  of  for 
cible  conscription  of  Irish,  17(5, 
177;  Magee  of  Mobile  recalled,  178; 
case  of  Cridland  at  Mobile,  179. 

British  Government,  The;  Benjamin 
complains  of  policy  of,  94,  95,  155, 
233;  attempts  to  embarrass,  100; 
objections  to  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy,  125;  attitude  toward 
blockade,  125,  127,  267;  and  con 
flicting  views  as  to  cooperation 
with  France,  160;  orders  of  as  to 
Confederate  operations,  166,  169, 
170,  272;  futile  attempt  to  force 
recognition  by,  186  et  seq. ;  de 
tention  of  Confederate  vessels  by, 
214;  and  Napoleon's  supposed  pro 
posals  for  joint  recognition,  185; 
Roebuck's,  charges  against  (as  to 
Napoleon's  offers),  187;  suspected 
secret  understanding  between  Sew- 
ard  and,  147,  148,  187;  fears  that 
recognition  would  lead  to  war 
with  U.  S.,  188;  leaves  Napoleon 
to  pull  his  own  chestnuts,  188;  de 
nials  as  to  Napoleon's  overtures, 
189,  191;  protests  of  Seward  against 
policy  of,  222;  its  policy  dictated 
by  the  U.  S.,  233;  "  Index  "  com 
plains  as  to  England  playing 
"  second  fiddle,"  272.  [See 
"  Lyons,"  "  Russell,"  "  Palmers- 
ton  "  and  "  Great  Britain."] 


British  vessels;  captured  by  U.  S., 
171. 

Bullock,  J.  D. ;  "Secret  Service"  of, 
24,  58,  59;  views  of  on  Confedeiate 
policy,  105;  sent  to  Europe,  111; 
and  the  Alabama,  156;  contn  cts 
for  vessels  in  French  ports,  MO, 
211 ;  complains  of  French  dec  ;it, 
216. 

Bunch  (British  consul) ;  negotiati  )ns 
through,  118;  Seward  requests  re 
moval  of,  119;  exequatur  of  re 
voked  by  Davis,  176. 

Butler,   Thos.  J.,   280. 

Cabinet;  and  congress,  28,  30,  48; 
first,  30;  second,  33.  [See  "  Con 
federate  Government"  and."  Da 
vis."] 

Campbell,  Judge  J.  A.,  44,  68,  156, 
257,  281. 

Canada;  and  Anglo-American  rela 
tions,  188,  237,  271;  Confedeiate 
operations  from,  214,  220  et  s<q., 
236;  Confederate  missions  to,  224; 
225. 

Chapman,  Lieut.,  25. 

Chesapeake,  The  affair  of  the,  223; 
and  Holcombe's  mission  to  Canada, 
224. 

Clay,  C.  C. ;  special  mission  to  Can 
ada,  241. 

Cobb,    of   Georgia,    26,    280. 

Collier,   of  Va.,    48,   54. 

Colonial  subjection  to  Europe  sug 
gested,  241. 

Colonies,  of  Europe  in  North  America; 
Confederate  policy  of  guaranty  of, 
84,  168,  207,  266. 

Commerce;  proposed  advantages  to 
Europe,  84,  86,  87;  Confederate 
policy  (laiswz  faire)  as  to,  110, 
133,  146;  advantages  offered 
France,  142,  147;  monopoly  of  Con 
federate  trade,  England  encour 
aged  to  prepare  for,  162.  [See 
"  Cotton."] 

Communication  with  Europe,  etc.; 
difficulties  of,  51,  52,  55,  97,  304, 
135,  173,  178,  247,  260;  plans  for 
facilitating,  97,  146,  159. 


INDEX 


295 


Compromise;  plans  of  (in  1860-61),  283 
et  seq. ;  and  territorial  expansion, 
285. 

Confederacy,    The;    seal    of,    18,    25; 
diplomatic  and  consular  agents  of 
(list),    21;    government    of,    25-65 
(survivors,     23,    24),     [see    "  Con 
federate    Government"];    flag    of, 
25;  provisional  government  of,  26, 
32;   permanent  government  of  [see 
"  Confederate    Permanent    Govern 
ment"];    missions  of    [see    "Dip 
lomatic     missions"];     provisional 
congress  of,  26  (laws,  32);  finances 
of,  32,  53  et  seq. ;  constitution  of, 
28    et     seq.     (ignored,     242,     252); 
permanent  congress  of  [see  "  Con 
gress"];    proposed    supreme    court 
of,  30,  34,  38;  opposition  party  in, 
32,     47      [see      "  Secession,"      and 
"  Embarrassments      and      Difficul- 
culties "        under       "  Confederate 
Government"];     defensive     policy 
of,    34;    prospects    of    a    counter 
revolution  in,  39,  47  [see  "  Seces 
sion  from  Secessia  "];  loans  of,  53, 
60,    63,    104,    195,    209    (the    bears 
and  the  bulls,   62,   63);   expansion 
policy    of    [see    "  Expansion    pol 
icy"];    and   the    Pacific,    75,    145, 
272;    foreign  operations   of   closely 
watched,    99;    diplomacy    of    (fac 
tors  causing  failure),  99,  100,  240; 
commercial    policy    of,     110,    133, 
142,    146,    147,    162;    cotton    policy 
and    the    blockade,    122,    126,    132, 
134,    243,    246;    representations    as 
to  blockade,   126,   144,    163;   sever 
ity  of  the  blockade  on,   132,    147, 
163,     247,     260;     disadvantages     of 
132,  146;  distress  of,  132,  225,  239, 
268,     269;     importance     of    border 
states  to,   145;  aid  associations  in 
England,   156;  friends  in  the  Brit 
ish  parliament  (agitation  by),  169; 
suggested  union  with  the  Mexican 
empire,  195;  approval  of  European 
intervention  in  Mexico,  204;  opera 
tions  of  from  Canada,  214,  220  et 
seq.;   hope  of  Lincoln's  defeat   at 


the  polls,  227,  228;  projects  for 
insurrection  in  the  North,  230; 
effect  of  victories  of,  231;  defeats 
of,  234,  239,  260;  attempts  to  in 
volve  England  in  war  with  the 
U.  S.,  237,  238,  271;  last  card  of, 
239  et  seq.;  colonial  subjection  to 
Europe  suggested,  241.  [Also,  see 
"Foreign  policjV  "Recognition," 
"  Confederate  Government,"  "  Eu 
rope,"  "  France,"  "  Great  Brit 
ain,"  "  Mexico."] 
Confederate  Government,  25-65. 
Confederate  Government,  the  provis 
ional;  organization  of,  26,  291; 
removal  of  to  Richmond,  32;  finan 
cial  measures  of,  32. 
Confederate  Government,  the  perma 
nent;  a  "  machine  of  the  few," 
17;  survivors,  23,  34;  birth,  33; 
policy  of  to  regulate  production, 
34,  89,  90;  collision  of  with  state 
authorities,  43,  45,  47;  impress 
ment  of  food  by,  43;  prohibition 
of  exports,  44;  disaffection  against, 
46,  47,  233,  239,  270;  embarrass 
ments  and  difficulties  of,  42  et 
seq.,  48,  51,  56,  102,  106,  233 
[also,  see  "  Communication."]; 
financial  measures  of,  53;  argu 
ments  to  secure  European  recogni 
tion,  87  [see  "  Europe,"  "  Great 
Britain,"  and  "France"];  and 
U.  S.  treaties  with  foreign  pow 
ers,  87,  109;  encourages  defection 
in  the  U.  S.,  220  et  seq.;  expecta 
tion  of  revolution  in  North,  221; 
expectation  of  international  com 
plications,  223,  271;  last  effort  of, 
239  et  seq. ;  secrecy  and  rumors, 
273.  [See  "  Confederacy,"  and 
"  Congress."] 

Congress,  provisional,  26;  laws  of,  32. 
Congress,  permanent,  33;  survivors,  34; 
prominent  members,  33,  35;  acts 
of,  34,  44;  character  of,  34,  35; 
financial  measures  of,  34;  and  the 
executive,  34,  35,  39,  44,  45,  48, 
49,  50,  96,  256,  268;  flight  of,  36; 
quarters  of,  36;  secret  sessions  of, 


296 


INDEX 


36;  proposed  report  of  debates  of, 
37;  stormy  scenes  in,  37-38;  ap 
propriation  for  more  vessels,  210; 
dissentient  reply  to  Davis'  last 
message,  268;  address  to  the  peo 
ple,  269;  "  Unionist  "  members  of, 
271. 

Conscription;  laws,  34,  40;  opposed  by 
Stephens,  40;  bureau  of  ("  rows  " 
in),  44,  46. 

Controversies,   169  et  seq. 
Corcoran,   W.   W.,  265. 

Correspondence;  private,  22;  preserva 
tion  of,  14;  purchase  of,  15,  19; 
capture  of,  52,  97,  164;  publication 
of,  96,  164;  destroyed,  172.  [See 
"  Diplomatic  correspondence."] 

Cotton;  export  of  urged,  63,  89,  90; 
"  Cotton  is  King,"  80;  Europe 
and,  80,  123,  132,  142,  243;  destruc 
tion  of  advocated,  88,  102;  aban 
donment  of  culture  recommended, 
89  (opposed  by  Stephens,  90); 
policy  as  to,  89,  90,  122,  126,  132, 
134,  243  (obstacles  to  export  pol 
icy,  89) ;  commercial  value  urged, 
89,  90,  105;  political  value  urged, 
101,  242  (disappointment  as  to, 
101,  242) ;  government  seizure  of 
(policy  of),  107,  246,  249;  indirect 
export  of,  101,  107,  165;  trade  in 
with  Federals,  102,  103;  govern 
ment  monopoly  and  shipment  of, 
104,  105  (urged  by  Mason,  195); 
proposed  neutrality  of,  126,  135; 
and.  the  blockade,  134,  142;  policy 
of  prohibiting  export  of  (urged), 
150;  expectation  of  a  "  cotton 
famine,"  159  ("  cotton  famine  pol 
icy,"  243). 

Cotton  bonds,   53. 

Cotton  loans,  59,  61. 

Crawford,   M.   G.,  of  Georgia,  27,  67. 

Crittenden  plan  of  compromise,  to 
prevent  secession,  283,  287. 

Cuba;  policy  of  the  Confederacy  to 
wards,  77,  98,  124,  168,  184,  202, 
207;  Seward's  warning  as  to,  78; 
Mason  and  Slidell  in,  136;  policy 
of  the  South  towards  before  seces 
sion,  278. 


Currency;    depreciation    of,    57;    cl)se 

of  paper  money  bureau,  269. 
Curry,  J.  L.  M.,  35. 
Dargan,  of  Ala.,  38. 
Davis,  George  (Attorney-General),  47. 
Davis,  Jefferson;  election,  27;  cotion 
famine  policy,  32,  88,  89;  increas 
ing  powers  of,  39,  44,  47,  ,iOj 
estimates  of  his  character,  41- 
sources  of  embarrassment  and  un 
popularity,  42  et  seq.,  239;  list 
message  of,  48,  50,  268;  foreign 
policy  of,  86,  88;  complains  of  ihe 
British  Government,  155,  163,  25; 
revokes  exequaturs  of  British  con 
suls,  176;  criticises  European  Gov 
ernments  for  refusing  recognition, 
200,  240;  opinion  as  to  major  ty 
rule,  228;  laborious  work  of,  2;;9; 
and  the  "  last  card,"  246,  263;  on 
cause  of  secession,  288.  [See 
"  Confederate  Government  "  and 
"  Congress."] 

Davis,  Judge,   16. 

Davis,   Mrs.   Varina  J.,   12. 

Davis,  Miss  Winnie,   22. 

Declaration  of  Paris  (of  1856),  111, 
118,  126,  134;  U.  S.  willing  to 
accept,  119;  Confederate  protects 
against  British  modification  as  to 
blockade,  164,  196;  Russell's  inter 
pretation  of  rule  as  to  blockade, 
164,  168. 

De  Leon,  recommends  recall  of  Con 
federate  commissioners  from  Eu 
rope,  97. 

Democratic  convention  at  Charleston, 
279. 

Democratic  convention  at  Chicago 
(1864),  231,  234. 

De  Morny,  Count;  views  of,   111-112. 

Desertions,   48,   239. 

Despatch  agents,  97. 

Dictator,   military;   favored,   241. 

Diplomacy,  Confederate;  factors  caus 
ing  failure  of,  99,  100,  240. 

Diplomatic  agents;  list  of,  25;  recall 
of,  favored,  95,  176,  196;  Sewaid 
warns  Europe  not  to  hold  inter 
course  with,  115.  [See  "  Diploma 
tic  missions."] 


INDEX 


297 


Diplomatic  correspondence ;  preserva 
tion  by  Pickett,  14;  purchase  of, 
15,  19. 

"  Diplomatic  council,"  a,  265. 

Diplomatic  missions;  (embarrassments 
and  difficulties  of,  92,  94,  120);  to 
Washington,  27,  67,  70,  117;  to 
Canada,  70,  224,  225;  to  Mexico, 
71,  75  (New  Leon),  76;  to  the 
West  Indies,  77;  to  Europe  (Yan- 
cey,  Rost  and  Mann),  91,  (Mason 
and  Slidell)  130,  (Mason)  200;  to 
Russia,  95  (recalled,  96);  to  the 
Pope,  99;  to  England,  109  et  seq., 
239,  258;  to  France,  123;  to  Spain, 
124,  125,  168;  to  Belgium,  125;  to 
Hampton  Roads  conference,  257. 

Dowling,   Robt.,  98. 

Dred  Scott  decision,  279. 

Dunnock,  Mr.,  102. 

Emancipation;  offered  for  recognition, 

83,  266;     Lincoln's    proclamation, 
effect  in  England,   165;   favored  as 
a    means    of   securing   recognition, 
195,     241,     242,     251;     the     "last 
card,"  239  et  seq.,  242,  246;  prepa 
ration  of  Southern  public  opinion 
for,    251,    258,    260;    opposition   to, 
260;  secrecy  of  negotiations  as  to, 
262;    anticipated   in  London,   262. 

Emigration  to  U.  S. ;  from  Ireland, 
168;  from  Frankfort,  233. 

England,  crisis  in,  182  et  seq.  [See 
"  Great  Britain  "  and  "  British 
Government."] 

Enlistments  in  Ireland,    168. 

Erlanger  loan,  54,  60,  61,   62.   241. 

Europe;  Confederate  financial  agents 
in,  59,  63;  change  of  financial 
program  in,  64;  Confederate  ex 
pectations  as  to,  79,  91,  109,  117, 
204,  249;  and  tariff  policy,  79,  80, 

81,  82;   opposition   to   slavery,   79, 

82,  84,   86,   97,    121,   242,   244,   263; 
and    Confederate    cotton,    80,    123, 
132,    142,    243;    Confederate    argu 
ments    to,    81,    93,    100,    109,    111, 
121,    125,    126,    133,    162,   267;    pro 
posed    commercial    advantages    to, 

84,  86,    87    [see    "Commerce"]; 
Confederate      operations      in,      93 


(closely  watched,  99);  no  hope 
from,  128,  218,  231,  257,  264; 
urged  to  break  the  blockade  to 
get  cotton,  134  (and  to  establish 
West  India  depots  of  supply,  163); 
accused  of  desiring  the  ruin  of 
both  North  and  South,  197;  de 
crease  of  Confederate  opportuni 
ties  in,  220;  Davis  complains 
against  the  indifference  of,  240; 
suggestion  of  colonial  subjection 
to,  241;  warned  against  future 
Northern  aggression,  250.  [See 
"  Recognition."] 

Executive,  absorption  of  power  by,  17, 
247  et  seq.,  268.  [See  "  Davis," 
"  Confederate  Government  "  and 
"  Congress."] 

Exemption  laws,  40,  46,  50. 

Exemptions,   complaints  against,   240. 

Expansion  policy;  Confederate,  66,  71, 
73,  75,  78,  93,  124,  129,  134,  145, 
207,  221,  257,  258;  discussions  in 
the  peace  convention  of  1861,  286; 
influence  of  the  South  on,  286. 

Export  and  import,   bureau  of,   105. 

Extradition,  180-181. 

Fearn,  Walker,  24,  76,  97. 

Ficklin,  52. 

Financial  agents  in  Europe,  59,  63. 

Financial  measures,  32,  53  et  seq.,  58, 
59. 

Financial  program  in  Europe,  change 
in,  64. 

Florida,  The,  156,  241. 

Foote,  H.  S.,  47,  95;  urges  recall  of 
commissioners,  95;  on  motion  of 
Hampton  Roads  conference,  258; 
on  strong  Union  feeling  in  the 
South,  270. 

Forbes,  J.  M.,  173. 

Foreign  policy,  66-107;  of  Yancey, 
Rhett  and  Toombs,  84,  87,  89,  123; 
of  Davis,  86,  88;  of  Stephens,  89 
(cotton  exportation),  90,  91;  of 
Johnston,  90;  Henry  St.  Paul's 
pamphlet  on,  202.  [See  "  Confed 
erate  Government,"  "  Davis," 
"  Benjamin,"  "  Mason,"  "  Sli 
dell,"  "  Recognition,"  etc.] 


2<>8 


INDEX 


Forsyth,  John,  27,  31,  67. 

France;  rumors  of  alliance  with,  49, 
273;  attitude  toward  blockade,  125, 
147;  attitude  toward  secession,  142, 
149;  policy  dependent  upon  that 
of  Great  Britain,  148,  161,'  204; 
proposes  joint  mediation,  159.; 
playing  a  complicated  diplomatic 
game,  190,  212  Rumors  of  prospec^ 
tive  aid  by,  219,  268,  273;  sug 
gested  alliance  with,  196;  Benja 
min  suspicious  as  to  the  designs 
of,  98,  205,  206;  Bullock  complains 
of  deceit  of,  216;  covert  threats  of 
future  war  against,  219.  [See 
"  Alliance,"  "  Napoleon,"  "  L'- 
Huys,"  "  Europe  "  and  "  Great 
Britain."] 

Goode,  John,  35. 

Government.  [See  "  Confederate  Gov 
ernment."] 

Great  Britain;  Confederate  sympathiz 
ers  in,  82,  100,  108,  150,  198,  201; 
neutrality  of,  94,  113,  170,  188, 
205,  215;  policy  of  Government  of, 
94,  106  [see  "  British  Govern 
ment"];  Confederate  complaints 
against,  96  [see  "  Davis,"  "  Ben 
jamin,"  "Mason"];  opposition  to 
slavery,  97,  128,  167,  187;  consuls 
of  in  Confederate  States,  98;  influ 
ence  of  Liberals  in,  99,  169,  201; 
effect  of  Seward's  watch  on,  99; 
effect  of  war  on  cotton  operators 
in,  106,  143,  159;  sympathy  for 
Union  cause,  108;  Mason's  instruc 
tions  as  minister  to,  133.  [See 
"  British  Government."] 

Gregg,  Maxey,  278. 

Guaranty  of  N.  Am.  colonies  of  Euro 
pean  powers,  84,  168,  207,  266. 

Gwin,  ex-Senator,  and  Napoleon's 
scheme  for  colonizing  Sonora,  217, 
258. 

Hanckle,  Mr.,  of  Charleston,  126. 

Hampton  Roads  conference,   253,   257. 

Harrison,   Burton  N.,   97,   215,   275. 

Helm,  C.  J.,  77. 

Henry,  Senator,  speech  on  emancipa 
tion  policy,  259. 

Henry,  Wm.  Wirt,  memoranda  of,  262. 


Hester,  extradition  of;  correspondence 
between  Russell  and  Mason  as  to, 
180-181. 

Heyleger,   L.,   79,  97. 

Holcombe,  J.  P.;  mission  to  Can;  da, 
224;  and  Niagara  Falls  pt  ace 
comedy,  228;  advises  further  en 
couragement  of  disruption  and 
anarchy  in  the  North,  236. 

"  Hoosier,"  encroachments  of  .he, 
241. 

Hotze,  Henry,  92,  198. 

Hughes,   Caleb,  150. 

Hunter,  R.  M.  T. ;  in  cabinet,  31,  120; 
attitude  toward  Cuba  and  Sp  lin, 
124;  instructions  to  Mason  and 
Slidell,  133-134;  policy  as  to  Eu 
ropean  intervention,  145;  sp<  ech 
favoring  expansion  and  oppo  >ing 
emancipation,  258-259. 
"  Impressment  of  supplies,  43,  54. 

Index,  The,  92,  156,  272. 

Indexes  to  diplomatic  corresponde  ice, 
19. 

Internal  complications,  Confederate 
hope  for,  241. 

Intervention;  sought  of  Europe,  125; 
British  policy  as  to,  134,  167;  ex 
pectation  of,  145  et  seq.,  195; 
expediency  of,  contemplated  by 
Palmerston  and  Russell,  158;  de 
pendent  on  military  situation,  158, 
194-195;  plan  of  joint  European 
action,  proposed  by  Napoleon,  159, 
161  (Russell's  reply,  161);  of  Eu 
rope  in  Mexico,  203;  opposition 
of  U.  S.  to,  232;  the  only  hope, 
242;  "  dream  of,"  257;  rumors  of 
by  France,  268,  273.  [See  "  Rec 
ognition."] 

Ireland;  emigration  to  U.  S.  from, 
176;  Confederate  agents  sent  to, 
196. 

Irish,  complaints  of  in  South,  176, 
177. 

Isturitz,  208. 

Jacques,  Col.,  peace  mission  of,  '227- 
228. 

Johnson,   of  Ark.,   37. 


INDEX 


299 


Johnson's  Island,  plans  for  an  expedi 
tion  against,  222,  226. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E.,  13;  views 
of  on  foreign  policy,  90. 

Kenner,  Duncan  F.,  secret  mission  of, 
239  et  seq.,  248,  251;  goes  to  Eu 
rope  via  New  York,  260-261;  ar 
rival  in  Europe,  264,  265;  confer 
ence  with  Mason,  etc.,  265;  in 
terview  with  L'Huys,  265;  Mason's 
interview  with  Palmerston  regard 
ing,  266;  negotiations  with  bank 
ers  for  the  sale  of  cotton,  266; 
return  to  U.  S.,  274. 

Lake  Erie,  Confederate  plans  for  opera 
tions  on,  222,  226,  234. 

Lamar;  J.  B.,  102;  L.  Q.   C.,  95,  200. 

Leach,  J.  T.,  45. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  46,  103. 

L'Huys,  160,  193;  denies  that  Napoleon 
proposed  recognition,  193;  as  to 
French  designs  in  Texas,  206;  and 
the  Confederate  navy,  209,  211, 
212.  [See  "  France."] 

Lincoln  and  slavery,  43,  82,  111,  285; 
election  to  presidency,  280. 

Lindsay,  Mr.,  M.  P.;  plan  to  control 
Confederate  and  Western  com 
merce,  98;  "  amateur  diplomacy  " 
of,  with  Napoleon,  147,  148,  182, 
186,  192;  motion  in  Parliament  for 
mediation,-  152;  statement  of 
causes  of  secession,  152;  and  Roe 
buck — interview  with  Napoleon, 
186;  attempt  to  conciliate  Pal 
merston  to  favor  joint  mediation, 
231;  abandons  resolution  for  medi 
ation,  233. 

Louisiana,  rumors  of  French  designs 
to  obtain,  268,  275. 

Lubbock,  Gov.,  205. 

Lyons,  James,  252. 

Lyons,  Lord,  117,  118,  147,  164;  co 
operation  with  U.  S.  as  to  consuls 
in  the  South,  177,  179,  180;  coop 
eration  with  the  U.  S.  to  frustrate 
Confederate  plans  in  Canada,  222. 

Lynch,  P.  A.,  mission  to  States  of 
the  Church,  99. 


Mallory,  Confederate  Secretary  of 
Navy,  30,  58,  59,  104,  273. 

Mann,  A.  Dudley;  manuscript  memoirs 
of,  22;  sent  to  Europe,  85;  sent  to 
the  Pope,  99;  mission  to  Belgium, 

.      125. 

Mason,  J.  M. ;  papers  of,  22 ;  and  the 
Confederate  loan  in  Europe,  62- 
63;  salary  as  commissioner  to  Eu 
rope,  92;  operations  and  argu 
ments  in  England,  93,  94,  99,  216; 
failure  to  obtain  official  recogni 
tion  by  Russell,  94,  144;  recall 
from  England  urged,  96;  with 
drawal  to  continent,  99;  recom 
mends  government  control  of 
blockade-running,  105,  195;  sketch 
of,  130;  sent  to  England,  125;  in 
structions  as  minister  to  England, 
133;  unofficial  reception,  144,  232; 
suggests  that  a  "  cotton  famine  " 
may  force  the  British  Government 
to  grant  recognition,  etc.,  149; 
complains  of  the  British  Govern 
ment,  149,  150,  153,  154,  166,  167, 
169;  call  for  correspondence  of  (in 
the  Commons),  154;  dissemination 
of  "  impressions  "  by,  156,  267; 
awaiting  contingencies,  156;  hopes 
against  fate,  159,  196,  199,  200, 
267,  274;  elated  over  Democratic 
victories  in  the  North,  165;  in 
structed  to  quit  London,  189,  197; 
remains  in  Europe  awaiting  con 
tingencies,  196,  197;  withdrawal 
from  Europe  is  strongly  urged, 
197;  sees  possible  hope,  if  Pal 
merston  should  die,  199;  commis 
sioner  to  the  continent  with  full 
power,  200;  difficulties  in  combat 
ing  anti-slavery  sentiment  in  Eng 
land,  216;  hopes  for  success  of  the 
anti-Lincoln  party  at  the  North, 
231,  232;  plans  to  embarrass  the 
U.  S.,  233;  hopes  to  convert  Eng 
land  to  slavery  views,  244;  and  the 
mission  of  Kenner,  265;  gives  im 
pressions  that  U.  S.  has  aggres 
sive  designs,  266. 


300 


INDEX 


Mason  and  Slidell;  mission  of,  130-144; 
departure  from  Charleston,  135;  at 
Havana,  136;  capture  of,  by  Wilkes, 
136;  reception  by  Europe,  141. 

Mason,  Miss  Virginia,  22. 

McHenry,  George;  views  on  the  cotton 
question,  103,  106,  242. 

McRae,   C.   J.,   63,   64,  105. 

Martial  law,   39. 

Matamoras  trade,  165,  171,  174;  not  a 
violation  of  the  blockade,  175. 

Maximilian,  201,  213,  273. 

McClure,   Dr.,   53. 

Mediation;  proposed  by  Lindsay,  152, 
231.  [See  "  Intervention."] 

Memminger;  Secretary  of  Treasury,  30, 
61,  103;  views  of  on  foreign  pol 
icy,  88,  90,  103. 

Mercier;  views,  113,  117;  mysterious 
errand  to  Richmond,  146,  149;  and 
Napoleon's  proposition,  189;  visit 
to  Paris,  214. 

Mexico;  proposed  alliance  with,  71; 
friendliness  toward  U.  S.,  72;  sus 
picious  of  Confederate  policy,  72; 
Pickett's  policy  towards,  73,  74; 
Spanish  invasion  of,  75;  northern 
provinces  of,  76;  and  Texas  (bor 
der  raids),  76;  suggested  union 
with,  76;  European  intervention 
in,  203;  and  the  U.  S.,  204;  Na 
poleon's  expedition  to,  205;  and 
Blair's  proposal,  253,  256,  266;  in 
vasion  of  favored  by  Stephens,  257 
[see  "  Alliance  "];  policy  of  South 
towards  before  secession,  278. 

Michigan,  The;   plan  to  capture,  234. 

Miles,  of  S.  C.,  39. 

Military  defeats  and  reverses  of  tire 
Confederacy,  146,  149,  168,  182, 
194,  195,  208,  252. 

Mississippi,  navigation  of  the,  66,  220, 
289. 

Mocquard,  M.,    185,  194. 

Monroe  doctrine;  Confederate  attitude 
toward,  75,  79,  83,  98,  84,  196,  204, 
217,  254,  257,  266;  Napoleon's  plan 
to  attack  the,  161,  268,  275; 
"  coiled  up  "  in  Lincoln's  mes 
sage,  241. 

Morgan,  Col.  James  Morris,  275. 


Morny,  Due  de,   204. 

Napoleon,  Louis;  attitude  of,  99,  101, 
123,  142,  151,  161,  213;  dreams  of 
empire,  142,_202,  ,205;  rcceptioi  to 
Slidell,  142";  ready"  to  act  v  ith 
England  to  break  the  block;  de, 
147,  151;  suggests  plan  of  inter 
vention,  148;  and  proposals  to 
build  a  Confederate  navy  in 
French  ports,  159,  209;  "  in  di  )lo- 
macy  nothing  exists  unless  it  is 
written,"  160;  avers  sympathy 
with  Confederacy,  161,  183;  con 
templated  mediation  through  Mer 
cier,  161;  plan  to  attack  the  i  on- 
roe  doctrine  in  Mexico,  161,  :!03; 
charged  with  designs  on  Mexico, 
Texas,  etc.,  164,  203,  205-206;  em 
barrassed  by  Mexican  expedition 
and  outbreak  in  Poland,  66; 
complains  of  unfair  treatment  by 
Russell,  183  (leakage  of  overtures) , 
187;  unwilling  to  take  initiative  in 
further  proposals,  183,  194,  ::08; 
action  of  dependent  on  Bri  ish 
policy,  184;  supposed  proposal.-  of 
(for  recognition),  185;  denials  as 
to  overtures  of,  189;  proposes  joint 
recognition,  185,  194;  willing  to 
grant  recognition,  in  cooperation 
with  Great  Britain,  186,  207,  "265; 
distrusted  by  Seward,  193;  Confed 
eracy  encouraged  by,  204,  210;  de 
signs  in  Louisiana,  268  (Seward's 
views  of,  206);  willing  to  cooper 
ate  with  Spain  in  granting  recog 
nition,  208;  promise  of  as  to  Con 
federate  navy,  211,  212;  and  the 
Bappahannock,  213;  policy  of, 
changed  by  international  and  po 
litical  events,  213,  214,  217;  the 
Confederacy  "  duped  "  by,  '217, 
240;  "  duplicity  "  of,  219;  and 
Sonora  (and  the  Confederate 
emancipation  policy),  258.  [See 
"  France."] 

Nassau  trade,   171. 

Navy,  Confederate  attempts  to  obtain; 
and  the  cotton  policy,  89,  90;  in 
England,  105,  214,  215;  from 
France  in  exchange  for  cotton,  146 


INDEX 


301 


(subsidy),  147;  the  Alabama,  156; 
the  Florida  156;  G.  N.  Sanders 
sent  to  England,  159;  plans  to 
build  in  French  ports  (101),  159, 
202  et  seq.,  209;  the  Alexandra 
170;  plans  interrupted  by  Forbes 
and  Aspinwall,  173;  plans  frus 
trated  by  U.  S.,  211,  216;  the 
Bappahannock,  213 ;  disappoint 
ment  in,  216;  the  Stonewall,  218; 
bold  seizure  of  the  Chesapeake,  223: 
capture  of  the  Philo  Parsons,  234 ; 
proposed  seizure  of  cotton  to  pur 
chase  a  navy,  246;  the  Shenandoah, 
272. 

Neutrality;  of  Mexico,  72;  of  Great 
Britain,  94,  100,  112,  113,  117,  124, 
125,  170,  188,  205,  215  [see  "  Brit 
ish  Government"  and  "Russell"]; 
of  France,  100.  [See  "  France " 
and  "  Napoleon."] 

New  Leon  (and  the  northern  provinces 
of  Mexico) ;  relations  with  the  Con 
federacy,  76. 

Niagara  Falls,   peace  comedy  at,  228. 

Northrop,   Dr.,   41,   43,   48,   54. 

Northwest,  the;  Confederate  expecta 
tions  as  to,  67,  221;  Confederate 
plans  for  encouraging  insurrection 
and  defection  in,  225,  230,  237. 

Opposition  party  in  the  South,  32,  47. 
[See  "  Secession  from  Secessia."] 

Orr,  Senator,  44,  66. 

Owl,  The,  264. 

Pacific,  the;  and  Confederate  policy, 
75,  145,  272. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  125,  153,  169,  170; 
opposed  to  double  diplomacy,  182, 
191,  192;  popularity  of,  199; 
sounded  by  Lindsay,  231-232;  in 
formal  interview  with  Mason,  232, 
2C6;  refusal  to  favor  joint  media 
tion,  233;  seeks  to  avoid  angry 
debate  against  the  U.  S.,  237. 

Parliament,  the  British;  Confederate 
friends  in,  144,  152,  169,  174,  182, 
190;  policy  of  intervention  dis 
cussed  in,  152;  American  seizure 
of  the  Peterhoof  discussed  in,  173; 
policy  cf  recognition  discussed  in, 


187-188;  U.  S.  friends  in,  189,  191; 
alarmed  at  proceedings  in  the 
American  Congress,  237.  [See 
"  Great  Britain."] 

Peace;  Confederate  expectation  of,  66, 
265;  favored  by  a  party  at  North, 
71,  227,  230;  proposals  as  to,  221, 
228,  229;  missions,  227,  228,  253, 
255,  257;  resolutions,  255,  256;  and 
reunion  sentiment  in  the  South, 
270. 

Peace  conference  at  Washington  (1861), 
286. 

Pearson,  Judge,  of  N.  C.,  44. 

Personal  liberty  laws,  279,  283,  284 
(the  real  cause  of  Southern  com 
plaint,  282). 

Peterhoof.  The;  capture  of,  171;  case 
before  prize  court,  171;  case  dis 
cussed  in  Parliament,  173. 

Peterman;  Confederate-French  secrets 
divulged  by,  211. 

Pettus,  Gov.,  102. 

Philo  Parsons,   The;  capture  of,  234. 

Pickett,  J.  T.;  preserver  of  Confed 
erate  papers,  14;  blamed  for  sell 
ing  diplomatic  correspondence,  16; 
secretary  of  a  commission  to  Wash 
ington,  68;  mission  to  Mexico,  71- 
76;  policy  toward  Mexico,  73,  74. 

"Pickett  Papers";  character  of,  16, 
19;  historical  value  of,  17,  18,  20; 
indexes  to,  19;  scope  of,  21. 

Policy,  defensive,  34.  [Also,  see 
"  Foreign  policy."] 

Polignac,  Prince,  275. 

Politicians,  Roebuck  on,  184. 

Pope,   missions  to  the,  99. 

Press  agents,    92. 

Prices,  55. 

Privateering,  110,  118,  119,   121. 

Prophecies,   unfulfilled,   264. 

Quintero,  J.  A.,  76. 

Rappahannock,   The,    213. 

Reagan,  J.  H.,  23,  30,   275. 

Recognition;  sought  in  Mexico,  72; 
sought  in  England,  111,  121,  153; 
various  plans  to  secure,  83;  offer 
of  emancipation  for,  107;  proposed 
in  the  British  Parliament,  109, 


302 


INDEX 


187;  contemplated  by  Napoleon, 
etc.,  112;  British  objections  to, 
125,  264,  267;  urged  by  Yancey 
(after  Trent  affair),  126;  urged  as 
in  accord  with  previous  British 
policy,  134;  possibility  of,  seen  by 
Adams,  159;  dependent  on  Con 
federate  victories,  182,  190,  194, 
204,  208,  213,  216,  232;  conflicting 
reports  as  to  Napoleon's  proposi 
tion  regarding,  186,  193,  194;  a 
delusion,  196,  264;  mentioned  as 
the  only  means  of  ending  the  war, 
233;  rumors  of  (and  emancipation), 
263,  264;  refusal  by  Great  Britain 
on  grounds  of  general  policy,  264, 
267;  emancipation  offered  for  (too 
late),  267. 

Revolution,  threatened  within  the 
Confederacy,  39,  47. 

Rhett,  R.  B.,  28,  280;  foreign  policy 
of,  84,  87;  on  causes  of  secession, 
278. 

Richmond;  removal  of  the  Confederate 
Government  to,  32;  Mercier's  mys 
terious  errand  to,  146;  indignation 
meeting  at,  258;  removal  of  ar 
chives  from,  273.  [See  "  Confed 
erate  Government  "  and  "  Con 
gress."] 

Roebuck;  on  politicians,  184;  opposes 
reconstruction  of  U.  S.,  187. 

Roman,   A.   B.,   of  Louisiana,   27,   67. 

Rost,  P.  A.;  sent  to  Europe,  85;  at 
Paris,  111,  112,  127;  sent  to  Spain, 
128;  advocates  alliance  with  the 
North,  128 

Russell,  Lord  John;  Confederate  com 
plaints  against,  96,  100;  error  in 
the  case  of  the  Alabama,  100;. 
fairness  of,  100,  149,  154,  155,  156, 
166,  174,  175;  attempts  to  embar 
rass,  100;  neutral  policy  of,  112, 
117,  124,  125;  refuses  to  hold  offi 
cial  communication  with  Confed 
erate  commissioners,  127;  refuses 
to  respond  to  Confederate  protests 
against  the  "paper  blockade,"  142, 
149,  195;  receives  Mason  unoffici 
ally,  144;  personal  sympathies 


of  against  the  Confederacy,  114; 
and  Napoleon's  proposals,  147;  re 
fuses  to  resort  to  "  double  diplo 
macy  "  of  Lindsay,  148;  a  secret 
understanding  suspected  between 
Seward  and,  147,  148;  reply  of  to 
Mason's  request  for  recognition  of 
the  Confederacy,  154;  berated  by 
Benjamin,  155,  164;  favored  n  m- 
trality,  166;  diplomacy  of,  ridi 
culed  by  a  London  paper,  1  )8; 
firmly  declines  to  recognize  he 
Confederacy,  198;  warns  Davis  fiat 
Confederate  neutrality  must  be  re 
spected,  215,  271;  Benjamin  dii  lo- 
matically  refuses  to  receive  n  >te 
of  (warning),  273.  [See  "  British 
Government."] 

Russell,  W.  H.,  110,  113,  115. 

Russia,  friendship  of  for  U.  S.,  95,  161. 

Salaries,  42. 

Sanders,  Geo.  N.,  97;  proposal  to  go  to 
Washington  on  a  peace  mission,  22  ). 

Search,   right   of,   174. 

Secession,  26,  280,  282;  opposition  to  in 
South,  26,  40,  43,  45,  68,  120,  1-35, 
270,  281,  291;  haste  in,  opposed 
by  Stephens,  26,  281;  from  "  Se- 
cessia,"  contemplated,  39,  43,  45, 
239,  270;  of  Virginia,  70;  influ 
enced  by  expectation  of  foreign 
aid,  79,  289;  cause  of,  82,  S3,  333 
(as  stated  to  Europe),  143,  l.">2, 
277-91,  (as  given  in  "  farewell  " 
speeches  in  U.  S.  congress,  288); 
attitude  of  England  and  France  to, 
112,  143  [see  "  France  "  and 
"Great  Britain"];  pronounced 
successful  by  Roebuck,  187;  natu 
ral  obstacles  to  the  success  >  f, 
195,  274;  declared  to  be  a  result  of 
British  policy,  237;  resulted  in 
emancipation,  274;  compromise 
plans  proposed  (in  1860-61)  to  pre 
vent,  283-284;  and  coercion,  2^7, 
289,  291;  due  to  "  anticipated  ag 
gression  "  of  North,  289,  290,  2<>l; 
election  of  Lincoln  a  pretext  for, 
289;  from  desire  to  perpetuate 
slavery,  289;  economic  causes  "f, 
290. 


INDEX 


303 


Secret  service,  92,  93. 

Seddon,  Secretary,  57. 

Seward,  W.  H. ;  and  Fort  Sumter,  68; 
firmness  and  vigilance  of,  99,  114, 
115,  116,  117,  272;  arguments  of 
against  secessionists,  116;  -warning 
of,  against  recognition  of  the 
South,  116;  asks  removal  of  Con 
sul  Bunch,  119;  views  on  the  Trent 
affair,  140;  and  Russell,  147-148; 
views  on  belligerency,  214;  control 
of  the  British  Government  by, 
272;  protest  of  against  British  pol 
icy,  222;  England  playing  "  second 
fiddle  "  to,  272;  compromise  plan 
of  to  prevent  secession,  284.  [See 
"  United  States."] 

Shenandoah,  The,  272. 

Sinclair,   Commander,   94. 

Slavery;  and  Mexico,  71;  and  Europe, 
79;  and  Lincoln's  policy,  82,  111; 
the  real  cause  of  the  war,  83,  278; 
European  opposition  to,  84,  86, 
122,  128  [see  "Great  Britain"]; 
Yancey,  Rost  and  Mann,  on,  122; 
"  necessary  evil  "  or  "  necessary 
good,"  279;  justification  of,  279, 
282;  an  anachronism,  283;  Lin 
coln's  opposition  to  extension  of, 
285. 

Slaves;  impressment  of,  34  (advocated), 
245;  enlistment  of,  recommended, 
49,  245,  253,  259;  bill  for  emanci 
pation  and  arming,  268;  com 
plaint  that  Northern  States  refused 
to  recognize  slaves  as  property  in 
the  territories,  283,  288;  fugitive 
(laws  as  to),  284,  288. 

Slave  trade,  29,  32,  81,  109,  110,  224; 
and  treaties,  87,  109;  British  oppo 
sition  to,  159;  opposition  to  re 
strictions  on,  279. 

Slidell,  John;  private  correspondence 
of,  destroyed,  22;  salary  as  com 
missioner  to  Europe,  92;  complaint 
against  De  Leon,  97;  sent  to 
Europe,  125,  130;  sketch,  131;  in 
sists  on  insufficiency  of  the  "  Stone 
Fleet,"  142;  offers  Napoleon  a 
cotton  subsidy  to  break  blockade, 


151;  views  on  duplicity  of  Eng 
lish  statesmen,  160;  appointed 
special  commissioner  to  Spain,  168, 
207;  confidence  of  in  Napoleon, 
190,  212,  213;  encouraged  by  Na 
poleon  to  build  a  navy  in  French 
ports,  209;  views  as  to  corvettes 
building  in  France,  213;  disap 
pointment  of,  216-217;  on  causes 
of  secession,  288.  [See  "  France  " 
and  "  Napoleon."] 

Sonora;  French  plans  to  colonize,  217, 
259;  contemplated  Confederate 
emigration  to,  259. 

South,   cause  of  secession  of,   277-291. 

Spain;  and  Mexico,  75,  204;  suggested 
alliance  with,  75,  78,  98,  124,  207; 
missions  to,  124,  125,  168;  attitude 
toward  the  Confederacy,  129,  168, 
208;  proposed  guaranty  of  Cuba 
for  recognition  by,  184,  207; 
sounded  on  recognition,  190. 

Sparrows,    Senator,   of  La.,   57. 

Speculators,   45,    56,   57,   102,   106,   239. 

Spence,  of  Liverpool,  51,  60,  61,  63, 
143,  S44. 

States,  collision  of  with  the  Confed 
erate  Government,  43,  45,  47.  [See 
"  embarrassments  and  difficulties  " 
under  "Confederate  Government."] 

Stephens,  Alexander  H. ;  opposed  to 
hasty  secession,  26,  277,  281;  his 
opinion  of  the  congress,  35;  dis 
satisfied  with  administration  pol 
icy,  40,  44,  48;  favors  recall  of  all 
European  commissioners,  95;  desire 
of  for  peace,  227;  favors  invasion 
of  Mexico,  257;  on  cause  of  South 
ern  discontent,  277,  278. 

Stonewall,    The,  218. 

St.  Paul,  Henry,  pamphlet  of  on  "  Our 
Home  and  Foreign  Policy,"  202. 

Subsidies,  requested  for  steamer  lines, 
98. 

Sumptuary  laws,   34,  44,   56,  89,   90. 

Sumter,  Fort,  69. 

Swan,  of  Tenn.,  96. 

Supreme  court,  proposed,  30,  34.  38. 

Tariff,  32,  79,  80,  81,  83,  84,  109,  111. 
116,  128,  164  (at  Confederat- 


3°4 


INDEX 


ports),  277  et  seq. ;  not  a  cause  of 
secession,  277,  278. 

Taxes,  29,  54;  on  cotton  production, 
89;  difficulty  of  collecting,  58. 

Texas;  and  Mexico,  76;  French  designs 
as  to,  98,  164,  203,  205-206. 

Thompson,  Jacob;  agent  to  Canada, 
14,  17,  18,  225;  and  proposition  to 
burn  Northern  cities,  226;  confer 
ences  with  the  peace  Democrats 
of  the  North,  230. 

Thouvenei,  149,  151,  160. 

Toombs,  Robert,  26,  31,  71,  77,  84,  89, 
109,  277,  280,  288. 

Transportation,  insufficient  56,  57,  102. 
[Also,  see  "  Communication."] 

Treasury  notes,  55. 

Trenholm,    Secretary,    57,    58,    104. 

Trent  affair,  126r  136;  rise  of  Confed 
erate  expectations  after,  127,  137, 
138;  effect  of  news  of  in  England, 
138;  friendly  adjustment  of,  139; 
and  international  law,  140. 

Trescot,    W.    H.,   118,   130. 

Tucker,  Beverly,  103. 

United  States,  The;  "  anticipated  ag 
gressions  "  of,  26,  282,  287,  288, 
289,  290,  291;  and  Mexico,  71,  204, 
256;  Confederacy  willing  to  ac 
cept  most  existing  treaties  be 
tween  foreign  powers  and,  87, 
109,  289;  friendship  of  Russia  for, 
95,161;  British  sympathy  for,  108; 
and  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  119; 
alliance  with  advocated,  128,  257; 
and  the  Trent  affair,  139;  emigra 
tion  to,  from  Ireland,  169,  176; 
capture  of  British  vessels  by,  171; 
British  fear  of  war  with,  188; 
Bright' s  opposition  to  disunion  in, 
189;  friends  of  in  British  parlia 
ment,  189,  191;  Confederate  en 


couragement  of  defection  End 
anarchy  in,  220  et  seq.,  225,  256; 
Confederate  expectation  of  re  so 
lution  in,  221;  plans  to  burn 
cities  in,  226;  Confederacy  j  nd 
peace  Democrats  of,  230;  opposi 
tion  of  to  intervention,  232;  men 
tioned  as  dictating  British  policy, 
233;  Palmerston  and,  237;  accused 
of  having  aggressive  designs,  241, 
250,  266.  [See  "  Seward."] 

Vallandigham,   C.   L.,   221,   230. 

Vance,  Gov.,  45,  227;  urges  peace, 
240,  253. 

Vessels,  Confederate;  the  Blanche,  78; 
the  Alabama,  156;  the  Alexandra, 
170;  the  JRappahannock,  213;  he 
Stonewall,  218;  the  Shenandoift, 
272.  [See  "  Navy  ".] 

Victoria,  Queen,  1C8, 127, 138. 

Vidaurri,  Gen.,  77. 

Walker,  N.  S.,  79. 

Walker,  R.  J.,  173. 

Washington,   L.   Q.   C.,  23. 

West  Indies,  Confederate  agents  in, 
77,  79. 

Wetler,  Mr.,  52. 

Wigfall,  of  Texas,  35,  39. 

Wilkes,  Captain,  136, 137, 140. 

Williams,  John,  214. 

Winder,   Gen.,   of  Baltimore,   39. 

Wright,    Gen.    Marcus   J.,   19. 

Writ  of  habeas  corpus;  suspended,  39 
(opposition  of  Stephens  to  suspen 
sion,  44,  48). 

Yancey,  B.  C.,  86. 

Yancey,  W.  L.,  31,  36,  54,  85;  mission 
of  to  Europe,  87,  108  (arguments, 
111),  complaints,  120;  resignation, 
124;  views  on  the  blockade,  126; 
return  of  to  the  South,  127. 

Young,  Lieut.  Bennett  H.,  235. 


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